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I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. 
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We live in an era of blurred lines – between disciplines, professions, pursuits.  Phones are no 
longer phones, but are camera and diaries, entertainment systems and work stations.  
Engineers have become environmental engineers – considering the environmental impact of 
their work, just as much as its structural integrity.  Similarly, ecological modernizers attempt 
to unify development and industrialization with environmental protection and advancement 
in a synergistic, mutually supportive manner.  In the realms of global health, diplomacy, 
security and international relations, as addressed in the following, such synergistic, 
interdigitated and smart approaches are also in play.  In all such cases, such enlightened 
approaches are the hallmark of enlightened human evolution.    
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Part One – Background and Introduction 
 
1. Original Contributions and Key Terms 
 
Amongst other original contributions to knowledge, my past work has shown that the 
pursuit of global strategic or stability goals, previously the remit of humanitarian 
interventions and broader hard power initiatives, are no longer limited to military purviews.1  
In this context, post the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, we live in an era which has seen 
challenges to the cost-effectiveness of traditional means of conflict prevention, resolution, 
and counter-terrorism.2 In my research, I have focused on the original advancement of 
‘smart’ (defined here as the multifarious use of non-military resources to achieve bilateral or 
multilateral strategic ends)3 and soft power efforts via global health programs – defined here 
as the provision of treatment, prevention and care services for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria (as well as broader health system strengthening initiatives) by related donor countries 
and organizations – with reference to (1) diplomatic, strategic, or foreign policy 
considerations and (2) the development of innovative systems to optimize their effectiveness 
in resolving civil conflict, regime change, and challenging human rights abuses as well as 
advancing health and non-health security.4  Under the Cool Wars5 paradigm, I have also 
advanced understanding of ways in which military and non-military initiatives may employ 
global health efforts as strategic tools, yet without compromising the health goals for which 
they were originally designed.6  In The Lancet Global Health, I characterized this need for 
greater disciplinary interdigitation, exchangeability and multifariousness (which echoes 
historical precedents) as follows: 
 
“Global health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) have, at present, no explicit or formal internal 
capacity to respond to the overarching diplomatic or foreign policy concerns of either their donors or the broader 
                                                             
1 Kevany, S. (2014).  Global health diplomacy, ‘Smart Power’, and the New World Order. Global Public 
Health,  DOI:10.1080/17441692.2014.92121 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2014.921219       
2 Center for Strategic and International Studies (2010). Final report of the CSIS Commission on smart 
global health policy. Retrieved from http://csis.org/event/rollout-final-report-csis-commission-
smart-global-health-policy  
3 Kevany, S. (2014).  Global health diplomacy, ‘Smart Power’, and the New World Order. Global Public 
Health,  DOI:10.1080/17441692.2014.92121 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2014.921219 
4 Kevany, S. (2014).  Global health diplomacy, ‘Smart Power’, and the New World Order. Global Public 
Health,  DOI:10.1080/17441692.2014.92121 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2014.921219       
5 Feldman, N. (2013).  Cool Wars: The Future of Global Competition.  Random House: New York. 
6 Kevany, S. and Baker, M. (2016).  Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement.  Joint Forces 
Quarterly, 83: 4th Quarter, 2016;  Kevany S (2015).  The United States’ Response to Ebola.  The New 




global community.7 To the utilitarian, this respect for professional boundaries is to be welcomed. To the 
cosmopolitan, the increasingly connected nature of both the causes of, and solutions to, poverty, disease, ill 
health, and health security—in the context of associated considerations of world peace, non-health security, 
conflict prevention, and international stability—implies that all entities, individuals, and policies are 
interconnected, and cannot operate in isolation of each other.28 As former President of the USA John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy remarked to the UN during its early idealism: ‘‘the long labor of peace is an undertaking 
for every nation—in this eff ort, none of us can remain unaligned. To this goal, none can be uncommitted’’.9 
 
The same may be said for global health initiatives: while for example the principles of the 
responsibility to protect10 may be combined with programs for HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention, to have a dual effect on both health and humanitarian levels the appropriate 
international relations design considerations must be borne in mind. If not, foreign 
assistance will struggle to achieve these objectives.  In this regard, my published research has 
advanced the theoretical development and practical application of such smart (or holistic) 
approaches to program design and delivery by presenting (1) a cohesive series of arguments 
in favour of the integration of global health, foreign policy, international relations, and 
diplomacy and (2) innovative practical and policy strategies for the use of such programs in 
the humanitarian intervention context.   
 
This overview commentary has therefore been designed to (1) explain the links and draw out 
interconnections between my past published papers, (2) highlight original contributions to 
knowledge, and (3) demonstrate the potential for further optimization of synergies between 
global health, security, conflict resolution, counter terrorism, and diplomacy.  This approach 
unites my seven key findings presented below into a single, coherent statement of the latent 
and potential role of global health and other international development and foreign 
assistance programs in the strategic, security, international relations, humanitarian 
intervention, and global stability contexts. 
 
My past publications thus represent original contributions to the fields of both global health 
and international relations.  In particular, and for the first time, my development of a 
                                                             
7 Michaud, J., Kates J. (2013). Global health diplomacy: advancing foreign policy and global health 
interests. Glob Health Sci Pract 2013; 1: 24–28. 
8 Brown, G. (2008) Moving from cosmopolitan legal theory to legal practice: Models of cosmopolitan 
law. Leg Stud 2008; 28: 430–51. 
9 Kennedy, J. (1963) Address to the United Nations Security Council, 1963. 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations.aspx    
10 Hehir, A (2013).  the Responsibility to Protect.  Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan; Davies, S. (2010). 
What contribution can International Relations make to the evolving global health agenda? 
International Affairs, 86(5), 1167-1190. 
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comprehensive set of evaluation criteria has enabled the value of global health programs to 
be determined not just from medical or economic but also from diplomatic, security, conflict 
resolution and political perspectives.  My associated findings have also demonstrated, 
building on prior research and literature, that (1) global health programs may generate both 
diplomatic and conflict resolution effects beyond primary programmatic goals11 and (2) that 
through the appropriate redesign of implementation processes, diplomatic (as well as health) 
gains to both donors and recipients may be further optimized.12  
 
Perhaps most importantly, my past work makes original contributions to arguments for the 
avoidance or limitation of hard power international interventions, where possible, by their 
substitution with smart power initiatives.  These smart global health approaches (see 
following definitions) are based on the development of original modifications to the use and 
design of global health programs to optimize their joint health and strategic impact.  In turn, 
my work has built on arguments for (1) transfers of funding from defense to development 
budgets (in both donor and recipient countries)13 and (2) the development of new, 
strategically-driven roles for military forces in global health efforts.14 
 
i. Global Health Diplomacy 
 
Prior research and literature on the global health diplomacy paradigm has synthesized the 
rubrics of international relations and development, making each mutually reinforcing and 
synergistic in achieving their objectives:15 global health programs, if designed with 
appropriate principles in mind, may be just as effective in diplomatic realms as the reverse in 
our multifarious, interdisciplinary era.  Separately but simultaneously, and advancing past 
efforts to look beyond conventional metrics of program performance16 – almost always, in 
                                                             
11 Kevany, S.  et al (2014).  Global health diplomacy in Iraq:  international relations outcomes of 
multilateral tuberculosis programmes.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30 (2):  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2014.890827   
12 Kevany S (2014).  Global health diplomacy, ‘Smart Power’, and the New World Order. Global Public 
Health,  DOI:10.1080/17441692.2014.92121 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2014.921219     
13 Burkle, S. (2013). Throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 
28(3), 1–3. Retrieved from 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8921591 
14 American Foundation for AIDS Research. (2013). U.S. global health investments: The evidence on 
health, diplomatic and economic impact. AMFAR Issue Brief. Retrieved from 
http://www.amrefusa.org/silo/files/amfar-global-health-investment-impact-june-2011.pdf 
15 Kickbusch, I., Novotny, T., Drager, N., Silberschmidt, G., & Alcazar, S. (2007). Global health 
diplomacy: training across disciplines. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 85, 82–91. Retrieved 
from http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0042-
96862007001200027&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es  
16 Brown, G. (2012). Distributing who gets what and why: four normative approaches to global 
health. Global Policy, 3(3), 292-302. 
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prior research and literature, viewed strictly from medico-economic perspectives such as 
cost-effectiveness analyses – my original global health diplomacy approaches also take into 
account (for example) considerations of sustainability, local ownership, cultural sensitivity, 
and responsiveness to local health and non-health needs in program design.  In an extension 
of the McNamara Fallacy (which posits that ostensibly positive quantitative assessments of 
success such as those employed by the United States’ Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara during the Vietnam War may be damagingly misleading),17 simply because global 
health’s diplomatic effects are unmeasured, that does not mean they don’t exist.   
 
ii. Smart Global Health 
 
A crossover hybrid – smart power18 – has recently been added to the foreign policy toolkit of 
diplomacy, soft power, and hard power.  Within the definition provided above, smart power 
also embraces the tactical use of global health interventions by military forces,19 and my past 
work has further defined and articulated this crossover by reviewing the strengths and 
weaknesses of international military responses to Ebola crises in West Africa20 as well as 
contributions by bilateral and multilateral health programs to international access, peace-
keeping, and nation-building in conflict and post-conflict settings such as Iraq,21 
Afghanistan,22 Sudan,23 and South Sudan.24   While prior research and literature has shown 
that the inherent multifariousness of smart global health offers alternatives to hard or 
coercive interventions25 – thereby saving lives through the avoidance or mitigation of 
                                                             
17 Basler, M. (2009). Utility of the McNamara fallacy. British Medical Journal, 339, b3141.23 
18 Kevany, S. (2014).  Global health diplomacy, ‘Smart Power’, and the New World Order. Global Public 
Health,  DOI:10.1080/17441692.2014.92121 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2014.921219     
19 Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2007). CSIS commission on smart power. Retrieved 
from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf  
20 Kevany, S. (2015).  The United States’ Response to Ebola.  The New York Times, Letters to the 
Editor.    http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/the-american-response-to-
ebola.html?_r=0  
21 Kevany, S. et al (2014).  Global health diplomacy in Iraq:  international relations outcomes of 
multilateral tuberculosis programmes.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30 (2):  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2014.890827    
22 Kevany, S., Sahak, O., Workneh, N. & Saeedzai, A. (2014).  Global health diplomacy investments in 
Afghanistan: adaptations and outcomes of Global Fund malaria programs.  Medicine, Conflict and 
Survival, 30:1, 37-55.  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13623699.2014.874187 
23 Kevany, S. (2014).   International Access and Global Health Diplomacy in Sudan.  The Lancet Global 
Health,  http://globalhealth.thelancet.com/2014/05/02/international-access-and-global-health-
diplomacy-sudan  
24 Kevany, S. et al (2012).  Diplomatic and operational adaptations to global health programs in post-
conflict settings: contributions of monitoring and evaluation systems to 'nation-building' in South 
Sudan.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, July-September; 28 (3): 247-62.  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23189590    
25 Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2010). Final report of the CSIS Commission on 




conflict26 – my original research found that its benign potency does not end there. Equally 
importantly, my work has generated new evidence that smart global health stands to benefit 
donor, as well as recipient, countries via the theory of enlightened self-interest,27 winning 
support for ostensibly altruistic28 efforts across the political spectrum.   
 
iii. Cool Wars  
 
Even the most intelligently designed, multifarious global health programs may struggle to 
perform without acceptance by local communities.  In remote villages or overcrowded urban 
centers in the world’s poorest countries, my past research has shown that acceptance of 
global health programs – even by the poorest of the poor – is far from a fait accompli.29  Yet if 
programs are considered appropriate and attractive by locals, that can make all the 
difference.  Building on the ideas developed by the Cool Wars paradigm,30 as well as exposure 
to the zeitgeist-driven San Francisco model of HIV/AIDS care,31 such acceptance is in turn 
vital for donor countries seeking to improve diplomacy and international relations.  This 
approach is of particular importance in the health security context.  In epidemic outbreak 
situations which are managed by combined civilian and military forces (as was the case in the 
2014 East Africa Ebola outbreak), both in-country and international responses were 
considered in my past work successful or unsuccessful not just on the basis of their 
curtailment of the outbreak (health security outcomes)32 but also through the way they were 
managed from a combined health security and health diplomacy outcome perspective.33 
 
                                                             
26 Feldbaum, H., & Michaud, J. (2010). Health diplomacy and the enduring relevance of foreign policy 
interests. PLoS Medicine, 7(4). Retrieved from 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000226 
27 Kevany, S. (2014).  Global Health Diplomacy: A ‘Deus ex Machina’ for International Development 
and Relations.  International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 3(2): 111–112.  
www.ijhpm.com/pdf_2867_7dfa3b1a8850ce1070ef08fb0d0204be.html  
28 Altruism is defined here as the contribution of individuals, organizations or nations -- charitable 
and financial or otherwise -- to the advancement of the health and development of developing 
countries without expectations of returns on such investments.   However, altruism is not considered 
to necessarily exclude acts of ‘enlightened self-interest’. 
29 Kevany, S. et al (2012).  Health diplomacy and adapting global health interventions to local needs in 
sub-Saharan Africa and Thailand:  evaluating findings from Project Accept.  BMC Public Health, 12: 
(459): 1-11.  http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/459/abstract    
30 Feldman, N. (2013).  Cool Wars:   The Future of Global Competition.  London: Random House. 
31 Kevany, S. (2016).  HIV/AIDS, Global Health Diplomacy, and “San Francisco Values”: From the Local 
to the Global. Annals of Global Health,  Sep-Oct; 81(5):611-7.  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27036717  
32 Kevany, S. (2015). The United States’ Response to Ebola. The New York Times, Letters to the Editor.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/the-american-response-to-ebola.html?_r=0 
33 Larkan F, Ryan C*, Kevany S. (2015).  The Geopolitics of Ebola and Global Health Security: Why 
Anthropology Matters.  Irish Journal of Anthropology, Vol, 18, 1. 
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My related work attempts to illustrate that, in the 21st century, international political or 
ideological allegiances (however futile or illusory they may ultimately be) are no longer 
necessarily won by arms supply or coup d’états.  Instead, it is the most diplomatically altruistic 
– rather than most militarily-generous – benefactors that now advance spheres of influence.  
References to such approaches in the global health context is therefore applied throughout 
this review to (1) capture professional experiences (and related research papers) in key 
combined strategic and epidemiological settings such as North Africa34 and the Middle East35 
and also (2) build on prior research, literature and policy statements demonstrating that it is 
those health programs that are most in tune with local cultures, values, societies, and norms 
that are both best-utilized36 and stand to more effectively win, from a diplomatic perspective, 
‘hearts and minds’.37   
 
2. Structural Overview 
 
This overview of my past work and demonstration of my original contribution is divided in 
to seven sub-sections.  Therein, I present four sets of original academic contributions to 
knowledge on the current relevance and remedial qualities of global health to four realms of 
conflict: prevention, resolution, counter terrorism, and security.  These sections focus on my 
observational academic and professional experience in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and South Sudan.  Although reviewing and analyzing actual events, the success of selected 
global health programs in each of these realms is also contrasted with the broader status quo: 
as well as their health benefits, such HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria treatment and 
prevention initiatives have implications for peace building and keeping but currently only - 
given the lack of appropriate parameters and structures - on an ad hoc basis.   
 
This is followed by an exploration of three further combined academic and practical findings 
that link my original contributions to knowledge throughout my past work, namely that (1) 
                                                             
34 Kevany, S. et al (2012).  Diplomatic and operational adaptations to global health programs in post-
conflict settings: contributions of monitoring and evaluation systems to 'nation-building' in South 
Sudan.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, July-September; 28 (3): 247-62.  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23189590     
35 Kevany, S. (2014).  Global health diplomacy in Iraq:  international relations outcomes of 
multilateral tuberculosis programmes.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30 (2):  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2014.890827    
36 Global Health Initiative. (2012). US government interagency paper on country ownership. 
Retrieved from http://www.ghi.gov/documents/organization/195554.pdf  
37 Obama, B. (2014, May 29). Full transcript of President Obama’s commencement address at West 
Point. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-
ofpresident-obamas-commencement-address-at-west-point/2014/05/28/cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-afc6-
a1dd9407abcf_story.html    
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contemporary approaches to global health program design, selection, delivery and evaluation 
- when viewed from the security and diplomatic perspectives - can be improved; (2) 
parameters of smart or diplomatic approaches to global health program design can be 
generated and applied; and (3) appropriate means by which smart or diplomatic approaches 
to global health program design, selection and delivery can be identified and implemented.  
 
Throughout, I also demonstrate how my original contributions have built on past and 
current research in the fields of international relations, diplomacy, and global health and 
development.  This includes, for example, (1) explorations at the institutional level of the 
diplomatic value of humanitarian programs by the Royal Institute for International Affairs38 
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies39; (2) bilateral40 and multilateral41 policy 
initiatives in the field of international relations, diplomacy, and global health; and (3) my 
collaborations with leaders in the field of global health diplomacy.42  In particular, my 
research has advanced many of the nascent arguments presented in these and other 
publications and research initiatives related to optimizing synergies between health and 
diplomatic efforts.  My work has also synthesized, in an original and innovative manner, 
many of the competing definitions of terms such as global health diplomacy and smart 
global health currently in use academically,43 politically,44 and in the broader policy context.45 
 
  
                                                             
38 Royal Institute for International Affairs. (2010). Global health diplomacy: A way forward in 
international affairs. Chatham House, meeting summary document. Retrieved from 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Global%20Health/280611sum
mary.pdf  
39 Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2010). Final report of the CSIS Commission on 
smart global health policy. Retrieved from http://csis.org/event/rollout-final-report-csis-
commission-smart-global-health-policy  
40 Walensky, R. & Kuritzkes, D. (2010). The impact of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPfAR) beyond HIV and why it remains essential. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 50(2), 272–275. 
doi:10.1086/649214 
41 Rodriguez-Garcia, R. (2001). How can health serve as a bridge for peace? George Washington 
University Medical School Research Paper. Retrieved from 
http://www.certi.org/publications/policy/gwc-12a.pdf 
42 Novotny, T. & Kevany, S. (2013). The way forward in global health diplomacy: Definitions, research, 
and training. In T. Novotny, I. Kickbusch, & M. Told (Eds.), 21st century health diplomacy (pp. 203–
225). Geneva: World Scientific;  Kevany, S., Benatar, S., & Fleischer, T. (2013). Improving resource 
allocations for health and HIV in South Africa: Bioethical, cost-effectiveness and health diplomacy 
considerations. Global Public Health, 8, 570–587. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23651436  
43 Lee, K., & Gomez, E. (2012). Brazil’s ascendance: The soft power role of global health diplomacy. 
The World Financial Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=414  
44 Feldbaum, H. (2010). Global health and foreign policy. Epidemiological Review, 32, 82–92. 
Retrieved from www.epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/1/82.full  
45 Michaud, J., & Kates, J. (2013). Global health diplomacy: Advancing foreign policy and global health 
interests. Global Health: Science & Practice, 1(1), 24–28. Retrieved from 
http://www.ghspjournal.org/content/1/1/24.full    
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3. Personal Statement 
 
Herein, I have also reviewed my published efforts in the context of my academic and 
professional experience, which (in brief) has included over one hundred field missions, many 
to conflict or post-conflict settings such as Sudan,46 South Sudan,47 Afghanistan,48 Iraq,49 
Egypt and Sierra Leone.  These have been performed as part of global health consulting or 
academic duties covering monitoring and evaluation, health diplomacy, program evaluation, 
and strategic assessments for a range of bilateral and multilateral institutions including the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Irish Department of Foreign 
Affairs, the United Nations Development Program, the University of California, and the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs.    
 
My development of original diplomatic evaluation and program design perspectives for 
global health, humanitarian and other development programs was, however, initially based 
on the exploration of the downstream, non-health effects of large-scale HIV/AIDS 
treatment programs in South Africa.5051  This concept was further developed based on 
extensive field work on health and humanitarian programs in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and 
Thailand, which highlighted positive synergies between smart health programs, diplomacy, 
security, and political stability.52  In all of these countries, and in each of the early stages of 
                                                             
46 Kevany S (2014).   International Access and Global Health Diplomacy in Sudan.  The Lancet Global 
Health.  http://globalhealth.thelancet.com/2014/05/02/international-access-and-global-health-
diplomacy-sudan  
47 Kevany, S et al (2012).  Diplomatic and operational adaptations to global health programs in post-
conflict settings: contributions of monitoring and evaluation systems to 'nation-building' in South 
Sudan.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, July-September; 28 (3): 247-62.  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23189590   
48 Kevany, S., Sahak, O., Workneh, N. & Saeedzai, A. (2014).  Global health diplomacy investments in 
Afghanistan: adaptations and outcomes of Global Fund malaria programs.  Medicine, Conflict and 
Survival, 30:1, 37-55.  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13623699.2014.874187  
49 Kevany, S. et al (2014).  Global health diplomacy in Iraq:  international relations outcomes of 
multilateral tuberculosis programmes.  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30 (2). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2014.890827     
50 Kevany, S., Meintjes, G., Rebe, K., Maartens, G., & Cleary, S. (2010). Clinical and financial burdens of 
secondary level care in a public sector antiretroviral roll-out setting (G. F. Jooste Hospital). South 
African Medical Journal, 99(5): 320-5.  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19588792 
51 Kevany, S., Benatar, S., & Fleischer, T. (2013). Improving resource allocations for health and HIV in 
South Africa: Bioethical, cost-effectiveness and health diplomacy considerations. Global Public Health, 
8, 570–587. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23651436 
52 Kevany, S., Khumalo-Sakutukwa, G., Singh, B., Chingono, A., Morin, S., & NIMH Project Accept Study 
Team. (2016). Global Health Diplomacy, Monitoring & Evaluation, and the Importance of Quality 
Assurance & Control: Findings from NIMH Project Accept (HPTN 043): A Phase III Randomized 
Controlled Trial of Community Mobilization, Mobile Testing, Same-Day Results, and Post-Test 
Support for HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa and Thailand. PloS one, 11(2), e0149335; Kevany, S et al 
(2012).  Health diplomacy and adapting global health interventions to local needs in sub-Saharan 




my work, I built on and advanced prior research findings related to the unintended 
consequences of humanitarian assistance53 and the integration of the theory and practice of 
diplomacy into global health programs.54 
 
In turn, and based on field experience in conflict and post-conflict settings, I sought to build 
on prior literature on the actual and potential role of appropriately selected, designed and 
delivered humanitarian aid programs to peace keeping55 and nation building.56  My associated 
research outputs and professional experience led to a list of principles – collated from related 
research efforts57 and unified, for the first time, to optimize the collateral benefits of global 
health programs without compromising (instead, enhancing) primary programmatic goals58 – 
as well as my development of an original tool for program evaluation.59  My key conclusions 
were then summarized in short commentary pieces in the United Kingdom,60 the United 
States,61 and Ireland.62  I have also demonstrated the applicability of these approaches in the 
military63 and counter-terrorism64 contexts. 
 
The methods I employed to achieve this included observational research, semi-structured or 
informal interviews, and operational research findings based on the overlaps, where they 
                                                             
53 Jan, S. (1998). A holistic approach to the economic evaluation of health programs using 
institutionalist methodology. Social Science & Medicine, 47, 1565–1572. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953698002287 
54 Kickbusch, I., & Buss, P. (2011). Global health diplomacy and peace. Infectious Disease Clinics of 
North America, 25, 601–610. doi:10.1016/j.idc.2011.05.006 
55 Kickbusch, I., & Buss, P. (2011). Global health diplomacy and peace. Infectious Disease Clinics of 
North America, 25, 601–610. doi:10.1016/j.idc.2011.05.006 
56 Feldbaum, H., & Michaud, J. (2010). Health diplomacy and the enduring relevance of foreign policy 
interests. PLoS Medicine, 7(4). Retrieved from 
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existed, with consulting or academic duties for organizations such as the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria or the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) 
respectively.  In all cases, and particularly where my findings synergized with consultancy or 
other duties, all necessary publication permissions were sought from the respective 
organization(s).  Similarly, in many cases, consultancy employers or academic colleagues were 
co-authors on the associated publications.65   
 
As a result of this approach, my publications were designed to add to and advance not only 
academic investigation (as presented in Findings 1 to 4 below) but also the practical, policy 
and operational understanding of the design and delivery of smart global health programs (as 
presented in Findings 5 to 7).  This distinction is also broadly representative of the 
chronological sequence of my published work, which evolved from academic analyses to the 
generation of more practical and policy-oriented efforts, though there is not a direct or exact 
correlation between this evolution and date of related publication.    
 
Finally, throughout my academic and professional experience, I have sought to support and 
advance prior research findings that international health, aid, humanitarian and development 
funding is increasingly reliant on demonstrating diplomatic and other collateral value.66  In 
turn, where possible, such programs have also been increasingly required to demonstrate 
their capacity to advance strategic,67 political,68 and diplomatic69 (as well as altruistic) 
objectives.70  I therefore sought throughout my research both to unify and add to these 
arguments in order to create a more compelling case, accepted across the political spectrum, 
for investment by affluent countries in the health of the world’s poorest people.71  
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Part Two – Original Findings and Contributions to Knowledge 
 
Finding 1: That smart global health efforts contribute to conflict prevention by 
removing sources of civil or international tension, thereby functioning on both 
altruistic and ‘world peace’ levels.  
 
Global health programs for communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria, as well as health system strengthening operations, are now nearly universal in scope 
and reach: in almost every nation, some form of bilateral or multilateral donor or recipient 
assistance program is in place.72  The primary objective of these programs is to alleviate 
illness and disease amongst the world’s poorest people.73   In order to achieve this, two key 
elements are required:  (1) international support for such altruistic efforts, and (2) delivery of 
well-designed intervention response programs.74  Over the past ten years, I have been 
extensively involved with the design, delivery, monitoring, evaluation and documentation of 
such initiatives in a wide range of settings, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. My objective, in 
this section, is to demonstrate my contributions to knowledge in documenting programmatic 
value in not just the health, but also the non-health political, stability, and strategic realms. 
 
Throughout my field and research experience, it became clear that – in both stable and 
unstable settings, though magnified in the latter – there was scope for further original 
contributions to prior findings on the benign (and occasionally malign) downstream impact 
of humanitarian efforts beyond the medical: their unintended consequences,75 collateral or 
downstream effects,76 and positive or negative externalities.77  For example, my work focused 
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regard, I have sought both to modernize, and find contemporary applications for, his ‘philosophical 
sketch’ of perpetual world peace  in the fields of smart global health and global health diplomacy. 
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on advancing prior related research findings that some global health efforts related to 
HIV/AIDS in Tanzania, Thailand and elsewhere may inadvertently challenge local cultural 
or religious norms,78 while other efforts (also often inadvertently) may have positive 
implications for political stability, nation-building, and security.79   
 
In addition to advancing understanding of the indirect effects of global health programs as 
conflict prevention mechanisms,80 my past work also recognized the importance of building 
on prior academic and applied efforts to develop new systems for international cooperation 
and stability – in many ways, synonyms for conflict prevention – under the auspices of the 
smart power paradigm.81  Prior literature has shown that such traditional and distinct – if not 
siloed – international relations, aid and diplomacy paradigms and techniques continue to be 
critical elements of both bilateral and multilateral efforts to prevent international conflict,82 
as do (as a last resort) hard power humanitarian intervention efforts.83  
 
Yet, my academic and professional experience also found that the status quo has not met with 
unqualified or even consistent success: at both national and international levels, there is an 
ongoing need for innovative and interdisciplinary systems of preventing conflict.  At the 
intersection of these dual research agendas, my original contributions to knowledge focused 
on the review, analysis and evaluation of health programs that had demonstrated – when 
appropriately selected, designed and delivered – their potential impact beyond health in the 
realms of international relations, domestic and international security, and conflict 
prevention.84   
   
My past work has sought to demonstrate that those global health programs designed with 
smart or diplomatic considerations in mind may hold the key to ensuring the consistent 
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effectiveness of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria efforts in the non-health context, and – 
critically – without such interdigitation reducing impact of primary programmatic health 
goals.  Building on the Cool Wars paradigm,85 which suggests that global spheres of influence 
will no longer be dominated by military or ideological allegiances, such approaches also 
function to prevent conflict (at both national and international levels) through the 
inculcation of broader strategic and security awarenesses in previously narrow areas of 
development focus.86 
 
I found that, to enhance the capacity and influence of global health efforts in the realm of 
conflict prevention (in, for example, the context of Southern Sudan’s civil and successional 
wars), key programmatic design features included adaptability,87 sustainability,88 the 
advancement of local ownership and involvement in service delivery,89 and the selection of 
cost-effective responses to disease threats,90 as well as responsiveness in program design to 
all forms of cultural, social, political, economic and religious sensitivities.91  When mindful of 
these considerations, the functionality of global health was found to have the power to 
operate simultaneously on health, altruistic, and national and international stability levels.92  
While prior research and literature has identified these features on an ad hoc or piecemeal 
basis (e.g. Feldbaum93 [2010] in the context of American foreign policy and Michaud et al94 
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[2012] regarding international security), my original contribution to knowledge in this regard 
has been the synthesis, collation, and formalization of such criteria. 
 
Based on my field experience in the South Sudan95 and the Republic of the Sudan96 settings, 
I observed that many global health programs were – either by accident or design – already 
partially yet successfully functioning in this holistic manner.  Although subsequent conflict 
has taken place in South Sudan, I observed and documented efforts to develop and 
implement smarter (or cooler, acknowledging the Cool Wars97 paradigm) programs that 
indirectly advanced internal, tribal and regional cooperation in the Western Equatoria and 
Bhar el-Ghazaal provinces.  This included improvements in governance and coordination 
across the new country (and in the immediate pre-secession era) via the health sector, as well 
as improved communication and harmonization of health initiatives at local, national and 
international levels.98 
 
Of key importance in achieving such synergies was, as documented in my research,99 the 
adaptation of health programs to align with political, security and diplomatic considerations. 
With my recognition that fragile states such as South Sudan and Zimbabwe required 
extensive changes to service delivery efforts based on local conditions, the primacy of 
broader strategic and stability considerations versus achievement of narrow programmatic 
goals in limited timeframes was also established. Through the enlightened,100 holistic 
approach to global health program design, evaluation and delivery that my work has posited, 
potential sources of national and international conflict and tension in both countries may 
have been, however fractionally, reduced.   
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Similarly, in North Sudan, my field experience indicated that investment in global health 
efforts improved both international communications and cooperation as well as access to 
otherwise ‘off-limits’ areas.101  My work has built on, and attempted to prove, this assertion 
by articulating that optimization of the dual role of diplomatic global health programs 
represents an innovative, practical – and, to date, underutilized – element of the 21st century 
foreign policy tool kit.  In order to further advance the impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and health system strengthening efforts in the realms of conflict prevention and 
national and international cooperation) described in prior research and literature as ‘Health 
as a Bridge for Peace’102) the need for a system of design that inculcated diplomatic 
awareness in to altruistic efforts was therefore found to be of key importance.  My past work 
has helped to fill this gap in contemporary knowledge on a situation-specific basis, including 
the contribution of global health programs to counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
Finding 2: That global health programs facilitate counterterrorism efforts by 
removing sources of grievance.  
  
National and international terrorism is one of the greatest security threats of the 21st 
century.103   Rather than pursue ideological or strategic agendas through conventional 
warfare, for which many states or population groups are ill-equipped, terrorist attacks 
represent a highly effective alternative to open conflict.  In many cases, prior research has 
found that these attacks may also be precipitated by the accumulation of economic, 
developmental, or other grievances104 including low levels of health service provision in 
resource-poor settings.105  No contemporary examination of national and international 
security is therefore complete without reference to the potential impact and effect of 
international health programs as a counter terrorism measure, 106 the theory and practice of 
which I have originally contributed to in my past work. 
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Based on my field experience in many countries associated with terrorism (e.g. Iraq, North 
Sudan, and Afghanistan), global health programs emerged as a possible counter terrorism 
measure via mitigating a key source of international resentment. This observation is in 
keeping with related prior research findings:107 by acting to redress global inequalities in 
health care funding, provision, and quality via efforts to reduce levels of HIV/AIDS, malaria 
or tuberculosis, one of the key motives for terrorist outrages – resentment against 
perceptions of exploitation or inequality – was removed,108 thereby undermining support for 
(and the attraction of) extremism.  
 
My work also built on prior research findings demonstrating that global health efforts, 
particularly if characterized by sensitivity to recipient community needs, could be highly 
effective in both health and non-health realms -- including as effective counter terrorism 
initiatives.109  This finding was based on evaluation and analysis of the activities of bilateral 
and multilateral actors with whom I worked, as well as the use of health and development 
programs by military forces.110  Of note, the latter were in many cases already in place in 
counter-terrorism settings, and were therefore (in keeping with prior research) often ideally 
positioned to engage in smart global health initiatives.111    
 
In order for global health efforts to act as both counter terrorism and humanitarian 
endeavors, my professional experiences also supported prior research findings that it was 
first necessary to ensure that the programs themselves do not become targets of 
extremism.112 Prior research had shown that – if identified as direct or even proxy actors 
against terrorism, or suspected of advancing ideological or counter-ideological agendas – 
program buildings and staff may quickly become targets.113  The maintenance of 
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organizational and operational independence of global health efforts from the work of 
official counter terrorist organizations was therefore identified as paramount.   
 
Yet global health programs were also observed, based on my academic and professional 
experience, to act against terrorism in other (less explicit) ways, and without compromising 
disciplinary integrity.  In Afghanistan, for example, malaria programs run by the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the United Nations Development Program, 
amongst other organizations, operated in provinces inaccessible to the military114 with only 
the urgency of local health needs allowing for the establishment of any form of international 
presence.  Through such efforts, and for the first time, my work demonstrated that (for 
example) malaria programs were able to provide services in a way that respected local 
cultures, religions, politics and society.  In this way, and building on prior research, 115 secure 
international access to and presence in ever more remote and hostile regions was achieved in 
an increasingly cooperative way. 
 
Although my research found that gains in counter terrorism in South Sudan, Iraq and 
Afghanistan (amongst other settings) made through such efforts were unquantifiable, the 
research and field evidence presented in my portfolio taken collectively suggests that there 
has been a significant impact in reducing negative perceptions of donor countries and 
organizations through global health.  Specifically, this synergy occurred when health 
programs were also designed in a way that inculcated awareness of both local and 
international security imperatives -- yet without advancing such a purview in to the realm of 
suspected military or espionage collaboration, for which global health workers have in the 
past been targeted.116  Such findings were (1) both supported by prior research, which had 
previously documented the opportunities and risks of such ‘hearts and minds’ efforts, and 
(2) built on these findings by articulating the specific processes (e.g. the interdisciplinary and 
collaborative design of global health programs, including expertise in the fields of 
international relations and diplomacy) and design criteria (e.g. those aspects of program 
design that produced diplomatic as well as altruistic dividends) that led to these enhanced 
effects. 
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Other original opportunities to improve the capacity of global health to act as counter 
terrorism operations at both policy and service delivery levels presented in my past research 
include (1) the allocation of health resources across regions, programs and population groups 
based on the dual consideration of both strategic and medical goals (as opposed to the past 
acceptance of the primacy of cost-effectiveness analyses in such decisions117) and  (2) 
improved consciousness amongst previously siloed global health organizations (and their 
staff) of the latent benign strategic and security implications of their activities.118 
 
Similarly – and while, again, maintaining operational independence – my research supported 
the established and accepted concept that smarter or more diplomatic global health 
programs improve staff safety by reducing past tendencies to operate in isolation from 
military, intelligence and security organizations.119 Without compromising programmatic 
integrity, the development of joint liaisons, initiatives and operations to identify, align and 
coordinate common objectives formed a key element of my original interpretation of the 
global health diplomacy paradigm.120    
 
In particular, the seemingly irreconcilable attempt to ensure that global health programs and 
institutions maintain operational independence while also contributing to non-health 
strategic or counter-terrorism goals was found, in my work, to be dependent on the medical 
and health community’s willingness to control the governance of such collaborations.121  
Without such effort, there is the risk that global health programs will, once again, be 
commandeered for such purposes without appropriate consultation and collaboration.122  I 
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suggest that the onus, even today, may therefore still remain on the global health community 
and its governing organizations (e.g. the World Health Organization) in this regard.123 
 
Other opportunities for global health to counter terrorism – identified in past research and 
further documented and demonstrated in my work – were found to include conscious 
efforts by global health programs to (1) win ‘hearts and minds’ in remote or isolated regions 
otherwise susceptible to extremist doctrine124 and (2) avoid implementation of interventions 
(however cost-effective they may be) likely to incite religious, social or cultural sensitivities 
among recipient populations.125   These considerations were, however, rarely (if ever) found 
to have been part of the scientific protocols that governed service design and delivery.  It 
was this gap that this element of my past research was designed to fill. 
 
In this regard, my (and other prior126) work also highlighted the need to review global health 
programs and activities from the perspective of their capacity to aid, abet, or facilitate 
extremist organizations by (either consciously or inadvertently) providing health care to 
terrorists, extremists, or their support networks and organizations.   However, rather than 
advocating for selected denial of care, such awareness was instead designed to ensure that 
health efforts were sensitive to both the potential negative and positive consequences they 
may make to local and international security.127  In my examination of the prior literature, no 
formal mechanisms for generating such awareness amongst the global health community 
were found to exist.128   
 
I concede that the latter findings are to some extent subjective: alternate interpretations of 
global health provision to terrorist groups (identified in both my past and other prior 
                                                             
123 Kevany S. (2016). Global health engagement in diplomacy, intelligence and counterterrorism: a 
system of standards. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 11(1), 84-92.  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2016.1161225    
124  Kevany S, Sahak O, Workneh N & Saeedzai A (2014).  Global health diplomacy investments in 
Afghanistan: adaptations and outcomes of Global Fund malaria programs.  Medicine, Conflict and 
Survival, 30:1, 37-55.  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13623699.2014.874187  
125 Kevany, S. et al (2012). Health diplomacy and adapting global health interventions to local needs. 
BMC Public Health, 12, 459. Retrieved from http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2458/12/459/abstract  
126 Stephan, M., & Beyerle, S. (2015). How to stop extremism before it starts. Foreign Policy. Retrieved 
from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/17/how-to-stop-extremism-before-it-starts/  
127 Eckenwiler, L., & Hunt, M. (2014). Counterterrorism, ethics, and global health.  Hastings Center 
Report. doi:10.1002/hast.308  
128 Kevany, S. (2015). James Bond and Global Health Diplomacy. International Journal of Health Policy 
& Management, Editorial commentary. 4 (x): 1-4. http://www.ijhpm.com/article_3098_0.html  
25 
 
research) consider such services as reducing negative perceptions of donor countries.129  In 
either scenario, however, my research reached the original conclusion that global health 
agencies and actors should attempt to both independently (and collaboratively) control and 
optimize the leveraging of their geostrategic access to off-limits regions for both strategic 
and altruistic ends, rather than cede control of these choices to security institutions.130 
 
Finding 3: That smart global health approaches are effective in resolving tensions in 
conflict settings. 
 
Original efforts to resolve national and international tensions in conflict and post-conflict 
countries and regions, as well as contribute to both health and national reconstruction, have 
been documented in my work in settings such as Iraq,131 South Sudan,132 Afghanistan,133  
Papua New Guinea,134 and Sierra Leone.135  In all cases – while health programs that respond 
effectively and efficiently to epidemic threats in such settings are of key importance in their 
own right – my research supported prior findings that their value is exponentially increased 
in (synergistically) both health and non-health realms when more abstract concepts such as 
sustainability and local ownership are taken in to account.136  The aim of this section is 
therefore to summarize my original findings on ways of optimizing global health program 
effectiveness in the conflict resolution realm. 
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In my experience, global health programs were observed, either accidentally or when 
intentionally holistically designed, to also contribute to abstract concepts such as peace-
keeping and nation-building137 in situations where national, international and community 
relations were effectively integrated in to program design and delivery.138  In turn, my past 
work also supported and further demonstrated the established argument that such 
downstream non-health effects – in cases where they could be planned and guaranteed – 
provided compelling rationales for continued and enhanced funding of global health by 
bilateral and multilateral donors.139   
 
For example, in professionally assisting in the redesign of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis 
services by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in Iraq, I observed a 
range of such collateral conflict resolution effects.  In turn, these were found to be the result 
– both directly and indirectly – of a combined constellation of planned and serendipitous 
programmatic features.  For example, and beyond the links I established between improved 
relations between donor and recipient states and the provision of cost-effective global health 
services,140 attention to geostrategic accessibility and coverage were also found to be of key 
importance.   
 
My work also supported the assertion that program visibility played a key role in the dual 
effectiveness of global health efforts, particularly in Iraq.141  While communicating donor 
contributions to local populations had been previously established as being of key 
importance,142 I found that appropriate branding was also dependent on the documentation 
of effective and diplomatically-managed partnerships with local actors such as the Ministry 
of Health.  In addition, I also found that high-profile events supported by both national and 
international partners attracted significant benign media coverage for international actors.143 
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In Iraq, my work also demonstrated for the first time that intervention selection was a key 
element of the integration of health and diplomatic considerations.  For example, such 
diplomatic (or smart) tuberculosis treatment, prevention and broader health systems 
strengthening efforts consciously avoided the use of any potentially culturally, religiously, or 
socially sensitive programs.  In addition, all such programs were explicitly non-ideological, 
avoiding the use of confrontational religious or cultural messaging. Similarly, awareness of 
program sustainability and alignment with local needs represented key diplomatic 
considerations that were found to change local perspectives on donor countries, building 
further on prior related research findings and hypotheses.144  In this way, also, intervention 
transferability (i.e. the capacity for programs to transition to local ownership and control) 
was also found to be an essential element of diplomatic program design and delivery.145  
 
However, the most significant contribution to the nation-building and peace-keeping effects 
of smart global health efforts that I observed in Iraq was, perhaps, in terms of conflict 
resolution.  This included the previously-identified contribution of international health actors 
to the maintenance of an established non-military international peace-keeping presence.146  
Although it is impossible to state categorically that smart or diplomatic health programs 
contributed to the augmentation of peace and stability, during my field visits discussions 
with local stakeholders revealed that local hostility and conflict were consistently allayed 
through provision of equally accessible services independent of local factionalism.147 
 
Anti-corruption efforts through international partnerships, as well as direct and indirect 
economic benefits of health programs, were also found to play key roles in the dual 
functionality of global health efforts in Iraq.  In regard the former, my work demonstrated 
that – in addition to supporting prior research findings that monitoring and evaluation 
systems play a valuable role in both improvement of program accountability and evidencing 
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program effectiveness148 –such systems were also observed to generate national and 
international partnerships and communications mediums in otherwise inaccessible settings.  
For example, in personal communiques during field visits (referenced in my related 
publication149), National Tuberculosis Program (NTP) representatives recognized that a key 
feature of the redesigned global health efforts was their capacity to tacitly improve financial 
accountability, thereby mitigating the risk of donor or recipient concerns (with inevitable 
international relations consequences) related to the inappropriate use of funds. 
 
Other original diplomatic effects of smart health programs evinced during my work in Iraq 
included innovative collaborative mechanisms between international actors, local 
communities, the Ministry of Health, the NTP, and other departments of the Iraqi 
government. These were in turn found to produce downstream socio-economic effects such 
as (1) increased equity and accessibility in service delivery and (2) reducing stigma towards – 
and thereby employability of – tuberculosis patients. More broadly, a donor commitment to 
high profile conditions of immediate national importance – the responses to which stood to 
make a tangible national impact in terms of both economic and population health – such as 
tuberculosis was found to represent a key element of smart, global health program design 
paradigms, in keeping with prior research and literature.150   
 
Finally, while prior research had shown that the inclusion of security or clandestine agendas 
as part of global health programs risks potentially negative diplomatic and inter-state 
relations consequences between recipient and donor countries151 as well as security risks to 
program staff,152 my research found that both explicit and implicit collaboration between 
armed forces and development programs had the potential to advance both peace-keeping 
and altruistic agendas in tandem.153  As a result, I concluded (in agreement with and building 
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on the work of other researchers154) that investment in global health efforts – through 
consideration of their combined direct, strategic, altruistic, security, and peacekeeping effects 
(not to mention a complementary reduction in the cost of hard power interventions through 
their substitution with smart power) provided a significantly higher return on investment 
than that captured by traditional systems of performance reporting.155 
 
Finding 4: That global health and associated responses have become national and 
international, health and non-health security issues. 
 
Prior research has shown that global health responses are increasingly important in terms of 
both health156 and non-health157 security.   In terms of the former, efforts to contain 
epidemic outbreaks such as Ebola or HIV/AIDS often have an international security 
component: responses are designed as much to protect the health of donor countries and 
allay risks of the spread of disease across borders as they are to treat and protect affected 
regions and populations.158  In such cases, the rationale for international bilateral or 
multilateral HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria or other programs is therefore based on a 
form of enlightened self-interest.159 
 
Ways in which disease outbreaks may affect broader security concerns, including the stability 
of developing countries, have been addressed in prior research.160  For example, a key 
element of international health responses such as the United States’ President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has been the health of the armed forces of developing 
countries.161 The potential of epidemic diseases to destabilize states or regional balances of 
power through effects on the health of armies or other national structures has prompted 
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extensive international donor investment in the military health of resource-poor settings,162 
with the added benefit to donors of creating military and strategic ententes.163   
 
Thirdly, prior research has paid increased attention to the overlap between health and human 
security, raising the profile of health as a security issue within and among organizations such 
as the European Union164 and the United Nations.165  The correlation of epidemic diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria with low levels of human security through, for 
example, economic deprivation (as identified in prior literature166) has promoted an 
associated examination of links between communicable health threats and broader societal 
concerns.   
 
In response to this network of connections between global health and international health 
and non-health security, my work has further explored opportunities for HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria programs to address, through smart design parameters, both health 
and non-health security threats in unison.167 Such concepts also extend to broader realms of 
international stability: its maintenance is, by nature, connected with (and an extension of) 
national and international security.168   Conversely, any efforts that help to improve global 
stability through global health 169 (which has represented one of the key overarching 
contributions of my past work) may therefore also be said to also improve global security. 
 
The original connections my past work identified between global health efforts and 
international security have also been driven by, and based on, exposure to the safety of 
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health program staff working in high-risk conflict or post-conflict environments.170  This led 
to my examination of partnerships between health and military organizations,171 framed in a 
manner that did not compromise the perceived or actual independence of altruistic efforts 
(which can, paradoxically, increase risks to program staff).172  Similarly, my academic and 
professional experience posited the original concept that the selection of those global health 
programs that are most suitable – culturally, economically, socially, politically and religiously 
– to recipient country and community conditions also significantly improves staff security. 173  
In a complementary manner, and building on prior research,174 my work demonstrated that 
international security efforts such as the deployment of military forces in international 
humanitarian interventions were also presented with opportunities to advance strategic, 
diplomatic or foreign policy agendas through improved engagement with, and use of, health 
efforts.175  In both cases, such approaches adhere closely to the smarter, more interdigitated 
and interdepartmental styles of government and governance identified as emerging in the 21st 
century.176  
 
The innovative efforts to advance health and security synergies between diplomatic, health, 
security and defense that I both articulate and envision are, however, dependent on the 
careful management and coordination of associated responses, as identified in prior 
communiques.177  Just as global health efforts that ignore local cultural, social, political or 
religious considerations may cause resentment and threaten international relations, my work 
has demonstrated that military or security-driven global health efforts may compromise both 
health and diplomacy outcomes if strategy neglects this dual diplomatic imperative. 
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Ultimately, my work and experience has supported and advanced the concept that it is only 
through interdisciplinary management – by, amongst others, military forces, bilateral 
agencies, donor and recipient country governments, and multilateral actors – that both global 
health and global security can be advanced in unison.178  More specifically, my research 
found that such improved collaboration and coordination between aid and national and 
international security agencies requires innovate and interdisciplinary joint expertise training 
in international politics, security, and health. Such efforts, while still nascent, are gaining 
momentum via efforts such as (1) the Office of Global Health Diplomacy179 situated within 
the United States’ State Department, (2) the Global Health Security Agenda,180 and (3) a 
range of other contemporary research and practitioner initiatives.181  Nonetheless, as the 
following review of the first of my combined academic and practical findings in the next 
section demonstrates, current systems of deploying global health for security, diplomatic, or 
strategic ends remain ad hoc and sub-optimal. 
 
Finding 5: That contemporary approaches to global health program design, 
selection, delivery and evaluation – when viewed from security, international 
relations and diplomatic perspectives – can be further optimized.  
 
My research has shown that the impact of global health’s actual and potential scope for 
further contributions to international relations and diplomacy – and therefore world peace, 
stability and security – is increasingly demonstrable.182  In many cases, humanitarian aid and 
development operations have succeeded where the use of military force or humanitarian 
intervention has failed.183  The classification of such efforts as soft power184 has evolved into 
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the use of terms such as smart power: 185 international health initiatives that, functioning in 
multifarious ways, both explicitly and implicitly advance diplomatic or international relations 
agendas.  The aim of this section is to present those aspects of my past work which suggest 
that contemporary program design approaches, while occasionally effective on an ad hoc 
basis, remain sub-optimal from the diplomatic perspective. 
 
In order to provide a comprehensive review of past dually-effective efforts, my research 
cited a range of development programs from the 20th century that have been successful in 
this regard, beginning with the involvement of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
colonial and post-colonial settings through to the hearts and minds programs of the Second 
World and Vietnam Wars186 by the United States.  Prior research has also shown that the 
creation of health corridors to provide essential supplies and services has limited the spread 
of civil war conflicts in Latin America,187 while the use of ‘Health as a Bridge for Peace’188 
systems have specifically and effectively targeted areas of ethnic or other forms of tension 
worldwide.  My original efforts to synthesize these findings found that this dual focus did 
not represent a misallocation of health resources, even from medical or epidemiological 
perspectives: rather, such smart efforts resulted in both fewer lives lost through conflict189 
and an augmentation of funding for global health (thereby saving yet more lives) when such 
dual effects could be articulated and demonstrated to politicians and policymakers ‘in a 
language they really understand’.190 
 
However, despite these successes, my research found that such effects, to date, have been 
promulgated on a largely extemporaneous basis, with their roots in the (often emergency) 
international responses described above.  As a result, in many cases prior research has 
demonstrated that global health programs had little or no impact beyond health:191 in such 
situations, the argument for global health as enhancing international stability (and therefore 
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security) lost force.  Further, my research generated the original finding that global health 
programs may even have a negative effect on international relations: in situations where they 
were externally, didactically imposed – with only, for example, donor health security in mind 
– local sensitivities and considerations were frequently ignored, thereby alienating local 
populations.192   
 
I both critiqued and supported the response of the United States and other countries to the 
2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in this regard;193 in some cases, military (or militarized) 
responses (possibly mistakenly) treated the disease vector as a conventional enemy.194  In 
other situations, such as the use of male circumcision interventions (despite their cost-
effectiveness when viewed from purely health economic perspectives) to stop the spread of 
HIV/AIDS,195 my research supported the established finding that there is too often little 
consideration of local cultural, social or religious practices in program selection and design, 
leading to increased suspicion and hostility towards donor countries.196  Similarly, both my 
academic and professional experience197 supported and affirmed the (also established) 
finding that the use of some reproductive health interventions, when interpreted by recipient 
communities as a population control effort, risked alienation between donor and recipient 
countries.198 
 
My research also reached the original conclusion that the utility of global health programs in 
the security, stability and diplomatic contexts is, in fact, potentially weakened by these types 
of interventions.  While traditional global health program selection, design and delivery 
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systems may therefore function highly when based on narrow performance metrics,199 I 
concluded that such utilitarian approaches are (at worst) flawed or (at best) incomplete when 
viewed from broader, more holistic perspectives.200  My research then investigated original 
ways in which dually-effective global health efforts that were successful on both health and 
diplomatic levels could be consistently guaranteed. 
 
Based on my review of global health programs that had been successful on both levels, I 
identified a range of common features that formed the key elements of smart diplomatic 
health responses.201  Although these have (as noted above) been articulated individually, my 
original contribution has been to collate and present these criteria in a unified manner.  As a 
result of my efforts, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria or health systems strengthening 
programs in resource-poor settings could, both theoretically and practically, for the first time 
(1) be observationally evaluated from a holistic perspective and (2) complement traditional 
measures of cost-effectiveness.  In order for this process to occur consistently and 
effectively, however, I found that (1) new tools and procedures to review global health 
program design from the diplomatic (as well as altruistic or epidemiological) perspective as 
well as (2) significant advances in levels of collaboration and consultation between health 
and diplomatic actors at the policy level would be required.202   
 
In supporting the need for such holistic, interdisciplinary, and interdepartmental decision 
making tools and systems, I also advanced the politico-economic philosophical case that 
considerations of cost-effectiveness in program selection, using narrow metrics to judge 
program success, should be significant but not paramount considerations.203  Conversely, 
with the more holistic consideration of international relations prerogatives in global health 
program design, such investments gained bipartisan support across the political spectrum204 
(thereby indirectly unifying the increasingly polarized government factions of the developed 
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world).205  Similarly, by proving their multifariousness in the defense or strategic realms, my 
findings suggested that funds previously devoted to the latter efforts may be meaningfully 
transferred to global health in order to achieve, less destructively, the same foreign policy 
ends206 – thereby challenging accepted rationales for investment in the military-industrial 
complex.    
 
With such a transfer of budgets from military-industrial to development budgets based on 
global health’s newly-demonstrated effectiveness in (1) security and strategy, (2) international 
ententes and alliances, and (3) conflict prevention and resolution, I have suggested that 
smarter global health may therefore meaningfully be said to have the potential to advance 
abstract concepts such as world peace and cooperation.207  However, I concluded that such 
dual effectiveness was also critically dependent on the identification of practically-applicable 
parameters for diplomatic program design, selection and delivery.  
 
Finding 6:  That parameters and tools to optimize smarter approaches to global 
health program design can be generated and applied. 
 
For global health to be an effective contributor to national and international stability and 
security, particularly in conflict or post conflict regions, my academic and professional 
experience suggested that a range of parameters that could inform program design, selection 
and delivery from the diplomatic perspective needed to be developed.  These included the 
above-referenced considerations of sustainability, transferability, visibility, effectiveness, 
adaptability, and coordination, as well as mindfulness of the significant scope to optimize 
relevant health program’s contributions (or non-contributions) to synergistic concerns such 
as human rights advancement.208 My aims in this aspect of my past research were therefore 
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(1) to identify an original ‘top ten’ list of such characteristics209 and (2) to develop a system 
for their practical application in the evaluative context.210  
 
Of note, I found that none of the above considerations were represented in contemporary 
systems of either global health program monitoring and evaluation or cost-effectiveness 
analyses. On occasions when considered or mentioned, I also found (in keeping with prior 
research) that such holistic evaluation was deemed to be unfeasible due to the lack of 
quantitative measurements for seemingly abstract concepts such as sustainability.211  In most 
cases, such considerations were found to be at best either an afterthought or referred to in 
generic terms in related policy documents.212  Other relevant parameters which faced similar 
constraints in terms of implementation and measurability were found to include awareness 
of the environmental impact of global health programs,213 the establishment of local and 
international institutional partnerships,214 accountability,215 neutrality,216 and geo-strategic 
location.217  In all cases, the diplomatic effectiveness and dividends of global health programs 
on which the fulfilment of these criteria depended was, at best, extemporaneous.218 
 
With my original identification, definition, and peer-reviewed publication of the top ten 
criteria for global health advancement of (1) diplomatic and (2) broader foreign policy 
agendas, such parameters were for the first time established.219  This also represented a first 
documented attempt to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, all relevant non-health 
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considerations were simultaneously considered (along with and without sacrificing traditional 
epidemiological aims) in global health program design and delivery. 
 
From the diplomatic perspective, and building on both my own and other prior research for 
each criterion, I defined the parameters as follows: (1) neutrality220 (selection of culturally, 
religiously and socially appropriate interventions); (2) visibility221 (appropriate branding to 
generate positive associations between international presence, health outcomes, and donor 
prestige); (3) sustainability222 (provisions to mitigate risks of international relations tensions 
consequent on program termination); (4) adaptability223 (delivery of programs that are 
responsive to locally-identified or emerging health or non-health priorities); (5) 
effectiveness224 (selection of interventions with proven primary health outcomes); (6) 
accountability225 (program contributions to monitoring and evaluation systems through the 
production of verifiable results); (7) partnership generation226 (contributions to the 
development of sub-national, national, and international partnerships within and beyond 
health); (8) design and implementation-level awareness of other economic, political, 
environmental, and social program effects227; (9) interdependence228 (program involvement 
with non health-related organizations); and (10) training229 (appropriate selection and 
recognition of program staff from the diplomatic perspective, including education on 
prevailing political and strategic themes).  In each case, the parameter represented either an 
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original contribution or an extension, distillation, or unification of previously disparate prior 
research. 
 
In order to advance practical efforts to improve global health’s diplomatic impact, I then 
converted these top ten lists into original questionnaire-style data collection and program 
review tools.  For each of the main diplomatic criteria, a series of sub-parameters were also 
identified.  For example, for program adaptability, interview and observational (or evaluative) 
research questions included enquiries on levels of (1) responsiveness to health needs, (2) 
responsiveness to non-health needs, (3) recipient-led program design, and (4) recipient-led 
resource allocation decisions.  In South Africa, I then undertook a field-level pilot of the 
diplomatic assessment questionnaires with the assistance of an interview guide230 (thereby 
adding a qualitative component) which was complemented, where necessary, by follow-up 
questions via e-mail exchanges and teleconferences with key managerial and field staff.  
Further on-site and desk research (e.g. reviews of intervention protocols and standard 
operating procedures) was also conducted to inform questionnaire responses, as necessary. 
  
My completion of this pilot evaluation resulted in the creation of an original performance 
metric for global health programs - the ‘K-Score’.  Each parameter and sub-parameter was 
scored according to its performance in the diplomatic realm (e.g. ‘highly advantageous’, 
‘moderately advantageous’, ‘neutral, not relevant, or not considered’, ‘not applicable’, 
‘potential moderate threat’, or ‘potential significant threat’), in accordance with the 
intervention’s identified level of alignment with associated diplomatic goals and principles.  
For the purpose of simplicity, I associated the response categories with scores of +2, +1, 0 
(zero) (for both ‘neutral, not relevant, or not considered’ and ‘not applicable’), -1, and -2, 
respectively, which allowed sub-classification and classification scores to be aggregated and 
averaged (with equal weightings) in order to provide an overall program diplomatic 
performance score. 
 
This innovative system of program evaluation represented, for the first time, an effort to 
specify –  quantitatively and quantitatively – the performance of a global health program on 
the diplomatic level.   Based on these results, I then generated a series of recommendations 
to troubleshoot areas of diplomatic deficiency, with a view to enabling the program under 
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review (in this case, a multilevel HIV/AIDS prevention intervention)231 to perform optimally 
on both diplomatic and altruistic levels in the future. 
 
Following my establishment of diplomatic parameters for global health program review (as 
well as a separate list of parameters for broader foreign policy considerations) and the 
development of associated tools, I sought to ensure (by their publication and open access) 
that all global health efforts now had the potential to be delivered in a smarter, more 
multifarious, and more holistic manner.232  My work recognized,  however, that the 
widespread use and application of such efforts also required the development of other policy 
level systems to ensure that diplomatic considerations could be integrated into program 
design on an ex ante as well as ex post basis. 
 
Finding 7: That innovative policy processes for the advancement of smart 
approaches to global health program design, selection and delivery can be 
implemented.  
 
Prior research has shown that efforts to develop policy coherence and harmonization – 
including optimizing synergies between governmental, international, and supranational 
initiatives – involve challenging accepted structures and purviews, not least through 
advancing knowledge transfer and communication.233  There is, as a result, an ongoing need 
for the evolution of policy processes – defined here as the evolution of, for example, 
ministerial concerns from agendas to provisionally approved and then official government 
policy234 -- particularly through greater interdigitation between siloed departmental purviews 
and associated areas of expertise.235  Such enabling environments are dependent upon 
innovative systems of both collaboration and coordination (collectively referred to here as 
coherence) in governance: Metcalfe (1994) notes that, in extreme cases, government 
ministries or departments may make significant decisions independently of either (1) central 
executive authority or (2) consideration of possible positive or negative externalities on other 
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departmental priorities.236  In many cases, existing structures of governance and 
policymaking (such as, for example, between health, development and foreign policies) are 
inherently restricted by implicitly or explicitly demarcated spheres of influence.237  Though 
greater policy coherence is not universally supported because of the complexities of 
interaction and decision-making it demands (of previously independently-operating 
government ministries, agencies or departments238), in the context of global health diplomacy 
my original contributions in this context were to advance such cohesion via (1) a review of 
gaps in policy coherence between departments of international development, diplomacy, and 
foreign policy and (2) the advancement of suggestions for practical, consultative and joint 
decision-making systems to fill them.  
 
As noted above, my academic and professional experience found that coherent (also referred 
to as ‘joined-up’ or holistic239) initiatives between global health, security, and diplomacy were 
primarily dependent on awareness amongst non-health policymakers of the diplomatic and 
strategic importance of global health programs.240  In order for this to take place, I also 
found that continued advocacy efforts to articulate the diplomatic dividends of global health 
efforts (e.g. through interdepartmental bodies such as the United States’ State Department 
Office of Global Health Diplomacy, to whom I presented these findings in November 2015, 
as well as via both my own and other prior research in the enlightened self-interest241 and 
foreign policy242 contexts) were necessary and effective -- yet insufficient to address the 
significant gaps and missed opportunities to develop interdigitated global health programs 
that functioned in synergistic, mutually beneficial ways.  This finding was consistent with the 
extensive prior research findings of others on coordination, collaboration and coherence in 
governance and policymaking referenced above; my original contribution has, in this context, 
been to highlight the need for greater coherence in the specific realms of defense, diplomacy 
and development, with each leveraging the other field’s strengths to advance mutual agendas. 
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Both my research and professional experience found that the conversion of either advocacy 
or scientific efforts in to routine policymaking decisions, which would represent a key basis 
of such improved coherence, would require innovative structural changes at the policy 
level.243  Similarly, both Ansell (2008)244 and Sørensen & Torfing (2009)245 advocate greater 
inclusiveness and collaboration in the policy process via the related concepts of network and 
meta governance -- both of which are designed to streamline operations, optimize 
interdepartmental synergies, and reduce purview-based disconnects.  Related conclusions 
have been reached in the research of Kickert (1997) in the context of the smart management 
of complex networks such as those between national, departmental, governmental and 
policymaking bodies.246  In challenging traditional siloed vertical public sector hierarchies, the 
original suggestions for collaborative diplomatic and aid policymaking that I have developed 
are aligned with these approaches: for example, currently (and in most cases only then on an 
ad hoc basis) my research demonstrated that international diplomacy and development efforts 
are rarely deployed in combination with each other, 247 and that few policy or governance 
mechanisms for coherence currently exist.248 
 
Yet both my academic and professional experience observed and documented that the 
nascent interdigitation and coherence of previously distinct health and non-health 
governance policy processes249 continues to grow.  For example, and as described above, in 
the security realm my research supported established findings that both the effectiveness and 
acceptability of demarcated foreign policy response strategies – traditionally reliant on 
independent (and often non-collaborative and uncoordinated) efforts by, for example, 
departments or ministries of defense, development and diplomacy -- are under scrutiny.250  
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Not least, this shortcoming is reflected in the challenges of modern conflict and security 
environments which conventional methods of intervention have struggled to successfully 
resolve,251 including the limited range and availability of effective responses to contemporary 
threats to world stability such as international terrorism252 and the Syrian civil war.253   
 
From both the security and the humanitarian ends of the governmental spectrum, therefore, 
my academic and professional experience has supported the previously-advanced hypothesis 
that a smart convergence of skills, responsibilities and interests is currently taking place -- 
even if in a manner which national political or policy systems are as yet not equipped to 
leverage to full effect.254  Related gaps identified in my research included (1) the lack of 
formal or informal policy processes for consideration of how (if at all) global health efforts 
might advance strategic interests; (2) how such processes can be adapted (in the both short 
and long terms) to respond to  foreign, development and diplomatic policy priorities, crises 
and emergencies simultaneously;255 (3) how such efforts might simultaneously advance the 
alignment of global health efforts with international security or defense priorities;256 and (4) 
whether such an advanced role in the broader foreign policy realm for global health would, 
on a routine policymaking basis, be feasible and operationalizable.257   
 
In line with Ansell (2008)258 and Sørensen & Torfing (2009),259 my work supported the 
finding that the establishment of direct lines of communication and consultation between 
disparate policymaking and political stakeholders represents a key first step in this regard.260   
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Yet the capacity of a new, cross-sectoral breed of global health diplomats to advise on global 
health inputs in the foreign policy context was also found, in keeping with prior research, to 
require (1) increased funding;261 (2) a clearer and broader mission statement, mandate, and 
purview;262 and (3) collaborative governmental platforms and fora (as represented in this 
context by the innovative location of the United States’ Office of Global Health Diplomacy 
within the State Department apparatus263). 
 
I concluded that, in keeping with prior research on collaborative governance systems,264 an 
original model for smart global health policy process restructuring would also require the 
direct involvement of global health representatives and relevant experts in the highest 
political and foreign policy discussions in order to articulate the possible contributions that 
adaptations to contemporary program efforts might make in resolving both pressing and 
longer-term foreign policy concerns.  In some countries, albeit to a limited extent, this 
process had already begun with global health experts sitting on national security councils;265 
to date, however, these efforts have focused on global health security issues related to 
pandemic control and preparedness rather than the proactive use of smart global health in 
the foreign policy, strategic, security, or diplomatic contexts.  
  
                                                             
261 Brown, M. et al (2014). Bridging public health and foreign affairs: the tradecraft of global health 
diplomacy and the role of health attachés. Science & Diplomacy, 3(3).    
262  Brown, M. et al (2014). Bridging public health and foreign affairs: the tradecraft of global health 
diplomacy and the role of health attachés. Science & Diplomacy, 3(3).    
263 Kevany, S. (2016). New roles for global health: diplomatic, security, and foreign policy 
responsiveness. The Lancet Global Health, 4(2), e83-e84; Kevany S (2015).   
264 Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An integrative framework for collaborative 
governance. Journal of public administration research and theory, 22(1), 1-29. 
265 United States Department of State. (2011). Leading through civilian power: The first quadrennial 




Part Three – Conclusion 
 
Original Contributions Redux 
 
I believe that the research papers and publications I present here have originally contributed 
to the understanding (and therefore optimization) of how global health programs have 
advanced, and have the potential to further advance, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, 
and counter-terrorism efforts as well as boarder concepts such as diplomacy, foreign policy, 
and international relations.  In each of the earlier (1 to 4) findings above, the examples I 
provide of academic and professional experience are, both individually and collectively, 
designed to demonstrate the vast actual and potential contributions of smart global health 
programs to broader, perhaps more abstract goals such as world peace and stability.266  These 
benefits also bring 21st century global health program design full circle, ensuring that an 
equally (if not more) important result – the health and well-being of the world’s poorest 
people – is enhanced by conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and the associated 
generation of compelling arguments for greater bipartisan funding and support for 
international development efforts. 
 
In terms of my latter findings (5 to 7) -- that contemporary approaches to global health 
program design, selection, delivery and evaluation, when viewed from the security and 
diplomatic perspectives, can be further optimized; that innovative parameters of smart or 
diplomatic approaches to global health program design can be applied; and that appropriate 
policy and political processes for the routine design and implementation of smart or 
diplomatic global health programs can be implemented -- the links between global health and 
national and international security and stability issues identified in my research were 
summarized in a series of editorial commentaries.267 Similarly, recommendations to address 
the shortcomings of past approaches (e.g. PEPFAR activities in Uganda 268 or bilateral efforts 
by organizations such as Irish Aid269) have been presented in peer-reviewed publications.  
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Similarly, I have demonstrated how my past work makes other original contributions to prior 
research and literature via (1) the generation of formal parameters for smart or diplomatic 
program design and (2) the articulation of models by which such efforts can be 
implemented.  In regards the former, my development and publication of a set of criteria for 
global health program design in the diplomatic, foreign policy and security realms may in this 
context represent the culmination of my original research findings over the past ten years.270  
I concede however that this is not an exhaustive system: future research may for example 
need to include more qualitative components beyond field staff interviews and 
questionnaires, as well as generating comparative K-Score results from different global 
health programs and interventions (and across diverse populations and settings) in order to 
further inform understanding of which global health initiatives have the greatest combined 
diplomatic, enlightened self-interest, and altruistic impact – as well as the inclusion of 
systems to ensure that diplomatic gains do not come at the cost of primary programmatic 
goals, and the trade-offs therein. 
 
Nonetheless, my past work has reflected extensive field experience (on consultancy, 
academic and other levels) in the adaptation, design, delivery and evaluation of global health 
programs in settings in which non-health considerations may occasionally take primacy over 
narrow medical performance metrics.  The articulation of these observations and experiences 
has thence collectively created the basis -- through exposure to observed links and synergies 
between global health programs and non-health concerns -- for this presentation of my 
original contributions to knowledge and academic literature.  Rewardingly, these efforts have 
subsequently been applied to niche groups as diverse as soldiers271 and surfers.272 This reach 
illustrates that (in a modified echo of Kennedy’s 1963 proclamation in the introduction to 
this work) the advancement of international relations, security, cooperation, peace and 
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For global health to perform optimally, in terms of both health and non-health outcomes, its 
programs and practitioners must also be willing to blur lines and look beyond the narrow 
confines of protocols and job descriptions.  Willing, also, to take on new responsibilities: to 
act, when necessary, as international security or diplomatic liaisons or (sometimes literally) 
barefoot diplomats.  Only then will all members of society – as well as all dimensions of the 
political spectrum – understand the critical value of global health investments to world 
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Background: Global health programmes require extensive adaptation for
implementation in conflict and post-conflict settings. Without such adapta-
tions, both implementation success and diplomatic, international relations
and other indirect outcomes may be threatened. Conversely, diplomatic
successes may be made through flexible and responsive programmes. We
examine adaptations and associated outcomes for malaria treatment and
prevention programmes in Afghanistan. Methods: In conjunction with the
completion of monitoring and evaluation activities for the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, we reviewed adaptations to the
structure, design, selection, content and delivery of malaria-related inter-
ventions in Afghanistan. Interviews were conducted with programme
implementers, service delivery providers, government representatives and
local stakeholders, and site visits to service delivery points were com-
pleted. Findings: Programmes for malaria treatment and prevention require
a range of adaptations for successful implementation in Afghanistan. These
include (1) amendment of educational materials for rural populations, (2)
religious awareness in gender groupings for health educational interven-
tions, (3) recruitment of local staff, educated in languages and customs, for
both quality assurance and service delivery, (4) alignment with diplomatic
principles and, thereby, avoidance of confusion with broader strategic and
military initiatives and (5) amendments to programme ‘branding’ proce-
dures. The absence of provision for these adaptations made service deliv-
ery excessively challenging and increased the risk of tension between
narrow programmatic and broader diplomatic goals. Conversely, adapted
global health programmes displayed a unique capacity to access potentially
extremist populations and groups in remote regions otherwise isolated from
international activities. Conclusions: A range of diplomatic considerations
when delivering global health programmes in conflict and post-conflict set-
tings are required in order to ensure that health gains are not offset by
broader international relations losses through challenges to local cultural,
religious and social norms, as well as in order to ensure the security of
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programme staff. Conversely, when global health programmes are
delivered with international relations considerations in mind, they have the
potential to generate unquantified diplomatic outcomes.
Keywords: adaptations; global health diplomacy; malaria; The Global
Fund; conflict
Background
Public health issues, including malaria, are particularly problematic in conflict
settings as a result of breakdowns in health systems, displacement of vulnerable
populations and increased risk of epidemics (Rowland et al. 2002). Malaria
prevalence, for many years, has been tied to conflict in Afghanistan; during the
Soviet invasion, rates of malaria increased faster than any other disease
(Johnson 1998). An estimated 5–10-fold rise in malaria prevalence is estimated
to have occurred as a result of the current Afghanistan conflict, with war consid-
ered to have been a key driver of the growth of Plasmodium falciparum (PF)
malaria in particular (Kolaczinski et al. 2005). Both malaria prevalence and
incidence is particularly high in rural areas, with cattle-owning individuals at
substantially higher risk (Bouma and Rowland 1995); of the 31 million popula-
tion of Afghanistan, an estimated 10 million or 31% of the population, live in
high-transmission areas (World Health Organization 2012a) – which are, in
many cases, also those regions most affected by insecurity. Children and teenag-
ers are considered to carry most of the burden of disease (Kolaczinski et al.
2005), though reliable demographic distribution figures are not currently
available.
Throughout the current conflict in Afghanistan, delivery of most basic
health care services has been the responsibility of international non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) due to the progressive breakdown in the delivery
of Afghanistan national and public health services during the war (Kolaczinski
et al. 2005). In recent years, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (‘The Global Fund’) has played an increasingly prominent role in
financing malaria treatment and prevention programmes around the world,
accounting for approximately US$8 billion of the US$9 billion that comprised
both national and international financing for malaria control in 2010 (World
Malaria Report 2011). Malaria grant recipients include the Afghanistan
Ministry of Health through the National Malaria and Leishmaniasis Control
Programme (NMLCP), the HealthNet Trans-Cultural Psychosocial Organisation
(HNTPO) and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) (Global
Fund 2011). HNTPO and BRAC hold primary responsibility for preventive
programmes through insecticide-treated bed net (ITN) and long-lasting insect
net (LLIN) distribution, while the NMLCP is responsible for malaria treatment.
Through the NMLCP, Global Fund grants support (1) supply of medications
for PF malaria and (2) investments in expanding diagnostic capacity at the
community level (Global Fund personal communication 2013). Cross-cutting


























interventions employed by all implementing organisations include LLIN and
ITN distribution, rapid diagnostic tests and the provision of artemisinin
combined therapy and oral artemisinin (Kolaczinski et al. 2005; World Malaria
Report 2011), and are, for the purposes of this paper, collectively and defined
as ‘global health programmes’ or ‘global health initiatives’. Since 2006, the
Global Fund has allocated over $68 million for malaria programmes in
Afghanistan, and over 7.3 million LLINs and ITNs have been distributed in the
country as a result of Global Fund support (Global Fund 2013).
Gaining access to populations in high-transmission malaria areas has
become extremely difficult as a result of security and logistical considerations
(Kolaczinski et al. 2005; World Health Organization 2012b). In addition,
highly conservative forms of Islamic beliefs make it hard to reach much of the
female population, and access to a public health facility in under one hour of
walking is possible for only 57% of the population (Ministry of Health 2008).
As a result of such logistical and environmental constraints, international col-
laborations, such as the Afghanistan Health Initiative between the United States
Office of Global Health Affairs and the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health,
are often limited in their focus to (1) the development of high-level leadership
and management skills and (2) focus on centralised treatment and care centres
such as the Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul, the southern and eastern regions
of Kandahar and Jalalabad and districts around the northern city of Mazar-
e-Sharif (Office of Global Health Affairs 2010). In spite of these circum-
stances, the provision of a ‘basic package of health services’ (BPHS) has been
contracted out to NGO in 31 out of the country’s 34 provinces (Ameli and
Newbrander 2008). For Global Fund grants in Afghanistan, specific challenges
to service delivery have included (1) difficulties in travelling to service deliv-
ery points to conduct monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercises (restricted to
the Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar and Kabul provinces) and (2) difficulty with
primary and sub-grant recipients adhering to procedures and practices under
grant agreements (Global Fund 2011).
Confusion between political, military and development objectives presents
dramatic and serious threats both to the safety of global health programme staff
(Center for Global Development 2013; Goniewicz and Goniewicz 2013) and to
their ‘diplomatic effectiveness’ (Buekens et al. 2013), while attempts to pursue
broader strategic or security-related goals through global health programmes
have been critiqued as attempts to ‘hijack’ primary programmatic objectives
(Woods 2005). Nonetheless, most overseas development assistance is focused
on strategically significant recipient countries, including Afghanistan (Gostin
and Mok 2009). In this way, both bilateral and multilateral global health pro-
grammes have become, implicitly or explicitly, increasingly intertwined with
broader foreign policy, diplomatic and international relations objectives (Feld-
baum 2010). Such foreign policy perspectives are both multilevel and multi-
causal (Rosenau 1966), and involve the synthesisation of information from a
wide variety of knowledge bases. Failure to consider such principles and


























objectives when designing, selecting and implementing global health
programmes and therefore runs the risk of creating a ‘tense and confusing
duality’ (CSIS 2010a). For example, programmes that challenge cultural, reli-
gious, ideological, social and behavioural norms in recipient countries and
communities, while compelling in terms of their capacity to achieve primary
outcomes, may also constitute potential liabilities from the diplomatic perspec-
tive. Although it is critically important for global health programmes to attempt
to optimise primary outcomes such as quality-adjusted life years, both their
design and content needs to be carefully assessed in order to ensure that (1)
they are not being achieved at the cost of diplomatic or international relations
objectives and (2) where they have the capacity to achieve such collateral
objectives, these are leveraged appropriately (Thompson 2008). In the case of
Afghanistan, as with other conflict and post-conflict settings, the need to both
sensitise and adapt all aspects of global health programme delivery to avoid
diplomatic and staff security risks consequent upon these potentially damaging
links (CSIS 2010b) may also be leveraged to generate positive diplomatic out-
comes (Bonventre 2008). More specifically, as Novotny notes, global health
programmes ‘attract a diverse and pluralistic world to better opportunities and
a sense of dignity. We can appeal to these values, and inoculate against
extremism’ (Novotny and Adams 2007).
The adaptation of global health interventions is essential to successful ser-
vice delivery in politically unstable settings Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa
et al. (2012), and may be broadly divided into diplomatic and operational types
(Kevany, Hatfield et al. 2012). Deciding which intervention components to
include, and which may be inappropriate on cultural, religious, economic or
social grounds, has become an essential part of health care planning in Afghan-
istan (Kolaczinski et al. 2005; Chowdhury, Alam, and Ahmed 2006; Thompson
2008; Wickford, Hultberg, and Rosberg 2008; Howard et al. 2010). The
Afghanistan National Strategy for Improving Quality in Health Care 2011–
2015 notes the importance of adapting international standards and health inter-
ventions to local conditions, including service assessment tools, M&E systems,
and ‘the science of health care improvement’ (Ministry of Public Health 2010).
Global Fund-supported organisations such as HNTPO, BRAC and the NMLCP
have been amongst the first to attempt to pilot alternative techniques for
malaria treatment and prevention (Kolaczinski et al. 2005; Chowdhury, Alam,
and Ahmed 2006), improving access to remote rural populations while also
increasing geographical coverage. HNTPO was the first organisation to pilot
insecticide-treated bed nets in Afghanistan in both refugee camps and the east-
ern Afghanistan province of Nangarhar, and amongst refugee communities in
particular, malaria interventions have been extensively adapted to better serve
environmental, social and economic conditions (Hewitt et al. 1996; Rowland
and Nosten 2001). However, continuing operational research to successfully
adapt health care delivery mechanisms in order to facilitate the scale up of pre-
vention, diagnosis and treatment capacity in insecure regions is still needed


























(Ahmad 2004). In this paper, using Global Fund-supported malaria pro-
grammes in Afghanistan as an example, we examine (1) the intervention-spe-
cific, logistical and environmental adaptations that have succeeded in
improving programmatic access and coverage in insecure or unstable regions
of Afghanistan and (2) potential indirect-associated gains in international rela-
tions and ‘global health diplomacy’.
Methods
Using Global Fund-supported malaria programmes as a sampling frame, we
reviewed the service delivery adaptations developed by implementing field and
central office staff in order to facilitate intervention delivery in insecure
regions. Data were collected through (1) desk reviews, (2) correspondence and
interviews with in-country staff and (3) site visits to HNTPO, NMLPC and
BRAC central offices and service delivery points. Associated identified adapta-
tions were categorised as (1) intervention-specific, (2) logistical or (3) environ-
mental. Such categorizations were derived on an iterative basis, with broad
groups of adaptation types emerging during the review process, as well as
through reference to prior groupings of global health intervention adaptations
(e.g. Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al. 2012).
In conjunction with the completion of on-site data verification and M&E
periodic assessment reports for the Global Fund, a desk review of the structure,
design, selection, content and delivery of related malaria interventions in
Afghanistan was conducted in order to identify key programmatic adaptations.
This process included review of all publicly available documentation related to
Global Fund programme design and delivery, as provided on the Global Fund
website for Afghanistan (Global Fund 2013) including (1) portfolio reviews of
the Global Fund malaria grants, (2) associated information on the Country
Coordinating Mechanism, Principal Recipient (PR) and Local Fund Agent
(LFA) and (3) data on grant disbursements, financial statistics and key results.
In addition, programmatic assessments of service utilisation and other related
and relevant documentation used for this paper such as derived from grant reci-
pient background portfolios (e.g. maps and charts of health centre location and
performance) were reviewed in collaboration with PR and sub-recipient teams
during site visits in order to identify site-specific adaptations to facilitate
service delivery in insecure regions.
Collaborative document and activity reviews were conducted with primary-
and sub-recipient Global Fund programme implementers, service delivery
providers, government representatives, local stakeholders and the Global Fund’s
LFA during site visits to HNTPO, BRAC, Ministry of Health and NMLCP offi-
ces. Reviews focused on discussion of (1) the intervention adaptations identified
during the desk review and (2) identification of possible successes and chal-
lenges of adapted service delivery from the diplomatic perspective. Subsequent
correspondence with the Global Fund, implementing organisations and in-coun-


























try representatives via email and conference calls also contributed to an enhanced
understanding of identified adaptations and associated diplomatic effects.
Site visits to primary and sub-recipient central offices were completed in
October 2011 as part of the Global Fund’s periodic review process. Site visits
to service delivery points were also completed throughout 2011 and 2012 in
order to gain a fuller understanding of intervention adaptations. These visits
are routinely conducted by the in-country LFA team as part of the Global
Fund’s M&E quality assurance process, whereupon the LFA team includes
reports on the success of intervention implementation, in terms of uptake and
acceptability to local communities, through the identification of local service
delivery adaptations. Site visits also present LFA staff with a rare opportunity
to meet with, and gain feedback from service delivery providers for Global
Fund-supported programmes based in insecure regions.
Results
Global health programmes for malaria treatment and prevention required a
range of adaptations for successful implementation in Afghanistan. These were
developed (1) to ensure the security of service delivery staff, (2) to improve
local acceptability of interventions, (3) to improve geographical and population
coverage, (4) to improve service utilisation and (5) in order to ensure that pro-
grammes were diplomatically sensitised. The following types of adaptations
were identified.
Intervention adaptations
Information, education and communication campaigns
Information, education and communication interventions are particularly
important in conflict settings (Spiegel 2004). In particular, the use of appropriate
language, careful efforts to avoid cultural or religious references, the appropriate
use of local dialects and languages, as well as the elimination of content that
may be perceived by local populations as inflammatory, ideological or propagan-
dist, are all essential to successful roll-out (Schuftan 2009). For example, the use
of military metaphors (e.g. global health ‘campaigns’) may need to be avoided
under these circumstances, as well as moderation of language that confronts
regional social or religious norms related to sexual activity, which is frequently
the case with HIV/AIDS programmes (see, for e.g. Calderon 1997). In addition,
adaptation of the medium itself has, in the past, been a critical consideration in
Afghanistan, with education for malaria delivered through mosques, local news-
papers and radio (Kolaczinski et al. 2005). In order to successfully promote
health education messages in insecure areas, all educational materials used in
Global Fund-supported programmes are routinely screened by implementers to
ensure the exclusion of any phrases, language or terminology that might be mis-
interpreted by militant or hostile elements in recipient communities.



























The selection of the most appropriate interventions from a diplomatic and
international relations perspective, in order to ensure that interventions are
restricted to those that do not conflict with local community, social, cultural or
religious norms, is essential to successful implementation (Castro, Barrera, and
Martinez 2004). For example, those interventions that may challenge social,
behavioural or even (in the case of HIV/AIDS) sexual norms are necessarily
excluded in the Afghanistan context (see below), while intervention design and
delivery is necessarily mindful of location, delivery and content in the religious
context. Similarly, Kolaczinski et al. (2005) note that relatively complex inter-
ventions such as indoor residual spraying, which require advanced planning,
smooth logistics, reliable health information, and accurate timing of the cam-
paigns, are unfeasible in conflict settings. In Afghanistan, Global Fund-sup-
ported programme staff routinely screen potential interventions to ensure that
no logistical, operational, cultural, religious, social or economic challenges
would be consequent on their implementation. This results in a focus on the
delivery of simple and easily implemented interventions such as ITN and LLIN
distribution that carry no risk of offending local sensibilities.
Service delivery adaptations
LLINs and ITNs constitute one of the few feasible options for protection
against malaria in chronic emergencies (Rowland et al. 2002; Howard et al.
2010), but their utilisation has required a range of adaptations to social market-
ing techniques (Howard, Chandramohan, and Freeman 2003). During the
OSDV process, LFA staff noted that, although LLINs and ITNs were being
distributed to households in accordance with Global Fund targets (thereby
meeting distribution targets at the de jure level), most recipients did not subse-
quently unpack and hang the nets. Distribution teams also observed confusion
amongst recipients related to the use of LLINs and ITNs, often characterised
as simply reducing the risk of mosquito bites rather than as malaria prevention
devices. In response, distribution teams expanded their responsibilities in order
to better orient household members on both (1) installation and (2) specific
uses and benefits of ITN and LLIN use in the context of malaria prevention.
Gender sensitivities
The use of combined male and female information sessions for malaria has a
successful record as a prevention mechanism (Atkinson and Fitzgerald 2010).
In Afghanistan, however, the use of mixed-gender interventions is considered
to be unacceptable on cultural, religious and social grounds, whereby male and
female group or social activities are traditionally strongly separated and delin-
eated (Moghadam 1989; Zulfacar 2006). Such practices are more pronounced


























in rural areas, where the majority of the population reside, as well as amongst
those with low educational attainment throughout the country (Manganaro and
Alozie 2011). In keeping with local customs, the Global Fund’s implementing
partners established separate male and female discussion groups in order to
ensure that women were able to access services without risk of social exclusion
or gender bias, as well as separate and distinct protocols to reflect different
social standards in urban and rural settings. In the former, implementers
assigned female staff members to conduct health education activities and
convey associated messages to community members during intervention
implementation, while in rural areas, where such levels of female involvement
were not considered to be culturally appropriate, ‘female-only’ health fora, in
which no male participants were permitted to attend or take part, were pro-
vided. Finally, gender issues were also considered in staff selection. In particu-
lar, female staff were found to more easily gain entry to the household to
monitor intervention uptake and adherence.
Logistical adaptations
Community preparedness and enlisting community support
In keeping with successful efforts by the Ministry of Health to enlist support
and approval of groups such as the Taliban for public health campaigns in
insecure regions (Rubenstein 2013), community preparedness is an essential
aspect of global health intervention implementation (Kevany, Khumalo-
Sakutukwa et al. 2010). In order to improve local acceptability in insecure
regions, including clear descriptions of the roles and organisational parameters
of international NGOs, extensive community preparedness for malaria interven-
tion introduction was conducted by implementing partners. These measures
helped to ‘sensitise’ remote or isolated communities for international involve-
ment in health services provision. Specific community preparedness measures
included (1) meetings with senior community and religious leaders, (2)
enlisting support of local health and political stakeholders, and (3) holding
community fora to seek the advice and input of community members on
malaria intervention design and delivery. In particular, the involvement of both
religious and community leaders was considered to be essential in the success-
ful implementation of malaria interventions, verification of distribution reports,
and in establishing reliable lines of communication with remote or rural areas.
This method is not unlike that which is utilised by other successful public
health programmes in Afghanistan, (e.g. BRAC) (Chowdhury, Alam, and
Ahmed 2006).
Staff selection adaptations
The selection of appropriately skilled staff is critical to successful global health
intervention delivery (Thompson 2008; World Health Organization 2010). In
addition to standard reference to professional requirements and qualifications,


























Global Fund-supported programmes in Afghanistan were found to make
extensive adaptations to staffing and hiring procedures, across both quality
assurance and service delivery functions, in order to successfully deliver ser-
vices in insecure regions. In areas such as the Helmand province, efforts were
focused on the recruitment of local, rather than international or inter-regional
staff, in keeping with negative connotations surrounding international activities
in these regions. Regional social, cultural and religious norms were strictly
observed, including the deliberate limitation and restriction of recruitment prac-
tices to (1) personnel of regional ethnic origin, (2) personnel adhering to regio-
nal religious beliefs, and, where possible, (3) personnel with authority and
credibility in rural communities. Notably, local recruitment was also associated
with a reported reduction in inaccurate service delivery and improved utilisa-
tion statistics, though only anecdotal evidence from programme officers and
coordinators is currently available in this regard.
Adaptations to M&E systems
M&E activities require extensive adaptations to function successfully in insecure
areas (Kevany, Hatfield et al. 2012). Of note, the importance of a clear distinction
between public health reporting and intelligence gathering related to non-project
activities must be made in order to explicitly avoid life-threatening dangers both
to project staff and public health workers (Center for Global Development 2013).
Global Fund-supported M&E activities were adapted in the Afghanistan setting
by (1) ensuring additional security for M&E and QA visits throughout accessible
regions (i.e. the Balkh, Herat, Kabul and Nangarhar provinces) and (2) modified
QA visit schedules, increased use of electronic communications and amendments
to reporting system flow in insecure or inaccessible regions. For the latter, ser-
vice delivery utilisation reports were provided both directly to regional offices
and also to the central office in order to ensure that data flow was consistently
maintained. In addition, heightened collaboration between the Global Fund’s
partners in Afghanistan (including BRAC and the NMLCP) helped to ensure
that, when necessary, alternative M&E reporting systems were available.
Integration and alignment of services
Of particular importance to the diplomatic delivery of global health interventions
in insecure settings is responsiveness to local needs (Chowdhury, Alam, and
Ahmed 2006; Ameli and Newbrander 2008; Thompson 2008; Global Health
Initiative 2012). In this context, the integration of malaria interventions with
activities addressing other community health and disease priorities has become a
key feature of adaptable and effective malaria programmes (Atkinson and Fitz-
gerald 2010). Similarly, in Afghanistan, any notion of vertical programming was
abandoned in the absence of political stability (Johnson 1998). The integration
process was facilitated through the Global Fund’s support (in concert with


























USAID, the European Union and the World Bank) of health facilities under the
health systems strengthening programme of the BPHS. Through previously
vertical service delivery points, Global Fund-supported malaria interventions are
delivered in conjunction with safe motherhood and neonatal care programmes,
child health and immunisation, public nutrition and other communicable disease
control (Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health 2010). Perhaps most importantly,
malaria treatment and prevention activities are also fully integrated with the
Afghanistan national primary health care programme through the BPHS, which
is comparatively well accepted in insecure areas. More broadly, integrated and
aligned collaborations form an essential component of international global health
programme success (Thompson 2008; Ng and Ruger 2011), and, in Afghanistan,
often the only way for successful international global health service delivery to
be maintained is through a network of well-established partners across govern-
ment departments (Kolaczinski et al. 2005). In this regard, the work of the Glo-
bal Fund’s in-country LFA team included the generation of recommendations on
(1) locally acceptable funding structures and (2) building relationships with
national government actors.
Accessibility adaptations
Adaptations to global health programme schedules and procedures are amongst
the most essential elements in increasing intervention uptake (Howard et al.
2010; Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al. 2010). Without appropriate consideration of
local customs, including working hours and times at which local communities
are able to access health services, successful intervention delivery is unlikely,
and may even increase the risk of hostility to global health programmes if not
carefully considered (Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al. 2012). In the case of
Afghanistan, changes to service delivery schedules and procedures developed by
the Global Fund’s implementing partners included the adaptation of working
hours to local conditions, increased use of community health care workers, and
the delivery of malaria ‘outreach’ services, including mobile treatment and LLIN
distribution units, in order to improve service accessibility to remote populations
in mountainous regions. For example, service delivery timetables included con-
sideration of local professional and agricultural cycles in order to ensure that
intervention availability did not conflict with other day-to-day engagements
amongst recipient populations. In addition, the support of ‘health posts’, com-
prised of two volunteer community health workers with flexible ‘working hours’,




Though global health initiatives are separate and distinct from security and politi-
cal considerations, it is often essential to ensure alignment in order to avoid


























potential dualities or inadvertent pursuit of conflicting regional goals (Thompson
2008; Feldbaum 2010) as well as ensuring the security of programme staff
(Burkle 2013; Goniewicz and Goniewicz 2013). This includes the sensitization
of global health programme service delivery to regional security considerations
(Bonventre 2008). In Afghanistan, insecure conditions have meant that coordina-
tion between health and security operations are critically important, not just for
the safety of the staff, but in the cohesive pursuit of broader national stability
(Rubenstein 2012). To this end, in Afghanistan, programme staff are routinely
advised on the importance of impartiality in service delivery (i.e. the non-aligned
provision of health services to all recipient populations, regardless of belief or
political alignment) in politically sensitive areas (especially those rural areas
which remain beyond the direct or effective control of the government), includ-
ing specific directives requiring avoidance of the use of any phrase or action that
might be interpreted as alignment either with domestic or international political
groupings, as well as reviewing routine security briefings from both international
agencies and the Afghanistan government in order to inform associated resource
allocation decisions . For example, in regions where anti-Western sentiment con-
tinues to prevail, references to bilateral (rather than multilateral) funding sources
may create security tensions if not explicitly accompanied by (1) dis-association
with armed activities or (2) specific statements and demonstrations of political
neutrality (Mogelson 2012).
Economic adaptations
In order to ensure successful utilisation of health services, interventions must
consider the economic needs and capacity of both service delivery providers
and recipients (Howard et al. 2010; Kevany, Murima et al. 2012) as conformity
with stated national economic strategies such as rural development and microfi-
nance (Chowdhury, Alam, and Ahmed 2006). In many cases, labour-intensive
but capital-cheap interventions are considered most appropriate to conflict
settings (Kolaczinski et al. 2005), and subsidised sales through NGO clinics
and mobile sales teams have, in the past, quickly increased malaria interven-
tion coverage in Afghanistan (Kolaczinski et al. 2005). However, legal consid-
erations also act as prohibitive barriers to the purchase of malaria prevention
mechanisms such as LLINs and ITNs in Afghanistan (Howard, Chandramohan,
and Freeman 2003). These include provisions in the Afghanistan constitution
guaranteeing free primary-level health care to all citizens, thereby effectively
prohibiting the sale of LLINs and ITNs at any price (Government of
Afghanistan 2013). In response, all related Global Fund-supported malaria
interventions are provided free of charge.
Branding adaptations
The ‘branding’ of interventions often has to be modified in conflict settings in
order (1) to ensure the safety of staff, (2) to ensure that interventions are not


























deliberately avoided due to their international connotations (Global Fund 2011;
Goniwiecz and Goniwiecz 2013) and (3) to ensure that services are readily
understood by often poorly educated populations who may have been cut-off
from international exposure (Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al. 2012).
Independence in programme branding and identity has also been identified as
being essential to service utilisation and uptake (InterAction 2012). At the
same time, programme branding of some kind is essential in promoting the
benign role of international actors in the region, contributing to changing per-
ceptions around their role and presence (USAID 2012). A health care organisa-
tion for civilian war victims, Emergency, has succeeded in having its brand
recognised as a neutral entity amidst conflicts between warring factions. How-
ever, maintaining this reputation has met with recent challenges, and the orga-
nisation has recently been a target of local authorities – ostensibly due to
corruption charges, though many accusatory anti-war messages have also been
an issue (Mogelson 2012). In the case of Afghanistan, a number of changes to
Global Fund-supported programme branding were introduced in order to
ensure that associated interventions did not attract hostile attention from
extremist groups. This included (1) the avoidance of the use of bilateral (rather
than multilateral) international insignia or logos and (2) an exclusive focus on
health-related issues in malaria community mobilisation messaging. As a result
of such adaptations to global health programme branding, with particular
regard to avoiding specific brands that suggested national or political affilia-
tions, international insignia such as those used by the Global Fund were suc-
cessfully maintained in service delivery.
Discussion
Direct adaptation benefits: changes in service utilisation
Perhaps, the most important measure of successful adaptations to global health
programme delivery is in terms of service utilisation (Kevany, Khumalo-
Sakutukwa et al. 2012). In the Afghanistan setting, ongoing introduction of the
above adaptations was observed by the study team to result in a wide range of
service utilisation improvements, most closely related to the successful
distribution of ITNs and LLINs, in accordance with Global Fund targets. While
these gains cannot be solely attributable to the adaptations process, both central
and field office staff noted the temporal association between intervention
introduction and improvements in uptake.
Collateral adaptation benefits: ‘Global Health Diplomacy’
More broadly, the evaluation of global health intervention effectiveness in
conflict settings also needs to make explicit humanitarian principles (Banatvala
and Zwi 2000). In this context, we propose a number of collateral diplomatic
benefits unique to conflict settings, that are consequent on these successful


























adaptations, and that are not captured by conventional measures of evaluation.
A range of diplomatic considerations when delivering global health pro-
grammes in conflict and post-conflict settings are required in order to ensure
that health gains are not offset by broader international relations losses through
challenges to local cultural, religious and social norms (Labonte and Gagnon
2010). Conversely, when global health programmes are delivered with interna-
tional relations considerations in mind, they have the potential to generate un-
quantified diplomatic outcomes through access to potentially hostile regions
and populations (Fidler 2007; Novotny 2007; Feldbaum 2010). In this context,
global health diplomacy therefore primarily represents the dual goals of
improving global health and bettering international relations, particularly in
conflict areas and resource-poor environments (Novotny 2007; Thompson
2008; Feldbaum 2010). In the case of Afghanistan, three sets of key collateral,
or indirect, outcomes, as a result of the intervention adaptations process, with
both diplomatic and international relations dividends, were observed and are
hereby proposed.
Access to extremist populations and insecure regions
As a result of the careful design of programmes for insecure settings in
Afghanistan, access of service delivery in insecure regions was dramatically
improved, most notably in the provinces of Faryab, Khost and Kunar, in which
both intervention implementation and safe passage for programme staff were
facilitated by negotiations with community elders. While this may be perceived
by some critics as serving the health needs of hostile and extremist groups, an
alternative interpretation views these efforts as helping allay political extrem-
ism in susceptible populations who have not yet become hostile to donor coun-
tries (Novotny 2007), or to entice populations away from terrorist groups and
militants as well as improving community health (Thompson 2008; Rubenstein
2013). In many cases, this is a matter of providing an alternative means of
access to health-related resources for local populations, whose only other
option may often be to align with terrorist groups that can provide for individ-
ual and community needs (Burkle 2005). Such collateral benefits are, however,
only conceivable with the most careful selection, design, delivery and
adaptation of services in politically and socially unstable regions (Kevany,
Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al. 2012) – and require an explicit separation between
health service delivery and political or strategic agendas in order to ensure the
safety of programme staff (Buekens et al. 2013).
Enhancing donor prestige and acceptability
Both the prestige and acceptability of international donor activities were
observed to improve as a result of the adaptations process. The careful consid-
eration of recipient population sensitivities and needs may, therefore, have


























resulted in significant increases in service utilisation in insecure regions, a key
indicator of intervention (and therefore donor) acceptability. This is aligned
with a diplomatic approach to global health programme selection, design and
delivery, which takes into account a range of associated considerations beyond
primary programmatic goals, including the promotion, where possible, of more
benign perceptions of donor organisations (CSIS 2007). This has also been
made possible by BRAC, who contain the name of their nation (Bangladesh)
in their organisation title, yet maintain strong approval from local populations
by (1) following a thorough intervention adaptations process and (2) maintain-
ing a lack of perceived national strategic interest in Afghanistan (Chowdhury,
Alam, and Ahmed 2006).
Building an acceptable international presence
Perhaps, most importantly, the successful adaptation of global health interven-
tions to insecure regions, as noted above, may help to build up an international
presence in otherwise-inaccessible provinces of Afghanistan, which would, in
turn, be impossible without appropriate adjustments to programme design,
selection and delivery. Health interventions have, in the past, been proposed as
a key aspect of ‘nation-building’ and ‘peace-keeping’ in insecure regions, not
least due to their capacity to safely access insecure areas as well as
accomplishing their primary programmatic goals (Centre for Strategic and
International Studies 2010; Pearson 2012). The successful adaptation of global
health interventions to local needs and sensitivities means that these processes
are facilitated and supported, and produce associated (but again unquantified,
and possibly unquantifiable) outcomes not least the added peace-keeping
effects that come with the location of neutral and benign international actors in
hostile regions, as exemplified by the presence of the Italian organisation
Emergency’s surgical centre in the conflict zone of Lashkar Gah in the
Helmand province since 2004 (Bush 1998; Mogelson 2012).
Conclusions
The absence of provision for global health programme adaptations may make
service delivery excessively challenging in conflict and post-conflict environ-
ments, as well as increasing the risk of tension between narrow, programmatic,
broader and diplomatic goals (Feldbaum 2010). Conversely, in Afghanistan,
appropriately adapted global health programmes displayed a unique capacity to
generate a range of collateral benefits when viewed as a method of diplomacy
(Fidler 2007; Novotny 2007; Thompson 2008), including the enhancement of
donor prestige and trust, as well as the development and maintenance of a
benign and non-adversarial international presence. This process may also help
to improve programme effectiveness, accessibility and even cost-effectiveness,
all of which are essential components of ‘diplomatic’ health interventions


























(Novotny 2007). The authors wish to note that the assessment of global health
programmes from a diplomatic perspective is a very new, potentially ground-
breaking, element of global health research and one in which little or no work
has been done to date. In the early twenty-first century, diplomatic outcomes
remain unplanned, and therefore unquantified aspect of the intervention process
at this stage of history, and can therefore only be discussed in an ad hoc,
observational and retrospective fashion. It is to be hoped that with the future
development of explicit criteria, guidelines and even methods of outcome mea-
surement related to diplomacy that these effects may, in the future, become
more easily recognised and described. Nonetheless, it remains critically impor-
tant, both (1) to maintain clear and explicit distinctions between development,
military and political agendas (Buekens et al. 2013) and (2) to ensure the
safety and security of programmatic staff through appropriate security liaisons
(Burkle 2013). Only with such distinctions and with the inclusion of such
considerations in programme selection, design and delivery can global health
successfully fulfil its potential to achieve both diplomatic and life-saving goals.
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Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are an essential element of
functioning and accountable global health programmes. In post-conflict
settings, the role of M&E systems is also critical to ensure that health
services are being delivered to those populations and regions most in need.
Given the inherent challenges of health service delivery in such environ-
ments, a range of both diplomatic and operational adaptations to M&E
procedures are necessary. Using the ‘12 components’ of a functioningM&E
system as a conceptual and analytical framework, we observed and
reviewed the key challenges to M&E systems in South Sudan as part of a
broader review of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
activities supported by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria. Based on additional interview-based reviews and analyses of
M&E activities, a list of adaptations to standardized M&E procedures in
response to post-conflict environmental challenges was developed. The
study concludes that development and implementation of M&E systems in
post-conflict environments requires extensive adaptations to conventional
procedures. Flexible and adaptable as well as ‘diplomatically sensitized’
M&E systems are considered to be essential to the successful completion of
M&E-related activities, and may also contribute to broader international
relations, ‘nation-building’, and peace-keeping goals.
Keywords: Global Fund; global health diplomacy; monitoring and
evaluation; post-conflict; South Sudan
Introduction
Taking South Sudan as a specific case, the purpose of this paper is to share
information on M&E challenges in post-conflict settings, and to highlight
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associated diplomatic and operational adaptations, based on recent field
experiences.
Implementing global health programmes in resource-poor settings
Global health programmes make up a large and increasing share of overseas
development assistance (ODA) (McCoy 2009), making their successful
implementation all the more important, from both ‘value for money’
(Global Fund 2010) and cost-effectiveness (Gold 1996) perspectives.
However, implementing interventions for diseases of public health
importance such as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria in resource-poor settings
presents a range of both specific and cross-cutting challenges to in-country
health ministries, project directors, health care providers and donors. These
include, amongst others, the procurement of goods and services, recruitment
and retention of skilled health personnel, supply chains, funding flows, and
working within a limited health systems infrastructure (Fleischer et al.
2008). In particular, monitoring and evaluating the performance of global
health programmes in resource-limited settings can raise a wide range of
challenges, including adequacy of funding, accessibility of sites, regularity of
data reporting, and the effective completion of quality assurance and quality
control activities (UNAIDS 2009).
Additional challenges of post-conflict environments
Delivery of global health programmes is especially important in post-
conflict settings. Populations in post-conflict environments may be dis-
proportionately vulnerable to infectious diseases (Ghobarah 2004), and in
even greater need of health services than is normally the case in resource-
poor settings. In addition, the delivery of health services and the effective
functioning of the health system may continue to be affected by on-going
civil, social, military and political tensions in the post-conflict period,
especially in geographical areas still considered ‘insecure’ (ibid.). Similarly,
there may also be reluctance amongst implementers and donors to conduct
global health programmes in areas that may place their staff, project
partners and other resources (e.g., vehicles and medical equipment) at risk.
These conditions present significant challenges to the implementation of
modern M&E systems, in the context of the ‘12 components’ of a
functioning M&E system (UNAIDS 2009).
M&E systems
Monitoring and evaluation systems for health are made up of 12
‘components’, representing the full spectrum of M&E-related activities
(UNAIDS 2009), and providing a conceptual and analytical framework for


























the review and adaptation of M&E systems. These components are:
organizational structures for M&E; human capacity for M&E; M&E
partnerships; an M&E plan; a costed M&E work plan; M&E advocacy,
communications and culture; routine programme monitoring; surveys and
surveillance; M&E databases; supervision and data auditing; evaluation and
research; and data dissemination and use. In post-conflict settings, many (or
all) of these components will need to be adapted to local conditions. In the
descriptions below, the adaptation of each of these components to post-
conflict settings is described.
Monitoring and evaluation in post-conflict environments
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is an increasingly important dimension
of global health programmes (Feachem 2007). In the absence of monitoring
and evaluation activities, effective implementation of performance-based
funding models, such as those adopted by innovative financing mechanisms
such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the
‘Global Fund’) and the World Bank (Center for Global Development;
World Bank 2010) is difficult or impossible to achieve. M&E systems also
improve the quality of decision-making, enhance efficiency, serve as an anti-
corruption mechanism, and build capacity for understanding programme
success (The Lancet 2010). Producing consistent, verifiable and measurable
programme results is all the more important in both resource-poor and post-
conflict environments, where there is often a more immediate need for funds
to be used to maximum effect (Management Systems International 2006).
More specifically, effective monitoring and evaluation of activities in these
settings helps to:
. determine if health services are being delivered to those most in need;
. devise adaptations to strengthen or enhance the service delivery
process;
. contribute, wherever possible, to both the strengthening of the health
sector as well as the broader, system-wide rebuilding process that is
frequently required in post-conflict settings;
. perhaps most importantly, ensure accountability in the appropriate
flow and use of donor funds (Global Fund 2011b).
Challenges to monitoring and evaluation in post-conflict environments
M&E systems face significant challenges in post-conflict settings. Reporting
systems are frequently underdeveloped, and the timely reporting of reliable
information from facilities to districts (and upwards, to the national level)
faces both logistical and operational challenges (USAID/BASICS 2006).
These include:


























. local capacity to capture adequately or document key data points and
for the secure transmission of data;
. site accessibility for quality assurance purposes;
. lack of existing M&E infrastructure; and
. difficulties in recruiting and training local staff in M&E procedures.
Both conflict and resource limitations impact upon the capacity to
document the data, and illiteracy levels are often extremely high. Perhaps
most importantly, post-conflict settings place significant additional profes-
sional burdens on health services staff, including higher demands on
personal and professional capacity in the effective delivery of health services.
In this way, M&E activities are often relegated to the category of ‘optional
extras’ compared to the more immediate challenge of delivering health care,
and to which all available resources must often be devoted.
Results-based financing and global health diplomacy in post-conflict
environments
More broadly, both the ethos and requirements of results-based financing faces
a range of challenges in post-conflict settings. Perhapsmost significantly, target-
based performance evaluation systems, when under fixed terms of engagement,
may not always have the capacity to respond to broader environmental
considerations, placing donors, implementers and evaluators in challenging
positions as they attempt to reconcile a need to set feasible and realistic
program goals under complex (and often unpredictable) broader economic,
political, social and security conditions (Winderl 2006). These concatenations
of circumstances may often place significant strain on relations between
stakeholders (Eyben 2006). Although no metrics are currently available to
measure the contributions (or threats) to international relations ideals affected
by development programmes, ignoring their effects from a diplomatic
perspective risks creating a ‘tense and confusing duality’ between foreign
policy and foreign assistance (CSIS 2010). There is, therefore, a constant need
to ensure that the principles of ‘global health diplomacy’ (Fidler 2007,
Feldbaum 2010) underpin all aspects of results-based financing – including the
development and implementation of M&E systems.
Methodology
In this paper, we present a case study of M&E activities of the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (‘The Global Fund’) in South
Sudan, including key challenges, lessons learned, and recommendations for
conducting future M&E activities in similar resource-poor, post-conflict
environments. Between May 2010 and May 2012, the authors conducted
seven field visits to Southern Sudan (or, since July 2011, the independent


























nation of South Sudan) to evaluate the M&E systems used by the principal
grant recipient. Field visits ranged from one week to five weeks, involving
extensive travel throughout the country, in order to:
. assess M&E capacity for grant reviews;
. complete on-site data verification (OSDV) quality assurance activities.
Through a series of interviews with key stakeholders, including the M&E,
HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria departments of the Ministry of Health of the
Government of South Sudan, combined with site visits and the composition of
technical reports for the Global Fund’s local funding agent (LFA), KPMG
Kenya, the authors gained a detailed understanding of the challenges and
associated adaptations required for a functioning M&E system in this
environment. Data collection was, therefore, largely qualitative in nature, and
combined aspects of both operational and observational research. Based on
these experiences, a series of ‘lessons learned’ from the field were agreed upon
with key stakeholders including national M&E and health representatives,
donor organizations, the LFA team, and programme implementers.
Setting
Environmental challenges
Covering an area of over 2.5 million square kilometres, and with a total
population of 45 million, the Sudan is one of the largest – and poorest –
regions in the world, with per capita GNP of just over US$1000 (World
Bank 2010). In South Sudan, which formally seceded from the North in
January 2011, and was recognized by the United Nations as the independent
Republic of South Sudan in July 2011, conflict between rival tribal, political,
religious and ideological factions has been on-going since the 1950s (Prunier
2004). This environment has created a range of challenges to the effective
functioning of a public health system. In many regions, no health facilities
are available, with only the most basic health outposts servicing rural areas,
while on-going political and military insecurity has meant that the country’s
health infrastructure, including referral, reporting and supply systems, is
significantly underdeveloped. This is reflected in the very high maternal
mortality rates of 2054 per 100,000 live births and a mortality rate for
children under five years of age of 135 per 1000 live births (Southern Sudan
Ministry of Health 2011).
Monitoring and evaluation systems in South Sudan
The Sudanese national M&E system was established in 2003. M&E units
were established at the federal level and in six states (Sid Ahmed 2010). Since
secession, the Directorate of Research, Planning and Health System


























Development (DRPHSD), under the Ministry of Health of the Government
of South Sudan has been responsible for coordinating M&E functions of the
national public health system (Ministry of Health 2010). Other partners
supporting monitoring and evaluation system development in South Sudan
include the World Bank, the United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative
(GAVI), the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the World Health Organization (WHO) (Government of
South Sudan 2009). Monitoring and evaluation activities of Global Fund-
supported programmes in South Sudan are jointly managed by the
provisional Government of South Sudan Ministry of Health and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as principal grant recipient
(PR). In addition, the local funding agent (LFA) for the Global Fund,
KPMG Kenya, contributes to this process via oversight, verification and
validation of programmatic M&E data. Together with international
technical assistance, these groups are responsible for undertaking perfor-
mance reviews, quality assurance, and on-site data verification activities in
the South Sudan region, and, in this way, have attained a unique
understanding of the associated challenges to global health programme
implementation.
Global Fund activities in South Sudan
Global Fund support for South Sudan includes grants for HIV (US$27
million), tuberculosis (US$47 million), and malaria (US$90 million), as well
as separate initiatives for health systems strengthening programmes (US$20
million) (Global Fund 2011a). Across all grants, the Global Fund guidelines
recommend between five to ten per cent of funds to be used for M&E
functions (Global Fund 2011c): of the US$184 million Global Fund
investment in South Sudan, between US$9 million and US$18 million is set
aside for M&E activities (Global Fund 2011a). Cross-cutting M&E
activities, including national M&E system strengthening are all grant-
funded with a special focus on associated training and database and
reporting systems development under the health systems strengthening
grant.
Key challenges to monitoring and evaluation in South Sudan
Capacity for M&E of global health programmes across all of the ‘12
components’ faces a range of challenges in South Sudan (Ministry of Health
2010). Some of the most significant challenges include:
. the absence of standardized tools for use at service delivery points (e.g.
the health facility level);


























. the lack of a common understanding of indicator measurement
(leading to the use of different systems of measurement, across
different health facilities, for the same indicators);
. lack of clear mapping of health facilities supported by various
partners;
. an inadequate archiving system for source documents and registers;
. limited supportive supervision; and
. underutilization of available M&E resources.
Other important challenges include: geographical barriers to access;
political insecurity; and lack of qualified local human resources (including
high levels of staff attrition and limited availability of staff with basic data
skills) (United Nations Development Programme 2010). Specific challenges
and weaknesses of the M&E system in South Sudan may therefore be
divided into ‘operational’ and ‘diplomatic’ challenges.
Operational challenges
Organizational structures
The Ministry of Health of South Sudan has developed a comprehensive
national M&E framework for the health sector (Ministry of Health 2010).
This includes plans for the development of appropriate indicators,
supportive supervision, organizational structures, M&E advocacy capacity,
and M&E work plans (Ministry of Health 2011) under the auspices of the
Directorate of Research, Planning and Health System Development
(DRPHSD). However, day-to-day functioning of the national M&E system
faces numerous challenges, including availability of human resources,
technical capacity, and appropriate infrastructure. At present, state and
local Ministry of Health M&E systems are extremely limited, with one M&E
officer per governorate.
Data collection
Infectious diseases amongst displaced persons and refugees are a common
feature of post-conflict settings (Spiegel 2004). This presents a specific
challenge to data collection for M&E, including the accurate completion of
M&E records at the service delivery point level as well as additional
provision in the design of registers (e.g., community of origin vs. community
of residence and capacity to address or prevent high levels of loss-to-follow-
up), as a result of difficulties in identifying transient patients, combined with
associated challenges related to loss to treatment follow up for both HIV
and tuberculosis programmes. The diversity of cultures and languages
associated with such displacements also has important implications for the
efficiency and effectiveness of M&E-related data collection activities.


























Data reporting and flow
M&E reporting systems face particular challenges in post-conflict settings,
including regularity of data flows from health facilities or service delivery
points upwards to state and national levels. Supply chains, for both
goods and data, may be difficult or impossible to maintain, while
communications with health facilities outside the main urban areas is
often sporadic. Such systems are also frequently disrupted due to on-
going regional conflicts, leading to difficulties in demand forecasting and
inventory management and transmitting data or goods to or from
regional and central levels, making the M&E of drugs and equipment
very difficult. In the context of South Sudan, geography and weather
patterns also impact supply chains and reporting (United Nations
Development Programme 2010).
Human resources for M&E
Human resources capacity for M&E presents specific challenges in post-
conflict environments. M&E staff training and retention is a continuous
challenge, including the loss of trained staff through conflict, the
unwillingness of trained staff to risk working in unstable environments,
and unpredictable payment systems. In the setting of South Sudan,
training and retention of skilled staff present a unique set of challenges
from an M&E perspective, including completion of register data;
frequency of data transmission; analytical capacity and capacity for
information use; and establishment of professional relationships (United
Nations Development Programme 2010).
Surveys and surveillance
In post-conflict settings, the limited availability of recent epidemiological
data presents a particular challenge to the setting of indicator targets and
associated resource allocation decisions, and anecdotal evidence is
frequently used as a last resort to determine disease incidence and
prevalence levels in the absence of effective surveillance systems (United
Nations Development Programme 2010). In the case of South Sudan,
very little data on the HIV, tuberculosis or malaria epidemics was
collected during the most intensive years of conflict (Wakabi 2010),
making both the effectiveness and appropriateness of Global Fund
programmes hard to measure. Despite this, there have been efforts
to strengthen local capacity for data generation and utilization,
including the successful recent completion of a national Malaria
Indicator Survey (MIS) and Sudan ‘Household Surveys’ (The Global
Fund 2011a).


























Data quality and verification challenges
A range of challenges related to data quality and verification are unique to
post-conflict settings. These include transport (e.g., damaged roads, limited
air travel, and irregularity of scheduling), and complex security clearance
systems. In the case of South Sudan, verification of performance-related
data (e.g., inventories, review of treatment registers, site visits) is frequently
difficult to achieve due to these logistical challenges related to site visits.
Diplomatic challenges
M&E advocacy, communications and culture
M&E advocacy, communications and culture across all levels of the health
system are often limited in post-conflict environments, creating obstacles to
regular monitoring and evaluation activities. In particular, opportunities for
data dissemination and feedback of results are often severely affected by
regional and national conflict. This issue is compounded in resource-poor
settings, where existing communications systems may already be inadequate.
In the case of South Sudan, where there are only 70 internet hosting
organizations, there are no email and only limited telephone services in place
in most rural areas, and related key communications tools are virtually non-
existent (CIA World Factbook 2010). Similarly, the lack of ground transport
routes, including paved roads, between regions presents additional commu-
nications challenges from an M&E perspective.
M&E partnerships
A limited range of service delivery providers are in place in South Sudan.
Many organizations and staff are reluctant to deliver services in post-conflict
settings, for the reasons outlined above. As a result, the opportunities for
M&E partnerships between national bodies and international or other non-
governmental organizations, leveraging the latter’s strength and experience,
are very limited in these settings.
Lessons learned
Conducting monitoring and evaluation activities
In response to these challenges, the effective implementation of M&E
activities for global health programmes in South Sudan has required the
development of a unique set of skills and strategies by key stakeholders and
associated adaptations to the ‘12 components’. To this end, and in
collaboration with these groups, the following checklist of considerations
for the adaptation of M&E activities has been developed for the South
Sudan region, according to ‘diplomatic’ and ‘operational’ needs.




























One of the main challenges of M&E systems in post-conflict environments is
their institutionalization at all levels of reporting (Sid Ahmed 2010). In the
case of South Sudan, M&E plans make explicit reference to the development
of M&E systems at all reporting levels (UNDP 2010), with the goal of
furthering the ‘institutionalization’ of M&E throughout the health system.
Similarly, the implementation of donor-specific M&E organizational
structures should, wherever possible, contribute to the development of
national M&E systems. In South Sudan, where national monitoring and
evaluation systems are not yet fully developed, donors and implementers are
routinely asked, by the Global Fund, to consider the value of their models in
forming the basis of national systems (UNDP 2010) in order to ensure that
these broader programme sustainability considerations are successfully
taken into account.
Data collection
Wherever possible, standardized M&E database systems should be
adaptable to post-conflict environments. This includes development of
contingency plans for missing data; changes in the minimum requirements
for data reporting (as opposed to the development of completely new M&E
systems); more flexible M&E-related standard operating procedures; and a
higher degree of collaboration with local actors (e.g., health facility M&E
staff) than might usually be the case. This is reflected in the development of
M&E databases by Global Fund principal recipients in South Sudan, which
makes specific provision for the development of advanced capacity in these
areas (UNDP 2010).
Data reporting and flow
Timelines for M&E data submission should be developed with the
challenges of a resource-poor, post-conflict environment in mind. If
possible, reporting may need to take place at a less frequent rate than in
stable settings, in recognition of infrastructural and resource challenges.
These considerations are reflected in M&E activities in South Sudan, where
flexibility in responding to reporting requirements is frequently required
(UNDP, personal communication, 2010).
Data quality and verification challenges
Without the availability of additional time to conduct M&E activities, the
risk that scheduling, logistical or security concerns will disrupt the timely


























completion of quality assurance activities is significantly heightened. If
necessary, adapted timelines may be required to complete monitoring and
evaluation activities such as on-site data verifications (OSDVs). In addition,
it may be necessary to commence activities in advance of deadlines, to allow
for disruptions.
Diplomatic adaptations
M&E advocacy, communications and culture
The M&E process requires a specific focus on diplomatic procedures in post-
conflict settings, including awareness of possible cultural and religious
differences between the M&E team and regional staff, especially in rural
areas. Clarity in communications during the M&E process is also of
particular importance, and includes use of appropriate, non-sectarian
terminology. In South Sudan, this approach is an integral part of M&E
activities (UNDP, personal communication, 2010).
M&E partnerships
The activities of a large number of donors and non-governmental
organizations, all operating small- to medium-sized projects, as is
often the case in post-conflict settings, makes the harmonization of
M&E activities among partners all the more important. This includes
regular meetings among partners to ensure that no duplication of M&E
effort is taking place. In South Sudan, the establishment of an
intersectoral M&E working group meant that M&E activities are
increasingly coordinated across donor and national organizations, with
quarterly meetings established to facilitate the exchange of experiences
and developments among stakeholders (Government of Southern Sudan
2010).
Planning, coordination and security
Additional planning and coordination are required for site visits, including
advance notice of planned site visits. In addition, where possible, all partners
(e.g., Ministry of Health and PR representatives) should attempt to
coordinate their activities rather than conducting individual assessments.
Security measures are also central to the safety of the monitoring and
evaluation team. For international staff working in the region, it is advisable
to complete appropriate security clearances; schedule a ‘Plan B’ in order to
avoid potential ‘flash points’ or insecure areas; carefully observe local
political developments; and maintain close contact with security, NGO and
other organizations who can provide timely information on security
situations.


























Contributions to peace-keeping and nation-building
Although development initiatives have had some effect in de-escalating post-
conflict tensions in South Sudan, in many cases they have been unable to
address broader social, economic and political issues due to a lack of
coordination with broader international strategic planning initiatives
(MacRae 1997). Ideally, and wherever possible, M&E activities, which
may leverage international communications links, should contribute to both
the peace-keeping and nation-building processes in conflict and post-conflict
settings (Church and Rogers 2006). This includes awareness of the potential
collateral contributions of M&E systems (e.g., improved national and
international communications and health systems strengthening), to the
broader conflict resolution process, as well as the interaction of local and
national priorities and their role in de-escalating tensions (Anten 2010).
Feldbaum (2010) notes that such health system strengthening activities in
post-conflict settings and their role in counter insurgency and nation-
building efforts ‘has further intertwined health and national security
objectives’. However, while the nexus between health sector development
and specific aspects of global health programmes have been widely
recognized (Biemsa et al. 2009), the causal mechanism with the ‘nation-
building’ process remains unclear (Eldon et al. 2008). This remains an area
of on-going research, for which specific metrics and outcome measures have
yet to be developed (Bonventre 2008), and which may represent a key
shortcoming of existing M&E systems.
Conclusions
Results
A range of challenges to M&E activities in post-conflict environments has
been identified, as well as associated adaptations. These included modifica-
tions to standardized procedures for reporting timeframes, communications,
planning coordination and security, and contributions to broader peace-
keeping activities in response to the post-conflict challenges of limited
regional accessibility, epidemiological data, supply chain and reporting
systems, and the M&E of displaced persons and refugees.
Achievements to date
A number of achievements in the strengthening of M&E activities specific to
post-conflict settings have already taken place in South Sudan. These
include the introduction of a number of initiatives designed to implement
the ‘lessons learned’ described above, which relate to the development of
national M&E tools, a common understanding on indicators and data
collection procedures, and improved harmonization of M&E activities


























across partners. In particular, the Ministry of Health has developed a
National M&E Framework for the health sector (Ministry of Health 2010),
and a National Health sector M&E Technical Working Group has been
created in order to provide closer coordination and technical support to the
national M&E system. In addition, UNDP M&E staff are located in close
proximity to the Ministry of Health to ensure closer collaboration between
government and donors.
The Global Fund has also made significant contributions to building on
specific ‘lessons learned’ for M&E in the South Sudan context. These include
support for national M&E system strengthening, through contributions to
the conduct of the 2009 national malaria indicator survey; the strengthening
of state level M&E systems through renovation of transportation,
equipment and internet connections; and completion of the antenatal clinic
sentinel surveillance survey for HIV (The Global Fund 2011a). In addition,
the process of health facility mapping – a major challenge to date in South
Sudan – is currently being finalized in order to provide information on
location and tracking of services, human resources, infrastructure and
equipment. Mapping has now been completed in nine out of the ten states of
South Sudan. More broadly, such development of M&E systems in South
Sudan looks likely to continue to increase after the comprehensive peace
agreement (Sin Ahmed 2010).
Next steps
Global health programmes are in high demand in post-conflict, resource-
poor settings, where the need for public health services is both immediate
and on-going. In few other environments is the need for healthcare as
urgently required. While the delivery of urgently-required health services
should not be constrained by the presence or absence of an M&E system, in
order for these programmes to function efficiently and effectively, and to
validate and maintain performance-based funding streams, functioning
M&E systems must be in place. In this article, we have attempted to describe
both the challenges to and achievements of M&E systems development and
adaptation in post-conflict settings. However, a number of the above
‘lessons learned’ still need to be operationalized in the conduct of M&E
activities in South Sudan – not least the development of appropriate metrics
to determine the contributions of global health and other development
programmes to more abstract goals including international relations,
‘nation-building’, and peace-keeping activities. In addition, while this is
based on experiences on South Sudan, it is to be assumed that these are, in
many cases, also common to other conflict and post-conflict, resource-poor
settings. Based on consideration of the above guidelines, programme
managers may take heart that an appropriately-adapted M&E system in
such a setting is not only feasible, but may have the potential to make a


























significant contribution, not just to national health systems strengthening,
but also to the broader ‘nation building’ process.
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Background: International development programmes, including global
health interventions, have the capacity to make important implicit and
explicit benefits to diplomatic and international relations outcomes.
Conversely, in the absence of awareness of these implications, such
programmes may generate associated threats. Due to heightened interna-
tional tensions in conflict and post-conflict settings, greater attention to
diplomatic outcomes may therefore be necessary. We examine related ‘col-
lateral’ effects of Global Fund-supported tuberculosis programmes in Iraq.
Methods: During site visits to Iraq conducted during 2012 and 2013 on
behalf of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, on-
site service delivery evaluations, unstructured interviews with clinical and
operational staff, and programme documentary review of Global Fund-sup-
ported tuberculosis treatment and care programmes were conducted. Dur-
ing this process, a range of possible external or collateral international
relations and diplomatic effects of global health programmes were assessed
according to predetermined criteria. Results: A range of positive diplomatic
and international relations effects of Global Fund-supported programmes
were observed in the Iraq setting. These included (1) geo-strategic accessi-
bility and coverage; (2) provisions for programme sustainability and
alignment; (3) contributions to nation-building and peace-keeping
initiatives; (4) consistent observation of social, cultural and religious norms
in intervention selection; and (5) selection of the most effective and
cost-effective tuberculosis treatment and care interventions. Conclusions:
Investments in global health programmes have valuable diplomatic, as well
as health-related, outcomes, associated with their potential to prevent,
mitigate or reverse international tension and hostility in conflict and post-
conflict settings, provided that they adhere to appropriate criteria. The
associated international presence in such regions may also contribute to
peace-keeping efforts. Global health programmes may frequently produce a
wider range of ‘collateral benefits’ that conventional monitoring and
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evaluation systems should be expanded to assess, in keeping with
contemporary efforts to leverage development programmes from a ‘global
health diplomacy’ perspective.
Keywords: global health diplomacy; Iraq; conflict; tuberculosis;
international relations
Background
Tuberculosis and Global Fund-supported tuberculosis programmes in Iraq
Iraq has an estimated population of 32 million, and, in 2011, was ranked 44th
out of 212 countries and territories by estimated number of tuberculosis cases
(WHO 2012). Iraq is also amongst the nine ‘high tuberculosis burden’ countries
in the World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office
(WHO-EMRO) Region, contributing 3% of total tuberculosis cases worldwide
(WHO 2012). Total tuberculosis caseload was 24,000 in 2011, of which 15,000
were new cases detected that year (WHO 2012). In response, the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, in collaboration with the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), began providing support to the Iraqi
National Tuberculosis Program (NTP) in 2007, with total investments to date of
approximately US$29.7 million (Global Fund 2012). Key focus areas include
(1) support to the delivery of services for quality Direct Observation Treatment
Strategy (DOTS) tuberculosis care for poor and vulnerable populations; (2) pro-
grammatic expansion to include the three northern governorates within the Ku-
rdistan Region (Erbil, Sulimaniya and Duhok); (3) increasing the NTP’s
management capacity; (4) increasing case detection rates of smear-positive
tuberculosis cases to 70% by 2014 and positive treatment outcomes amongst
smear positive cases to 85% and the treatment success rate for incident cases
(all new cases plus relapses) to 89%; and (5) improving universal access to
diagnosis, treatment and care for Multi Drug-Resistant tuberculosis
(MDR-TB) (UNDP 2010a), for which 84 cases existed in 2011 (WHO 2012).
At least in part as a result of these initiatives, notifications of smear positive
cases in Iraq increased from 38% in 2006 to almost 57% in 2011 (WHO 2011),
while estimated mortality from TB per 100,000 population has declined from
4.1 in 2005 to 3.2 in 2011 (WHO 2012).
Challenges to tuberculosis programmes in Iraq
High levels of stigma surrounding tuberculosis (including, for example the
reluctance of infected persons to approach health care providers due to social
pressures) have resulted in significant challenges to treatment and care in Iraq.
In addition, the prolonged recent conflict has resulted in significant reductions
in the infrastructural and human capital capacity of the NTP, operating under
the auspices of the national Ministry of Health, to deliver effective diagnosis,
treatment and prevention campaigns in many parts of the country (Al-Hilfi,

























Lafta, and Burnham 2013). Governorates across Iraq also vary immensely in
terms of security, geography and cultural diversity, with a wide range of differ-
ing languages and dialects (e.g. Arabic, Sorani, Kurmanji, Azeri, Aramaic);
religions (including Shia, Sunni, Yezidi, Zoroastrian, Christian, Jewish); and
ethnicities (such as Kurdish, Arabic, Assyrian, Turkmen, Feyli), presenting
challenges to standardized, equitable and consistent intervention implementa-
tion. In addition, current epidemiological data for tuberculosis, as well as other
health conditions, is limited by the lack of any recent national census or survey
data in the country beyond the landmark collaborative NTP and WHO
‘capture-recapture’ study (Huseynova et al. 2013). Above all, the current secu-
rity situation is a major limitation for global health and other international
development projects (Lane 2013), as a result of both ongoing high levels of
terrorism as well as continuing political and religious tensions throughout the
country (Fawcett 2013). In this context, there have been calls for the more
explicit use of global health programmes as a tool of international relations
and diplomacy in the Iraq setting as a meaningful alternative to the pursuit of
‘hard power’ interventions (Horton 2006).
The development of a ‘global health diplomacy’ perspective
A number of articles have outlined the rationale for the pursuit of broader
diplomatic objectives through foreign assistance programmes (see, for example
CSIS 2010; Feldbaum 2010; Feldbaum and Michaud 2010; Katz et al. 2012;
Novotny and Adams 2007). As well as achieving their direct and planned
programmatic goals, global health initiatives also have the capacity to make sig-
nificant collateral contributions to the diplomatic and international relations
goals of donor countries, including conflict resolution, nation-building and
regional peace-keeping activities (Feldbaum 2010). Simultaneously, dramatic
recent increases in funding for global health programmes under programmes
such as the Global Fund and the USA’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief mean that there is increased demand for the evaluation of both direct
(Bendavid and Bhattacharya 2009) and indirect (or ‘collateral’) programme
impacts, outcomes and outputs (Walensky and Kuritzkes 2010). In this context,
Fidler (2007), in advancing the concept of ‘global health diplomacy’, defined
here as the dual goals of improving global health and bettering international
relations in conflict areas and resource-poor environments (Novotny and Adams
2007), notes that the traditional political hierarchy (in which foreign assistance
programmes, including health initiatives, are traditionally consigned to the field
of ‘low politics’) is, increasingly, informed by development activities. As a
result of this paradigm shift, the role, design and implementation of global
health programmes is being reexamined in the light of their potential contribu-
tion to the ‘high political’ aims of diplomacy and international relations.

























Diplomacy and global health
Global health programmes are, therefore, increasingly visible in conflict and
post-conflict settings around the world (United States Institute of Peace 2009),
leveraged, where possible, by donor countries, in a strategic capacity, both (1)
to win ‘hearts and minds’ in lieu of ‘hard power’ options in a ‘smart power’
international relations framework (CSIS 2007, 2010); and (2) in keeping with a
‘statist’ approach which seeks to link health initiatives to a diplomatic remit
(Alesina and Dollar 1998; Davies 2011). In order to achieve these broader
goals, global health programmes are increasingly aligned with the principles of
international relations, helping to inform the selection, design, structure and
delivery of associated interventions (Chatham House 2011), while the funda-
mental guiding principles of diplomacy are increasingly integrated into their
design and delivery (McInnes and Lee 2012; Novotny and Adams 2007).
Although these principles have not been exhaustively defined, and measure-
ment of related programmatic performance lies well outside the range of con-
ventional monitoring & evaluation systems (Bonventre 2008), the evaluation of
global health’s contributions to international relations outcomes is increasingly
of interest (Novotny and Kevany 2013).
The Global Fund and global health diplomacy
While the Global Fund is a non-aligned, apolitical organization (Global Fund
2013a), all global health activities may, deliberately or inadvertently, produce
diplomatic and international relations dividends as well as health gains
(Feldbaum and Michaud 2010). In addition, the Global Fund is guided in
resource allocation decisions across and within recipient countries by the
strategic preferences of donor countries, specifically those related to (1) donor
bilateral development objectives and priorities (Aidspan 2013a) and (2) capac-
ity-building activities in countries of specific interest to donors (Aidspan
2013b). In the Iraq context, though none of the Global Fund’s programmes are
intentionally, consciously or explicitly designed to address international rela-
tions or diplomatic issues, related outcomes may therefore nonetheless occur
on an unplanned, ad hoc basis. Significantly, multilateral and non-aligned ini-
tiatives such as the Global Fund are uniquely positioned to deliver health ser-
vices, with appropriate diplomatic gains, in areas and regions where bilateral
donors may fear to tread.
Developing and conducting a global health diplomacy evaluation
Given the importance of cultural and social considerations in conflict and post-
conflict settings, the Global Fund attempts to take into consideration ‘program
appropriateness’ as well as programme effectiveness and efficiency (Global
Fund 2010), at least in part as a result of close attention to communications

























protocols and joint decision-making with the NTP (Lane 2013). In this context,
and in order to attempt to evaluate the achievement of both the implicit and
explicit international relations outcomes by foreign assistance programmes in
post-conflict settings, we applied a range of criteria outlining the key features
of diplomatically ‘sensitized’ global health programmes to tuberculosis preven-
tion, treatment and care programmes supported by the Global Fund in Iraq.
Methods
Global health diplomacy evaluation criteria development
Proposed possible criteria for the development of ‘diplomatically effective’
foreign assistance programmes were developed based on a review of the litera-
ture and in conjunction with a parallel book chapter (Novotny and Kevany
2013). Through this review of publications related to (1) health diplomacy; (2)
global health and international relations; and (3) global health and foreign pol-
icy, we extracted those diplomatic principles and characteristics considered
desirable, appropriate and effective in global health programmes in order to
form the basis of a ‘global health diplomacy’ perspective for programme evalu-
ation, as articulated in the recent book Twenty-First Century Global Health
Diplomacy (Novotny and Kickbusch 2009). Briefly, these include questions
such as ‘does the global health programme assist access to strategic resources
or markets’; ‘is the donor’s regional or international influence and prestige
enhanced’; and, perhaps most importantly, ‘has this program contributed to
regional stability, nation-building, international relations, helping us move
towards world peace.’ This suggested principles for (1) the pursuit of
diplomatic objectives in the global health context (e.g. Feldbaum 2010); (2)
requirements for the achievement of ‘global health diplomacy’ outcomes (e.g.
Kickbusch and Buss 2011); and (3) international relations, security and ‘smart
power’ considerations (e.g. CSIS 2010). For each criterion, associated
contributions and achievements from Global Fund-supported tuberculosis
programmes in Iraq were assessed and described.
Site visits
In April and May 2012, and in September and October 2013, the authors
conducted a series of field visits to tuberculosis diagnosis, treatment and
prevention service delivery points (SDPs) supported by the Global Fund in the
Kurdistan Regional Governorate (KRG) of Iraq, including the Sulimaniya,
Duhok and Erbil governorates. These visits were organized in concert with the
Global Fund’s Local Fund Agent, KPMG LLP, the NTP and the grant principal
recipient (UNDP), for the Global Fund’s on-site data verification (OSDV) and
routine service quality assessment (RSQA) review purposes. SDPs included
specialized tuberculosis clinics, general hospitals with tuberculosis coordination

























units, primary health care centres and regional tuberculosis offices throughout
the KRG.
Interviews
Programme implementation and challenges were reviewed and evaluated
through direct observation of service capacity and delivery, as well as through
(1) a series of semi-structured interviews with clinical and operational
representatives at the SDP level; (2) meetings with representatives of the
UNDP and grant sub-recipients (including representatives of the International
Medical Corps); (3) during meetings and discussions with NTP officials; and
(4) as a part of discussions with recipients of tuberculosis services. During
SDP site visits, interviews with stakeholders and service delivery providers
were also conducted. This process was complemented by observational data
collection on the alignment of tuberculosis programme design with the princi-
ples of international relations and diplomacy.
Document review
Site visits and associated interviews were complemented and supplemented
by desk reviews of the interventions, targets and implementation structure of
associated Global Fund tuberculosis grants for Iraq, including the review of
(1) grant principal recipients’ and sub-recipients’ performance frameworks;
(2) associated monitoring and evaluation work plans; and (3) progress update
and disbursement request reports. In addition, all other available records
related to service delivery, geographical coverage and programme
achievements at the SDP level were reviewed during, and subsequent to,
each site visit. This included review of (1) programme structure and design;
(2) staffing; (3) geographical coverage; (4) target populations; and (5) interac-
tions with national and donor institutions. Finally, additional data on the
content of UNDP programmes, including specific provisions for consider-
ations around the potential collateral intervention outcomes of diplomacy,
peace-keeping, nation building and conflict prevention were sourced from
subsequent correspondence with UNDP in-country representatives.
Results
Geo-strategic accessibility and coverage
Geo-strategic considerations of global health and other international
development programmes relate to assessments of their location from a
political, security or even counter-terrorism perspective (Christ and Daniel
2013). Global Fund and UNDP-supported sites in Iraq range from a 60-bed
federal hospital, for treating drug-resistant cases of tuberculosis, to the smallest

























‘Category-C’ primary health care centres in remote and rural areas,
representing a broad range of both geographical coverage and service delivery
options (Al-Hilfi, Lafta, and Burnham 2013). In addition, the initiation of
health volunteer activities in the marshlands of southern Iraq through the
training of women health volunteers has also taken place as a direct result of
Global Fund support (resulting in both increased case detection among
household contacts and improved follow-up on treatment). More broadly, the
18 governorates in which Global Fund-supported interventions are currently
available in Iraq include all 124 national health districts, the three northern
governorates of the KRG and all disputed areas between the KRG and Iraq
(Kirkuk and Ninewa), in addition to current conflict areas including the
Baghdad, Salaheldeen, Anbar, Basra and Diyala Governorates. Global Fund
and UNDP activity in these areas represents rare cases in which international,
UN-mandated presences are permitted, which otherwise remain, to a great
extent, inaccessible to most multinational or multilateral organizations.
Intervention selection
The selection of culturally, religiously and socially appropriate global health
interventions is particularly important in conflict and post-conflict settings
(Rubenstein 2011), where sensitivities both to the nature and goals of donor
involvement and, as a result, utilization of the interventions themselves, may
be significantly affected (Kevany 2013). With these considerations in mind,
Global Fund tuberculosis programmes in Iraq maintain strict fidelity to interna-
tionally approved interventions for tuberculosis treatment, prevention and care
(Global Fund 2011), focusing on (1) expansion of quality assured tuberculosis
diagnostic and treatment services; (2) tuberculosis interventions for high risk
population groups; (3) engagement of the private sector in tuberculosis control;
(4) operational research and impact measurement; (5) provision of quality-
assured laboratory services for MDR-TB; (6) developing human resources spe-
cific to MDR-TB; (7) M&E; and (8) tuberculosis drug and case management
(UNDP 2012). In addition, Global Fund-supported interventions were selected
based on the domestic needs such as strengthening the capacity of diagnostic
laboratories and infrastructure of the TB care facilities. For the Round 6 and
Round 9 (Phase I) Global Fund grants, the UNDP-NTP partnership has
focused on the provision of first- and second-line tuberculosis treatment, as
well as developing human resources to provide associated services including
DOTs training, smear sputum microscopy and MDR-TB drug and case man-
agement. Tuberculosis treatment, prevention and broader health systems
strengthening efforts, therefore, consciously avoid the use of any potentially
culturally, religiously, or socially sensitive interventions. In addition, all Global
Fund-supported programmes for tuberculosis treatment and prevention in Iraq
are explicitly non-ideological, avoiding the use of religious, cultural or other
influences (Partners in Health 2012).


























Appropriate branding of global health interventions may help to improve
perceptions of donor countries and organizations amongst recipient populations
(Leonzon 2010). At a number of SDPs visited during site visits, international
branding, both for the Global Fund and the UNDP, was observed in the form
of (1) Global Fund annotations on key diagnostic instruments; (2) presence of
Global Fund logos and plaques outside health care provider sites; and (3)
branding of programme vehicles and other equipment. In addition, throughout
the grant, a number of high-profile events, supported by both the Global Fund
and the UNDP, and attracting significant media coverage (e.g. tuberculosis
conferences; the launch of tuberculosis partnerships; the hand-over of the coun-
try’s first specialized tuberculosis hospital to the NTP), took place (Touma
2012; WHO 2012). In addition, the logos of all multilateral partners, including
the Global Fund, the UNDP and the WHO are found on most health registers,
guidelines and equipment (UNDP, personal communication). The use of Global
Fund branding and logos should be distinguished from bilateral branding,
which may cause tensions and hostility in conflict and post-conflict settings
(see, for example Kolaczinski et al. 2005). Programme branding was, therefore,
observed to avoid the use of references to specific donor countries, focusing
specifically on descriptions of the forms of treatment and support available.
Programme sustainability and alignment
Limitations on, or threats to, programme sustainability present one of the great-
est threats to both health and diplomatic outcomes of global health pro-
grammes (Lyman and Wittels 2010). Conversely, sustainable global health
programmes designed in a manner closely aligned with, and transferrable to,
recipient country priorities and capacities have the potential to produce signifi-
cant diplomatic dividends (McInnes and Lee 2012). In this context, Global
Fund-supported programmes in Iraq have built on close relationships with both
the NTP and the national Ministry of Health throughout the grant process, with
both priority alignment and intervention transferability forming essential ele-
ments of programme design and delivery (Al-Hilfi, Lafta, and Burnham 2013;
Lane 2013; Touma 2012): since the beginning of Global Fund grant activity in
Iraq, related objectives have consistently been derived from the goals of NTP.
As part of the UNDP mandate and the mission priorities of the Global Fund,
the NTP and the Iraq Anti-Tuberculosis Association (of which the latter are
the only two national stakeholders in the Global Fund project in Iraq) are cur-
rently undergoing capacity development in both administrative and financial
aspects, in addition to the technical strengthening that the NTP has received
from the Global Fund since 2008 (UNDP, personal communication). In particu-
lar, national health system capacity-building through training of health workers
and management staff has become a key element of broader efforts to ensure

























programme sustainability (Yang, Farmer, and McGahan 2010). Similarly, all
Global Fund-supported SDPs visited during site visits were found to be operat-
ing under the auspices of nationally approved tuberculosis care providers at the
governorate, regional and district levels, rather than through independent or
external providers, with a view to eventual funding and administrative transi-
tion. Programme sustainability has also been promoted through investment in
capital good that simultaneously contributes to the pursuit of health systems
strengthening goals. This includes (1) strengthening the infrastructure of the
NTP through renovation of tuberculosis clinics and MDR-TB in-patient hospi-
tals; (2) procurement of diagnostic equipment designed to extend programme
services to reach the most vulnerable populations (e.g. X-ray machines and
microscopes for tuberculosis clinics in prisons; provision of molecular diagnos-
tic equipment to TB coordination units at the district level); and (3) fully
equipping five culture laboratories and two mobile clinics to provide
tuberculosis services to internally displaced populations (UNDP 2012).
Contributions to ‘nation-building’ and peace-keeping initiatives
Given the location of Global Fund-supported initiatives in a number of conflict
and post-conflict regions, potential contributions to peace-keeping and ‘nation-
building’ (and rebuilding) exercises are often regarded as hidden ‘collateral’
programme outputs (Kevany 2012; Novotny and Kevany 2013). These include
the contribution of international actors to the maintenance of an established,
non-military international peace-keeping presence. Nonetheless, the causal
mechanism between improved security and the presence of international devel-
opment programmes is unclear (Eldon, Waddington, and Hadi 2008). Although
it is impossible to state categorically that global health programmes contribute
to the augmentation of peace and stability, local stakeholders noted that the
provision of such services has helped to allay hostility and conflict in certain
settings, not least through the common provision of equally accessible tubercu-
losis services, independent of local factionalism. Similarly, the Global Fund
currently supports a number of refugee initiatives in Iraq, through the NTP, for
the treatment of TB as a result of the current Syrian refugee crisis. Above all,
the neutral stance of the Global Fund towards sensitive international political
issues has provided a healthy ground for proper cooperation with national
authorities (NTP, personal communication).
Programme effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Global health programmes are more likely to be diplomatically effective if they
can be associated with proven results (CSIS 2010). Similarly, global health
programmes are more likely to advance diplomatic goals if they can be demon-
strated to save more lives than alternative investments (Marseille and Hofmann
2002). All of the tuberculosis treatment, care and prevention activities in the

























Iraq setting were selected, wherever possible, to be both effective and
cost-effective in health economics terms. This is in keeping with the stated
policies of the Global Fund, to ensure that, wherever possible, optimal ‘value
for money’ is attained (The Global Fund 2010), and illustrated by a focus on
the provision of large-scale, low-cost, diagnostic and treatment interventions
for tuberculosis such as those described above. For example, the Iraq National
Reference Laboratory, with support from the Global Fund, passed drug
proficiency susceptibility panel tests that decreased the cost of MDR diagnosis
which was previously done abroad in Egypt, Iran, Jordan and India (NTP,
personal communication), while declines in the percentage of unfavourable
treatment outcomes (e.g. died, treatment failure, default or transfer) from 16%
(2007) to 11% (2012) due to good drug adherence reflects the success of
proven cost-effective community-based advocacy, communication and social
mobilization programmes (NTP, personal communication).
M&E and anti-corruption systems
Improved international communications are increasingly recognized by both
bilateral and multilateral donors as an essential feature of international coopera-
tion (Dahinden 2011), including the development of links to isolated popula-
tions through which global health initiatives can build networks and
relationships (Kevany, Hatfield et al. 2012). In this context, the establishment
of national and international M&E systems has formed a key component of the
Global Fund’s programmes in Iraq. In 2012, a national M&E database was
piloted in nine governorates by the UNDP, and, once launched online in 2013,
will become the Iraqi Ministry of Health’s first official M&E database. To
complement this initiative, both computers and Internet services have been pro-
vided to all tuberculosis clinics by the UNDP as part of a strategy to
strengthen M&E capacity at the regional level. More broadly, updated M&E
registers, treatment and identity cards, sheets and using an electronic nominal
recording system have now been introduced in all governorates (NTP, personal
communication). These advancements improve the development of timely and
standardized reporting systems, both internally and internationally, on pro-
gramme performance. In addition to playing a valuable role in both improve-
ment of programme accountability and evidencing programme effectiveness,
and also in terms of anti-corruption (Global Fund 2012), these M&E systems
also provide valuable national and international communications mediums in
otherwise-inaccessible settings. Similarly, and as part of the site visits, both
Global Fund OSDV and RSQA activities by international actors were con-
ducted successfully, for the first time, in 2012, and subsequently in 2013, gen-
erating further M&E communications advances between local stakeholders and
international actors. NTP representatives recognized that a key feature of the
Global Fund’s performance-based funding model is its capacity to improve
financial accountability, thereby mitigating the risk of donor (or recipient)

























concerns related to inappropriate use of funds (Al-Hilfi, personal
communication).
International partnerships
Global health programmes may contribute to the development of sub-national,
national and international partnerships with reference to appropriate standards
for how donor and multilateral organizations should interact with governments
in recipient countries (Adams, Novotny, and Leslie 2008; CSIS 2010), coordi-
nate initiatives (CSIS 2010), and build international alliances beyond health
(Kickbusch and Buss 2011). International partnerships between the Global
Fund and in-country stakeholders in Iraq are mediated by the UNDP (UNDP
2012) and include a range of innovative collaborative mechanisms between the
grant principal recipient, the Global Fund, the National Ministry of Health, the
NTP and other departments of the Iraqi government. For example, the Iraq
Global Fund country coordinating mechanism (CCM) has been chaired
throughout the grant process by the Iraqi Minister for Health, while the Global
Fund-supported ‘Stop Tuberculosis Partnership’ is under the joint patronage of
the First Lady of Iraq and the WHO-EMRO (WHO-EMRO 2012). In addition,
both the Global Fund and the UNDP have advanced regional partnerships (e.g.
with the KRG) for programme implementation purposes, helping to build both
national and international partnerships through global health initiatives.
Economic benefits
International health programmes may generate economic benefits at both the
macro- and microeconomic levels (Bhargava et al. 2010; Kevany, Murima et al.
2012), which, in turn, broaden global health intervention effectiveness from a
diplomatic perspective (Feldbaum 2010; Fidler 2007). In Iraq, related economic
benefits of Global Fund-supported programmes were observed to include (1) the
presence of a significant number of patients of working age undergoing
tuberculosis treatment, thereby contributing to the labour force; (2) the
generation of links between healthcare and other social services (e.g. referral of
tuberculosis patients to social services at both SDP and regional levels); and (3)
the ‘up-skilling’ and associated increased earning potential of tuberculosis
training programmes for health professionals. For example, both case
notifications and successfully treated TB patients in Iraq are consistently highest
amongst persons of working age (NTP, personal communication). At the patient
level, UNDP planning documents (see below) also make explicit their program-
matic focus on both (1) increasing social equity for tuberculosis patients; and (2)
reducing stigma towards, and thereby employability of, tuberculosis patients
(UNDP 2013).


























The failure to align global health activities, and related policies, with broader
strategic and diplomatic considerations may create a ‘tense and confusing dual-
ity’ for both donor and recipient organizations (CSIS 2010). Unless carefully
designed in this context, global health programmes run the risk of unintention-
ally obstructing, or even opposing, international relations and diplomatic
considerations. In the case of Iraq, political instability and tensions within the
central government of Baghdad are ongoing, challenging both the ease with
which international donors can provide assistance while also affecting their
willingness towards involvement with global health programmes (Al-Hilfi, per-
sonal communication). In Iraq, Global Fund and UNDP-supported tuberculosis
interventions have, since their introduction, adhered to broader, strategic coun-
try policies as jointly generated by the UNDP and the Government of Iraq,
including the National Development Plan for the Government of Iraq 2011 to
2014 (Iraq National Ministry of Planning 2010) and the United Nations Devel-
opment Assistance Framework for Iraq 2011–2014 (UNDP 2010b). Equally
importantly, tuberculosis treatment and care programmes in Iraq are directly
linked to the Millennium Development Goals (specifically, to Goal 6: ‘Combat
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases’ and Target 6C: ‘To have halted and
begun to reverse by 2015 the incidence of malaria and other major diseases’)
(United Nations 2013).
Commitment to ‘high-profile’ conditions
Tuberculosis remains one of the most ‘high profile’ diseases in Iraq and
throughout the Middle East, both due to historical links with the region and
ongoing high caseloads in global terms (WHO 2012). In this context, the
capacity of Global Fund-supported programmes to focus on conditions wide-
spread in the general population, rather than limiting interventions to specific
regions or population groups, in turn results in more visible, high-profile, high-
impact and ‘popularized’ global health programmes, which are, in turn, more
likely to attract benign national and international attention (Feldbaum, Lee and
Michaud 2010). Such enhanced coverage provides, in itself, a compelling med-
ium for diplomatic effects of global health programmes. As is the case with
HIV in other contexts (e.g. Lyman and Wittels 2010), the introduction of
health campaigns for conditions whose neglect may otherwise constitute threats
to economic, political or social stability may also be associated with such pro-
grammes. In the Iraq setting, TB remains one of the most ‘high-profile’ and
epidemiologically significant diseases, with recent evidence indicating that, of
the 14,500 TB cases in Iraq in 2011, up to 31% (95% CI 24–42) were unre-
ported (Huseynova et al. 2013). In this context, Global Fund support of the
NTP has expanded involvement of primary health care centres (PHCCs)

























throughout the country to 1186 sites (62% of all PHCCs) (NTP, personal com-
munication), representing significant population and geographical coverage.
Global health and clandestine activities
Clandestine interaction between political and military intelligence-gathering
activities and global health programmes has been shown to increase the secu-
rity risk of both programme staff and programme recipients (Wood-Wright
2013). In addition, the inclusion of clandestine agendas as part of global health
programmes risks potentially negative diplomatic and international relations
consequences between recipient and donor countries (ibid). Nonetheless, the
more explicit collaboration between armed forces and development pro-
grammes has become an increased prerogative in many parts of the world,
designed to protect non-military program staff (Burkle 2013). In a recent open
letter, the Deans of the major medical schools in the USA called on the incum-
bent US political administration to strengthen efforts to make more explicit the
interaction between global health and clandestine (as well as explicit) military
and strategic intelligence activities (Bueken et al. 2013). In the case of Iraq,
improving personnel security whilst also ensuring that the risk of diplomatic
incidents occurring on this basis is minimized is of central importance to the
achievement of both health and non-health goals.
Discussion
Limitations on the role and applicability of cost-effectiveness analysis in
resource allocation
The rise of a utilitarian approach to international development programme
evaluation, as represented by tools such as cost-effectiveness analysis, has
resulted in the predominant use of single-metric measures as exclusive
barometers of worth or value, or the ‘ruthless winnowing of complex problems
into narrowly-defined tasks with measurable targets’ (Fidler 2011). In a
variation on the McNamara Fallacy (Basler 2009), global health programmes,
as demonstrated above, may have a range of downstream, collateral or indirect
outcomes, impacts or outputs that are not currently quantified – and are
therefore considered to be non-existent. Before global health resource
allocation decisions across alternative interventions are made based on criteria
such as cost-effectiveness, therefore, the relative and absolute strengths of
interventions according to broader diplomatic and strategic criteria should,
wherever possible, be considered and included in the associated calculus
(Kevany, Benatar, and Fleischer 2013). For foreign assistance programmes to
be of optimal effectiveness, they should be evaluated, qualitatively,
observationally and quantitatively, according to the most complete range of
outcomes which they stand to deliver.

























Metrics to measure global health diplomacy achievements and effectiveness
The current USA Secretary of State called, in his inaugural speech, for health
and development programmes to enhance their diplomatic role in order to
negate the need for ‘hard power’ interventions, wherever possible (United
States State Department 2013). However, the development of formal metrics to
evaluate the international relations and diplomatic effectiveness of foreign
assistance programmes has not, to date, been achieved, although attempts have
been made to articulate these dividends (e.g. Bush 2011; CSIS 2010). Given
the fundamentally unquantifiable nature of many of these related outcomes,
including the winning of ‘hearts and minds’, the generation of good will
towards donors, and the furthering of international cooperation and partner-
ships, further assessments on the basis of the criteria and approach outlined
above, to be further developed in line with advances at the theoretical level,
are encouraged. In the future, these outcomes might be more formally evalu-
ated through their inclusion in routine service assessments, complementary to
the health outcome-focused instruments currently in use (e.g. Global Fund
2013b), and based on those tools currently employed by the Global Fund and
related organizations.
Broader diplomatic sensitization of health and development programmes and
staff
The advanced training of international health personnel in the principles of
diplomacy and international relations has been proposed as a key feature of
global health diplomacy (Katz 2012). In regions such as Iraq, the potential sig-
nificance of such training is heightened, especially when viewed from the inter-
national relations perspective. Wherever possible, the sensitization of global
health personnel to the diplomatic importance of their work and associated
interactions should be included as a key part of their training, most particularly
in conflict and post-conflict settings. Only in such circumstances can the diplo-
matic dividends of such initiatives be optimized. More broadly, these findings
indicate the potentially significant contributions that the design, content and
implementation of global health programmes can make to diplomacy. Adher-
ence to the assessment criteria proposed elsewhere (Novotny and Kevany
2013) has the potential to make foreign assistance programmes both less con-
tentious and more effective in their simultaneous pursuit of development and
diplomatic goals. In this way, the use of foreign assistance programmes to
contribute to broader international relations goals may also be monitored and
evaluated. Ultimately, recognition of these accomplishments has the potential
to focus the attention of developed nations on the use of global health
programmes as both a practical and effective way of pursuing the goals of
international relations and diplomacy, particularly amidst sharply decreasing
public support for other forms of ‘hard power’ interventions in recent years.

























Conclusion: the diplomatic effectiveness of global health programmes
These findings suggest that global health programmes in Iraq are already well
advanced in their diplomatic and international relations effectiveness, fulfilling
all four of the identified advantages of leveraging global health programmes
for conflict resolution in the country – in turn, helping to reframe the modus
operandi of twenty-first century diplomacy (Horton 2006). SDPs and other
stakeholders observed during this review produced a wide range of examples
of the potential diplomatic effectiveness of appropriately designed global health
programmes in conflict and post-conflict settings. Beyond their direct, primary
and explicit public health effects, Global Fund-supported tuberculosis
programmes in Iraq were also shown to have an implicit effectiveness in the
context of (1) reducing hostility towards international programmes through
appropriate modifications to interventions and based on the non-aligned,
multilateral nature of programme branding; (2) inclusive attention and care
towards potentially peripheral and extremist groups and individuals, winning
‘hearts and minds’; (3) transcending traditional social, cultural and religious
barriers through the equitable and unbiased provision of services; (4) engender-
ing community support through health care provision; and (5) augmenting
peace-keeping activities through the establishment of communications networks
and the development of an international, but non-hostile, presence in conflict
regions. Provided associated considerations are taken into account at the
programme design, resource allocation and implementation phases, global
health initiatives may therefore improve accessibility to, and stability in,
remote and inaccessible regions.
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Global health engagement in diplomacy, intelligence and
counterterrorism: a system of standards
Sebastian Kevany
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ABSTRACT
Distinctions between global health and other challenges to security
and development, including counterterrorism initiatives, are
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in the twenty-first
century. Indeed, it is increasingly unfeasible for global health
organisations and initiatives, at both bilateral and multilateral
levels, to claim that their work operates in isolation from non-
health considerations. Intentionally or unintentionally, global
health efforts have the potential to generate both benefits and
threats to international security and counterterrorism efforts.
Rather than advocate a complete dissociation between global
health and intelligence, diplomacy and foreign policy, this article
proposes a ‘Top 10’ ‘code of engagement’ between relevant
professional communities to enable global health institutions and
organisations to conduct their interactions, in conjunction with
the broader interests of global community, on mutually
acceptable terms.
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Philosophical approaches such as cosmopolitanism and epistemic uncertainty remind us
of the ‘fundamental interconnectedness of all things’ (Adams, 1987). Never have such the-
ories resonated so clearly as in the twenty-first century, where, under the auspices of the
technological revolution, no global event can be said to occur in isolation. Such overlaps
apply to politics, international security and global health, as articulated in the recent Lancet
editorial ‘National Armies for Global Heath’ (2015); the advancement of the ‘smart global
health’ paradigm (CSIS, 2010); the examination of global health’s overlap with counterter-
rorism efforts (Eckenwiler & Hunt, 2014); and the implications of the Ebola outbreak for
global health security (The Lancet, 2015).
Enter the ethically fraught and much-opposed concept of interdisciplinary collabor-
ation between global health, counterterrorism and international security initiatives. For
all their differences, these efforts occupy much of the same space as one another. All
require personnel working in often dangerous surroundings. All are active in regions
where religious and political extremism is known to take place, such as Boko Haram’s
and Al-Shabaab’s operations in countries with significant malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS
and health system challenges. All are supported by wealthy and industrialised Western
© 2016 Department of Security Studies and Criminology
CONTACT Sebastian Kevany sebastian.kevany@ucsf.edu
JOURNAL OF POLICING, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER TERRORISM, 2016























societies and organisations. Trade in counterfeit medicines—vital to the provision of many
global health programs—is increasingly of interest not just to organised crime, but to ter-
rorist organisations (Mackey & Liang, 2011). And, perhaps most importantly, all are increas-
ingly concerned with promoting world peace, economic development and political
stability (Feldbaum & Michaud, 2010; Mackey & Strathdee, 2015).
The time has come for ‘global health’ to address the inevitability of these connections
and associated responsibilities. It is increasingly unfeasible, as well as less and less credible,
for global health organisations and initiatives, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels,
to claim that their work operates in isolation from other considerations (Buekens, 2013).
Intentionally or unintentionally, global health efforts have the potential to generate
both benefits and threats to international security and counterterrorism; global health
organisations and associated staff are increasingly becoming aware of the range of corre-
sponding threats (e.g. the security of personnel) and benefits (e.g. increased funding and
bipartisan support for health programs) (American Foundation for AIDS Research, 2013).
Both health and non-health experts appear ambivalent about the ideal balance or struc-
ture of these collaborations, instead taking refuge in terms such as ‘uncertainty’,
‘beyond our scope’ or ‘a lack of expertise’ (Dewachi et al., 2014; Eckenwiler & Hunt,
2014). This calls for a formal system, acceptable across both health and non-health com-
munities, that directs actual and latent synergies and tensions between development, dip-
lomatic and security programs. In this context, the following ‘soft code’ for global health
programs, organisations, initiatives, institutions and staff can help direct engagement in
such non-health endeavours.
(1) That global health respond to the declining political and social acceptability of hard
power: In the wake of the devastating world wars of the twentieth century, succeeded
with the disastrous and potentially cost-ineffective military efforts in Iraq and Afgha-
nistan in this century, social approval for, and acceptability of, international interven-
tions continues to decline. In an era when both the visual and the visceral
consequences of conflict-related death and destruction are increasingly harder and
harder to avoid, individuals, communities and societies have become increasingly
intolerant of military action. This is similar to the mutually assured destruction para-
digm of past generations, that diminished societal thresholds for the threat of nuclear
war to such an extent as to make such forms of conflict politically impossible (Yeres-
kovsky, 2000). The current and not unrelated reluctance of international alliances to
engage in theatres such as Syria (Rogin, 2012) has created a vacuum of intervention-
ism that has yet to be adequately addressed, while such conflicts continue to spiral
out of control. World powers are thus increasingly being forced to consider non-mili-
tary options, including smart global health, both to protect international stability and
to project influence (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2010).
(2) That global health agencies control the leveraging of extensive geostrategic access to
‘off-limits’ regions, countries and communities for strategic and altruistic ends: Terrorist
organisations such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab operate in regions with significant
public health problems, while global health programs operate in geopolitical regions
often affected by, or associated with, terrorism. A range of opportunities exists for
global health programs to support strategic as well as humanitarian or altruistic
goals, such as enhanced or shared monitoring and evaluation systems. Rather than






















simply issue nolle prosequis (Buekens, 2013), global health leaders have the capacity
to determine acceptable ways in which their organisations and programs respond to
global security threats without compromising disciplinary integrity or primary
medical goals. At the collaborative level, this might imply coordinating activities,
reporting, strategies and tactics with international non-health organisations and initi-
ating appropriate liaison structures at the organisational and group levels that are
both acceptable to, and harmonised or aligned with, the domestic policies of recipi-
ent countries (Kevany, Sahak et al., 2014).
(3) That global health resources be allocated across regions, programs and population
groups based on strategic and medical goals: In a variation of the McNamara Fallacy
(Basler, 2009), the exclusive use of health outcomes as determinants of resource allo-
cation decisions ignores the downstream, collateral, indirect or inadvertent conse-
quences of global health efforts across target populations, geostrategic regions
and international relations. For example, the intensification of health education cam-
paigns, which include both medical and diplomatic messaging (or, at least, medical
messaging presented in a diplomatic fashion), in regions or communities susceptible
to radicalisation may meaningfully address both health and non-health consider-
ations. Examples include modifying or amending community mobilisation and
post-test support service promotion for voluntary counselling and testing in Zim-
babwe; the re-branding of associated intervention names in Tanzania in response
to contemporary political social and religious considerations (Kevany et al., 2012);
and the no arms logos on United Nations Development Programme vehicles and
facilities in South Sudan (UNICEF, 2001). More broadly, the US President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has been extensively associated with adapting health
education messaging to support indirect or downstream non-health goals (Dietrich,
2007). Considering a broader set of holistic criteria or ‘values’ related to foreign policy,
security and diplomatic outcomes of global health programs (Kevany, 2014) could,
therefore, help simultaneously optimise both health and non-health gains.
(4) That global health organisations and initiatives develop awareness at the group and
individual levels of the strategic and security implications of their activities: Global
health personnel operate under a humanitarian aegis and training structure. This
limited scope presents both advantages and threats. While practitioners are often
highly trained in related disciplines and sub-disciplines such as epidemiology,
health policy or health systems, the broader political, strategic and international
relations consequences of their actions, decisions and modus operandi generally
go unconsidered (Katz, Kornblet, Arnold, Lief, & Fischer, 2011). Education, as part
of basic global health training, in international diplomacy represents a potentially
vital element of a more enlightened, cosmopolitan and multifarious approach to
global health efforts that can address both health and non-health goals. Similarly,
global health programs are obliged to ensure the protection and security of their
staff—both ‘local hires’ and international personnel—via collaborative awareness
and education efforts. These collaborations should occur in advance of project roll-
out at the highest possible strategic and program design levels, to prevent potential
threats on a prima facie basis.
(5) That global health programs do not operate in isolation from military, intelligence and























coordinate objectives: There is currently limited or no explicit coordination between
strategic concerns and health objectives among major donor groups and countries
such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Nascent efforts to address
this through the Office of Global Health Diplomacy in the US State Department or
the integration of smart approaches to European health and development efforts
(Kerry, 2013; Rehn, 2005) have, to date, been given only a low priority in associated
organisational manifestoes. Practical solutions include providing political, security
and economic risk reports to international personnel; the absence of concerted
and explicit efforts raises the risk of a ‘tense and confusing duality’ (CSIS, 2010; The
Lancet Editorial, 2015) in foreign policy. There is, therefore, an urgent and significant
‘unmet need’ to develop joint liaison capacity at all levels of policy and practice: from
the highest echelons of international development and defence ministerial and
departmental decision-making to individuals at the field level (Kevany, Jaf et al.,
2014).
(6) That global health programs consciously seek to win ‘hearts and minds’ in remote or iso-
lated regions otherwise susceptible to extremist doctrine: Global health programs,
through health education campaigns, community mobilisation, community
working groups and other forms of stakeholder involvement, stand to generate
not only health but also educational, diplomatic and international relations gains
(Kevany, Benatar, & Fleischer, 2013). In many cases, related operating environments
are isolated, with limited exposure to or interaction with, schools of thought and cul-
tures beyond local religious organisations. Global health programs stand to generate
acceptable alternatives to extremist ideology in these regions by designing and deli-
vering interventions in a way that simultaneously improves recipient health while
addressing the root causes of terror and extremism. Appropriate embedded
themes may, therefore, not just improve health, but also combat militant or radical
fundamentalism at its source (Kevany, Sahak et al., 2014).
(7) That global health programs do not implement interventions likely to incite religious,
social or cultural sensitivities among recipient populations: Driven by narrow metrics
such as quality-adjusted life years as used in conventional cost-effectiveness and
monitoring and evaluation techniques, as well as in broader health agenda setting
(Kleinman, 2010), the impact of global health interventions on social, cultural and reli-
gious norms (community and individual level) has never been greater. Such issues
have become particularly relevant in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, responses
to which (such as birth control promotion and male circumcision intervention) have
challenged traditional behaviours (see Bhattacharya, 2004) in a way that, for example,
tuberculosis or malaria programs have never been required to. While it is often
important to inculcate social progress in global health programs, such as exploiting
the overlap between HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention and the advancement of
human rights (Kevany et al., 2013), the risk that such interventions may be inter-
preted as challenging revered traditions and sensibilities, or the suspicion that pro-
grams are being designed for more sinister ends (e.g. birth versus population
control) (Critchlow, 1995) can alienate, antagonise or offend recipient populations.
Global health programs should, therefore, be carefully vetted based on global






















health diplomacy criteria (Kevany, 2015) to ensure that diplomatic threats do not out-
weigh health gains.
(8) That global health programs continue to address the underlying causes of extremism,
including poverty, alienation and disenfranchisement: The root causes, operating
environments and goals of counterterrorism and ill health will remain closely
linked in the foreseeable future. Poverty, lack of opportunity and employment,
social and cultural isolation, limited educational options and issues related to
social justice and the global distribution of wealth, corruption and global inequal-
ity—all contribute to both radicalisation and the scale and scope of communicable
and non-communicable diseases. Similarly, extremism and fundamentalism are
associated with social alienation, poverty, lack of personal opportunity and choice,
limited diversity in educational perspectives and a sense of distress at being (actually
or mistakenly) threatened or exploited by external forces beyond individual control
(Schwartz & Dunkel, 2009). Global health efforts, when appropriately designed and
delivered, address both the medical and structural inequalities that generate the con-
ditions for terrorism to flourish—thereby short-circuiting the malign ‘Catch-22’ cycle
under which humanitarian interventions fail due to broader economic, political and
diplomatic challenges (Benatar, 2015).
(9) That global health programs do not aid, abet or facilitate extremist organisations by pro-
viding health care to terrorists, extremists or their support networks and organisations: The
Geneva Convention agreements make clear the fundamental importance of neutral
medical and health care provision to both antagonists and civilians in conflict zones
(Pledge Peace Union, 2015). With the ostensible contemporary failure of conventional
systems of terrorism control and containment, global health efforts may wish to re-
examine their role in providing humanitarian and other medical support to extremist
groups, at both individual and organisational levels (Stephan & Beyerle, 2015). In Syria,
for example, distinctions between allies and foes are increasingly hard to recognise,
making partisan support difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Ethically, therefore,
should global health programs adhere to a Hippocratic manifesto that accepts all-
comers with impunity, equal access and respect? Conversely, how should global
health and security communities respond to efforts by violent extremist groups such
as Islamic State to use health initiatives to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of annexed popu-
lations (Gardham, 2015)? Or, is it possible to save more lives by preventing attacks and
avoiding conflict if global health efforts more explicitly adapted traditional approaches
based on unconditional altruism, within Geneva Convention standards, to pursue stra-
tegic as well as humanitarian objectives?
(10) That none of these steps be interpreted as donors engaging in ‘development bribery’:
‘Smart’ global health programs require a modus operandi which belies the myth
that such efforts are forms of international bribery to pacify potentially troublesome
regions (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). For global health programs and practitioners to
achieve broader non-health goals, an extensive ‘rebranding’ of image, style and
approach is required. ‘Soft’ perceptions around donor health programs are no
longer as easily practicable in an era when such perceived distinctions are becoming
increasingly difficult to maintain. Global health programs may, ultimately, find broader
public and political support whenmore explicitly presented as tools of national security























Organisations such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram continue to commit some of the most
destructive and inhumane outrages of the modern era. Conventional response systems—
particularly standing armies—even when combined with the latest military-industrial
technologies can do little to prevent such attacks, and appear rigid and lumbering
when faced with such nimble opponents, occasionally even causing more destruction
than they resolve (Kevany, 2015). It is time, if not for an entirely new strategic and security
paradigm, at least to explore every option that can be leveraged in opposition to such out-
rages, including the more explicit combination of health and security efforts—via, for
example, new health security treaties within the sustainable development goal framework
(Kickbusch, Orbinski, Winkler, & Schnabel, 2015), multilateral initiatives such as the Global
Health Security Agenda (GHSA) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015), under
the auspices of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Convention against Crime
(2015), or as ‘soft law’ in the form of a widely accepted code of conduct.
These proposals, although in keeping with contemporary efforts to ‘codify’ global
health’s remit (Gostin, 2013), will inevitably be controversial. Nonetheless, these inexorable
connections bring global health efforts significantly closer to those of organisations con-
cerned with international security than most other professions or disciplines, even within
the international development métier. Global health programs have the power, scope and
capacity to mitigate many of the environmental conditions threatening global
cooperation and security by promoting health education, international collaborations
and exchanges, access to health services and progressive ideals that frame donor activity
as cosmopolitan collaboration, rather than neo-colonialism. This evolution is also relevant
to the overlap between paradigms of global and international health and related concep-
tual frameworks (Koplan, Bond, & Merson, 2009). Global community efforts to address the
root causes of global adversarialism, poverty and inequalities in wealth, status and access
through foreign assistance (‘global health’) are rooted in responses to cross-border health
security threats (‘international health’) and broader non-health structural challenges via a
‘sense of local and global social, economic, physical and moral interdependence in the
face of ongoing natural, biological and human induced tragedies’ (Benatar, 2015).
Any such integration brings with it both risks and responsibilities. The prestige, role,
perception and security of global health programs and staff will inevitably be affected.
Yet the fact remains that such an evolution is already taking place. Would not the polio
vaccination workers assassinated in Pakistan as a result of associations with foreign
policy and international security considerations (Gostin, 2014; The Guardian, 2014) have
been safer operating under appropriate and collaborative ‘security umbrellas’ (Burkle,
2013), making implicit connections explicit? Global health and broader development
workers are increasingly involved in political and security endeavours, and their effective-
ness, efforts and bravery in this regard are worthy of recognition (Kevany, 2014). However,
only a careful and planned consideration of such synergies, governed by the global health
as well as defence and intelligence communities, can address such international security
threats while also pursuing the goals of better global health outcomes and world peace.
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Both the theory and practice of foreign policy and diplomacy, including systems of
hard and soft power, are undergoing paradigm shifts, with an increasing number of
innovative actors and strategies contributing to international relations outcomes in the
‘New World Order’. Concurrently, global health programmes continue to ascend the
political spectrum in scale, scope and influence. This concatenation of circumstances
has demanded a re-examination of the existing and potential effectiveness of global
health programmes in the ‘smart power’ context, based on adherence to a range of
design, implementation and assessment criteria, which may simultaneously optimise
their humanitarian, foreign policy and diplomatic effectiveness. A synthesis of
contemporary characteristics of ‘global health diplomacy’ and ‘global health as
foreign policy’, grouped by common themes and generated in the context of related
field experiences, are presented in the form of ‘Top Ten’ criteria lists for optimising
both diplomatic and foreign policy effectiveness of global health programmes, and
criteria are presented in concert with an examination of implications for programme
design and delivery. Key criteria for global health programmes that are sensitised to
both diplomatic and foreign policy goals include visibility, sustainability, geostrategic
considerations, accountability, effectiveness and alignment with broader policy
objectives. Though diplomacy is a component of foreign policy, criteria for
‘diplomatically-sensitised’ versus ‘foreign policy-sensitised’ global health pro-
grammes were not always consistent, and were occasionally in conflict, with each
other. The desirability of making diplomatic and foreign policy criteria explicit, rather
than implicit, in the context of global health programme design, delivery and
evaluation are reflected in the identified implications for (1) international security,
(2) programme evaluation, (3) funding and resource allocation decisions, (4) approval
systems and (5) training. On this basis, global health programmes are shown to
provide a valuable, yet underutilised, tool for diplomacy and foreign policy purposes,
including their role in the pursuit of benign international influence. A corresponding
alignment of resources between ‘hard’ and ‘smart’ power options is encouraged.
Keywords: smart power; global health diplomacy; foreign policy; international
relations
Background
A renaissance in diplomacy and foreign policy
Foreign policy is designed to create and maintain cordial relations between countries
while simultaneously pursuing objectives such as security, international development,
cooperation and conflict resolution, and domestic economic growth (Smith, 2008), under
the auspices of the ‘enlightened self-interest’ of nation states (de Tocqueville, 1865;
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White, 2001). Associated principles include advancement of human rights, promotion of
democracy, good governance, prevention of violent conflicts, collective security, dispute
arbitration, abolition of aggressive war, free trade and interstate cooperation (Nolan,
1998). As both a subset and a tool of the foreign policy métier, principles of diplomacy
include negotiation (and, specifically, skill in handling international negotiations without
hostility), conflict resolution, dialogue, and communications (United States Department
of State, 2010). Among other countries and interstate organisations, the European Union,
the United Kingdom and the United States all include the encouragement of regional
cooperation, the advancement of human rights, the promotion of democracy and good
governance, and the prevention of violent conflicts as joint diplomatic and foreign policy
priorities (Frist, 2007; Smith, 2008; United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
2013; United States Department of State, 2010).
In the twenty-first century ‘NewWorld Order’ (see, e.g. Etzioni, 2013), traditional foreign
policy and diplomacy practices are undergoing a dramatic transition (Horton, 2007).
Contemporary international initiatives are no longer exclusively under the auspices of narrow
professional divisions, but include a range of less formal, ‘non-state’ actors (Kickbusch,
2012). Katz, Kornblet, Arnold, Lief, and Fischer (2011) define these ‘multi-stakeholder’
diplomatic and foreign policy approaches as encompassing a ‘larger sphere of interactions’
among participants who have not, traditionally, been involved in international politics.
Separately, but simultaneously, foreign assistance investment has reached unprecedented
levels of growth, while also increasing dramatically in scale, scope and political prestige in
recent years (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2011).Within international
development, dramatic recent increases in funding for global health programmes (Fidler,
2011; Ravishnakar et al., 2007) – represented by a quadrupling in expenditure between 1990
and 2007 (Institute for Health Metrics, 2010) – has driven a strengthening of previously
tenuous links between global health, diplomacy and foreign policy (Garrett, 2012). In this
context, the role, content, structure and importance of global health programmes are being
reappraised and reframed as alternative tools of both foreign policy and diplomacy (Burkle,
2013; CSIS, 2010; Feldbaum, 2010; Fidler, 2007; Nye, 2004), in turn driving a dramatically
increased demand for optimisation of these ‘collateral’ outputs (The Lancet, 2010).
The unique role of global health
There is a growing appreciation of the preeminent effectiveness of global health
programmes in achieving both diplomatic and foreign policy goals as compared to other
forms of international development (Vanderwagen, 2006), including leveraging health
initiatives to improve the security, influence and image of donor countries or organisations
(Feldbaum, 2010; Feldbaum & Michaud, 2010), or, more simply, ‘using health-related
cooperation to pursue non-health objectives’ in the foreign policy context (Fidler, 2011).
The contemporary political status of global health (Fidler, 2007), as well as its future
trajectory within the current ideology that underpins the global economy (Benatar, Gill, &
Bakker, 2011), is therefore unprecedented. Although there are occasions when health
programmes maintain independent and nonaligned targets, in most cases, the medical, the
economic and the political are increasingly inseparable (Farmer, Kleinman, Kim, &
Basilico, 2013; Kleinman, 2010), forming a compelling basis for bridging international
barriers ‘because health transcends traditional, and more emotional, concerns’ (Bourne,
1978). This alignment presents valuable opportunities for stronger international alliances
through global health, as defined by the constellation of interests in what has become





































Silberschmidt, & Alcazar, 2007; Stewart, Keusch, & Kleinman, 2010). Global health
programmes, therefore, ‘have political ramifications that cannot be ignored’ (CSIS, 2011).
Concurrently, the global health community has successfully begun to leverage these links to
influence associated political and economic resource allocation decisions (Lee, 2007).
However, such integration of roles and objectives, at both the bilateral and multilateral
donor levels, requires astute, informed and practical judgement to be successful in
optimising both direct and indirect programmatic goals (Kickbusch, Lister, Told, &
Drager, 2012).
‘Policy coherence’ versus ‘stove-piping’
In recognition of the complex mixture of motivations that guide contemporary international
development policies (Lumsdaine, 1993), as well as the ‘myriad newer uses’ of foreign
assistance programmes (Lancaster, 2007), the European Union explicitly advocates the
strategic use of global health to achieve diplomatic goals (Europa, 2010; European
Commission, 2010; Rehn, 2005), which has, in turn, become a defining feature of pan-
European foreign policy in recent years (Kagan, 2002). In the United States, increasing
levels of integration between the State Department and US Agency for International
Development (USAID) are indicative of their increasingly interchangeable roles (Shah,
2011; United States Department of State, 2008), reflected, in this context, by the ground-
breaking creation of the Office of Health Diplomacy within the State Department
(Morrison, 2013) as well as an enhanced role for US ambassadors in health diplomacy
(Michaud & Kates, 2013). In the United Kingdom, the Department for International
Development (DFID) has been assigned an explicit foreign policy role (Lords Select
Committee, 2011; Rushton & McInnes, 2006) under the stated goal of ‘policy coherence’
between global health and foreign affairs (Kickbusch et al., 2007), and in a manner
evocative of the traditional foreign policy practices of smaller countries (see, e.g. Irish
Department of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Similarly, nations such as Russia and China have
made foreign policy goals an explicit objective of their international health and
development programmes (see, e.g. The Guardian, 2013a, 2013b), while from a ‘South-
South’ perspective, the global health diplomacy efforts of countries such as Cuba and Brazil
have both won international acclaim as well as generating significant political capital for
donors (Keck, 2007; Lee & Gomez, 2012). At the supra-national level, the United Nations
has shown an increased propensity to combine conflict resolution and humanitarian
activities (Associated Press, 2011; Burkle, 2013), while the World Bank has recommended
that global health programmes should respond, wherever possible, to policy issues beyond
their primary goals (The World Bank, 2011). Such ‘mainstreaming’ of responsibilities and
shared values blurs the line between previously ‘siloed’, disciplinary, and ‘stovepiped’
ministerial or departmental responsibilities (Sundberg & Sandberg, 2013) in recognition of
‘spill-over effects’ (Kickbusch & Buss, 2011) that have, since the dawn of international
initiatives, made it inevitable that no aspect of foreign policy operates in isolation (Hagel,
2004). In the academic context, such realpolitik is represented by a ‘post-functionalist’ or
‘statist’ (Brown, 1992) diplomacy and foreign policy framework, under which the success
of global health programmes is judged by both their direct and indirect outcomes.
A revolution in defence and security
The deployment of ‘hard power’ or the use of military coercion to influence the
behaviour and interests of political bodies to achieve diplomatic goals such as




































international conflict prevention and resolution, is in a period of rapid evolution (Nye, 2004).
Traditional forms of international military interventions are declining both in public support
(Keeter, 2007; Shackle, 2011) and in judicial legitimacy (Gallup News Service, 2002), in
light of revelations that conflicts such as the Iraq War resulted up to half a million civilian
deaths (Burkle & Garfield, 2013), while their cost-effectiveness – including spiralling
medical costs for returning veterans (Baker, 2014) – is also under increasing levels of
scrutiny (Scully, 2011). The ongoing reluctance of the international community to
intervene in conflicts such as Syria is at least in part due to the echo of these interventions
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2013) and has resulted in the ‘taxonomy of conflict’
(Burkle, 2013) undergoing dramatic transitions, including calls for the greater integration of
global health programmes into security operations (Burkle, 2013). This has also been
illustrated, not just by the effects of global health programmes during political uprisings in
Bahrain, Turkey, and Egypt in recent years (Rubenstein, 2013), but through initiatives such
as the World Health Organization (WHO)–mandated ‘Health as a Bridge for Peace’
programme, which leverage global health initiatives in support of political, structural, and
social peace-building (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2001). Contemporary foreign policy trends
therefore suggest that the ‘Cold Wars’ of the past will be increasingly supplanted in the
twenty-first century by ‘Soft Wars’, ‘Smart Wars’ (Simons, 2012), or even ‘Cool Wars’
(Feldman, 2013), creating and pursuing combined aid-related and military-based interna-
tional alliances. This vision has drawn heightened attention to innovative roles for global
health programmes in achieving security, defence and conflict prevention or resolution
goals (Birdsall, 2013; Feldbaum, 2010; Michaud & Kates, 2013), with particular reference
to the selection, design and delivery of appropriate interventions for (1) military stability
operations and (2) ‘partnership engagement’ (Michaud, Moss, & Kates, 2012). Recognition
of associated ‘peace and stability’ dividends (Brainard, 2006; Novotny & Kevany, 2013)
through appropriate adaptations to programme design, selection and delivery considerations
have, in turn, inculcated an awareness that the transcendent goals of both foreign assistance
and foreign policy include the pursuit of international cooperation, conflict resolution and
peace-keeping (Kickbusch & Buss, 2011).
‘Smart global health’: aligning the principles of global health, foreign policy and
diplomacy
Foreign policy and diplomatic perspectives are both multilevel and multicausal (Rosenau,
1966), involving synthesisation of information from a wide variety of knowledge
bases. The failure to consider such a range of criteria when designing, selecting and
implementing global health programmes therefore runs the risk of creating a ‘tense and
confusing duality’ (CSIS, 2010), whereby the implications of delivering global health
programmes without diplomatic or foreign policy considerations are just as dangerous to
human dignity as the reverse (Fidler, 2007). For example, global health programmes that
challenge cultural, religious, ideological, social and behavioural norms in recipient
countries and communities, while compelling in terms of their capacity to achieve
primary ‘target’ outcomes, may also constitute potential liabilities from the diplomatic or
foreign policy perspectives ‘as public health experts act without awareness of larger
diplomatic strategies or tensions that may be at play’ (Katz et al., 2011). On this basis,
diplomatic, international development and foreign policy trends are increasingly
aligned with the theory of ‘smart power’ (Ferrero-Waldener, 2007): the strategic use of
persuasion, capacity building and the projection of influence, in ways that are both cost-





































resource base across national actors (CSIS, 2010). ‘Smart global health’, in turn,
leverages global health programmes for epidemiological, economic, political and
international relations and a range of other international concerns (CSIS, 2010). Although
traditionally associated with bilateral agendas, ‘smart global health’ approaches also
apply to the initiatives of multilateral organisations such as The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which often have highly significant diplomatic and
foreign policy effects (see, e.g. Kevany et al., 2014; Kevany, Sahak, Workneh, &
Saeedzai, 2014; Michaud & Kates, 2013) but which, in the absence of appropriate
systems of recognition, have achieved only limited attention (Kickbusch et al., 2012).
Diplomatic triumphs – and failures – of global health
The indirect, collateral or ‘downstream’ effects of global health programmes have, to
date, led to a number of unanticipated, and often inadvertent, diplomatic and foreign
policy triumphs for donors. Similarly, a lack of awareness of the diplomatic and foreign
policy ramifications of global health programmes has, on occasion, led to a corresponding
decline in donor prestige and international relations. The former include the documented
diplomatic and foreign policy gains consequent upon the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPfAR) (Walensky & Kuritzkes, 2010); polio eradication campaigns
(Kaufmann & Feldbaum, 2009); health-related ceasefires in conflict regions (Kickbusch
& Buss, 2011); and partnerships between the United Nations Development Program and
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in conflict and post-conflict
settings (Kevany, Benatar, & Fleischer, 2013; Kevany et al., 2012; Kevany, Jaf, et al.,
2014; Kevany, Sahak, et al., 2014). Conversely, the latter includes poorly designed
penetration of vaccination campaigns in Pakistan by clandestine agencies, jeopardising
both primary programmatic goals and the lives of global health programme workers
(Buekens, 2013); fiscal threats to the sustainability of PEPfAR’s HIV treatment
programmes (Lyman & Wittels, 2010); negative environmental consequences of health
interventions (WHO, 2013) and notwithstanding the widespread, long-standing suspicion
in recipient communities of hidden agendas embedded within controversial global health
interventions such as male circumcision (Quigley, Weiss, & Hayes, 2001) and family
planning (Uche, 2011). Strategic global health interventions, therefore, must be both
‘productive and useful from a health perspective’, yet ‘vigilant about the unanticipated
consequences they produce’ (Katz et al., 2011).
Optimising collateral diplomatic and foreign policy effects
Although it is critically important for global health programmes to pursue primary outcomes
such as gains in quality-adjusted life years, their selection, design, content and delivery
should, ceteris paribus, be carefully assessed in order to ensure that (1) these outcomes are
not being achieved at the expense of foreign policy, diplomatic or international relations
objectives (Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2010) and (2) where interventions
have the capacity to achieve benign collateral or ‘spill-over’ (Kickbusch & Buss, 2011)
objectives, these are recognised, recorded and rewarded (Royal Institute for International
Affairs, 2010). The rise of a utilitarian approach to international development and foreign
assistance evaluation, however, as represented by the ascendancy of decision-making tools
such as cost-effectiveness analysis, has resulted in the predominant use of narrow, single-
metric assessment measures as exclusive barometers of global health programme worth or
value – the ‘ruthless winnowing of complex problems into defined tasks with measurable




































targets’ (Fidler, 2011). Under what has been described as the ‘precautionary principle’
in global health, contemporary practices dictate that the moral worth of an action is
determined only by its quantified outcome, without regard to unintended consequences
(Martuzzi & Tickner, 2004). Such approaches are, necessarily, restricted in their capacity to
reflect values or outcomes beyond those of predetermined interest to the medical profession
(Jan, 1998): in a variation on the McNamara Fallacy (Basler, 2009), global health
programmes may produce a range of unquantified, and often unquantifiable, diplomatic
and foreign policy outcomes, impacts or outputs, which are, therefore, considered to be
nonexistent. There is, however, a ‘lack of ability’ to demonstrate effectiveness in this
context, particularly in the absence of related programme assessment criteria (Bonventre,
2008), which would help to ensure that global health programmes attain even the minimum
acceptable standards required in the diplomatic or foreign policy spheres. Policymakers
have, therefore, called for a system of assessment that reflects these broader considerations
(Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2010) both (1) in order to portray international
development and foreign assistance expenditures as ‘return-producing investments’ (Jaffe,
2013) rather than costs; (2) to ‘speak a language that people with power really understand’
(Nye, 2004); while also (3) taking into account the realpolitik of a broader range of
international affairs (Novotny & Kevany, 2013). Without the articulation of these benefits,
global health programmes run the risk of being viewed as ‘misplaced priorities’ (Transcript
of House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011). In turn, the establishment of (1) a ‘taxonomy’
for the integration of diplomatic and foreign policy values into global health (Katz et al.,
2011), (2) ‘diplomatically-sensitised’ quantitative and qualitative outcomemeasures (Royal
Institute for International Affairs, 2010) and (3) systems of measurement for global health
programme impact on non-health outcomes and values (CSIS, 2011) have been called for.
Current research questions around the coherence, effectiveness and legitimacy of global
health diplomacy (Kickbusch & Buss, 2011) therefore include (1) how current and
potential, explicit and implicit, national and international benefits of foreign assistance may
more meaningfully serve foreign policy objectives when ‘diplomatically-sensitised’; (2)
how policymakers can determine if global health programmes are diplomatically effective
(or harmful), contributing to or hindering foreign policy goals and (3) how to recognise,
quantify and reward the value of these contributions (Novotny & Kevany, 2013).
Criteria development
Philosophical basis
A wide range of definitions for ‘global health diplomacy’ and ‘global health as foreign
policy’ have been proposed in recent years (see, e.g. Feldbaum, 2010; Kickbusch et al.,
2007; McInnes & Lee, 2006; Novotny & Adams, 2007), helping to identify key criteria
for ‘diplomatic’ or ‘foreign policy–sensitised’ global health programmes. In many cases,
these definitions relate to a range of philosophical perspectives and conceptual frame-
works, including Rawlsian, Machiavellian and Kantian approaches (see, e.g. Rawls,
1971) to international development, all of which (1) reflect a ‘neo-utilitarian’ philosophy
and (2) consider contributions to such abstract concepts as world peace (Kickbusch &
Buss, 2011). On this basis, a synthesisation of contemporary global health programme
design, delivery and evaluation criteria, grouped by common themes and keywords, and
which pay specific attention to optimising the strategic use of global health interventions,
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Alternate definitions based on competing interpretations
of ‘global health diplomacy’, including (1) the use of foreign policy to pursue global





































health diplomacy’ through multilateral organisations such as the WHO (see, e.g.
Kickbusch et al., 2007) though beyond the scope of this paper, are also borne in mind –
not least in the context of the significant potential contributions of ‘health-sensitised foreign
policy’ to global health outcomes (see, e.g. Kickbusch et al., 2012).
Field experience
The identification of both diplomatic and foreign policy criteria also draws on the
retrospective overview and synthesisation of the author’s experience of global health
programme implementation and evaluation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan,
Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya; settings in which the integration of
global health programmes with diplomatic and foreign policy considerations is often both
indispensable and unavoidable. This experience includes examination of the international
relations effects of Global Fund–supported malaria programmes in Afghanistan and
Iraq (Kevany, Jaf, et al., 2014; Kevany, Sahak, et al., 2014); the development of
‘diplomatically-sensitised’ monitoring and evaluation systems in South Sudan (Kevany,
Hatfield, et al., 2012), the implementation of transferable and sustainable innovative
antiretroviral adherence programmes in Ethiopia (Marseille & Kevany, 2010); the
responsiveness and adaptability of voluntary counselling and testing services to prevailing
political, social and economic conditions in Zimbabwe (Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa,
2012; Kevany et al., 2013) and the alignment of global health programmes with diplomatic
priorities (Fleischer, Kevany, & Benatar, 2010) in South Africa (Kevany et al., 2013).
Refining the distinctions between diplomacy and foreign policy in the global health
context
As noted above, diplomacy is a ‘subset’ of the broader foreign policy toolkit (Royal
Institute for International Affairs, 2010), and associated evaluation criteria tend to be
inherently explicit, responding to the needs of both donors and recipients. By contrast,
‘foreign policy values’ of global health programmes tend to be characterised on a more
implicit basis, responding to a broader agenda related to the ‘enlightened self-interest’ of
donors and international organisations (Kassalow, 2001). This agenda includes strategic,
political, and security considerations beyond the realm of diplomacy (Alden & Amnon,
2011) and is often in pursuit of ostensibly distinct objectives such as conflict resolution,
conflict prevention, or trade and economic considerations. While ‘diplomatically-
sensitised’ global health programmes address the dual goals of improving both global
health and international relations (Novotny & Adams, 2007), global health programmes
that respond to foreign policy needs both support foreign policy objectives (CSIS, 2010)
and make global health decisions on the basis of ‘high politics’ (Labonte & Gagnon, 2010;
see also distinctions proposed to this effect in Kickbusch & Buss, 2011). At the most
fundamental level, diplomatic criteria may therefore be viewed as enhancing the value or
worth of global health programmes to recipients both donors and, while foreign policy (or
‘smart power’) criteria relate more specifically to the corresponding goals and needs of
donors. Both diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives, despite these distinctions, respond
to the overarching needs of the international community. Identified ‘strategic global health’
criteria have therefore been divided into ‘diplomatic’ and ‘foreign policy’ categories.
Nonetheless, this distinction does not preclude conflicts between diplomatic and foreign
policy criteria.




































Criteria for ‘diplomatically-sensitised’ and ‘foreign policy-sensitised’ global health
programmes
Global health programmes that have been sensitised to achieve diplomatic goals,
supplementary to primary programmatic objectives, adhere to a common set of design,
implementation and outcome criteria for optimising diplomatic effectiveness (see Table 1).
Key characteristics include unbiased delivery of services, across population groups; the
development of linkages and partnerships between host and donor countries; training,
involvement and employment of local communities, including entrepreneurship and
employment generation; ideological and cultural neutrality, sensitivity and adaptability;
the choice, where possible, of the most effective and cost-effective interventions;
sustainability, and appropriate programme visibility and branding. Global health pro-
grammes designed to pursue foreign policy goals were found not only to overlap, but also to
conflict, with the above diplomatic criteria, due at least in part to their separate and distinct
philosophical basis (Table 2). Related criteria include geostrategic and geopolitical
location, including the provision of an international stabilising presence; a focus on
‘high-profile’ conditions such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; alignment with
donor foreign policy goals, strategies and organisations; consideration of ‘nation-building’
and peace-keeping roles of global health programmes in recipient countries, including
contributions to national and international security agendas; collaboration with military
interventions under appropriate ‘security umbrellas’; responsiveness to economic incen-
tives of donor countries and funders; inclusiveness in service delivery, and contributions to
international networks and regime change in unstable states. In summary, for both foreign
policy–sensitised and diplomatically-sensitised global health programmes, all identified
criteria, themes and keywords reflect consideration of five key issues of interest to the
pursuit of cohesive and enhanced international engagements: who (e.g. programme staff
background and training); what (e.g. selection of appropriate interventions); when (e.g.
consideration of prevailing political issues); where (e.g. geopolitical and recipient
population considerations) and how (e.g. programme adaptability and sensitivity).
Implications
The military, global health, and international security
The lack of alignment between the military, foreign policy, and global health programmes
has led to recent decades being the most dangerous ever for global health workers
(Rubenstein, 2013) and for which risks more formal recognitions of valour have been
suggested (Burkle, 2013), lending special significance to the diplomatic and foreign policy
implications of global health programmes in conflict and post-conflict settings. Concur-
rently, with the formal adoption and adaptation of global health programmes as a tool of
diplomacy and foreign policy (Obama, 2014), the use of hard power as a system of
international conflict resolution has been increasingly complemented by less intrusive,
invasive and destructive systems of intervention, variously described as ‘armed social
work’ (Feldbaum, 2010) or ‘civilian power’ (United States Department of State, 2010). By
demonstrating the effectiveness of global health programmes in achieving military goals,
the transfer of responsibilities and associated resources from ‘hard’ to ‘smart’ power
options, based on the recognition and measurement of the latter’s diplomatic and foreign
policy impact, is increasingly a la mode (Bonventre, 2008; Burkle, 2013). This paradigm
involves new and innovative roles for the military in concert with global health





































Table 1. Diplomatic criteria for global health programmes.
1 Neutrality: The selection of culturally, religiously and socially appropriate interventions
(Kevany, 2012; Kevany, Hatfield, et al., 2012; Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa, et al., 2012),
encompassing vigilance around possible unanticipated consequences of global health
programmes on recipient societies, cultures and religions (Adams, Novotny, & Leslie, 2008)
2 Visibility: Appropriate programmatic branding to generate positive associations between
international presence, health outcomes, and donor prestige (Alesina & Dollar, 1998), thereby
ensuring that (1) international contributions are clearly visible (CSIS, 2010; The Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2011) and (2) programmatic achievements are
conveyed to both local and national leaders (CSIS, 2010)
3 Sustainability: Provision for programme sustainability (Jaffe, 2013) or (as a minimum
acceptable standard) transferability (Lyman & Wittels, 2010) in order (1) to mitigate risks of
international relations tensions consequent on programme termination and (2) to ensure a
‘forward-looking commitment’ in programme design, selection and implementation
(CSIS, 2011)
4 Adaptability: Delivery of global health programmes that are responsive to locally identified
health and non-health priorities, in a manner adaptable to circumstantial demands beyond the
intervention protocol (Kevany, 2012), including, where appropriate, recipient-led programme
design and resource allocation decisions (Global Health Initiative, 2012)
5 Effectiveness: The selection, wherever possible, of global health interventions with proven
primary health outcome effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in order to ensure recipient
countries, communities and individuals are provided with optimal health benefits under
constrained budgets (Kevany et al., 2013; Marseille & Khan, 2002; Ord, 2013)
6 Accountability: Contributions to monitoring and evaluation systems, through the production of
verified programmatic results, to (1) reduce corruption and increase transparency (Kevany,
Hatfield, et al., 2012; Mulley, 2010), (2) generate a stronger rationale for support to donor
stakeholders (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2011) and (3)
support new notions of programmatic responsibility (Adams et al., 2008; CSIS, 2010)
7 Partnerships: Contributions of global health programmes to the development of sub-national,
national, and international partnerships, with reference to appropriate standards by which
donor and multilateral representatives interact with governments in recipient countries (Adams
et al., 2008; CSIS, 2010), coordinate initiatives (CSIS, 2011), and build international alliances
beyond health (Kickbusch & Buss, 2011)
8 Economic, political, environmental, and social effects: (1) Optimising contributions of global
health programmes to economic growth at the micro- (Kevany, Hatfield, et al., 2012) and
macro-economic levels through the creation of improved economic climates (AMFAR, 2013),
(2) generating social and political benefits that promote stable nations (Novotny & Adams,
2007), social justice and equity (ibid), social stabilisation (Jaffe, 2013) and (4) the promotion
of productivity, dignity and self-worth among recipients (USAID, 2013), and (4) minimising
negative environmental impacts of medical supplies (WHO, 2013)
9 Interdependence: Articulating, where possible, the parameters of global health programme
involvement with non–health-related organisations, in order to (1) protect the well-being of
programme staff through adherence to well-defined mission statements (Kolaczinski, Graham,
Fahim, Brooker, & Rowland, 2005) and (2) preserve recipient community trust (Michaud &
Kates, 2013)
10 Training: Appropriate selection, training and recognition of global health programme staff
from the diplomatic perspective, including education on (1) prevailing political and strategic
themes and (2) systems by which intervention activities may stand to contribute to, or
exacerbate, broader diplomatic strategies (Katz et al., 2011)




































Table 2. Foreign policy criteria for global health programmes.
1 Geo-political location: Reference to strategic locational considerations (CSIS, 2010), including
capacity to access geographic areas hostile to international actors (Feldbaum, 2010); positively
influencing areas prone to insurgent manipulation (Bonventre, 2008); enticing populations
away from terrorist groups (Rubenstein, 2013); working in regions which may contribute to
regime change (Birdsall. 2013, AMFAR, 2013); and decreasing opportunities for opponents
with destructive agendas (Jaffe, 2013)
2 Nation-building and peace-keeping initiatives: Contributions to nation-building (Kevany et al.,
2012a) and peace-keeping processes (Eldon, Waddington, & Hadi, 2008; Kevany, 2012),
including resolution of conflict (Novotny & Adams, 2007); regional stability (Feldbaum,
2010); integration of peace-building concerns into global health programmes (Novotny &
Adams, 2007; Macrae, 1997; Kickbusch & Buss, 2011); and advancing democratisation in the
developing world (AMFAR, 2013)
3 Strategic alignment: Harmonisation between bilateral and multilateral global health and
foreign policies (CSIS, 2007; Feldbaum, 2010) and inculcation of strategic awareness of
relationships between global health and foreign policy goals (CSIS, 2010), including
recognition of the capacity of global health programmes to advance or obstruct international
relations objectives (Katz et al., 2011)
4 ‘High-profile’ conditions: Responding to health needs that may have significant implications
for donor security, health or economic well-being (CSIS, 2010; Feldbaum, 2010), including
transnational epidemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (Michaud &
Kates, 2013)
5 Human rights: Alignment between global health service delivery and the defence and
advancement of human rights, including the abolition of slavery, freedom from tyranny, and
access to health services, thereby contributing to the advancement of human dignity, both
within and beyond health (WHO, 2012)
6 Accessing strategic markets and resources: Optimising the extent to which global health
programmes assist, in a manner that is fair and transparent to recipients, in gaining access to
strategic resources or markets (Feldbaum, 2010), including commodity resources from low-
and middle-income countries (AMFAR, 2013; Novotny & Kevany, 2013), which, in turn,
generate economic gains for both donors and recipients (Jaffe, 2013)
7 Inclusiveness: Leveraging global health programmes to unite opposing political factions,
promoting reconciliation and peace (Rubenstein, 2013), including negotiation, mediation and
‘public health persuasion’ initiatives, through integration of former adversaries within the same
health service (Kickbusch, 2012) regardless of affiliation (Rubenstein, 2013)
8 Prestige: Leveraging global health programmes to revise negative donor stereotypes (Katz
et al., 2011), including (1) altering perceptions of donor countries and organisations in
recipient communities (Bonventre, 2008), (2) winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of actual or
potential extremist populations (Feldbaum, 2010; Novotny & Adams, 2007) and (3) elevating
‘donor image’ (AMFAR, 2013)
9 Smart power: Delivery of global health programmes in terms of ‘armed social work’
(Feldbaum, 2010), ‘civilian power’ (United States Department of State, 2010) and ‘militarised
aid’ (Burkle, 2013), aligned with the support and protection of armed forces (Rubenstein,
2013) in conflict and post-conflict settings (Burkle, 2013)
10 Communications: Development of communications links to isolated populations through
which bilateral and multinational initiatives may build networks and relationships, gather
strategic information and intelligence related to health and non-health issues, in pursuit of
overarching political objectives and build a platform for environmental, security and





































interventions’ in conflict and post-conflict settings (Burkle, 2013), by which military
protection for global health initiatives is provided with strategic goals in mind (Rubenstein,
2013) (2) ensuring that global health practitioners communicate and collaborate effectively
and strategically with diplomatic and military personnel, and (3) refining the roles of
soldiers to provide an increased proportion of health and humanitarian assistance in an era
increasingly dominated by the use of unmanned drones to achieve combat objectives
(Kreps & Zenko, 2014; Michaud & Kates, 2013). In this way, global health interventions,
combined with military support, and delivered to inaccessible, persecuted or oppressed
populations, may allow world powers to intervene more readily in settings such as Syria,
with a greater likelihood of United Nations approval, less bloodshed, heightened
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness and without the confrontational and reputational risks
to Western powers consequent to recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent examples
of Africa Union forces operating in collaboration with global health initiatives in Somalia
have shown how compelling such collaborations can be in combating political and religious
extremism, illegitimate regimes, and tyranny (see, e.g. Straziuso, 2013), in the manner of
successfully coordinated efforts between the United Nations’ armed missions and the
United Nations Development Program in South Sudan (Kevany, Hatfield, et al., 2012).
Global health funding
The characterisation of global health as a diplomatic or foreign policy tool will ultimately
bring with it greater visibility and, therefore, investment support (Katz & Singer, 2007).
Even in the context of recent advances, global health funding currently represents a mere
0.0005% of worldwide health expenditure (Garrett, 2012). The more evidence that can
be generated regarding the manifold outputs of global health programmes, the stronger the
case for associated funding; success in engaging governments and other funders is more
likely when altruistic efforts can also be shown to benefit the national interest (Council on
Foreign Relations, 2013; United States Global Leadership Coalition, 2012) ‘as a recipe for
increased attention and resources’ (Michaud & Kates, 2013). In parallel, this process may
further entrench global health efforts in the political milieu, making them ‘less vulnerable
to prevailing winds’ (Garrett, 2012) whereby the alleviation of suffering and ill-health in
the developing world is seen as discretionary in times of fiscal crisis (Novotny & Kevany,
2013). Under these circumstances, and in the context of increasingly fierce battles for
funding by organisations such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (Ki-Moon, 2013), it is at best naive, and at worst irresponsible, not to leverage
international relations outputs as a key incentive to augmented donor funding.
Global health resource allocation decisions
Expertise in the appropriate allocation of resources across global health programmes,
from both the diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives, will be required if such
programmes are to attain optimal effectiveness in these realms (Fidler, 2007). This has
already been illustrated by proposals for the more formal inclusion of expert ‘global
health diplomacy’ considerations in health and HIV/AIDS resource allocation decisions
in South Africa (Kevany et al., 2013), and includes the development of specialist capacity
for (1) the reprogramming of existing resource allocation decisions from the diplomatic
and foreign policy perspectives as well as (2) consideration of the strategic application of
appropriately-adapted global health programmes to respond to immediate political, social,
or security-related situations and emergencies (Birdsall, 2013; Novotny & Kevany, 2013).




































In turn, the development of such expertise also suggests value in the creation of diplomatic
or foreign policy liaison units in organisations such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria and the European Union, designed to link the needs and
objectives of international development and foreign affairs more explicitly, and as
pioneered by both the US Office of Global Health Diplomacy, the US Department of
Defense Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Global Health Directorate, and
the ‘transformational vision’ of global health under the DFID in the United Kingdom
(Horton, 2007).
Global health programme evaluation
Concerns of global health programme implementers around the lack of capacity of
existing systems of evaluation to reflect contributions such as the creation of secure, just,
and productive communities in the context of broader ‘mission metrics’ (Mercy Corps,
2011) have led to calls to include ‘a more general appeal to concepts such as moral justice
and compassion’ (Lee, 2007). Both statesmen and ‘health diplomats’ therefore require a
holistic system of evaluation that reflects these broader, collateral considerations. Though
extensive challenges persist in attempting to place values on the downstream effects of
global health programmes, ‘merely attempting to quantify what has previously been
thought unquantifiable will pay dividends’ (Bonventre, 2008) in the context of a ‘21st
Century political investment’ (Novotny & Kevany, 2013). Further development and
recognition of diplomatic and foreign policy assessment criteria will therefore require
significant changes to existing monitoring and evaluation systems towards broader, more
holistic methods (Kevany et al., 2012a; United States Department of State 2011) as well
as associated investment in the expansion of responsibilities in the duties of related
personnel to include diplomatic and strategic assessments. This may be achieved, at
least in part, by the adaptation of existing tools such as the Global Fund’s on-site data
verification and routine service quality assessment tools (see, e.g. The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2013; Novotny & Kevany, 2013) – though reliance
on generic templates may, paradoxically, produce just the lack of inclusiveness that the
development of more responsive and holistic evaluation systems is designed to avoid.
Global health training
Global health practitioner responsibilities may be divided into their de jure life-saving roles
and their de facto international relations responsibilities (Katz et al., 2011). In a ‘New
World Order’ in which the basis (even the very definition) of professional achievement is
increasingly questioned by society (Krugman, 2013), such endeavours represent a
compelling beau ideal of twenty-first century achievement. In this context, professional
training for global health may need to more explicitly value individual and organisational
representative capacity, beyond mere technical or epidemiological competence: To date,
neither bilateral donors nor associated multilateral organisations such as the Global Fund
have systematically given global health professionals a framework for understanding the
political milieu in which they act (Katz et al., 2011). Such increasingly interdependent
operating environments require understanding of both global health and international
relations: ‘a capable health diplomat must have a sophisticated understanding of the
structures, programmes, approaches, and pitfalls surrounding these relationships to achieve
success, whether working in the clinical setting or at the policy-making table’ (Novotny &





































international relations, diplomacy, and foreign policy, but also on contemporary national,
supra-national, and global political, security and policy agendas. In the absence of such
training components, global health professionals may, otherwise, struggle to develop and
maintain effective international partnerships (Katz et al., 2011), at least in part due to a
lack of appreciation of prevailing socio-cultural and political contexts.
Approval procedures and cost-effectiveness analysis
The traditional role of clinical review boards has been as arbiters of global health
programme acceptability from the medical, ethical (or ‘bioethical’) perspective, under the
auspices of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2008). With the
recognition that global health programmes may pose critical threats, as well as potential
gains, to foreign policy and diplomatic outcomes, such roles and responsibilities will need
to be expanded accordingly. This has already been reflected, in recent years, by two major
trends in the global health métier. Firstly, the range of approvals required for global health
programme implementation continues to expand in response to unethical clinical
practices, particularly those related to randomised controlled trials in Africa (Reuters,
2011; World Medical Association, 2008). Secondly, from an academic perspective, the
recognition of diplomatic and foreign policy effects of global health programmes has
directly challenged advocates of cost-effectiveness analysis as the overarching – even the
sole – criterion in programme worth or value (see, e.g. Marseille & Khan, 2002; Ord,
2013). The dangers inherent in programme selection and approval decisions based solely
on conventional or utilitarian cost-effectiveness criteria have already been reflected in the
political and economic dilemmas of investment in HIV treatment versus prevention (Piot,
Zavdie, & Turmen, 2002) and these risks are increasingly under scrutiny from both the
bioethical and humanitarian perspectives (Cookson, McCabe, & Tsuchiya, 2007; Kevany
et al., 2013). When attempting to optimise diplomacy and foreign policy, as well as
primary programmatic outcomes of global health programmes, conventional measures of
performance designed for use in programme selection are therefore necessarily relegated to
discussions of technical (i.e. informing choices between interventions within the same
programmatic area) rather than allocative (i.e. informing choices across programmatic
areas) efficiency (Disease Control Priorities Project, 2008; Jan, 1998, Kevany et al., 2013;
Piot et al., 2002). With the development of more holistic approval systems, global health
programmes may, in turn, become more meaningfully, and therefore more strategically,
selected.
Conclusions
A renaissance approach to global health
Both diplomatically and foreign policy–sensitised global health programmes may make
international development more effective by building international trust and cooperation
(Skinner & Sriharan, 2007); winning ‘hearts and minds’ (Feldbaum, 2010); working
towards international conflict resolution and the pursuit of peace (Kickbusch & Buss,
2011); improving communication and terms of trade (CSIS, 2010); and bringing, with a
benign international presence, greater stability to unstable areas (Kevany, Hatfield, et al.,
2012; Kevany, Khumalo-Sakutukwa, et al., 2012). Such programmes also have the
potential to directly improve health outcomes through changes in service utilisation and
uptake; improved geographical accessibility; sustainability; adaptability; and equity
(Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al., 2008). More broadly, global health actors stand to improve




































in prestige (Fidler, 2007), donor countries to gain in terms of ‘international image building’
(CSIS, 2010) and recipient populations to benefit through associated increases in global
health funding (Clinton, 2012), thereby potentially, and perhaps ironically, saving more
lives than if global health programmes were ‘stovepiped’ within a narrow programmatic
construct (Atwood, 2010). Conversely, when viewed as political choices, global health
programme decisions are likely to be made badly if governed exclusively by philanthropic
considerations that ignore this ‘two-in-one’ character of humanitarian aid (Valentino,
2011). Without consideration of related interdisciplinary principles, ‘the high expectations
that global health will achieve diplomatic goals beyond technical objectives will be
thwarted by these gaps’ (Katz et al., 2011). Any consequent augmentation of resources for
global health would, if appropriately distributed, therefore ultimately contribute not just to
global health outcomes, but also to more abstract and transcendent ideals (Kickbusch &
Buss, 2011). In this context, future research may wish to consider (1) the further
corroboration of the proposed criteria presented in this paper, with reference to specific
historical and contemporary practices; (2) examples of diplomatic and foreign policy
triumphs and threats of global health programmes; and (3) the applicability of diplomatic
and foreign policy criteria to a more diverse range of development initiatives.
A renaissance in diplomacy and foreign policy – revisited
Concerns about the corruption of the high idealism of global health programmes, which
have their primary mission diverted or compromised to serve more powerful or competing
interests, are relevant to the promotion of ‘global health diplomacy’ approaches (Paulson,
2010). Many of these reservations may lie, however, not with the reframing of global health
programmes as tools of foreign policy and diplomacy but with efforts to make both
diplomatic and foreign policy criteria, for so long implicit in programme design and
delivery, part of a more explicit system of assessment and service delivery (Labonte &
Gagnon, 2010). Abstract goals such as world peace, international cooperation, and global
prosperity and security may transcend even the high idealism of global health programmes
themselves (Novotny & Kevany, 2013). More specifically, from a foreign policy perspective,
while it is of course unacceptable for global health programmes not to achieve, to the greatest
extent possible within diplomatic and foreign policy parameters, their health-related goals,
the achievement of health outcomes at high (but possibly sub-optimal) levels may be
preferable if under the auspices of the joint pursuit of broader strategic and security interests
(Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2010), thereby saving additional lives through
improvements in international relations and conflict prevention or resolution (Burkle,
2013). Concurrently, the development of global health diplomacy perspectives challenge
traditional notions of foreign policy practice, which, in the ‘New World Order’, rather than
simply promoting national interests, ‘have become more concerned with partnerships than
rivalries, and alliances rather than enmities’ (Horton, 2007) – while also challenging
traditional beliefs around who should decide, and who should take responsibility for, setting
priorities in foreign policy, foreign assistance and international development (Sridhar &
Woods, 2007). With military, global health and foreign policy practitioners working
together more closely than ever to better achieve mutual goals (Michaud & Kates, 2013),
and in a world in which both a reluctance to resort to twentieth-century-style ‘hard power’
interventions and a greater than ever variety of ‘barefoot diplomats’ are increasingly
evident, the alignment of global health programmes with the principles of defence,
diplomacy and foreign policy will ensure that the ‘greater good’ of harmonious





































programme-specific targets. Global health diplomacy is, in essence, too valuable to
neglect – not just for recipients, not just for donors, but also for the international
community. In this regard, today, and as it was half a century ago: ‘The long labor of
peace is an undertaking for every nation – and, in this effort, none of us can remain
unaligned. To this goal, none can be uncommitted’ (Kennedy, 1963).
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health program selection, design, delivery and
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Abstract
Background: Global health programs, as supported by organizations such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), stand to make significant
contributions to international medical outcomes. Traditional systems of monitoring and evaluation, however, fail to
capture downstream, indirect, or collateral advantages (and threats) of intervention selection, design, and
implementation from broader donor perspectives, including those of the diplomatic and foreign policy
communities, which these programs also generate. This paper describes the development a new métier under
which assessment systems designed to consider the diplomatic value of global health initiatives are described and
applied based on previously-identified “Top Ten” criteria.
Methods: The “Kevany Riposte” and the “K-Score” were conceptualized based on a retrospective and collective
assessment of the author’s participation in the design, implementation and delivery of a range of global health
interventions related to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Responses and associated scores reframe intervention worth or
value in terms of global health diplomacy criteria such as “adaptability”, “interdependence”, “training,” and
“neutrality”. Response options ranged from “highly advantageous” to “significant potential threat”.
Results: Global health initiatives under review were found to generate significant advantages from the diplomatic
perspective. These included (1) intervention visibility and associations with donor altruism and prestige, (2) development
of international non-health collaborations and partnerships, (3) adaptability and responsiveness of service delivery to local
needs, and (4) advancement of broader strategic goals of the international community. Corresponding threats included
(1) an absence of formal training of project staff on broader political and international relations roles and responsibilities,
(2) challenges to recipient cultural and religious practices, (3) intervention-related environmental concerns, and (4) a lack
of prima facie consideration of intervention diplomatic and foreign policy consequences.
Conclusions: Global health interventions stand to generate significant diplomatic advantages for donor and recipient
countries and organizations when appropriately selected, designed, targeted, and delivered. Conversely, in the absence
of the application of standards such as those developed under the Kevany Riposte, threats to diplomacy and
international relations may occur. With the application of related systems to other global health programmes and
settings, comparative results on the relative worth of alternate approaches from the diplomatic perspective may be
generated to better inform political, strategic, and global health policy and programmatic decisions.
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Theoretical & philosophical basis
Global health, diplomacy, and foreign policy
Foreign policy trends in both the European Union and
the United States are increasingly aligned with “smart
power” [1] approaches, in recognition of the “myriad
newer uses” of global health and development initiatives
[2]. The European Union advocates strategic use of for-
eign assistance, combined with diplomacy and arbitra-
tion, to pursue foreign policy goals under the Common
Foreign & Security Policy [3,4] via a specific focus on
global health [5]. Similarly, in the United States, increas-
ing levels of alignment between the State Department,
the United States Agency for International Development,
the Department of Defense and the Department of Health
and Human Services is indicative of their increasingly
interchangeable roles [6]. In the United Kingdom, foreign
assistance now forms an integral component of foreign af-
fairs [7] under the stated goal of “policy coherence” [8].
Conversely but convergently, both the United Nations and
international military forces have displayed an increased
propensity to combine conflict resolution and humanitar-
ian activities [9], whilst the World Bank has recommended
that international development focus on security issues
beyond primary programmatic goals [10]. These trends
are of increasing importance to the design, delivery and
evaluation of global health intervention programs under
initiatives such as the United States’ President’s Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) [11] particularly in
the context of the recent creation of the Office of Global
Health Diplomacy [12] and related programs supported
by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (“The Global Fund”) [13].
Aligning & sensitizing global health programs to
international affairs
Unlike the medically-dominated ethos of global health,
diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives are both multi-
level and multicausal, involving the synthesis of informa-
tion from a variety of social science knowledge systems
[14]. Failure to consider foreign policy and international
relations principles and objectives when designing, select-
ing and implementing global health programs such as
PEPFAR and the Global Fund’s related HIV/AIDS initia-
tives may, therefore, create a “tense and confusing duality”
[15]. For example, while global health programs that chal-
lenge cultural, religious, ideological, social and behavioral
norms are often compelling in terms of their capacity to
achieve primary health outcomes, they may also create
unquantified downstream benefits, or constitute potential
liabilities, from the diplomatic and foreign policy perspec-
tives. Although it is critically important for such initiatives
to attempt to optimize outcomes such as quality-adjusted
life years (QALYs), their design and delivery needs to be
carefully evaluated in order to ensure that (1) these goals
are not being achieved at the cost of foreign policy, diplo-
matic, international relations, or broader global strategic
objectives, and (2) their potential to achieve such collateral
objectives is optimized [16].
Ranking global health programs from the foreign policy
and diplomatic perspectives
The rise of a utilitarian approach to global health evalu-
ation, as represented by tools such as cost-effectiveness
analysis, has resulted in the predominant use of narrow,
single-metric measures as exclusive barometers of global
health program worth or value [17]. No international ini-
tiative, however, operates in isolation or without epistemic
consequences [18]. In a variation on the McNamara
Fallacy [19], such programs produce a range of down-
stream, collateral or indirect outcomes that are not ad-
equately quantified – and, therefore, considered to be
non-existent. In the 21st century, both foreign policy-
makers and global health professionals require an innova-
tive métier that reflects these broader considerations, both
(1) in order to portray global health expenditures as in-
vestments rather than costs, and (2) to “speak a language
that people with power really understand” [20]; foreign as-
sistance priorities and associated resource allocation deci-
sions should, where possible, include consideration of the
universal and fundamental aspirations of global political,
security, and strategic affairs [21]. The recent emergence
of the smart power paradigm [22] has, at least in part,
been a product of this increased integration between for-
eign policy and global health initiatives [23], elevating glo-
bal health to the status of a powerful diplomatic and
foreign policy tool, rather than merely a humanitarian ef-
fort. There has been, to date, a “lack of ability” to demon-
strate the effectiveness of foreign assistance programs in
this context [24]. This paper outlines the development
and application of just such a “diplomatic assessment” ap-
proach for global health programmes, adopting a term
from the art of fencing, and eponymously entitled the
Kevany Riposte, due to it’s conceptual basis as an innova-
tive and interdisciplinary approach that challenges “siloed”
[13] or “stovepiped” [25] perspectives. These efforts are
based on the author’s prior identification of “Top Ten”
lists for diplomatic effectiveness [25], and as applied to a
retrospective and collective assessment of PEPFAR and
Global Fund-supported HIV/AIDS initiatives in South
Africa, Sudan, Kenya, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Tanzania,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, and elsewhere, in order, for the
first time, to assess intervention program threats and ad-
vantages from this broader perspective.
Methods
Defining “HIV/AIDS initiatives”
Community-based behavioral, educational, and diagnos-
tic initiatives form an innovative and essential part of
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both the Global Fund and PEPFAR’s HIV/AIDS response
paradigms [26,27]. Such programs provide, amongst other
features, technical assistance to strengthen prevention
programming; community support mechanisms; referral
systems; and other behavioral and community-based
health promotion and educational initiatives [28]. Within
this broader operational context, HIV Counseling & Test-
ing (HCT) based around “wellness days”, “community
mobilization”, and “post-test support services”, amongst
other forms of service delivery, are provided in commu-
nity venues in order to increase, for example, numbers of
persons tested for HIV/AIDS provided with personalized
support and guidance regarding behavioral risk-reduction,
as well as raising community awareness and engagement.
In the health systems strengthening context, related inter-
ventions also contribute to capacity building (e.g. the
provision of district-level trainers to implement “Preven-
tion with Positives” programs) [29]. For the purposes of
this paper, “HIV/AIDS interventions”, “HIV/AIDS pro-
grammes”, and “HIV/AIDS initiatives” therefore refer to
such community-based, multi-level HIV/AIDS responses,
including combined diagnostic, prevention, behavioural,
and health system strengthening programs under the
auspices of Project Accept [30], the Global Fund, and
PEPFAR South Africa [31], whilst excluding therapeutic
programs such as antiretroviral treatment and surgical
interventions such as voluntary adult male circumcision.
Kevany Riposte and K-Score development
Systems by which to quantify the latent and potential glo-
bal health diplomacy and foreign policy value of global
health programmes were developed based on previously-
identified criteria for “global health diplomacy” and “global
health and foreign policy” appropriateness and effective-
ness in global health program design, delivery and
evaluation [32]. Originally presented in the form of two
“Top Ten” tables – representative of those features or
characteristics of global health programs identified as
effective in the foreign policy or diplomatic contexts,
respectively, in the related literature – classifications were
adapted to Excel-based questionnaire and scoring formats
(see Additional file 1 Annex 1: Diplomatic Assessment
Questionnaire and Scoring Tool). Development of the
Kevany Riposte and K-Score also drew on the author’s
prior contributions to the development and utilization of
related designs, in particular the Global Fund’s Routine
Service Quality Assessment (RSQA) and On-Site Data
Verification (OSDV) tools [33]. The results presented in
this paper relate specifically to “diplomatic”, rather than
“foreign policy”, considerations.
Implementation & utilization
Diplomatic assessments of HIV/AIDS initiatives were
based on the retrospective and collective assessment of
the author’s field deployments for diplomatic monitoring
& evaluation, cost-effectiveness, and quality assurance
purposes on behalf of the Global Fund, the United
Nations Development Program, PEPFAR implementing
organizations (e.g. the International Training and Educa-
tion Center for Health), the University of California, San
Francisco, and the Project Accept community-based vol-
untary counseling and testing intervention (as imple-
mented under the United States’ National Institutes for
Mental Health) between 2007 and 2014. Related on-site
engagements included field missions to service delivery
points (e.g. mobile HIV/AIDS counseling and testing cen-
ters in the Northwest Province of South Africa for PEP-
FAR and in Sudan and South Sudan for the Global Fund)
and engagements and liaisons with key governmental and
non-governmental organizations and individuals (e.g. the
South African, Sudanese and South Sudanese Ministries
of Health on behalf of the Global Fund). Field-level and
on-site observations conducted to inform assessment re-
sponses were undertaken, where possible, with the assist-
ance of an interview guide (see Additional file 2 Annex 2:
Interview and Assessment Guide for Diplomatic and For-
eign Policy Assessments) and were complemented, where
necessary, by follow-up questions via e-mail exchanges
and teleconferences with key managerial and field staff.
Further on-site and desk research (e.g. review of interven-
tion protocols and standard operating procedures) was
also conducted to complete remaining questionnaire re-
sponses, as necessary.
Defining assessment classifications & sub-classifications
The primary classifications employed in the Kevany
Riposte and K-Score were based directly on previously-
identified “Top Ten” criteria keywords (e.g. “communi-
cations”; “adaptability”), as described above. Related
sub-classifications were based on interpretations and
descriptions of each primary classification in the literature
(e.g. the “adaptability” classification was associated with
themes of “responsiveness to health needs”, “responsive-
ness to non-health needs”, “recipient-led program design”,
and “recipient-led resource allocation”). For purposes of
both detail and consistency, four such sub-classifications
were developed for each classification, resulting in 40 as-
sessment questions. In turn, these sub-classifications were
expanded and articulated in the form of specific thematic
questions to be addressed to relevant project staff, includ-
ing program managers, field officers, and other project
personnel, designed to be relevant to project activities at
the individual, intervention and policy levels (see below).
Policy, intervention and individual level assessment
dimensions
As a result of the broad range of issues related to the
diplomatically-effective delivery of global health programs,
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the above assessment procedures included implicit consid-
eration of three main evaluation dimensions: (1) policy
level (e.g. whether donor organization guidelines addressed
relevant practices & procedures), (2) intervention level (e.g.
whether intervention protocol and standard operating pro-
cedures were appropriately designed from the diplomatic
perspective), and (3) individual level performance and re-
sponsibilities (e.g. sensitization of national and international
project staff to consideration of broader local, national, and
international strategic environments). Sub-classification
questions were designed to be informed by, and completed
based on consideration of, these three constructs.
Responses, scoring and comments
Response options to sub-classification questions were
divided into six categories: “highly advantageous”, “moder-
ately advantageous”, “neutral, not relevant, or not consid-
ered”, “not applicable”, “potential moderate threat”, and
“potential significant threat”, in accordance with level of
alignment with associated diplomatic goals and principles
(Table 1). These response categories were associated with
scores of +2, +1, zero (for both “neutral, not relevant, or
not considered” and “not applicable”), -1, and -2, respect-
ively. Sub-classification scores were then aggregated and
averaged in order to provide an overall classification score.
No weighting was attached to different classifications or
sub-classifications, based on the assumption that all classi-
fications were of equal value or importance from the dip-
lomatic perspective. Scope for additional comments,
narrative descriptions, and categorization justification was
also included at the assessment and evaluation stage in
order to provide further explanation, as necessary, for
scoring decisions. Finally, all classification scores were ag-
gregated and averaged in order to determine an overall
intervention-specific diplomatic assessment rating, repre-
sentative of the collective programs under review, in the
diplomatic context (the “K-Score”).
Program performance from the diplomatic
perspective
Overall diplomatic assessment results
Diplomatic assessment ratings at the classification and
sub-classification levels are presented in Table 2 and
Additional file 1 Annex 1. The HIV/AIDS initiatives
under review were collectively found to be “moderately
advantageous” from the diplomatic perspective, attain-
ing an overall average score of +1 across diplomatic as-
sessment classifications. This included three “highly
advantageous”, three “moderately advantageous”, one
“neutral”, and three “potential moderate threat” classifi-
cation scores (Fig. 1).
“Highly advantageous” classifications
HIV/AIDS initiatives were considered to be “highly advan-
tageous” under the diplomatic assessment classifications
of “visibility”, “adaptability”, and “partnerships”. These re-
sults are in keeping with prior findings related to both the
structure and “unintended consequences” of HIV/AIDS
intervention programs [18]. For example, the extensive
intervention adaptability of related HIV/AIDS interven-
tions has been documented elsewhere [34], including the
importance of intervention visibility and communications
through revisions to key practices (e.g. evolving interven-
tion “branding” and terminology to fit with local cultures
and social norms) and community mobilization activities.
Similarly, the generation of international partnerships
through collaborations based on international HIV/
AIDS initiatives is in keeping with prior findings related
to the documented success of academic and inter-
governmental collaborations under both the Global
Fund and PEPFAR [35].
“Moderately advantageous” classifications
HIV/AIDS initiatives under review were found to be “mod-
erately advantageous”, from the diplomatic perspective, in
terms of “sustainability”, “accountability”, and “economic,
political, environmental and social effects”. These findings
are also supported by reference to related studies. For ex-
ample, positive assessments for sustainability were driven
by intervention strengths in the context of “country owner-
ship” [36] and transferability to local actors, while diplo-
matic advantages in the “accountability” context are aligned
with previously-documented strengths of PEPFAR and the
Global Fund in monitoring and evaluation and other qual-
ity assurance and control systems [37]. Similarly, positive
economic, political, and social outcomes were driven by the
Table 1 Scoring and Results Classifications for “Top Ten” Criteria
Classification Interpretation Score
Highly advantageous Intervention program displays clear and significant value from the diplomatic or foreign policy perspective. +2
Moderately advantageous Intervention program displays some strengths in advancing diplomatic or foreign policy goals. +1
Acceptable, neutral, or not
relevant
Intervention attains diplomatic or foreign policy minimum standards. 0
Not applicable Intervention program does not operate in the context of this classification (or sub-classification). 0
Potential moderate threat Intervention program may constitute a threat to diplomatic or foreign policy goals. −1
Potential significant treat Intervention program constitutes a clear and significant threat from the diplomatic or foreign policy perspective. −2
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widespread provision of social and economic support ser-
vices (such as “Back to Work” or income-generating horti-
cultural schemes), which were frequently attached to those
primary service delivery components under review [30].
“Neutral” classifications
HIV/AIDS interventions were classified as “neutral” from
the diplomatic perspective in the context of “effective-
ness”. The limited consideration of budgetary constraints
after the intervention or programmatic support period,
combined with the high demand for affordable and cost-
effective health care delivery and financing strategies in re-
cipient countries, are current causes of concern through-
out both the global health and international development
contexts [38], most particularly in the current global re-
cession era. In this context, the increased use of both
health and non-health effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
information as a key component of intervention design
Table 2 Diplomatic Assessment Results
Classification Sub-classification 1 Sub-classification 2 Sub-classification 3 Sub-classification 4 Score Rating
Neutrality Cultural Social Religious Other
Neutrality Score −1 −1 −2 2 −1 POTENTIAL
MODERATE THREAT
Visibility Appropriate Branding Safety & Security National Linkages Visibility through
Communications
Visibility Score 2 1 1 2 2 HIGHLY
ADVANTAGEOUS
Sustainability Sustainability Transferability Intervention Type Forward-Looking
Commitments
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and delivery on a prima facie rather than a post-hoc basis
may significantly strengthen intervention design and deliv-
ery [39] in this regard.
“Potential moderate threat” classifications
Potential moderate threats to diplomatic considerations,
interests and outcomes at both recipient and donor
levels related to “neutrality”, “interdependence”, and
“training”. These findings are, once again, in keeping
with a range of contemporary recommendations on the
design and delivery of global health intervention pro-
grams. For example, in the context of neutrality, the im-
position of international cultural, social and religious
standards and norms on recipient societies, often with-
out appropriate levels of consultation at the local and
community levels, may represent a threat both to suc-
cessful program implementation and to international re-
lations [34]. Conversely, a lack of awareness of the
strategic implications of global health’s resource alloca-
tion decisions may mean that foreign assistance can un-
intentionally support extremist organizations [40].
Similarly, in the context of “interdependence”, a lack of
organizational and operational coordination and align-
ment between health and non-health initiatives related to
broader strategic and international affairs considerations
has been identified as a possible source of conflict between
health and diplomatic goals [41]. Finally, in the context of
“training”, limited levels of broader political education and
awareness in global health practitioners operating in inter-
national environments has been identified as a key gap at
the individual capacity level [42,43].
Potential significant threats at the sub-classification level
Although no classifications were rated as a “potential sig-
nificant threat” from the diplomatic perspective, specific
sub-classifications recording this result are highlighted
here. These include programmatic threats to religious
neutrality (under the “neutrality” classification), limited
assurances and planning regarding funding sustainability
(under the “sustainability” classification), limited or no
prima facie use of health and non-health cost-effectiveness
findings (under the “effectiveness” classification, and as
described above), limited or no consideration of envir-
onmental impact (under the “economic, political, environ-
mental and social effects” classification), and inadequate
provision of broader diplomatic training, awareness, and
formalization of related roles and responsibilities (under
the “training” classification). Strategies to address these
potentially significant diplomatic threats have been pre-
sented, in recent years, via innovative recommendations




For the first time, a global health intervention has been
assessed through the lens, and from the perspective, of
diplomatic appropriateness, sensitivity and effectiveness.
HIV/AIDS initiatives were found to score positively in
terms of diplomatic effectiveness, whilst also evincing
both (1) potential areas of improvement and (2) a limited
number of potential diplomatic threats. These findings
may represent significant considerations for policymakers
both within and beyond global health, who are now
equipped to determine the value, worth or risk of global
health investments beyond the narrow metrics employed
by traditional monitoring and evaluation or cost-
effectiveness analyses associated with a narrow (and
often exclusively medical) selection of outcomes, out-
puts and impact assessments [44]. These results
should, nonetheless, still be considered in conjunction
with traditional measures of program effectiveness or
efficiency in order to determine associated resource
allocation and implementation decisions: low levels of
intervention cost-effectiveness, for example, may be
Fig. 1 Diplomatic Advantages & Threats of Selected HIV/AIDS Initiatives
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offset by significant intervention returns or value at
the diplomatic level [35].
Enlightened strategic & resource allocation decisions:
beyond cost-effectiveness
The results presented here are designed for use and ref-
erence at both the global health policy level and across
the broader milieu of bilateral and multilateral foreign
policymaking and practice. For example, within global
health and development, these results may help to
inform “enlightened” resource allocation decisions be-
yond the “potentially flawed” [35] reliance on cost-
effectiveness analyses as the exclusive determinant of
global health program worth or value. Perhaps even
more importantly, the interpretation and use of these
results at the diplomatic and foreign policy level pre-
sents a range of opportunities for policymakers to le-
verage, design, and refine global health and other
development initiatives for the purposes of foreign pol-
icy and diplomacy [45].
“Smart power” and “smart global health”
At its most optimal, the Kevany Riposte and the K-Score
may help both health and non-health, bilateral and
multilateral organizations to manipulate aid in order to
substitute for, offset, complement, or support the use of
hard power in favour of smart power options, via the
creation of a new “stage” in the escalation of inter-
national engagements, in keeping with 21st Century
standards of acceptability for, and effectiveness of, inter-
national military interventions [46,47]. A new step in the
“escalation hierarchy” amongst traditional and accepted
stratifications such as neutrality, diplomacy, soft power
and hard power [48] would be epitomized by such smart
global health initiatives [45]. This may, in turn, bring
about (1) a transfer or collaboration of resources from
hard to smart international initiatives operating under
“military umbrellas” [46] and, where feasible and appro-
priate, (2) the increased or enhanced use by military
forces and related organizations of smart global health
systems to pursue foreign policy and strategic preroga-
tives [49].
Utilization in the international intelligence context
The employment of global health programs for strategic
political ends in an unstructured manner has, in the
past, put global health workers at a security risk by asso-
ciation, regardless of whether or not individual- or
organizational-level activities are in fact related to such
ostensibly extraneous objectives [50]. At the same time,
Western powers are increasingly open to the use of in-
novative, collaborative and interdisciplinary efforts to re-
solve contemporary international affairs and security
challenges [51], against which conventional response
systems have faced significant challenges. In this highly
nuanced, complex, and occasionally clandestine context,
non-health dividends may be attained if global health
programs are selected, designed and delivered in a man-
ner that bears in mind potential international conflict
resolution, cooperation, and security goals as well as pri-
mary health and development outcomes [52]; past re-
search has suggested that locating highly-diplomatic
global health projects in extremist regions, as informed
by the “geo-strategic considerations” classification, pro-
vides meaningful alternatives to political or other forms
of extremism [53]. In this context, the Kevany Riposte
and the K-Score may offer standards by which inter-
national agencies such as the United Kingdom’s Security
Service,(MI5), the European Union’s Intelligence Ana-
lysis Centre [54], and the United States’ Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) liaise with both donor, supra-
national, and recipient departments of international de-
velopment and health in a fashion that both (1) reduces
threats to aid workers and (2) integrates multifarious di-
mensions to global health programs which are, in turn,
(3) conducted in a style acceptable and transparent to
recipient country governments. Such innovative collabo-
rations, instead of acquiescing to demands that global
health funding be transferred to defense [55], stand to
achieve both altruistic, intelligence, and security goals
simultaneously. Perhaps most importantly, employment
of assessment systems under the Kevany Riposte in this
context will also help to ensure that global health pro-
grams do not inadvertently harm international security
by providing aid, health, or other financial support to ex-
tremist organizations [56]. Notwithstanding these other
potential gains, traditional (and possibly flawed) ap-
proaches to intelligence gathering through international
development initiatives [57] stand to be both improved
and made more effective by the application of relevant
criteria, models, procedures and standards to both
organizational and individual-level activities and liaisons
in this context.
Limitations
The absence of comparator results from other global
health intervention programs is a key limitation of this
work. The generation of relevant comparable “K-Scores”
in different settings (e.g. the diplomatic effectiveness of
tuberculosis treatment programs in Iraq or malaria pre-
vention initiatives in Afghanistan, as described elsewhere
by the author) [17,52] may, as with the results of cost-
effectiveness analyses, generate opportunities for inter-
vention ranking or league tables [58] from the diplo-
matic or foreign policy perspective. For example,
comparisons with HIV/AIDS interventions excluded
from this review (e.g. antiretroviral treatment or male
circumcision) might provide useful information to
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policymakers regarding related resources allocation de-
cisions. This review should, therefore, be characterized
and interpreted as a pilot initiative, based on which, in fu-
ture, Kevany Riposte systems, scope, and results may be
further refined and applied by larger teams. In addition,
future efforts might also (1) consider dividing the system’s
structure and results across the three major evaluation di-
mensions outlined above (i.e. individual, policy and inter-
vention levels) in a more explicit fashion, (2) correlate
health and diplomatic outcomes (see below), and (3) at-
tempt to further describe the political and operational
mechanisms by which the results of diplomatic and for-
eign policy evaluations may be translated from findings
such as those presented here into policy, and thence into
practice [59–61] (see below).
Plotting health effectiveness against intervention
effectiveness
A related area of potential interest and inquiry to organi-
zations such as the United States’ Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) is consideration of the
effects of diplomatically “highly advantageous” global
health interventions on health outcomes. Do “more dip-
lomatic” global health interventions relate to improved
health outcomes – or vice versa – or both? Such find-
ings, though beyond the scope of this paper, might be
determined through cross-referencing intervention med-
ical efficacy and effectiveness against diplomatic assess-
ment values. Though direction of causality may be
challenging to prove, the establishment of such relation-
ships may help to further explain the manifold connec-
tions between diplomatically and medically successful
global health interventions [62].
Recommendations
Global health interventions and related Global Fund and
PEPFAR-supported programs have the potential to be of
significant importance in alleviating developing coun-
tries from the worst effects of communicable and non-
communicable disease and ill-health. More broadly, such
interventions may also have the potential to advance
diplomatic considerations related to the interests of both
donor and recipient countries, as well as national and
international, health and non-health, goals and initia-
tives, such as strategic and security concerns. In order to
optimize the potential future impact of these latter di-
mensions, and based on the results presented here, re-
lated recommendations include (1) consideration of the
redesign of HIV/AIDS initiatives in the context of train-
ing, organizational interdependence, and neutrality, whilst
also addressing the specific “potential significant threats”
at the sub-classification level described above; (2) the
further development of intervention sustainability, ac-
countability, and latent political, economic, social and
environmental potential; (3) the development and
prima facie integration of intervention health and non-
health effectiveness findings into intervention program
design and delivery; (4) building on the successes and dip-
lomatic advantages associated with intervention visibility,
adaptability, and partnership development; and (5) lever-
aging these latent diplomatic assets, at the individual,
intervention and policy levels, in order to address broader
national and international strategic concerns.
Next steps: utilization of results and “evidence into policy
& practice”
The identification of five main opportunities and mecha-
nisms for utilization of the results of the Kevany Riposte
and K-Score have previously been identified by the author
as (1) training, (2) evaluation, (3) resource allocation, (4)
funding, and (5) military and international security consid-
erations [25]. A range of realpolitik scenarios for such ap-
plications are conceivable. In one possible example,
widespread diplomatic reviews conducted under the aus-
pices of organizations such as the Office of Global Health
Diplomacy, the United Kingdom’s Royal Institute for
International Affairs, or the European Union’s External
Action Service, might provide a detailed picture of the
comparative worth of global health interventions, from
the diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives, across a
range of key settings, population groups, and regions
around the world. These results might then be overlaid,
with the assistance of donor and recipient country foreign
policymakers or professional diplomats, with global diplo-
matic, political, foreign policy or strategic needs and
threats in order to determine both (1) overall and targeted
global health investments, (2) geo-strategic and demo-
graphic focus, and (3) intervention program selection,
whilst (4) better aligning interventions with broader stra-
tegic considerations and the work of non-health inter-
national initiatives and organizations. In this way, the
smart use of global health initiatives may provide a mean-
ingful and effective alternative or complement to other
forms of international intervention on the world stage, ad-
vancing both health and non-health goals [63].
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Applying Smart Power via Global 
Health Engagement
By Sebastian Kevany and Michael Baker
T
he U.S. military is entering a 
period of dramatic redirection 
and restructuring at a time of 
broader international upheaval, from 
Ukraine to Syria.1 The past decade 
of global conflict has emphasized 
the predominant hard power focus 
of the Armed Forces, often with 
limited success. The emergence of a 
new mission—smart power—offers 
opportunities to shift toward innovative 
forms of international intervention and 
conflict resolution by the U.S. military 
through coordination with national 
security strategies such as global 
health diplomacy (GHD).2 Recently 
articulated doubts over the wisdom of 
supplying health, development, and 
other forms of economic support to 
those countries that support Islamic 
fundamentalism highlight an increasing 
need for the United States and other 
world powers to harmonize and align 
development, altruistic, and security 
initiatives.3
Military forces could be deployed 
and used to contribute to foreign policy, 
global health, and the strengthening of 
key local actors in related sectors.4 Doing 
so could maintain strategic regional and 
international goals and advance interna-
tional stability and development through 
strategies such as global health engage-
ment (GHE). GHE is defined as “health 
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activities which the DOD [Department 
of Defense] conducts in support of the 
national security policy and military strat-
egy of the United States.”5 While a range 
of tensions exists around expanded mili-
tary engagement in humanitarianism, we 
can attempt to guide this process toward 
a mutually acceptable engagement on 
both altruistic and strategic levels via the 
GHD paradigm.
Considerable damage to the interna-
tional prestige of the armed forces of the 
United States and United Kingdom has 
resulted from the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars and associated events.6 Combined 
with questions of strategic gains, cost-
effectiveness (consideration of the 
“opportunity costs” of the combat and 
postcombat periods, including care of 
returning veterans), long-term regional 
stability, and lack of global social, po-
litical, and cultural acceptability, there is 
increasing speculation regarding the use 
of combined military, health, and devel-
opment initiatives as some of the possible 
effective substitutes for, or complements 
to, hard power interventions. For exam-
ple, strengthening host-nation healthcare 
systems is one path to achieving strategic 
goals, through accessing and stabilizing 
regimes opposed to extremism.7
Opponents of smart power strate-
gies point to the fact that there is no 
proven correlation between international 
development programs and the capacity 
of donors to positively influence geostra-
tegic or geopolitical events, yet medical 
initiatives are increasingly recognized 
as an effective and efficient method of 
supporting the global community’s 
dual-health and non-health priorities in 
tandem.8 These include threat reduction 
from epidemics, enhanced security (in-
cluding health security), and political and 
diplomatic alliances—pursued in concert 
with each other, rather than in isolation, 
via DOD initiatives such as medical sta-
bility operations and partner engagement 
and force health protection and readi-
ness.9 Thus GHE is specifically designed 
to support both national security and 
international engagement.10
The modern international security 
environment has undergone significant 
changes since the end of the Cold War. 
One significant driver of this change is 
the failed state, an environment that pro-
vides little hope for a better future among 
young populations and is “susceptible 
to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and 
international criminals.”11 Concurrently, 
the nature of the physical battlefield has 
changed via an increasing number of 
tribal and ethnic clashes that involve non-
state, guerrilla, or other irregular players 
rather than uniformed forces.12 This 
evolution of the conflict environment 
has had a corresponding impact on ap-
proaches used by security instruments to 
implement and influence foreign policy 
objectives.
The U.S. Marine Corps first identified 
related models in the latter half of the 
1990s, describing its vision of future war-
fare in this context as the “Three Block 
War” under which hypothesis individual 
soldiers are required to simultaneously 
conduct military, peacekeeping, and aid 
operations in combination with, and in 
close geographical proximity to, each 
other.13 The essence of this innovative 
concept is that modern militaries, to be 
effective, must be trained to operate in 
all three operating environments simul-
taneously—and that to do so, leadership 
training in related noncombat skills, in-
cluding health care and diplomacy, must 
be conducted at all levels of command.
Military technology has advanced 
significantly in recent years, including 
remote imaging that can be leveraged to 
gain immediate information regarding 
needs on the ground through overflight 
by satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs). This ascendancy of technological 
warfare has led to a reevaluation of the 
role of traditional or conventional armed 
forces as ground troops.14 Apart from 
growing public intolerance of military 
and civilian “body counts” associated 
with the pre-UAV era, the increased 
range of options offered by related 
technological advances has meant that 
the threat neutralization roles formerly 
the responsibility of the foot soldier are 
increasingly delegated to unmanned 
interventions.15 As described in the Three 
Block War paradigm, the role of indi-
vidual soldiers is evolving beyond mere 
combatants. To adapt to these new and 
diverse roles, as well as proving purpose-
ful activity for the residual manpower 
surplus associated with technological war-
fare, the Armed Forces require increased 
training in, and awareness of, their role 
as international representatives, global 
health workers, and diplomats, as well as 
their traditional battlefield roles.
Soldiers will continue to function ac-
cording to the rules of engagement and 
take orders and procedures from their 
officers, while demonstrating an explicit 
awareness and recognition of their im-
plicit role as benign liberators and agents 
of international relations and develop-
ment that stands to significantly enhance 
their prestige, value, functionality, and 
self-esteem. Such aspirations mirror the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
longstanding Peace Support Operations 
doctrine, which includes the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to civilian popula-
tions as one of its six guiding principles.16
Since the end of the Cold War, inter-
national economic crises and domestic 
budgetary pressures have generated 
tremendous pressure on Western military 
establishments to adapt and streamline 
operations via a diversification of roles 
and responsibilities. Military and politi-
cal leaders’ recognition of international 
health emergencies and climate change 
as threats to national security is notable.17 
The Policy Guidance for DOD Global 
Health Engagement, released in May 
2013, made important first steps in 
related diversification processes.18 All of 
these vectors have come to be important 
elements in the strategies and tactics used 
by the military in current and recent 
conflicts—as well as in the context of 
the debate about the appropriate role, 
structure, and composition of the U.S. 
military. These broader global develop-
ments have contributed in a critical way 
to a rapidly evolving conflict environment 
in which traditional interventions have 
struggled to achieve success.
GHD as a Strategic Military Tool
The discussion thus far suggests that the 
increased use of tools such as GHE by 
the Armed Forces should be examined 
more closely in the diplomatic context 
as well as in its primary health security 
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role (for example, the 2014 response 
to West Africa’s Ebola outbreak) of 
protecting vital national health security 
interests.19 This is particularly relevant 
in the context of DOD guidance that 
promulgates the use of global health 
programs to achieve strategic endstates 
or to support other national and inter-
national objectives. Global health, in this 
context, is defined as the alleviation of 
those health challenges that affect the 
world’s poorest and most marginal-
ized populations, with an emphasis on 
communicable diseases such as HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, as well 
as specific reference to health concerns 
that require global cooperation due to 
transcendence of territorial boundar-
ies.20 GHD in this context is therefore 
best described as a foreign policy tool 
that blurs the line between altruism and 
enlightened self-interest. It leverages 
military and political assets in response 
to both human or natural disaster emer-
gencies and longer term nation-building 
and stabilization through infectious 
diseases control and support in order 
to achieve specific goals for the global 
community.21
Western military forces hold a distin-
guished tradition of providing emergency 
health and aid assistance to civilian 
populations overwhelmed by natural 
disasters or civil strife.22 The military is 
unique in providing immediate response 
using transportation assets, surveillance, 
monitoring and evaluation, and other 
intelligence tools—particularly important 
in both epidemiological and security 
contexts.23 The Armed Forces also have 
a built-in logistics supply system that 
can put relief anywhere in the world in a 
short time. This represents a unique set 
of capabilities that often make the mili-
tary the best “first responder” for GHE.24 
Opportunities for those fields of endeavor 
related to GHE (for example, emergency 
medical care, provision of drugs or treat-
ments, rapid mobilization of people or 
resources) and those generally associated 
with GHD (polio eradication, HIV/
AIDS prevention or treatment, and 
anti-malarial campaigns) are increasingly 
evident.
Medical “hearts and minds” opera-
tions were also initially highly successful 
as an alternative to military force during 
the Vietnam War, and it remains a regret 
of the conflict’s high-level planners that 
such approaches were not maintained and 
employed more extensively.25 Modern 
GHE doctrine, encompassing longer 
term global health interventions, appears 
to have assimilated related lessons on 
the need for different configurations, 
supplies, and training for appropriate, 
sustainable, and effective responses, in 
both medical and strategic contexts. 
For example, after more than 13 years 
People’s Liberation Army Navy hospital ship Peace Ark Senior Captain Sun Tao shares medical experiences during group activity during Fundamentals 
of Global Health Engagement Course at Makalapa Clinic as part of Rim of the Pacific 2016, Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, July 11, 2016 (U.S. Navy/
Katarzyna Kobiljak)
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of operations according to traditional 
military roles, U.S. involvements and 
interventions in Southeast Asia are now 
increasingly characterized as soft power 
missions, while DOD policy guidance for 
GHE stipulates parameters to “ensure 
legality, appropriateness, and effective-
ness” as well as building the trust and 
confidence of partner nations and com-
munities.26 The United States is not 
alone in pursuing such innovative strate-
gies; other international actors such as 
Venezuela and Cuba, through sustainable 
initiatives such as community based clin-
ics and hospitals that provide long-term 
and affordable health care to recipient 
populations, have been “particularly 
adept at parlaying provision of medical 
services to nationals of other countries 
into support in international forums” 
as well as advancing strategic donor 
self-interest.27
The military has proved its nascent 
capacity in settings such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan to provide longer term GHE 
support operations. This is evident in 
programs that mitigate infectious diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and ma-
laria, as well as making healthcare systems 
stronger.28 There has been no evidence to 
date of the maintenance of these activities 
after military withdrawal, while related 
GHE initiatives have both demonstrated 
the potential capacity of the military in 
this regard and produced significant yet 
unmeasured strategic gains that were po-
tentially as effective in achieving strategic 
goals as combat and ballistic efforts.29 
While combined tactical and altruistic 
successes have occurred throughout mili-
tary history, no formal framework and set 
of standards for their delivery, along with 
a set of operational principles governing 
such engagements that optimize smart 
power effectiveness, have been developed 
and applied.
Issues of Primacy, Alignment, 
and Harmonization
In a recent editorial, The Lancet exam-
ines the risks and benefits of the inevi-
table augmentation of the military’s role 
in global health in the 21st century.30 
We must ask to what extent GHE and 
other altruistic endeavors could be 
used by the United States and others 
as a convenient rationale for expanding 
international military presence—argu-
ments that Russia has employed to 
justify its occupation of eastern parts 
of Ukraine.31 Interagency coordination 
and governance of combined GHE and 
GHD activities as well as public and 
media transparency are therefore key 
concerns.32
Enhanced alignment between DOD 
and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), for example, 
inevitably raises questions around align-
ment between civilian and military 
doctrines. Would DOD, in a joint GHD/
GHE operation scenario, subordinate 
itself to the governing principles and 
authority of USAID? Or, under a GHD 
paradigm, would USAID become 
increasingly aware of strategic consider-
ations, with specific regard to settings in 
which conflict is currently taking place or 
recipient populations that pose a proven 
threat to donor security? DOD is at pres-
ent subordinated to USAID through 
its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
in every foreign disaster response that 
DOD is asked to support. For nondisas-
ter engagements, such as partner-nation 
capacity-building, while not subordinate 
to USAID, DOD policy guidance 
directs that “GHE activities should 
be consistent with the relevant U.S. 
Embassy’s integrated country strategy 
Co-founder and CEO of Seed Global Health speaks on “Improving Developing Country Health Systems Through the Spirit of Volunteerism,” part of 
Secretary’s Office of Global Health Diplomacy Speaker Series, at State Department, April 22, 2014 (State Department)
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and complementary to USAID’s country 
development cooperation strategy” to 
avoid redundancy—or even conflict—be-
tween individual agency efforts.33 The 
development of coherent, consistent, and 
broadly applicable GHE approaches may 
be informed, enhanced, and made prac-
ticable by reference to relevant criteria, 
standards, and guidelines for smart global 
health.34
Developing a Frame 
of Reference
If the U.S. military chooses to devote 
greater levels of resources and effort 
to GHE in order to achieve joint stra-
tegic and altruistic ends under a GHD 
paradigm, adherence to appropriate 
program and intervention design, 
delivery, and selection criteria will be of 
critical importance. As a recent RAND 
report notes, “A focus on the higher-
order objective of enhancing legitimacy 
of local leaders would cause planners 
to carry out global health programs in 
a different way.”35 This demonstrates 
the importance of adapting focus to 
optimize multilevel gains. Equally 
important, interventions should not 
threaten the structure or integrity of 
local healthcare systems by significantly 
exceeding local standards of care.36 
Smart intervention categories in this 
regard, and as described in recent DOD 
guidance, also include educational and 
training exercises. These are endeavors 
to which, for example, the plans, opera-
tions, and military intelligence division 
of organizations such as the U.S. Navy 
and Naval Reserve might meaningfully 
contribute.
Civil affairs units of the United 
States and other militaries traditionally 
conduct civil-military operations, includ-
ing initiatives such as Civil Information 
Management, Foreign Humanitarian 
Assistance, and Nation Assistance. The 
remit of such units also extends to the 
preservation and restoration of protected 
targets such as healthcare facilities in 
war zones, facilitating links between 
military commanders and civil society. 
Civil affairs personnel have become in-
creasingly integral to U.S. (and United 
Nations) peacekeeping operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and the former 
Yugoslavia, while also contributing via 
short- and long-term aid efforts in coun-
tries such as Cambodia and Honduras.37 
Civil affairs units do not focus primar-
ily on health issues, but, via the GHE 
paradigm, the U.S. military continues to 
develop international health and global 
health capacity in this context.
The development of systems by 
which the military can operate in closer 
cohesion with global health initiatives 
is central to the success of smart power 
strategies. These include consideration of 
the delivery of health assistance programs 
under military umbrellas, defined (in 
this context) as military support, advise-
ment, protection, and coordination for 
health, development, and foreign as-
sistance activities in unstable or insecure 
environments. While successful strategic 
outcomes may have been at least partially 
achieved in recent conflicts through 
global health roles in “armed social 
work,” the dangers posed to non-military 
international development and diplo-
matic representatives have never been 
greater.38 These include the increased 
incidence of violent deaths, abductions, 
and hostage situations involving formally 
and informally deployed personnel in 
regions as diverse as Sudan, Somalia, and 
Syria. To counter this threat, military 
intelligence, surveillance, and commu-
nications can provide support to assist a 
humanitarian response, allowing, for ex-
ample, transportation and logistics to be 
fine-tuned for maximum impact and staff 
security. Careful and detailed advance 
liaison with local stakeholders, including 
health, military, and political representa-
tives, can also help to ensure both health 
and strategic successes via a “hand off” 
to local personnel or organizations as the 
military departs.39
DOD policy guidance suggests that 
GHE initiatives should target activities 
on locations or regions “where there 
is humanitarian need balanced with 
operational and strategic significance.”40 
Accessing unstable or ungoverned areas 
is a critical aspect of 21st-century U.S. 
military and diplomatic policy.41 Two 
of the major smart power questions—
“What are the positions and preferences 
of the targets to be influenced?” and 
“What forms of power behavior are 
most likely to succeed?”—are linked to 
the objective of enhanced geographical 
influence and coverage by international 
actors.42 Access to and development of 
an international presence in otherwise 
non-permissive areas provide opportuni-
ties for communications and education 
to populations whose only other alter-
native is often exposure to extremist 
propaganda, doctrine, and inculcation. 
Appropriately designed, selected, and 
adapted global health initiatives, operat-
ing in concert with the military umbrellas 
to provide protection and support, have 
been demonstrated in such circumstances 
to enhance both international influence 
and relations in remote geographical 
regions of countries such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq.43
International development and health 
programs have traditionally assisted with 
or been employed as tools of interna-
tional lines of strategic intelligence and 
communication.44 The recent outcry 
over the use of vaccination programs as a 
cover for intelligence-gathering activities 
in Pakistan elicited a range of dissociat-
ing responses from medical leaders, the 
White House, and other key actors at 
the State Department.45 Arguments that 
objectives such as international security 
transcend those of international develop-
ment suggest that such condemnations 
should be tempered by broader historical 
and contextual considerations.46 The 
use of GHE surveillance from both the 
national and health security perspectives 
forms an explicit element of related DOD 
policy guidance.47 The access granted to 
global health and development programs 
in insecure environments cannot be sys-
tematically leveraged or exploited in this 
ad hoc manner, both risking safety and 
security of program staff and jeopardiz-
ing future target population approval of 
any forms of international involvement. 
Rather, a compelling case for structures 
governing the use of strategic commu-
nications and observations, in either an 
explicit or an implicit manner, is made 
based on the tragic lessons learned from 
such experiences.48
88 Features / Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016
Training
GHD in the context of military person-
nel training will include the develop-
ment of enhanced diplomatic and 
humanitarian skill sets, with a specific 
focus on improving strategic capacity 
within GHE staff and improving diplo-
matic and humanitarian capacity within 
combat staff. The Three Block War 
paradigm illustrates the complex spec-
trum of challenges and responsibilities 
likely to be faced during deployment 
or on the modern battlefield, includ-
ing stability operations. The essence of 
such approaches is that both military 
and foreign assistance personnel must 
be trained to operate coherently in 
diplomatic, humanitarian, and combat 
capacities simultaneously rather than in 
a stovepiped fashion. Adaptations to the 
related “strategic corporal” approach 
build on the increasingly global consen-
sus that leadership in complex, rapidly 
evolving, and potentially hostile health 
and security environments requires 
a much broader range of skills and 
training than previously considered 
necessary.
To achieve joint strategic and altru-
istic goals, the U.S. military may wish to 
invest further in the application of smart 
power and GHD contributions to GHE. 
This would include enhancing specialist 
diplomatic input on the choice of GHE 
interventions, the manner in which they 
are delivered, as well as their duration, 
sustainability, and alignment between 
medical and strategic considerations. 
These are of critical importance to “the 
evaluation of DOD GHE projects as a 
means to determine whether strategic 
theater objectives are satisfied,” with 
particular reference to unexpected health 
or non-health outcomes and conse-
quences.49 To date, in the United States 
and elsewhere, diplomatic, development, 
and military forces, when acting inde-
pendently of each other, “may lack either 
the appropriate authority or resources 
to employ smart power,” risking “tense 
and confusing dualities” between agency 
agendas.50 Such increased levels of inter-
departmental cooperation are desirable 
yet have been exceedingly difficult to ac-
complish in practice.51 The use of GHD 
specialists, building on the development 
of GHE coordinators at DOD, will help 
to ensure the greatest possible strategic 
impact and alignment. Complementary 
inputs include advising on host-nation 
capacity for GHE project appropriateness 
and country ownership.52
Conclusions
What do these recommendations imply 
for the future acceptability, prestige, 
and success of international interven-
tions by the U.S. military and its allies? 
As the 21st century progresses, DOD 
is presented with a unique opportunity 
to establish itself not only as eminently 
capable of power projection but also as 
an altruistic and humanitarian organi-
zation. To achieve these noble goals, 
which echo the national and interna-
tional respect and admiration for the 
Armed Forces in the immediate after-
math of World War II as exemplified 
by the Marshall Plan, decisionmakers 
may choose to support strategic plans 
using GHE as a key role for the Armed 
Forces, addressing contemporary 
“asymmetries of perception” surround-
ing the military’s role in international 
affairs.53 It may be unrealistic to propose 
that significantly expanding the scope 
of GHE informed by GHD operat-
ing principles would single-handedly 
counter the doubts that have been gen-
erated by more recent armed conflicts in 
which the United States has engaged.
It is nonetheless hoped that such an 
enhanced role in both diplomatic and 
medical endeavors would augment the 
successful and simultaneous pursuit of 
development and strategic goals. Related 
initiatives such as Operation United 
Assistance have cast the U.S. military in a 
new light—as a highly responsive, effec-
tive, rapid response organization that has 
the capacity to contribute to national and 
also global health and non-health security.
A range of concerns and critiques 
related to U.S. military involvement in 
global health and broader international 
development programs deserves recogni-
tion. For example, the visible role that 
the military has played in recent disaster 
relief efforts from Haiti to Monrovia 
to Fukushima, and, most recently, the 
response to the Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa, has elicited an abundance of com-
mentary both supportive and questioning 
of the military’s role. The latter has 
been driven by events such as attacks on 
healthcare workers in Pakistan as a result 
of associations with security activities in 
pursuit of Osama bin Laden and more 
general concerns around the implications 
of military GHE “occupations.”54 Such 
agendas, though potentially justifiable on 
the international and health security levels, 
cast doubt upon the viability of expanded 
collaborations between global health and 
geopolitical or geostrategic concerns.55 
Until these ambiguities are resolved, 
DOD GHE efforts will continue to be 
critiqued for “an ad hoc, short-term focus, 
poor appreciation of local cultural norms, 
inadequate high-level involvement, and a 
failure to properly assess effectiveness.”56
Issues of political and social legiti-
macy surrounding armed interventions 
are at least partially addressed through 
the integration of hard and soft power 
operations, helping to rebuild American 
military preeminence as an agent of 
good.57 As a counterpoint, the pursuit of 
armed interventions that either ignore 
the health and well-being of civilian 
and other populations is increasingly 
unacceptable on social, political, and 
legislative bases—as well as being fraught 
with negative strategic consequences.58 
Global public opinion appears united in 
believing that the reported 100,000 civil-
ian deaths during the Iraq conflict should 
never be allowed to happen again.59 To 
limit the extent of such casualties and 
to improve military legitimacy, smart 
power efforts require critical funding 
decisions related to the military-industrial 
complex, including, where feasible and 
appropriate, advocacy for GHE in lieu of 
or complementary to ballistic alternatives. 
The past 3 to 5 years have already seen 
a dramatic evolution of the way GHE is 
designed, planned, and executed in many 
combatant commands. We advocate for 
the continuation, diplomatization, and 
acceleration of this process.
Former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen 
has stated that “we have been leading 
with the military for far too long. We 
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need to get diplomacy, development, 
fiscal, economic, financial, and edu-
cational tools out in front. We cannot 
kill our way to victory. It’s not going 
to work.”60 The limited effectiveness 
of the Transformational Diplomacy 
Doctrine under the George W. Bush 
administration is in direct contrast to 
the role of military GHE under a smart 
power system proposed in this article.61 
As the United States faces expansionism 
from a more aggressive China, a newly 
emboldened Russia, and the dangerous 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the 
pressure to maintain and develop interna-
tional stability and balance of power has 
never been greater. The declining social, 
cultural, economic, and political thresh-
olds of public tolerance for violently 
contested international conflicts that do 
not relate directly to national security 
indicate that with each passing decade, 
the U.S. military is becoming more wary 
of becoming embroiled in less-than-vital 
engagements.62
Given the rapidly changing and 
increasingly non-human or technologi-
cal nature of combat, serving Soldiers, 
Marines, Sailors, and Airmen need to be 
gainfully occupied in meaningful ways 
during both peace and war. An enhanced 
role for GHD-based GHE would address 
this issue in an enlightened and also a self-
interested fashion. Otherwise, as Sun Tzu 
teaches us, an unoccupied army quickly 
becomes restless—and may, ultimately, 
end up provoking the very conflicts it 
seeks to resolve. JFQ
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threat that can undermine peace 
and stability in yet another East 
African country. Local and regional 
dynamics could create a “perfect 
storm” that would exacerbate 
the threat. If its issues remain 
unaddressed, Tanzania is likely 
to experience the same security 
trends as Kenya, where, with the 
help of external support, local 
capabilities have been developed 
to conduct increasingly deadly 
attacks that affect U.S. and other 
foreign interests. In response, the 
United States needs to focus policy-
level attention on the situation 
in Tanzania and invest additional 
intelligence, law enforcement, and 
strategic communications efforts 
to combat the spread of violent 
extremism.
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Oddly Familiar?
Images of the beau sabreur continue to evolve in the 21st 
Century. In an era, when pursuit of — or opposition to — 
ideological goals through violent conflict is increasingly 
regarded with a jaundiced eye by society,1 the world is looking 
for new benign (and malign) points of reference. Enter the 
“James Bond” motif: worldly, humanitarian, concerned with 
the global public good, a seasoned “international,” a natural 
diplomat who eschews violence except as a last resort, coupled 
with a willingness, for part of one’s professional life, to forsake 
conventional lifestyles; possessed of cultural awareness, 
sophistication, diplomacy, and a physical capacity to survive 
in often uncomfortable surroundings — 007 is one of the 
few benign 20th Century paradigms to have endured recent 
cultural, historical and societal shifts.2 Does this sound oddly 
familiar to some of those inhabiting the world of global health? 
And, if so, where might this continuing convergence between 
the pursuit of world peace, international development, 
conflict resolution, and international cooperation — the 
evolution of a history of international health closely 
connected with both colonialism and commerce — ultimately 
lead? Without trivializing or misrepresenting the very serious 
nature of global health work by drawing flippant parallels, 
this commentary examines possible ways in which the remit 
of both the organization and the individual within the métier 
may be expanded to address non-health issues – related to 
international security, diplomacy, and foreign policy – on a 
more formal, structured, and explicit (rather than ad-hoc or 
implicit) basis under the “global health diplomacy” (GHD) 
framework, while also commenting on (1) the limits to such 
integration, and (2) ways in which synergies may be achieved 
successfully.
New Standards of Style
Global health, though encompassing a highly diverse group of 
individuals and organizations with varied motives, specialties, 
and modus operandi, is not, historically, a glamorous 
profession. Often indifferently rewarded, and without those 
formal systems of disciplinary recognition that distinguish 
other walks of life, honours are more often internal and 
nebulous rather than external and quantifiable. In the past, 
society has shown limited interest in recognizing associated 
individual-level altruism and hardships. This, however, may 
be changing. “Generation Z,” we are told, places greater value 
on doing good for humanity than on achievements such as 
wealth accumulation.3 In what Douglas Adams calls the 
“Fundamental Interconnectedness of All Things,”4 disciplinary 
boundaries — which can be both inefficient and artificial — 
in both global health and other professions, are increasingly 
being tested and expanded,5 – akin to the multi-functionality 
and convenience of the modern “smart phone.” Professional 
contributions to resolving the world’s problems, are, in the 
multifarious “smart” era, now hailed as realistic and achievable 
personal goals. Engineers, for example, are increasingly 
becoming environmentalists6; conversely, is it only a matter 
of time before we see Bond fighting the real enemies of the 
21st Century – less Cold War politics and megalomania, 
and greater attention to social and economic inequality, the 
excesses of the military-industrial complex, environmental 
degradation, prejudices, poverty, racism, disease, corruption, 
human rights violations, and improving global health, that 
drive so many of our world’s more fundamental problems? 
Combating such ills, whether natural, cultural, historical or 
man-made, may represent a more compelling rasoin d’etre to 
the next generation than fighting stereotypical and traditional 
global “bads.” The global health remit, under the GHD 
paradigm, therefore becomes increasingly integrated with 
that of the diplomat or the attaché in order to advance the 
global community’s health and non-health goals.
Professional Parallels
Global health workers, who conduct vital and important 
international medical work as well as de facto “barefoot” 
international relations,7 do not sign up to be diplomats — let 
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alone intelligence operatives — and should not be exposed, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, to risks which may affect their 
colleagues as much as themselves.8 However, those doctors, 
nurses, project managers, field staff, epidemiologists, and 
other specialists within the global health community traveling 
to countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, 
and Iraq do so with the knowledge that they are placing 
themselves in potentially perilous situations — and that, 
directly or indirectly, their endeavours are inexorably tied 
to concerns of conflict resolution, “smart power,” diplomacy, 
foreign policy, and international relations.9 Implicitly, if not 
explicitly, it is not uncommon for global health professionals 
— particularly those politically appointed, or representative 
of national governments — to undertake duties far beyond 
their brief related to foreign policy, and international 
relations,5 even if these pursuits are not always directly related 
to the advancement of health goals, but instead operate in 
parallel with them. Similarly, bilateral aid programs have 
consistently combined political goals with healthcare agendas 
in an implicit manner10; GHD approaches merely make these 
implicit mechanisms explicit, and therefore both clearer, and 
better optimized, by both donors and recipients. The historical 
parallel of global health workers doubling as missionaries, 
or vice versa, is a compelling representation of the medical 
community’s capacity to pursue broader, “downstream” 
goals. In parallel, at the personal level, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that global health work often demands an inherent 
courage and awareness of environmental and situational 
risks – dangers which may not necessarily increase in 
direct proportion to the addition of diplomatic duties and 
responsibilities.11 
The Wrong Way
The assassination of community health workers in Pakistan12 
as an indirect result of associations with clandestine activities 
in the search for Osama Bin Laden, though possibly a one-
off catastrophic event, may have damaged the credibility of 
immunization programs throughout the developing world 
for years to come.13 Such tragedies have, in recent years, 
raised serious questions around the acceptability of implicitly 
combining global health with foreign policy initiatives.14 
This was not an isolated event: Germany’s foreign spy agency 
“routinely camouflages its agents as development aid workers, 
even in war zones,”15 while other countries have allegedly made 
use of aid personnel for intelligence purposes in locations 
such as Cuba.16 Further examples abound: In March 2009, 
Sudan expelled several major foreign aid agencies, including 
Oxfam and Save the Children, from the Darfur region in 
response to accusations by President al-Bashir of foreign aid 
workers being “spies” and “thieves.”17 Global health personnel, 
due to their location and activities, may therefore face ethical 
and moral dilemmas around their implicit role and function, 
including situations such as vaccination or family planning 
programs being used as plots for “western control,”18 or the 
training of health workers manifesting as a threat to the 
military-government apparatus. Even more critically, many 
personnel also remain hopelessly naïve about how both 
donor governance and recipients of aid interpret their work 
in political terms.19 The unplanned, unstructured, and ad-hoc 
combination of global health and foreign policy initiatives 
will, therefore, inevitably lead to  further tragedies and 
failures of the kind described above —with correspondingly 
greater threats to global health workers’ safety and security 
— while the discrediting of associated agencies threatens 
both diplomatic and broader international relations between 
donors and recipients. 
Opportunity Points
Within the global health architecture, opportunity points 
for the involvement of global health in foreign policy can 
only be identified through an understanding of the actors, 
contexts and challenges of both fields. Medicine and health 
are, to a far greater extent than other forms of international 
development, involved in situations of conflict, terrorism, 
warfare, and humanitarian emergency and catastrophe, 
making the integration of diplomacy into related projects and 
interventions of critical importance.20 The advancement of 
foreign policy goals by national governments through health 
and development programs is, thus, a natural evolution of 
this association. Actors such as the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) frequently (though 
on an ad-hoc basis) advance both health and non-health 
agendas in unison, such as the secession of South Sudan 
from the Republic of Sudan,21 challenging extremism in 
Afghanistan,22 or contributing to conflict resolution in 
Iraq.23 Even players such as Medicins sans Frontieres (MSF) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO), despite their 
exclusively apolitical manifestoes, cannot hope to avoid some 
form of non-health influence, partisanship, or even (in the 
case of MSF) potentially offensive elitism.24 At the individual 
level, even non-political global health representatives are 
frequently presented with opportunities to design and deliver 
recommendations and programmatic adaptations that address 
or report on both health and non-health (eg, political, social 
or economic) goals in concert with each other.25 Even more 
fundamentally, such personnel are implicitly responsible for 
North-South relations in their comportment, behaviours 
and personal diplomacy when operating overseas.5 To date, 
however, no standards, trainings, operating procedures, 
evaluation tools or guidelines, though now available,26 have 
been routinely employed this regard.27
The Right Way?
Rather than advocating for greater delineation on this basis, 
fields such as GHD, under certain interpretations,28 attempt to 
resolve these tensions by encouraging, leveraging and making 
explicit such overlaps from the “smart power” perspective, 
employing altruistic operations to pursue broader non-health 
goals including international security.24 GHD can therefore 
be leveraged to pursue global “goods” unrelated to health 
programs – a benign force, as long as it is not manipulated 
into pursuing global “bads” via rapacious foreign policies – 
and, even then, remains a better route than violent conflict. 
Is there, then, a “right” way for global health to interact 
with international politics, intelligence and diplomacy? Or, 
conversely, can non-health professions such as the clandestine 
services also help to advance global health? In spite of the 
threats, dangers, and blanket opposition to such proposals 
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from the medical community,13 if appropriately structured, 
delivered and monitored, there may yet be a place for 
diplomatic, security, and political activities embedded within 
the global health milieu. Those shocked and appalled by the 
scale and scope of civilian casualties in recent conflicts29 
have called for alternatives to engagements such as the Iraq 
War through the implementation of global health programs 
working in collaboration with intelligence services and 
operating under “military umbrellas.”30 Such approaches 
seek to exploit synergies between health and non-health 
organizations such as the advancement of humanitarian 
causes, conflict resolution, and international cooperation, as 
well as via operational overlaps: both groups are embedded, 
often for long periods, in remote and potentially hostile 
cultures; both operate under the aegis of international agencies; 
and both play a (conscious or unconscious) part in broader 
international strategic initiatives which may be unrelated 
to their primary programmatic responsibilities.20 Examples 
such as the highly political nature of the polio immunization 
boycott in Northern Nigeria and related diplomatic efforts to 
overcome challenges to uptake, are representative of potential 
future successes of disciplinary integration based on GHD 
approaches.31 However, successful collaborations are equally 
dependent on adherence to a set of standards and operating 
principles that recognize and respect both mutual and distinct 
goals, operating procedures, and standards of conduct 
between health and non-health organizations.32 
Building Mutually Acceptable  and Appropriate Collaborations
Such approaches represent the antithesis of contemporary 
thought in this regard, and will inevitably provoke 
controversy. Innovative and interdisciplinary combinations, 
most frequently designed to involve health in broader global 
agendas but also, conversely, to integrate and pursue foreign 
policy concerns via international development, if ever to occur 
successfully, must be carefully and meticulously planned – 
not least to protect the health, safety, prestige and operational 
independence of the global health community. If this is 
possible, on the basis, perhaps, of adherence to and application 
of appropriate criteria for the “diplomatic” and “foreign policy” 
sensitization of global health interventions,11 opportunities 
for mutually acceptable associations may exist. These might 
include, for example: (1) Leveraging the location and presence 
of international health programs in unstable regions for 
international security and conflict resolution purposes; (2) 
enhancing and engaging with information gathered through 
monitoring and evaluation systems to better understand local 
communities, cultures, and preferences; (3) exploiting the 
extensive collaborations that global health efforts develop 
with community, district, regional, and international bodies; 
and (4) eraming such associations as an explicit quid pro quo 
with recipient countries, whereby vital intelligence efforts 
related to national and international security are, formally or 
informally, exchanged for, or combined with, the provision of 
altruistic development programs. 
Uneasy Allies
As health and politics become increasingly and inexorably 
intertwined, the risk of “cross-contamination” across 
previously-distinct professional and disciplinary challenges 
increases exponentially; associations between clandestine 
organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
world politics, and global health initiatives have never before 
been so much in the public eye.33 Similarly, the invovement of 
military organizations as potential actors in in global health 
operations — such as under Operation United Assistance in 
response to the Ebola outbreak33 — are the subject of intense 
contemporary media interest, scrutiny, and even alarm. 
Such reflection is both welcome and necessary, and has both 
the safely of global health workers and the advancement 
of international cooperation and diplomacy as it’s goal. 
Nonetheless, with the decreased stature, cost-effectiveness, 
international social and cultural acceptability, and even 
relevance of “hard power” operations in the 21st Century, 
opportunities for such collaborations in the interests, not 
just of global health, but also of broader international 
security, are both of increasing importance and increasingly 
unavoidable. In the context of contemporary crises such 
as Syria and the Islamic State, both strategic and altruistic 
initiatives have either failed, or faced unacceptable security 
challenges — at both the individual and organizational levels 
— when operating independently of each other. Structured 
liaisons and collaborations may be the only alternative 
left. Success, in turn, relies on intelligence, military, global 
health, and development organizations working together in 
unprecedented ways, as characterized by the recent creation 
of the United States’ Office of Global Health Diplomacy 
(OGHD) embedded within increasingly political divisions 
of the State Department.34 The involvement, in such cases, of 
essentially political and foreign policy departments into the 
very mechanics of global health program design and delivery 
should be welcomed and endorsed by the global health 
community – not just for the added global health funding this 
dual agenda may generate, but because of the essential and 
urgent need to integrate diplomatic principles and practices 
into a profession that has, for too long, been dominated by the 
narrow (and often culturally, politically and diplomatically 
insensitive) nature of interventions designed exclusively by 
the medical and economic professions.35 Those involved will 
likely resent and resist such encroachments of their purview 
– but both shaking and stirring such boundaries will, in the 
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New roles for global health: diplomatic, security, and foreign 
policy responsiveness 
Global health initiatives such as the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
have, at present, no explicit or formal internal capacity 
to respond to the overarching diplomatic or foreign 
policy concerns of either their donors or the broader 
global community.1 To the utilitarian, this respect for 
professional boundaries is to be welcomed. To the 
cosmopolitan, the increasingly connected nature of 
both the causes of, and solutions to, poverty, disease, ill 
health, and health security—in the context of associated 
considerations of world peace, non-health security, 
confl ict prevention, and international stability—
implies that all entities, individuals, and policies are 
interconnected, and cannot operate in isolation of each 
other.2 As former President of the USA John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy remarked to the UN during its early idealism: 
‘‘the long labor of peace is an undertaking for every 
nation—in this eff ort, none of us can remain unaligned. 
To this goal, none can be uncommitted’’.3
Most recently, the blurring of the line of institutional 
responsibilities to advance and protect global and 
international health has been shown by an expansion of 
military purviews in response to such emergencies as the 
west African Ebola outbreak.4 Correspondingly, and in 
parallel, rationales exist for global health professionals 
and organisations to work, wherever possible, to resolve 
diplomatic and foreign policy issues beyond health—
with the sine qua non that health outcomes, access to 
services, and “health for all” remain primary operational 
goals.5 Where collateral or downstream eff ects—of, for 
example, health systems strengthening initiatives—can 
advance non-health international aff airs to the benefi t 
and satisfaction of both donor and recipient countries, 
as well as the broader global community, there seems to 
be no reason why such an expanded de jure and de facto 
remit should not be encouraged.
This has, of course, been happening since the very 
beginning of global health and international develop-
ment eff orts.6 What distinguishes a 21st century 
approach—an era of increasing levels of trans-
parency, technology, education, interdigitation, and 
accountability—is the evolution of the implicit to 
the explicit; of a shift away from the covert use of aid 
to advance foreign policy and diplomacy (often in 
suboptimal ways) to an overt system of programme 
design, delivery, and evaluation that optimises both 
health and non-health goals in tandem with each 
other, in the mutual interests of both donors and 
recipients, and leveraging all available synergies. These 
considerations inevitably have implications for the 
type of interventions that are used; if in no other way 
than by ensuring that cost-eff ective approaches are 
also adaptable and responsive to local needs, cultures, 
religions,7 and other country ownership considerations.8
Consider international terrorism; a growing threat to 
which conventional “hard power” responses have had 
limited success in addressing. What could, or should, 
global health do about it? Dissociate (as advocated 
by the Deans of the US medical schools),9 isolate, 
establish boundaries, and “stove-pipe”? Or accept 
the possibility that such disciplinary overlaps, and 
associated consideration of both health and non-health 
considerations in programme design, delivery, and 
location, are both benign and inevitable under “smart”,10 
multifarious, and interrelated approaches? To focus 
eff orts only on health outcomes risks, as one report 
puts it, creating “tense and confusing dualities”11 when 
measured against political, diplomatic, or other foreign 
policy metrics and benchmarks. It could therefore be 
both appropriate and timely for global health leaders to 
take the initiative in establishing mutually acceptable 
parameters for such interdisciplinary engagements 
before it is too late, and the chance for such inputs has 
passed.
Two recent pieces—one developing an instrument 
for the establishment and evaluation of diplomatic and 
foreign policy principles and standards within global 
health programmes,7 the other proposing a set of codes 
or soft laws by which global health governance can 
control and calibrate its inputs to international security 
and the broader, non-health interests of the global 
community12—might help to provide the basis for such 
an approach. For so long reliant on resource allocation 
instruments such as  cost-eff ectiveness, making narrow 
metrics the only consideration in assessing programmatic 
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worth or value,13 policy makers now have the option of 
expanded, holistic assessments of the eff ects of global 
health programmes across both health and non-health 
outcomes.
To return to the original example, for how long 
can the Global Fund—an organisation with growing 
international infl uence—attempt to transcend the non-
health political, security, and international relation 
concerns of the global community, which will continue 
to be implicitly aff ected by its interventions? Is the 
illusory virtue of apolitical aid—the very existence of 
which is highly questionable—worth the cost of avoiding 
(often minor) modifi cations to programme design and 
delivery that enable the harmonised achievement of 
benign health and non-health objectives?
 With the ascendancy of the global health diplomacy 
paradigm,1 both bilateral and multilateral donors now 
have a powerful and unique opportunity to pursue and 
support noble humanitarian and international relations 
goals that are closely linked to the high ideals of global 
health. The development of diplomatic, political, 
and security, and foreign policy liaison offi  ces—in the 
manner of the US Offi  ce of Global Health Diplomacy—
would help to ensure that criteria for positive diplomatic 
and foreign policy eff ects are advanced in tandem with 
world health.
By elaborating and making explicit to donors the 
benign collateral eff ects of health programmes, 
global health diplomacy approaches also present an 
important message to funders: that their investments, 
as well as pursuing altruistic ideals, also achieve 
even more “enlightened self-interest”10 ends such 
as national security, international relations, confl ict 
resolution, world peace, and the prevention or 
mitigation of armed confl ict—through, for example, 
improved communications or the establishment of an 
international presence.14 At a time when arguments 
against the augmentation of hard power budgets have 
become increasingly compelling, if the same aims can be 
achieved through soft or smart power,15 we stand on the 
brink of an era in which global health will become fi rmly 
established in the high political pantheon.
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Global health diplomacy:  a ‘Deus ex Machina’ for international 
development and relations
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Brugha and Bruen (1) raise a number of compelling issues related to the interaction between politics and policy in the global health context. The first question that their 
views invite is whether this is, at heart, best characterized 
as a benign or malign influence. Many commentators have 
suggested that this overlap should be discouraged (2–4), 
while others advocate a decrease in ‘stove-piped’ or ‘siloed’ 
approaches to government, politics, and academia (5,6). 
To use a parallel example, the world of sport has indirectly 
contributed a number of notable political advances, not 
least the end of apartheid in South Africa as a partial result 
of the ban imposed on their international teams (7). In spite 
of this, organizations such as FIFA refuse to be drawn into 
supporting sanctions against international football teams on 
non-sporting grounds (8). The future scope and role of global 
health will, inevitably, face corresponding challenges.  In this 
context—and in terms of the sustainability of global health 
funding in a time of fiscal austerity—an enhanced role for 
political considerations may be just the “Deus ex Machina” 
that global health needs.
Diplomacy in global health leadership
The authors point to global health leaders such as Sir 
Richard Feachem as necessarily being adept at both 
political machinations as well as the more altruistic goals 
of international health and development. Organizations 
such as the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and their leaders, are increasingly aware of their 
responsibilities in this context (9,10); for example, the damage 
done to international relations through deeply unpopular 
structural adjustment policies of the late 20th Century (11) 
are, fortunately, now a thing of the past. In the 21st Century, 
global health leaders will be drawn from a more dynamic, 
interdisciplinary and, above all, diplomatic generation (12).
The formalization of political considerations in global 
health
Bruen and Brugha refer to the ‘ghost in the machine’ of politics 
in global health. This reflects the traditionally implicit, yet 
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undefined, role of political considerations in this context. 
Institutions such as the WHO have been implicitly politicised 
since their inception (13), and contemporary global health 
initiatives find their roots in colonial and post-colonial 
political and economic considerations (13). Increasingly, in 
the 21st Century, such influences are formalised and explicit. 
This evolution has been led by the creation of the Office 
of Health Diplomacy in the United States Department of 
State, which has been mandated with an official agenda to 
optimise the diplomatic and foreign policy impact of global 
health programmes (14). The European Union has enshrined 
the use of global health programmes as part of its external 
relations ‘soft power’ strategy (15), while the United Kingdom 
has recognised the pursuit of international affairs goals as a 
central responsibility—even raison d’être—of the Department 
for International Development (16).
Tempering extremist donor approaches
In the recent Ugandan parliament ruling outlawing 
homosexuality (17), both sides of the political spectrum in 
donor countries such as the United States considered each 
other culpable. Proponents of liberal and progressive sexual 
policies in the global health context accused the evangelical 
right of a focus on abstinence-only programmes, to the 
detriment of health services  for “most at risk populations”, 
(18); in response, conservative commentators countered 
with suggestions that policies acceptable in places such as 
San Francisco, driven by the ‘unruly melange’ of a highly 
effective local civil society (19), were imposed upon recipient 
countries without appropriate recognition of contemporary 
social, political, and cultural norms (20). In reality, the truth 
most likely lies somewhere between these two viewpoints. 
What is clear in both cases is that global health programmes, 
driven by either conservative or progressive political agendas, 
increasingly need to be monitored and vetted based on 
transcendent ideals that resonate with all elements of the 
political spectrum; the ‘post-partisan’ criteria of global 
health diplomacy. To paraphrase Rudyard Kipling, this will 
allow policy-makers to legislate and plan for the inevitable 
triumphs and disasters of programme implementation – but, 
ensured of diplomatic sensitivity, to treat these two imposters 
just the same.
Global health diplomacy and the Global Fund 
Specific mention of the roles, aspirations, and responsibilities 
of the Global Fund in this context recognizes the innovative 
*Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA
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style of the organisation highlighted by Bruen and Brugha. 
The hidden, unmeasured, and collateral effects of Global 
Fund programmes in contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan 
have been documented by this author elsewhere (21,22). As 
the Global Fund may therefore help to bring much more 
than just good health to recipients, especially in conflict 
and post-conflict settings, should not such achievements be 
measured, documented, and brought to the attention of the 
Fund’s (often sceptical) donors?  In parallel, on the micro 
level, the responsibilities of local funding agents and fund 
portfolio managers in the international relations context are 
increasingly under scrutiny (23). The adversarial culture by 
which it has been suggested the Global Fund was initially 
driven (24) has been tempered by such ‘neo-utilitarian’ 
approaches” (25).
Conclusion: formalizing the God in the machine
In times of fiscal austerity, illustrating that political, foreign 
policy, diplomatic, or international relations ends can be 
achieved through global health, provides a “miraculous” (or 
“Deus ex Machina”) added incentive to funders to maintain 
(or increase) their support of related bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives. The enhanced role of diplomacy and foreign 
policy in global health, therefore, has benign implications 
for global health funding, but also for world peace, for a new 
and less destructive role of military forces, and for both the 
theory and practise of international relations (21,22). To date, 
the integration of such principles has been a largely ad-hoc 
process; terra incognita for both diplomats and global health 
practitioners. The development and application of explicit 
criteria for global health programme design, evaluation, 
and delivery from the diplomatic and foreign policy 
perspectives, both to optimise benign effects and to eliminate 
interdisciplinary threats (26), will help to usher in a new era 
for both global health and international relations—one in 
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Diplomacy and Health:  The End of the Utilitarian Era
Sebastian Kevany1*, Marcus Matthews2
Abstract
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), as a system of allocative efficiency for global health programs, is an influential 
criterion for resource allocation in the context of diplomacy and inherent foreign policy decisions therein. This is 
because such programs have diplomatic benefits and costs that can be uploaded from the recipient and affect the 
broader foreign policy interests of the donor and the diplomacy landscape between both parties. These diplomatic 
implications are vital to the long-term success of both the immediate program and any subsequent programs; 
hence it is important to articulate them alongside program performance, in terms of how well their interrelated 
interventions were perceived by the communities served. Consequently, the exclusive focus of cost-effectiveness 
on medical outcomes ignores (1) the potential non-health benefits of less cost-effective interventions and (2) the 
potential of these collateral gains to form compelling cases across the interdisciplinary spectrum to increase the 
overall resource envelope for global health. The assessment utilizes the Kevany Riposte’s “K-Scores” methodology, 
which has been previously applied as a replicable evaluation tool1 and assesses the trade-offs of highly cost-
effective but potentially “undiplomatic” global health interventions. Ultimately, we apply this approach to selected 
HIV/AIDS interventions to determine their wider benefits and demonstrate the value alternative evaluation 
and decision-making methodologies. Interventions with high “K-Scores” should be seriously considered for 
resource allocation independent of their cost-effectiveness. “Oregon Plan” thresholds2 are neither appropriate nor 
enforceable in this regard while “K-Score” results provide contextual information to policy-makers who may have, 
to date, considered only cost-effectiveness data. While CEA is a valuable tool for resource allocation, its use as a 
utilitarian focus should be approached with caution. Policy-makers and global health program managers should 
take into account a wide range of outcomes before agreeing upon selection and implementation.
Keywords: Diplomacy, Cost-Effectiveness, Threshold, Resource Allocation
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Background
A Challenge to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
In recent decades, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) has 
become increasingly important in both technical and allocative 
resource allocation decisions for global health interventions.3 
This includes, but is not limited to, the determination of which 
programs to support, in which places and focusing on which 
populations, based on cost per unit of currency involved 
against outcomes such as HIV/AIDS infections averted, 
quality-adjusted life years gained, or disability-adjusted life 
years lost.4 Such utilitarian approaches, while valuable in 
the technical efficiency realm, have been considered short-
sighted and narrow in “real–world” scenarios, especially 
those in which cultural, social, religious, diplomatic, equity, 
accessibility, and political considerations have to be taken 
into account.5 How does CEA decision-maker respond, for 
example, to situations in which tides of popular support for 
less cost-effective interventions, such as antiretroviral therapy 
for HIV/AIDS, result in an increase in funding for global 
health,6 and thereby potentially saving more lives than if 
optimal utilitarian interventions were exclusively used?
Global Health Intervention Value
Assessing the relative value or worth of global health 
interventions begins with the development of hypothetical 
comparisons. A range of highly cost-effective interventions 
for HIV/AIDS are, of course, already in existence.7 To date, 
few of these have been formally assessed from a foreign policy 
perspective.8 However, certain features of contemporary 
interventions suggest possible foreign policy advantages or 
threats.1 In the case of HIV/AIDS, behavioral or surgical 
interventions are frequently in conflict with local traditions 
and societal norms; from the social, religious or cultural 
viewpoints.9 While such interventions may be highly cost-
effective, how much attention from their advocates has gone in 
to the challenges to local health traditions — notwithstanding 
possible downstream health effects — in the developing 
world’s primary healthcare context? Similarly, the promotion 
of other HIV/AIDS interventions has, to date, paid little heed 
to the challenges that this brings about on the non-health 
level.10 
Diplomatic Versus Economic Value
To assess the total utility of global health interventions and 
capture the wider interrelated community health and non-
health benefits, which is of real interest to program donors; it 
is necessary to consider a quantitative model that is designed 
to capture the broader socio-economic implications. The 
“Kevany Riposte” is a recently-developed and published CEA 
tool that assigns numerical values to the diplomatic worth (or 
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threats) of global health interventions.1 The Kevany Riposte 
incorporates the following 10 assessment criteria when a 
particular intervention’s inherent design is being analyzed 
(Table 1).
In each instance, the specific criterion is graded on a 
mathematical benefit-threat spectrum, which results in a 
“K-Score” that quantifies the potential risks and rewards of 
the criteria that constitute a particular intervention. When 
the K-Scores are summated, they are contextualized against 
the “Kevany Threshold” (KT), which is an effectiveness 
quorum that can be optimized depending upon the donor’s 
effectiveness tolerance. The K-Score’s inherent threat-benefit 
calculations are, therefore, mathematically rated accordingly 
(Table 2).
The result from the application of the Kevany Riposte is 
an overall clearer understanding of an intervention’s cost-
effectiveness and potential externalities. Thus, the Kevany 
Riposte and the resulting positioning with respect to the 
KT can offer a much better understanding of a particular 
intervention’s diplomatic value to a donor’s philosophy, 
national values, and overall foreign policy agenda.
Balancing Diplomatic and Economic Value With the Kevany 
Riposte
The assessment of global health interventions that fail to 
achieve the KT results in a hypothetical model that (1) forces 
an intervention’s rejection from the resource allocation 
pantheon or (2) necessitates the intervention’s modification 
to adhere to the diplomatic criteria listed above. In practice, 
this would involve the application of a KT to a selection, or 
the entire range, of HIV/AIDS interventions currently in 
use. Such a process would take place both via desk reviews 
and at the field level, focusing on those classifications and 
sub-classifications under which the intervention registered 
potential, moderate or severe diplomatic threats. For example, 
intervention timelines and the feasibility of long-term 
handover to local actors would be guaranteed, in advance 
of intervention implementation, to be within the capacity 
of local actors in the long-term.11 Similarly, there is an 
increasing consensus that global heath interventions which 
stand to challenge local healthcare as well as other traditions 
or practices should be designed and delivered on a highly 
collaborative and interactive basis with recipient countries, 
local communities and other stakeholders. 
The result of such diplomatic “screening” procedures for global 
health programs will be to ensure that, on a prima facie basis, 
all interventions are both cost-effective and diplomatically-
effective – ideally, without sacrificing either health or non-
health gains, but nonetheless providing analytical tools to 
respond to ethical dilemmas related to situations in which 
such trade-offs have to occur. The combination of such 
considerations stands to improve program implementation, 
uptake, utilization, donor support, and recipient recognition 
and appreciation of donor efforts.12 Let us consider a concrete 
worked example showing a plausible (not clearly unethical) 
cost-effective intervention that can be rejected (or severely 
Table 1. Criteria and Non-exhaustive Outline of Themes Assessed and Questions Evaluated
Criterion Description of Themes (Not Exhaustive)
Neutrality How tailored is the intervention to the recipient’s society, religious practices, cultural values?
Visibility How visible are the source funding organizations?
Sustainability Can the intervention be financially supported by the recipient after the funding period? Can the intervention be transferred?
Effectiveness
Has the intervention and its results been scientifically validated? Are there measures in place to deal with constrained 
budgets? 
Adaptability
Can the intervention respond to unforeseen health needs? Does the intervention have positive externalities? Have 
communities had an input?
Accountability
Does the intervention produce regular results from communities that are verifiable? Is an M&E philosophy prevalent and is 
corruption combatted?
Partnerships
Does the intervention promote institutional partnerships: national and regional? Do intervention staff receive guidance on 
international standards?
Economic, Political, 
Environmental and Social 
Effects
Does the intervention contribute to wider economic growth? Does the intervention promote political stability? Does the 
intervention increase dignity and self-worth amongst recipients? Does the intervention utilize public space appropriately? 
Does the intervention damage the environment?
Interdependence
Is the intervention coordinated with the aims of other programs? Does the intervention complement or operate in tandem 
with other interventions?
Training
Have intervention staff been trained? Is the training qualification recognized? Have staff received training to deal with 
cultural and religious customs? 
Abbreviation: M&E, Metaphysics and Epistemology.
Table 2. Scoring and Results for K-Score Classifications
Classification Explanation Score
Highly advantageous Intervention program displays clear and significant value from the diplomatic or foreign policy perspective. +2 
Moderately advantageous Intervention program displays some strengths in advancing diplomatic or foreign policy goals. +1 
Acceptable, neutral, or not relevant Intervention attains diplomatic or foreign policy minimum standards. 0 
Not applicable Intervention program does not operate in the context of this classification (or sub-classification). 0 
Potential moderate threat Intervention program may constitute a threat to diplomatic or foreign policy goals. −1 
Potential significant threat
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modified) and swapped out based on diplomatic criteria.
Methods
Comparing Diplomatically and Economically-Effective 
Choices
Our example focuses on, firstly, a global health intervention 
for HIV/AIDS that is effective, efficacious and cost-effective; 
in both the controlled (trial) and applied (field) contexts 
(“Intervention A”), and that is implemented based on surgical 
procedures (eg, voluntary adult male circumcision). The 
context is a low-income, developing country setting with 
limited educational opportunities and high levels of religious 
practices and awareness, as well as a significant focus on 
traditional (even tribal) values related to sexual health and 
gender norms. These norms are not considered damaging 
from western perspectives; rather, they are neutral in terms 
of social progressiveness, recognizing the multifarious global 
health interventions that address, in concert with each other, 
both health and (for example) oppressive gender practices 
that are to be welcomed and supported. Our cost-effectiveness 
ratio for this intervention is approximately US$3000 per HIV 
infection averted, both with a “K-Score” of 5 out of a possible 
10, with 3 criteria classified as “significant diplomatic threats”: 
namely, sustainability, adaptability, and neutrality. 
Our comparator intervention (“Intervention B”) is 
implemented via a combination of voluntary counseling and 
testing, post-test support services, antiretroviral treatment, 
and community mobilization, as well as utilizing strategies 
such as; “abstinence, be faithful, and condomize” (ABC), 
which represent interventions with both health and non-
health agendas,13 and scores highly on the K-Score (9 out 
of 10, with 3 criteria classified as “significant diplomatic 
advantages”) but is less cost-effective (US$5000 per HIV 
infection averted). Such an intervention has been initially 
evaluated from the outset of study design for effect on 
diplomatic and foreign policy outcomes, as well as standard 
health and medical metrics.1 More specifically, challenges 
to (non-damaging) local customs have been mitigated, 
sustainability has been ensured; downstream and side-effects 
have all been considered as part of the original assessment 
plan. Effects on local perceptions of donors, cultural, and 
religious acceptability, and the anticipation of long-terms 
intervention issues have also been considered on a prima facie 
basis.
Results 
Finally, we take the United Nations (UN) international 
statistical standard for population health metrics of 100 000 
susceptible persons suffering from a generalized HIV epidemic 
(prevalence 10% and incidence 2%). Total number of HIV 
infections, therefore, currently stand at 10 000 and increase 
(excluding annual HIV-related deaths) at a rate of 2000 per 
year. The implementation of intervention A, under a fixed 
budget of US$1 000 000, would, in this theoretical framework, 
avert 333 HIV infections in the first year of implementation 
or 16.6% of new infections. Conversely, intervention B[1] 
would avert 200 infections or 10%. Our question then 
becomes: is the difference in the number of HIV infections 
averted (133 infections or 6.6% of new infections) offset 
by diplomatic gains, including but not limited to; (1) their 
potential to attract additional funds to intervention B, thereby 
increasing the funding envelope (eg, increases in support for 
antiretroviral and other global health interventions at the turn 
of the century),14 (2) the possible health gains consequent on 
increased long-term utilization via the performance of the 
sustainability, visibility, and cultural acceptability criteria15 
for intervention B, and (3) at the most abstract level, the 
(nebulous and possibly unquantifiable) health gains and lives 
saved as a result of improved international relations between 
donor and recipient countries.16 
If these possible benefits can be shown to equal or 
exceed the 133 HIV infections that the original choice 
of intervention B failed to avert, the case for preferring 
investment in intervention B is strengthened. Let us assume 
that, for example, the diplomatic success of the intervention 
resulted in a doubling of funding for intervention B (from 
US$1 000 000 to US$2 000 000), thereby also doubling the 
number of HIV infections averted (from 200 to 400). This 
means that, in comparison to the choice of staying with the 
“less diplomatic” intervention A, an additional 67 HIV/
AIDS infections (or 20% of all new infections) are averted in 
the first year of implementation. Such increases in funding 
and support for interventions that capture both donor and 
recipient imaginations, as well as “hearts and minds,” is not 
unprecedented (witness the dramatic mobilization of funding 
for antiretroviral treatment during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
for example17).
Discussion
K-Scores and Cost-Effectiveness Ratios
An additional assumption is the effect of improvements in 
K-Scores on cost-effectiveness ratios. Improved K-Scores are 
not connected to the cost of the intervention (either absolute 
cost or cost per unit of output or outcome). Rather, these 
scores are linked to outcomes. For example, if we accept an 
increase in funding for the intervention by a factor of 20% 
— as a possibly conservative estimate in the context of the 
quadrupling of funding for global health interventions in 
recent years — for each additional K-Score point, outcomes or 
outputs improve in a directly corresponding manner. In this 
example, a differential in K-Scores of 4 implies an increase 
in funding for intervention B of 80%. Based on our initial 
budget of $1 000 000 for intervention B, this would, therefore, 
increase to $1 800 000. This improved budget would, therefore, 
generate a total of 360 HIV infections averted.
Advantages and Disadvantages
As an alternative or complement to traditional CEA for 
global health, the development and application of diplomatic 
thresholds has both advantages and disadvantages. Positives 
include the development and selection of more sensitive, 
sustainable and “diplomatic” global health interventions that 
advance, for example, international relations, cooperation 
stability, security and conflict resolution – the broader 
interests of the global community – without sacrificing 
the primary altruistic, humanitarian, and development 
goals of international medical assistance measures. 
Possible disadvantages include the need for additional 
design considerations for global health interventions that 
integrate these concerns, rather than, as in the past, simply 
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developing an effective or cost-effective intervention and 
proceeding directly to implementation. The feasibility of 
these pre-implementation checks should also be considered 
– is it realistic for bilateral and multilateral donors, as well 
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to undertake 
“diplomatic evaluation” checks, via a checklist or electronic 
app, on their efforts on both a pre-hoc and post-hoc basis? 
Many would, however, consider these added bureaucratic 
and administrative hurdles a small price to pay for the dual 
advancement of diplomatic and development goals in a 
synergistic fashion.
Conclusions
In this example, the KT is based on an increase in funding 
envelopes contingent on the fulfillment of diplomatic criteria. 
It is hard, but not impossible, to support this assertion. It is 
also, perhaps, no coincidence that the ascendancy of global 
health interventions which are likely to score highly in terms 
of K-Scores (eg, antiretroviral treatment and voluntary 
counseling and testing) coincided with a period of dramatic 
growth in global health funding.18 Conversely, in latter years, 
the focus towards less emotive efforts was linked, again perhaps 
coincidentally, with more cost-effective but potentially less 
diplomatic efforts.19,20 The “threshold” is, therefore, based 
on considerations such as the capacity to attract funding. In 
practice, the KT can, therefore, be defined as “the point at 
which diplomatic outcomes, including sustainability, cultural 
awareness and other considerations, increase intervention 
funding, momentum, utilization and support to such an 
extent that the total number of HIV infections averted equals 
or exceeds those of alternative HIV infections, with better 
cost-effectiveness in controlled, rather than ‘real world,’ 
long-term settings.” The consideration of the KT in resource 
allocation decisions and global health intervention selection, 
therefore, stands to simultaneously advance diplomatic and 
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Endnote
[1] The “lifetime cost savings” for Interventions A and B are assumed, for the 
purposes of this model, to be the same.
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Global health diplomacy, national integration, and regional 
development through the monitoring and evaluation of HIV/
AIDS programs in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Samoa
Sebastian Kevany1*, Amy Gildea2, Caleb Garae3, Serafi Moa4, Avaia Lautusi4
Abstract
The South Pacific countries of Vanuatu, Samoa, and Papua New Guinea have ascended rapidly up the 
development spectrum in recent years, refining an independent and post-colonial economic and political identity 
that enhances their recognition on the world stage. All three countries have overcome economic, political and 
public health challenges in order to stake their claim to sovereignty. In this regard, the contributions of national 
and international programs for the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, with specific reference to 
their monitoring and evaluation (M&E) aspects, have contributed not just to public health, but also to broader 
political and diplomatic goals such as ‘nation-building’. This perspective describes the specific contributions of 
global health programs to the pursuit of national integration, development, and regional international relations, 
in Vanuatu, Samoa and Papua New Guinea, respectively, based on in-country M&E activities on behalf of the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) during 2014 and 2015. Key findings include: (1) that global health programs contribute to 
non-health goals; (2) that HIV/AIDS programs promote international relations, decentralized development, 
and internal unity; (3) that arguments in favour of the maintenance and augmentation of global health funding 
may be enhanced on this basis; and (4) that “smart” global health approaches have been successful in South 
Pacific countries.
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Background
The South Pacific countries of Vanuatu, Samoa, and Papua 
New Guinea have ascended rapidly up the development 
spectrum in recent years (1), refining an independent and 
post-colonial economic and political identity that enhances 
their recognition on the world stage. This process has not been 
an easy one, with all three countries having had to overcome 
economic, political and public health challenges in order to 
stake their claim to sovereignty, national identity, and internal 
cohesion (2). In this regard, national and international 
programs for HIV/AIDS, with specific reference to their 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) aspects, have augmented 
not just public health, but also, as in other settings (3), broader 
political and diplomatic goals such as ‘nation-building’, defined 
here as the societal integration of diverse origins, histories, 
languages, cultures and religions within the boundaries of a 
sovereign state (4). This ‘perspective’ describes the specific 
contributions of global health programs to the pursuit of 
national integration, development, and regional international 
relations, in Vanuatu, Samoa, and Papua New Guinea, 
respectively, based on the authors’ in-country diplomatic 
and M&E activities, observations and experiences on behalf 
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and 
Malaria (‘The Global Fund’) and the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). These missions were 
conducted in response to a range of challenges that face many 
low- to middle-income countries from the M&E perspective, 
including deficiencies in appropriate equipment, skills, and 
communications systems (3).
The challenge of regional integration in Vanuatu
The Republic of Vanuatu has faced considerable challenges 
in developing a ‘national identity’ as a result of location, 
geography and logistics. Covering more than 80 islands across 
more than 800 square miles, the advancement of regional 
integration and cohesion since national independence in 
1980 has been achieved only through overcoming significant 
political and economic challenges (5). Since Vanuatu’s 
recognition as an independent state by the United Nations 
(UN), successive governments have grappled with the 
challenges posed by creating a unified leadership across a 
diverse range of settings, cultures and populations (6). Such 
efforts have demanded contributions from every facet of 
society (7) and every government department, including joint 
initiatives between international global health organizations 
such as the Global Fund and the World Health Organization 
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(WHO) with the Vanuatan Ministry of Health (8). Amongst 
other achievements, such collaborations have sought to 
advance the vertical, horizontal and diagonal integration 
of health programs; programmatic impact on local health 
services; government health ministerial restructuring; and the 
development of national healthcare strategies in a harmonized 
and aligned fashion across the island chain (WHO County 
Office Vanuatu, personal communication, 2014).
The role and resurgence of the Ministry of Health
The Ministry of Health of Vanuatu has been of signal 
importance in these efforts. Throughout Vanuatu’s history 
of independence, successive governments and ministers 
have made public health — with its broad reach and focus 
on accessibility, equity, and equality in service delivery — a 
lynchpin of national integration efforts (9), defined in this 
context as “the development and awareness of a common 
identity amongst the citizens of a country” (10). This ‘dual 
role’ of Vanuatu’s public health programs was threatened, in 
recent years, via the pursuit of a highly contentious curative 
treatment strategy to the exclusion of funding for preventive 
medicine strategies (11). The subsequent restoration of 
the original public health paradigm in 2014 (12) has seen a 
resurgent role for the  Ministry of Health, and public health 
in particular, in promoting both regional integration and 
preventive medicine.
Other contributions of global health efforts to national 
integration: monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of HIV/
AIDS programmes
Efforts made in the design, delivery and M&E of HIV/AIDS 
programs in Vanuatu have successfully adapted to this dual 
role of simultaneously promoting health and well-being 
whilst also contributing to the development of a national 
identity in a fashion that has been documented in other 
contexts (3). The national government has leveraged a range 
of opportunities to advance national integration, regional 
cooperation, and public health in concert with each other 
(13) — not just through the provision of health services, 
but also in parallel with culturally-appropriate health and 
education campaigns (14); inter-island supply chain and M&E 
activities; and joint national and regional training initiatives 
that focus on the application of M&E-driven decision-making 
in a coordinated and harmonious fashion within and across 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) member countries 
(15). In particular, the socially, culturally, and economically 
‘sensitized’ nature of HIV/AIDS programs, such as low-cost, 
inclusive, geographically widespread, and therefore accessible 
Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) programs, 
supported by regionally – and linguistically adapted health 
education initiatives, has helped to ensure that intervention 
acceptability across Vanuatu’s tribes, cultures and islands has 
led to improved uptake and utilization (16). In addition, the 
development and support of national M&E systems under 
the auspices of the Global Fund (amongst other donors) 
has been recognized as assisting successive governments in 
their efforts to both restore the broader public health system 
to previous standards of service delivery and improve inter-
island communications, cooperation, and coordination via 
enhanced reporting systems (17). Specific examples include 
the development of regional M&E capacity through trainings 
on remote islands such as Espirito Santo, the deployment of 
associated reporting equipment to rural healthcare facilities, 
and the establishment of harmonized donor and national 
health surveillance reporting systems (18). Finally, significant 
related efforts to pursue malaria eradication in Vanuatu (19) 
have given Vanuatu a unique place, and level of prestige, on 
the world stage via international publicization of such efforts 
(20). Through attempts to convince the global community 
that, via the right programs and international support, malaria 
eradication at the national level is possible in the 21st century, 
such efforts have also built and affirmed a positive national 
and international identity for target countries.
Public health amidst economic transition in Papua New 
Guinea
Standing on the brink of potentially dramatic economic 
growth and social change associated with production from 
the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project, the direction of 
resource revenues into improved and sustainable public 
health service delivery offers an opportune vehicle for Papua 
New Guinea to translate natural resources into human 
development outcomes (21). In this context, Papua New 
Guinea has the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS in the Pacific 
region, and has become the forth country in the Asia Pacific 
region to be declared a ‘generalized epidemic’ (22). However, 
the lack of accurate and reliable surveillance and M&E 
data on the epidemic – particularly from remote areas – (i) 
significantly impacts the accuracy of health status indicators, 
which risk understating the extent of HIV/AIDS and other 
infectious diseases such as TB and malaria (23), (ii) limits 
coordination and harmonization between key stakeholders in 
healthcare delivery (24), and (iii) constrains both donor and 
recipient funding and decision-making through the absence 
of valid, reliable and up-to-date performance data (25). 
Opportunities for international relations via enhanced 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems
The development of a functioning and cohesive M&E 
system in Papua New Guinea has, therefore, been a long-
standing concern for donor organizations, focusing both 
on disease-specific systems (such as those for HIV/AIDS) 
(26) and broader health systems strengthening initiatives 
such as training, technical support, and key equipment 
provision (27). Amongst the donors currently operating 
in Papua New Guinea, perhaps the most significant, from 
an international relations perspective, is the Australian 
DFAT, formerly represented under the auspices of its 
development arm, AusAid. Given the increasingly significant 
regional, strategic and economic significance of close 
relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea, the 
development of effective and functional M&E systems fulfills 
a range of donor goals beyond ensuring quality assurance, 
transparency, and accountability in service delivery — such 
as the generation of reliable performance metrics with which 
to track funding — and as governed by policy initiatives 
such as the Papua New Guinea and Australia Partnership 
for Development: Health and HIV Schedule (28). Such 
collaborations recognize, both implicitly and explicitly, that 
supporting recipient governments to create an efficient health 
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system is both (i) an effective and sustainable approach to 
improving health service delivery and (ii) contributes to 
regional and international relations (29), including bridging 
political, economic, cultural and social differences to advance 
cooperation between nations.
Translating global health reporting into global health 
diplomacy
How are enhanced HIV/AIDS M&E systems leveraged 
for diplomatic and international relations purposes (3)? 
Primarily, the production of valid, robust and reliable results 
of DFAT initiatives helps to strengthen the case for ‘value 
for money’ to both donor and recipient governments (23), 
demonstrating returns on investments and thereby building 
support for ongoing global health funding to the Australian 
Parliament (27,28). In this context, broader ‘lessons learned’ 
by DFAT in the implementation of Evaluation Capacity 
Building (ECB) programmes in Indonesia, Timor-Leste, 
Vanuatu, Fiji, and the Philippines are being accommodated 
to provide insight into local challenges and opportunities 
via the application of paradigms such as ‘South-South’ 
cooperation and ‘triangular assistance’ (30,31). Secondly, 
the production of such results may help to illustrate to the 
Papua New Guinean Ministry of Health, and the broader 
national government, that the interests of their country – and 
there are perhaps none more compelling that the provision 
of healthcare for infectious diseases (22) – are well-served by 
the ongoing involvement of external aid and development 
programs (3), as opposed to adopting ‘aid skeptic’ stances, 
as promoted by Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo (32). 
For this to be achieved, M&E strengthening has demanded a 
collaborative approach to capacity-building that appreciates 
the technical, conceptual and practical challenges faced 
by health sector implementing partners (33). Thirdly, the 
generation of M&E-based communications and reporting 
systems operating between donor and recipient countries 
may help to foster broader strategic collaborations, and closer 
international relations, in an era of heightened international 
activity and interest in the natural resources of the South 
Pacific region (34). Taken together, these considerations are 
of critical importance, not only to global health, but also to 
regional diplomatic and foreign policy priorities.
Equitable national development through provincial 
capacity-building in Samoa
In a parallel fashion, though under contrasting circumstances, 
broader national development in Samoa has been enhanced 
through HIV/AIDS M&E systems via concerted efforts 
by the Global Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), the WHO, and other donors 
and international technical advisory bodies (35). The ongoing 
support by organizations such as the Global Fund for rural 
antenatal care clinics, for example, encompassing the training 
and equipping of local nurses to deal with both infectious 
diseases and associated reporting systems, has provided 
a vital impetus to both (i) the country’s ‘health security’, in 
accordance with the WHO’s identified regional priorities 
(36) such as the implementation of international health 
regulations (37); and (ii) provincial development through 
the decentralization of (previously-concentrated) health and 
other public services outside of Apia, the national capital (38). 
The associated provision of health education to, and access 
to health services by, provincial populations in provinces 
such as Sanga, Tumasaga and Shefa therefore represents an 
advance, not just in the quality of  healthcare, but also in 
the distribution of public services in an equitable fashion 
throughout the country (39). 
Social and cultural consequences of the pursuit of universal 
testing and coverage 
Given the concentrated nature of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
in Samoa (40), a unique opportunity exists to achieve two 
goals that are rarely-attained in developing (or indeed even 
in developed) countries: (i) universal HIV/AIDS status 
awareness, and, in conjunction, (ii) universal antiretroviral 
treatment for all persons diagnosed with HIV/AIDS (41). At 
present, through the efforts of the Samoan Ministry of Health, 
working in conjunction with donor organizations such as 
the Global Fund, all 12 persons who have been diagnosed 
with HIV/AIDS have been initiated on treatment (Samoan 
Ministry of Health, personal communication, 2014). Even 
when considered in the context of the very low reported HIV/
AIDS incidence and prevalence in Samoa (a cumulative total 
of 23 cases since surveillance efforts began in 1990) (42,43), 
both universal coverage and Samoa’s success in containing 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic are remarkable achievements. 
However, given the limited knowledge of HIV/AIDS status, 
especially in rural areas, resulting in a high probability of 
undiagnosed HIV-positives (Samoan Ministry of Health, 
personal communication, 2014), truly ‘universal’ diagnosis 
and coverage of HIV/AIDS patients through VCT cannot 
yet be said to have been substantively achieved. In response, 
attention to cultural, religious, and social norms in service 
delivery has formed a key element of improving uptake of HIV/
AIDS testing in the country (44). In particular, both health 
education efforts to reduce stigma (45) and the development 
of ‘youth-friendly’ information centers (42) in response to the 
vulnerabilities of young people to HIV/AIDS (46) represent 
key initiatives by the Ministry of Health in this regard over 
recent years. In the context of the often conservative nature of 
Samoan society (47), the pursuit of national and post-colonial 
social and cultural development is therefore also supported by 
the development of such socially – and culturally – ‘sensitized’ 
(48) interventions. 
Conclusion: benefits of HIV/AIDS monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) efforts beyond healthcare
Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa, in collaboration 
with organizations such as the Global Fund and the 
Australian DFAT have made consistent efforts to ensure 
that the broader, non-health outcomes of health, HIV/
AIDS and related M&E activities are, either implicitly 
or explicitly, optimally realized. In these countries, such 
‘downstream effects’ include, for example, regional centers 
being addressed with equal importance, from a health service 
delivery perspective, as regional capitals (41). Similarly, donor 
organizations’ efforts to strengthen M&E through initiatives 
such as on-site data verifications and routine service quality 
assessments, as well as broader health system level M&E 
strengthening initiatives (27), have contributed to both 
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national and international links and communications at all 
levels of geographical and service delivery (49). In the most 
meaningful way, therefore, these ‘enlightened self-interest’ 
(50) or ‘smart’ (51) donor approaches have advanced altruistic 
and diplomatic goals simultaneously. Related initiatives have, 
in parallel, and through such multi-level funding rationales, 
made a profound impact on the control of communicable 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and health system strengthening. 
In a similar fashion, the large-scale and rapid response of 
regional and other international partners to assist Vanuatu 
in the wake of the recent and devastating tropical cyclone 
has advanced, in parallel, regional solidarity, public health, 
and disaster relief (52). Other small post-colonial nations, 
in the South Pacific and elsewhere, may have much to learn 
from these ‘smart’ approaches to international health and 
development. In assessing the success of these programs, and 
in making the case for future donor support, it is therefore of 
paramount importance to recognize and attempt to optimize 
and quantify not just their health but also their broader ‘non-
health’ outcomes (53). 
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ABSTRACT
Irish Aid, Ireland’s overseas representative and international development
presence, is undergoing a period of rapid evolution, reflecting parallel changes
in corresponding government ministries and aid agencies in Europe, the United
States and other high-income donor countries. Common to this political,
governmental and structural evolution is an increased integration between
development and diplomacy, which forms a key cornerstone of twenty-first-
century ‘enlightened self-interest’ approaches to foreign affairs. We propose that
an ‘enlightened self-interest’ paradigm would not only enhance Ireland’s capacity
for the simultaneous pursuit of both diplomatic and development objectives,
but also result in an ‘enlightened mutuality of interests’ benefitting both donors
and recipients, in keeping with Ireland’s distinguished history in this regard.
Using the ‘enlightened self-interest’ framework as a lens, we consider a range
of contemporary themes related to the integration of development, diplomacy,
trade and broader foreign affairs issues in the Irish context, such as security and
international relations. These include (1) Ireland’s past implicit ‘diplomatic
development’ achievements and leadership, which provide a historical and
current context for the ‘global health diplomacy’ paradigm; (2) measures for
making integration of different dimensions of foreign policy a more explicit and
transparent endeavour; and (3) efforts to identify where in Ireland’s foreign
affairs architecture such synergies may be found, developed and enhanced.
Finally, (4) we consider those capacities required by governments, in Ireland
and elsewhere, to operationalise ‘diplomatic development’ programmes.
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Ireland, via its overseas diplomatic and development presence, is presented
with significant opportunities to design, and adapt, aid programmes to generate
optimal impact on both donor and recipient strategic interests. Such ‘smart’
development approaches can help create a compelling case for maintenance and
support of international foreign assistance funding across the political,
economic and social spectrums; advance political, economic, development
and security aspirations in unison; and promulgate an effective and innovative
paradigm to be replicated by other small, high-income donor countries.
BACKGROUND: CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS
Foreign affairs theory and practice in the twenty-first century
International development, aid and foreign assistance programmes are increas-
ingly leveraged by donor countries to pursue foreign policy, diplomacy, security,
international relations and domestic and international economic growth—
along with traditional objectives such as poverty alleviation and world health—
through the strategic allocation of funding across recipient regions, countries,
interventions and population groups.1 This incorporation of disparate, and
ostensibly unrelated, aspirations into a single, over-arching foreign policy
strategy, has often been implicit in international initiatives throughout history.2
More recently, however, it has been formally and explicitly enshrined in
international initiatives, such as in efforts to define the European Union’s role
in global health and ‘smart power’.3 In the case of the United States of
America, it has been formalised by the creation of departments such as the
Office of Global Health Diplomacy.4 This evolution, or revolution, in foreign
policy theory and practice5 is taking place in parallel with the identification of
related synergies across foreign policy concerns.6 In a complementary fashion, it
is also occurring through the increased integration of both donor and recipient
departments of foreign policy and assistance.7
1Harley Feldbaum, ‘Global health and foreign policy’, Epidemiological Review 32 (2010), 82–
92, available online at: www.epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/1/82.full (8 September 2015);
William J. Fallon and Helene D. Gayle, A healthier, safer and more prosperous world, Final report
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on smart global health policy
(Washington, D.C., 2010), available at: http://csis.org/event/rollout-final-report-csis-commission-
smart-global-health-policy (8 September 2015).
2Joshua Michaud and Jennifer Kates, ‘Global health diplomacy: advancing foreign policy and
global health interests’, Global Health: Science and Practice 1 (1) (2013), 24–8; available at: http://
www.ghspjournal.org/content/1/1/24.full (8 September 2015).
3European Commission, The European Union’s role in global health, COM (2010)128 final
(Brussels, 2010); Oliver Rehn, ‘Europe’s smart power in its region and the world’, speech at the
European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, 1 May 2008. Available at:
www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08–222_en.pdf (8 September 2015).
4In the U.S., the Office of Health Diplomacy is located within the Department of State; further
information about this office is available at: http://www.state.gov/s/ghd/about/index.htm (8 September
2015).
5Richard Horton, ‘Health as an instrument of foreign policy’, The Lancet 369 (2007), 806–7;
available at: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster14964748696365445822&hlen&oi
scholarr (8 September 2015); David Fidler, ‘Reflections on the revolution in health and foreign
policy’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 85 (3) (2007), 243–4; available at: www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17486221 (8 September 2015).
6David Fidler, ‘Rise and fall of global health as a foreign policy issue’, Global Health
Governance 4 (2) (2011), 1–12.
7Sebastian Kevany, Solomon Benatar and Theodore Fleischer, ‘Improving resource allocations
for health and HIV in South Africa: bioethical, cost-effectiveness and health diplomacy
considerations’, Global Public Health 8 (2013), 570–87; available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/23651436 (8 September 2015).
2 Irish Studies in International Affairs
Integration and post-partisanship
The integrated, simultaneous pursuit of multiple foreign policy goals is both
practically and conceptually distinct from ‘tied aid’ approaches, which attach a
range of (often unpopular or ethically questionable) economic, political and
structural conditions to the disbursement of donor funds.8 To emphasise this
distinction, in the United States, the location of the Office of Global Health
Diplomacy within the State Department makes explicit the goal of leveraging
global health programmes to promote and project a range of national values
and international objectives, including both enhanced international relations
and the pursuit of economic, political, security and strategic considerations.9 In
the United Kingdom, the Department for International Development (DfID)
has, in recent years, become increasingly aligned with broader Whitehall
priorities.10 Such integration has, at least in part, been driven by (1) the post-
partisan political ideal of making altruistic (and ostensibly charitable or ‘equity’
focused) foreign assistance funding more palatable to all elements of society,
including the electorate and the media; as well as by (2) the generation of
consensus-building and cross-party support for international initiatives such as
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in the United
States.11 Thereby, diplomatic and development activities will, in theory,
increasingly take place in a politically uncontested arena.12
The pursuit of self-interest and foreign policy by small countries
Concepts such as foreign policy and enlightened self-interest have specific
applications to small, open economies such as Ireland. How, for example, might
a small state, situated within the European Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) still pursue its own interests in the bilateral foreign policy arena,
or adequately and fairly project its views at the multilateral level? How is that
self-interest (1) defined internally, and (2) projected externally? Examples of
‘internal’ challenges include the utilisation of economic assistance mechanisms
such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in ways that benefit Ireland but
may not always promote the interests of low-income countries.13 Conversely,
‘external’ concerns encompass the projection of Ireland’s pro-development
global image—even if this requires domestic fiscal and budgetary sacrifices.
Historically, Irish national self-interest has been pursued through policies of
diplomacy and negotiation, including ‘competitive bargaining’ related to trade,
security and diplomatic issues—rather than by coercive or military measures—
via multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, in order ‘successfully to
8Jon Temple, ‘Aid and conditionality’, in Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig (eds), Handbook
of development economics, 4415–523 (Oxford and Amsterdam, 2010).
9See http://www.state.gov/s/ghd/ for information on the Office of Global Health Diplomacy
(8 September 2015).
10For information on the DfID, see the website of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office/about (8 September
2015).
11John Kerry, ‘Remarks at a global health event with partner countries’, New York, 25 September
2013; the text of these remarks is available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/
214733.htm (8 September 2015).
12Rochelle Walensky and Daniel Kuritzkes, ‘The impact of the president’s emergency plan
for AIDS relief (PEPfAR) beyond HIV and why it remains essential’, Clinical Infectious Diseases
50 (2) (2010), 272–5; doi:10.1086/649214.
13Conall O’Caoimh, ‘CAP system turns developing world’s farmers into beggars’, Irish Times,
Debates, 17 July 2002; available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/cap-system-turns-developing-
world-s-farmers-into-beggars-1.1088840 (8 September 2015).
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exert its will on the world’.14 This approach has been further enhanced by Ireland’s
commitments to European Union systems such as the CFSP, under the aegis of
which diplomatic and development considerations are increasingly intertwined.15
The use of development aid, in this context, can therefore be seen as
not so much a claim of moral superiority but rather a conscious diplomatic
strategy, in keeping with Ireland’s political culture, which is designed to
maximise the State’s influence.16
Such approaches, perhaps not just coincidentally, mirror the development of
global health diplomacy strategies by other ‘like-minded countries’ such as
Norway.17 Leveraging potential synergies between diplomacy and development
in the Irish Aid context can build on Ireland’s traditional approaches to both
foreign policy and self-interest on the world stage. This stands to enhance
Ireland’s role in and leadership within related European institutions such as the
CFSP and the European External Action Service (EEAS), both of which are in
the process of exploring such synergies.18 This will require careful balancing,
and even occasional trade-offs, specifically in situations in which the interests of
Ireland and those of its aid recipient countries are not synonymous, as may be
the case where subsidised agricultural exports from Ireland undermine local
food sustainability in low-income countries.19 One of the most compelling means
of achieving such a balance is through the significantly heightened interaction,
harmonisation and coordination between, for example, Irish Aid and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s political and economic divisions.
International development and foreign policy
Within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of countries such as
Ireland and Australia, amongst others, there has been a corresponding move
towards foreign policy integration as development objectives become more
closely linked with broader diplomatic concerns.20 Associated and formally
articulated values and principles include the pursuit of good governance, the
14Daniel Thomas and Ben Tonra, ‘To what ends EU foreign policy? Contending approaches to
the Union’s diplomatic objectives and representation’, UCD Dublin European Institute Working
Paper, 11–12 July 2011.
15Further information on Irish involvement with the CFSP is available from the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); see ‘Common security and defence policy’, available at:
https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/peace-and-security/common-security-
and-defence-policy/ (8 October 2015).
16Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle and Noel Dorr, ‘Preface’, in Tonra et al. (eds),
Irish foreign policy (Dublin, 2012), xvii–xxii: xx.
17Kristin Sandberg and Steinar Andresen, Health as foreign policy: the case of Norway (Geneva,
2012), Graduate Institute of Geneva Paper Outline; available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/
sites/iheid/files/sites/globalhealth/shared/Consortium/Cuba2009/Health%20as%20Foreign%20Policy
%20paper%20outline%20Norway%2010.03.09_2_.pdf (28 September 2015).
18Rehn, ‘Europe’s smart power in its region and the world’.
19Jean-Christophe Bureau and Alan Matthews, ‘EU agricultural policy: what developing
countries need to know’, Trinity College Dublin, Institute for International Integration Studies,
Discussion paper 91 (Dublin, 2005), available at: https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/
pdfs/iiisdp91.pdf (28 September 2015).
20Government of Ireland, One world, one future: Ireland’s policy for international development
(Dublin, 2013), available at: https://www.irishaid.ie/media/irishaid/allwebsitemedia/20newsand
publications/publicationpdfsenglish/one-world-one-future-irelands-new-policy.pdf (28 September
2014); Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Overview of global health
initiatives’, (Barton, ACT, 2014), available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/aidissues/health/Pages/
home.aspx#initiatives (29 September 2015).
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protection and advancement of human rights and the pursuit of national and
international economic growth and political stability, transcending a previously
narrower development paradigm.21 Such an approach is demonstrated in the
multiplicity of non-health gains, such as regional integration, improved
international relations and better provincial development, associated with
successful regional global health disbursements.22
The incorporation of these themes in recent policy documents such as
Ireland’s One world, one future: Ireland’s policy for international development
implies that ‘pro-poor’ efforts, multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, and
politically ‘enlightened self-interest’ are not merely compatible but, if appro-
priately framed, are more effectively pursued together.23 The strategy envisages
a multi-faceted and prominent role for Ireland in the alleviation of global
poverty and hunger, as well as in tackling climate change, promoting gender
equality, supporting fragile states, and facilitating ongoing efforts to address
global health concerns such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This reflects a broad
and diverse—but integrated—focus, combining efforts to tackle the underlying
determinants of global inequity and under-development (poverty), contempor-
ary and traditional sectoral priorities (hunger, climate change, global health,
and HIV/AIDS), utilising cross-cutting and systemic approaches (gender- and
rights-based approaches and efforts to assist fragile states). This ambitious
combination of increased scope and greater specificity is reconciled through the
articulation of ‘whole of government’ approaches, which identify common
denominators and synergies between and across such thematic areas.24
To date, however, both in Ireland and elsewhere, this nascent search for
synergies and organisational integration has taken place in a largely ad-hoc way.
There has been no establishment or application of formal systems for
determining the degree to which development programmes are being effectively
employed to generate a broader range of envisaged benefits for both donors and
recipients. The broader frame of reference encapsulated in Ireland’s 2013
strategy has initiated a ‘development diplomacy’ process—combining the more
traditional development objectives related to poverty and (sector-specific)
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with a focus on reciprocal or mutual,
global, public goods, such as economic growth and good governance. These
bring development programmes into the sphere of diplomacy, and they require
integrated ways of working across and within the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT).
Identifying ‘diplomatic development’ synergies
A review of the 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid observed that the Development
Cooperation Division generates ‘a positive effect for Ireland, contributing to
stability and security, enhancing our reputation, and deepening social and
21DFAT, Statement of strategy, 2011 to 2014 (Dublin, 2011). The full text of this document is
available at: https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/aboutus/dfat-statement-of-strategy-
2011–2014.pdf (29 September 2015).
22Sebastian Kevany, Caleb Garae, Serafi Moa, Av’aia Lautusi and Amy Gildea, ‘Global health
diplomacy, national integration, and regional development through the monitoring and
evaluation of HIV/AIDS programs in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Samoa’, International
Journal of Health Policy Management 4 (2015), 337–41; doi: 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.89.
23Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
24Trocaire, ‘Achieving policy coherence for development through a whole of government
approach’, Briefing paper, September 2013. The text of the paper is available at: http://www.
trocaire.org/resources/policyandadvocacy/achieving-policy-coherence-development-through-whole-
government-approach (29 September 2015).
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economic ties elsewhere’.25 Given this ambitious goal, which is an emerging
feature in a number of high-income donor countries, this paper seeks to identify
and begin to resolve some of the related political, economic and diplomatic
challenges and opportunities facing Ireland. It does so by exploring the utility
and applicability of ‘enlightened self-interest’ approaches to development,
which build on synergies between national and international strategic objec-
tives. Insofar as there is an assumption that such synergies exist, based on
insights, precedents and examples from related literature, the paper then aims
to identify the capacities required by donor governments to ensure that such
theoretical ‘compatibilities’—between sets of international principles and
goals and national interests and objectives—can be achieved, operationalised,
augmented, monitored and (perhaps most importantly) sustained. Based on a
review of Ireland’s past and current development achievements, we then
point to where in the Irish Aid and broader DFAT institutional architecture
such synergies may be found, developed and enhanced, including the further
empowerment of the Irish Aid division in the political and diplomatic milieu.
The paper ends with an identification of the types of capacities needed
to ensure a sustainable ‘mutuality of benefits’ for Ireland as a donor country,
its main aid recipient country partners and the broader international
community.
Interdepartmentalism and the decline of ‘siloed’ government
Prior to a major reorganisation in 2003, Ireland practiced a ‘siloed’ approach to
development, based on demarcations and divisions across different arms of the
DFAT, an approach that was strongly criticised internationally by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well
as raising concerns domestically.26 The resultant reorganisation sought to
integrate, rather than divide, the Irish government’s foreign policy and
development functions through ‘cross-cutting approaches’ and in line with a
tradition of adherence to broader national and international policy trends.27 It
is no coincidence, then, that the principles and approaches of Irish Aid strategy
in the period 2003 to 2013 were aligned with the multi-sectoral MDGs that set
the global development agenda from 2000 to 2015.28 Ireland’s 2013 One world,
one future policy therefore represents a significant advance: this ‘whole of
government’ policy is not only informed by and aligned with the post-MDG
policy landscape, it is also helping to shape that landscape, which will be
25Irish Development Education Association, ‘Submission to review of the White Paper on Irish
Aid: views on behalf of IDEA and its members’ (March 2012); available at: http://www.dochas.ie/
Shared/Files/4/IDEA_White_paper_submission.pdf (29 September 2015).
26Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance
Committee, DAC peer review: Ireland 2014 (Paris, 2014; hereafter cited as OECD/DAC, Peer
review: Ireland 2014). The full text of the review is available at: http://www.oecd.org/ireland/peer-
review-ireland.htm (30 September 2015); and Oireachtas Reports, ‘Joint Committee on Foreign
Affairs debate’, 15 July 2004, available at: http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%
20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/committeetakes/FOJ2004071500003 (8 October 2015).
27Government of Ireland, One world, one future; see also Helen O’Neill, ‘The evolution of
Ireland’s foreign aid over the past 20 years: a ‘review of ISIA reviews’ since 1994’, Irish Studies
in International Affairs 24 (2013), 179–236; available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42912420
(30 September 2015).
28Joe Costello, T.D., Beyond 2015: where next for the Millennium Development Goals? Minister
of State’s Keynote address, 16 August 2012; available at: https://www.irishaid.ie/news-publications/
speeches/speechesarchive/2012/august/beyond-2012-millennium-development-goals/ (8 October
2015).
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characterised by new initiatives such as the Global Health Grand Convergence
2035.29
Irish Aid’s ‘Priority areas for action’—which include (1) promoting human
rights and accountability, (2) provision of essential services, (3) promotion of
trade and economic growth, (4) action on climate change, (5) a focus on fragile
states, and (6) tackling ‘global hunger’—represent a broad and potentially
coherent focus for this ‘post-MDG’ era.30 Such diversity and breadth of scope,
incorporating as it does cross-cutting economic and political goals, will,
however, require significant adaptability in, and responsiveness of, Irish Aid
programmes in partner countries where the focus and budget has, in the past,
been driven by those traditional ‘sectoral’ systems of engagement with which
recipient governments were most familiar. Recent challenges, such as the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa in 2014, have already demanded greater interdepart-
mentalism and interdisciplinary collaboration (between, for example, depart-
ments of foreign affairs and health), blurring the line between international
development, security and foreign policy responsibilities.31 In this context, the
One world, one future approach looks to advance integration and policy coherence
across Irish Aid and the DFAT’s established diplomatic goals, epitomised by
references to ‘the centrality of international development cooperation to Irish
foreign policy’ as well as to ‘bringing Ireland’s contribution to the fight against
global poverty and hunger to the centre of our foreign policy—where it rightly
belongs’.32
Aligning principles and practice: international development as ‘high politics’
At the heart of integrated political, foreign assistance and international
relations approaches such as the ‘global health diplomacy’ paradigm lies the
goal of harmonisation and alignment of diplomatic and development systems at
the international, national and programmatic levels.33 In Ireland, as elsewhere,
without the application of formal coordination mechanisms that recognise the
diverse (and occasionally conflicting) origins and goals of development and
diplomacy, there remains the risk that these pursuits may not only fail to work
synergistically but may also fall victim to ‘tense and confusing dualities’.34
Through the One world, one future vision, Ireland has already taken significant
early steps to initiate this alignment—albeit in an implicit (and to some degree
ad-hoc) manner:
by using a Whole-of-Government approach, we will ensure that our political
and diplomatic engagement with [recipient] countries, as well as our
engagement within the European Union and at the international level,
particularly the United Nations, goes hand-in-hand with our humanitarian
support.35
29Dean Jamison et al., ‘Global health 2035: a world converging within a generation’, The
Lancet 382 (9908) (2014), 1898–1955.
30Irish Aid, ‘What we do: HIV and AIDS overview’, information available at: https://www.
irishaid.ie/what-we-do/our-priority-areas/hiv-and-aids/hiv-and-aids-overview/ (7 October 2015).
31Tara Sonenshine, ‘Ebola: an opportunity for public diplomacy’, The Globalist, 4 August 2014;
available at: http://www.theglobalist.com/ebola-an-opportunity-for-public-diplomacy/ (8 October
2015).
32Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
33Thomas Novotny and Vincanne Adams, ‘Global health diplomacy—a call for a new field of
teaching and research’, San Francisco Medicine 80 (3) (2007), 22–3.
34Fallon and Gayle, A healthier, safer and more prosperous world, Final report of the CSIS
Commission.
35Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
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For example, the inclusion as ‘Priority areas for action’ of horizontal or inter-
sectoral approaches such as support to fragile states that simultaneously face
complex development challenges—such as hunger and food insecurity—shows
that Irish Aid initiatives no longer intend to operate in isolation, either from
each other or from their broader environment.
Such approaches represent much more than grand aspirations that potential
synergies will drive diplomatic dialogues between health and non-health actors
at the highest levels of the political spectrum. A number of commentators
predicted the rapid recent ascent, in an increasingly globalised world, of global
health initiatives from a ‘low’ to a ‘high’ focus within the political milieu.36
Examples include diplomatic dialogues around polio immunisation boycotts in
Nigeria, whereby diplomats, politicians and medical professionals engaged in a
collaborative ‘troubleshooting’ process to overcome cultural and policy
obstacles to vaccination campaigns, in keeping with innovative systems of
health policy decision-making.37
From the implicit to the explicit: an incremental process
Diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives on ‘global health and develop-
ment’—henceforth used to denote all activities that advance the health of the
world’s poorest people, including food security, poverty alleviation, agricultural
and medical initiatives—fit closely with the central tenets of Irish Aid’s policy
and philosophy in the twenty-first century. Approaches articulated in One
world, one future are mirrored in the recent development of formal criteria for
‘diplomatically sensitised’ or ‘foreign policy sensitised’ development pro-
grammes, in the form of ‘Top Ten’ design, implementation and review
recommendations.38 These include cost-effectiveness (efficiency and value for
money), international coordination (development as an essential element of
foreign policy), alignment (coordination with the European Union’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy), interdepartmentalism (drawing on the strengths
of all government departments) and human-rights awareness (ensuring that
associated principles and standards are promoted, protected and integrated).
They also encompass contemporary themes such as international conflict
resolution and ‘smart power’ (support of efforts that recognise links between
peace, security and development); enhancing connections with domestic
economic opportunities (joint initiatives between, for example, DFAT and the
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine); adaptability (programmatic
responsiveness to a rapidly evolving global environment); and domestic and
international communications (engaging with the Irish public about the impact
of Irish Aid). Traditional foreign affairs principles are also included, such as
political neutrality (a commitment to humanitarian principles of impartiality
and operational independence), sustainability (partnership agreements that
support long-term and inclusive economic growth), and accountability
36Horton, ‘Health as an instrument of foreign policy’; Fidler, ‘Reflections on the revolution in
health and foreign policy’.
37Ruairı´ Brugha and Zsuzsa Varvazovszky, ‘Stakeholder analysis: a review’, Health Policy and
Planning 15 (3) (2000), 239–46; Judith Kaufmann and Harley Feldbaum, ‘Diplomacy and the
polio immunization boycott in Northern Nigeria’, Health Affairs 28 (4) (2009), 1091–1101,
available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/shared/summer/GHD%202011%
20Summer%20Course/Kaufmann%20et%20al%202009%20Nigeria_Polio.pdf (7 October 2015).
38Sebastian Kevany, ‘Global health diplomacy, “smart power”, and the new world order’,
Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy and Practice 9 (7) (2014),
787–807, DOI:10.1080/17441692.2014.921219.
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(generating institutional change to strengthen relationships between policy-
makers, service providers, citizens and taxpayers).
One world, one future, through these thematic areas and objectives, therefore
develops a common and transferable set of principles that stand to contribute
to both improving the quality of life of the world’s poorest people and to
Ireland’s, and the global community’s, diplomatic, economic, political and
security ideals. This context also illustrates the manner in which approaches
such as ‘global health diplomacy’ stand to enhance Ireland’s international
engagements in an increasingly structured fashion.
PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE: BUILDING ON IRISH AID’S TRADITIONS TO
DEVELOP INNOVATIVE PARADIGMS
Irish Aid’s ‘history of diplomacy’
As a prelude to the current vogue for diplomatic development programmes,
Ireland has, for many years, been designing, selecting, implementing and
delivering international foreign assistance initiatives that are models of sensitive
interventionism. Historically, Ireland has tended to avoid those programmes
that risk causing religious, cultural or social confrontation in recipient
countries.39 This has been particularly evident in Ireland’s support of interna-
tional health programmes, via an established focus on initiatives that advance
human dignity and well-being, whilst, where necessary and appropriate,
challenging recipient community norms in a diplomatic fashion.40 Other donors
may have much to learn from Irish Aid’s ‘low-risk’ approaches in this regard as
they pursue highly ‘cost-effective’, yet socially uncertain, strategies.41 The
origins of Irish Aid’s approach lie in Ireland’s international position as a small
but high-income country with an open economy; a belief in foreign assistance as
a symbol of Ireland’s place as an independent and prosperous state on the
world stage;42 and associations with a range of national and international
organisations (including missionary religious congregations and the Holy See).
Its commitment to neutrality via refraining from membership of international
military organisations such as NATO has been complemented by a proven
long-term commitment to United Nations peace-keeping and development
missions around the world.43 Taken together, the evolution of its development
programme and Ireland’s particular historical circumstances have ensured
that Irish Aid has consistently remained aware not just of the ideals of
development, but also of the associated political, security, national and
international prestige, economic and religious contexts in which such pro-
grammes operate.
39Kevin O’Sullivan, ‘Biafra to Lome´: the evolution of Irish government policy on official
development assistance, 1969–75’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 18 (2007), 91–107;
available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25469818 (7 October 2015).
40Irish Aid, Irish Aid annual report 2013 (Dublin, 2013); available at: https://www.irishaid.ie/news-
publications/publications/publicationsarchive/2014/july/irish-aid-2013-annual-report/ (7 October
2015).
41Maria Quigley, Helen Weiss and Richard Hayes, ‘Male circumcision as a measure to control
HIV infection and other sexually transmitted diseases’, Current Opinion in Infectious Diseases 14 (1)
(2001), 71–5; available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11979118 (7 October 2015).
42Kevin O’Sullivan, ‘History and the development aid debate in the Republic of Ireland’,
Policy and Practice: A Development Education Review 12 (2011), 110–23; available at: http://www.
developmenteducationreview.com/issue12-perspectives6 (30 September 2015).
43Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
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A tradition of diverse, sensitive and inclusive programmes
Ireland’s development partnerships and cooperation efforts over the last 20
years have taken place at two main levels of engagement: (1) at national (or
bilateral) level with key partner countries and (2) at international (or
multilateral) level encompassing broader global engagements. Both national
cooperation, in the form of sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) and direct
budgetary support to sectoral ministries, and international cooperation, via
United Nations agencies such as the WHO, UNICEF and the World Food
Programme (WFP), as well as the European Union and new multilateral
initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
have been consistently scrutinised and vetted, to maintain Ireland’s tradition of
diverse, sensitive and inclusive programmes. Such diversity, sensitivity and
inclusiveness finds its roots in Ireland’s missionary tradition, in a shared
colonial history with the developing world, and, since accession to the EEC
in 1973, in a high level of responsiveness to development ideals at the
pan-European level.44 Today, this tradition is reflected in the range of
development initiatives that Ireland is currently associated with—one of the
broadest, and most ambitious, portfolios for a country of its size.45 These
programmes have consistently won plaudits from peer organisations amongst
both donors and recipients, including the OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee, which as recently as 2014 described Irish Aid as an ‘honest broker’,
‘innovative’, ‘punching above its weight’, and ‘excelling in delivering effective
aid’.46
Restoring Irish Aid funding to pre-recession levels: beyond ‘pro bono’ rationales
Ireland has achieved high levels of international prestige based on the design
and delivery of its aid programmes. In the eyes of some elements of the
international community, however, this reputation has been tarnished by
funding cuts such as those applied to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria in the wake of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economic collapse.47
The one-third reduction in the Irish Aid budget since 2008, even if under-
standable in view of the overall cuts in government expenditure resulting from
the economic crisis,48 remains unprecedented in Irish history. The case for the
restoration of international development funding to pre-recession levels can,
however, be strengthened through articulating a broader diplomatic and
development strategy that brings benefits to both donors and recipients, and
by designing, delivering and reviewing aid programmes accordingly. In
countries such as the United States, a case for the augmentation of global
health expenditure from other sectors—such as the highly funded defence
budget—is being made, based on the argument that international hostility can
be equally, or better, addressed via military- or non-military-led humanitarian
44See Justin Kilcullen, ‘Introduction’, in Brian Maye, The search for justice—Tro´caire: a history
(Dublin, 2010); O’Sullivan, ‘History and the development aid debate’; and Europa, ‘Foreign and
security policy: speaking with one voice’, European Union policy document; available at: www.
europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (30 September 2015).
45Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
46OECD/DAC, Peer review: Ireland 2014.
47Irish Forum for Global Health, ‘Aid funding for health’, Position paper, November 2010;
available at: http://www.globalhealth.ie/uploads/files/ifgh%20aid%20paper.pdf (30 September
2015).
48Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
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initiatives. The corollary of this argument is twofold. First, an enhanced
coordination between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power efforts (witness both the recent
efforts by international armed forces in response to the West African Ebola
outbreak and the Irish navy’s actions in safeguarding refugee health).49 And,
second, an increased responsibility for aid agencies across this expanded, and
integrated, range of political, strategic and diplomatic deliverables.50
Whether in Ireland or the United States, therefore, the capacity to
demonstrate to ‘aid sceptics’ that development investments can bring tangible
benefit to donors neutralises arguments against funding programmes of foreign
assistance. The benefits to Ireland from investing in international development
therefore extend far beyond enhancing an international reputation for the
advancement of global equity, altruistic humanitarianism and disinterested
support for related global goals and values, towards generating tangible benefits
that directly or indirectly contribute to economic growth. Such benefits include,
for example, domestic dividends such as increasing the supply of international
health workers, which make up a significant and increasing proportion of
Ireland’s health-care work force.51 Similarly, recognition of the international
partnerships developed as a result of Irish Aid programmes in recent years—
which have resulted in political dividends, trade gains and the creation of jobs
for Irish (and non-Irish) citizens domestically and internationally—have been
cited as rationales for restored or at least enhanced development funding.52 If
Irish Aid were to adopt an international assistance paradigm that goes beyond
that of simply the pro bono donor, and if it did so in a manner that complied
with the values and principles enshrined in the One word one future strategy, this
would not threaten areas of programme integrity, such as the advancement of
global health and development. Rather, it would likely rebuff critics of foreign
assistance, and perhaps even encourage their participation in aid and
development, thereby strengthening bipartisan support for Ireland’s contribu-
tions and commitments to international development.53
49Editorial, ‘National armies for global health?’, The Lancet 384 (1477) (25 October 2014);
available at: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)61923-1/fulltext?
rssyes (1 March 2015); and Lorna Siggins, ‘More than 350 migrants rescued by LE “Niamh” in
Mediterranean’, Irish Times, 24 July 2015; available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/
irish-news/more-than-350-migrants-rescued-by-le-niamh-in-mediterranean-1.2296442 (1 October
2015).
50Frederick M. Burkle, Jr, ‘Throwing the baby out with the bathwater: can the military’s
role in global health crises be redeemed?’, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 28 (3) (2013), 1–3;
available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPageonline&aid
8921591 (30 September 2015).
51Emma Quinn,Managed migration and the labour market—the health sector in Ireland (Dublin,
20016), report for the European Migration Network, research supported by the European
Commission Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security and the Department of Justice,
Equality and Law Reform Ireland; available at: http://www.emn.ie/files/p_20100715122609
mamanges%20Migration%20and%20the%20Labour%20market_the%20health%20sector%20in%20
Ireland.pdf (7 October 2015).
52Jessica O’Dowd, ‘A need for reciprocal partnerships, not aid’, Irish Forum for Global
Health Conference 2014, ‘Partnerships Panorama’, available at: http://globalhealth.ie/a-need-for-
reciprocal-partnerships-not-aid/ (7 October 2015); Department of Public Expenditure and
Reform, Comprehensive expenditure report 2015–2017 (Dublin, October 2014), available at:
www.per.gov.ie/the-comprehensive-expenditure-report-2015–2017–2/ (7 October 2015).
53See Suerie Moon and Oluwatosin Omole, ‘Development assistance for health: critiques and
proposals for change’, Centre on Global Health Security Working Group Papers, Working Group
on Finance, Paper 1 (London, April 2013); available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/
chathamhouse/public/Research/Global%20Health/0413_devtassistancehealth.pdf (7 October
2015).
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Twenty-first century capitalism: domestic growth through international
development
Lessons from the mutually beneficial and ‘enlightened self-interest’ approaches
of organisations such as Ireland’s Electricity Supply Board (ESB)—which has,
in the past, both developed infrastructure and built capacity in developing
countries while simultaneously generating new markets for Irish skills and
expertise through highly regarded rural electrification projects54—may provide
a basis for corresponding international opportunities for Irish services and
agriculture in the future. Supported by organisations such as the World Bank,
ESB’s ‘commercial development’ efforts have included collaborations in
emerging markets such as Vietnam and South Africa, as well as in post-conflict
settings such as Kosovo, to build or rebuild essential public infrastructure
services.55 ‘Tied aid’ approaches to development make foreign assistance
dependent on the fulfilment of unilaterally determined economic and political
deliverables from recipients. On the other hand, the creation of systems by
which public sector commercial initiatives and altruistic aid ideals can formally
be combined—to the benefit of both Ireland and the global community—is an
indispensable element of ‘21st Century Capitalism’.56 Under such a paradigm no
international commercial initiative can be considered acceptable, at the social,
political or cultural levels, without generation of some form of associated ‘public
good’ dividend. Such programmes, and the manner in which they are delivered,
have or can become elements of Ireland’s international contribution to the
development assistance architecture, and can benefit its reputation. Such
synergies and systems could thus be a compelling (and cost-effective) way of
reversing the decline in Ireland’s international standing and its development
budgets in the aftermath of the aforementioned ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom and bust.57
Efforts to assess, in practical terms, Ireland’s performance in this context may, in
turn, generate opportunities for ‘diplomatic’ deployment of combined interna-
tional commercial and development engagements, from which both DFAT and
Irish Aid may draw important lessons. At the broadest possible conceptual level,
the explicit ‘diplomatisation’ of both national and commercial development
programmes can thereby provide benefits, not just to individual donors, but also
for efforts to achieve international growth and stability and global cooperation.
Looking beyond cost-effectiveness in international development resource
allocation decisions
The success and value of international development programmes has always
been judged on direct programmatic performance in the achievement of
‘indicator targets’ in terms of outputs, impact and outcomes.58 Increasingly,
54Da´il E´ireann Debates, ‘Written answers—overseas development aid’, Wednesday, 27 January
1999; available at: http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/1999/01/27/00135.asp (7 October 2015).
55Electricity Supply Board International, Engineering and consultancy around the world
(Dublin, 2014); available at: http://www.esb.ie/img/esbi_corporate_profile.pdf (7 October 2015).
56David Audretsch and Roy Thurik, ‘Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century: from the
managed to the entrepreneurial economy’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10 (2000), 17–34;
available at: http://people.few.eur.nl/thurik/Research/Articles/Capitalism%20and%20democracy
%20in%20the%2021st%20century,%20from%20the%20managed%20to%20the%20entrepreneurial
%20economy.pdf (7 October 2015).
57Irish Forum for Global Health, ‘Aid funding for health’.
58The Global Fund, ‘Guidelines for completing the PR “ongoing progress update and
disbursement request” and LFA “ongoing progress review and disbursement recommendation”’,
March 2014; available at: http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/guidelines/Core_PUDR_
Guidelines_en/ (7 October 2015).
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however, success is also judged on their social, cultural and ethical acceptability,
and on the downstream economic, political and social advancement the
programmes may catalyse.59 Compelling contemporary examples of the need
to find the balance between these criteria are found in debates around the
provision of cost-effective, but potentially culturally, religiously or politically
sensitive interventions related to HIV/AIDS in developing countries. To what
extent should the most economically-efficient programmes be selected at the
cost of recipient country ‘social norms’? Conversely, to what extent should
(potentially harmful) recipient beliefs and traditions be challenged in the
pursuit of optimal health outcomes?60 In the same way, innovative approaches
to development programme design, selection and review raise demanding
questions about supporting initiatives that may conflict with diplomatic
principles; conversely, the use of global health approaches that are sensitised
to these principles—even if less cost-effective—becomes more attractive when
viewed through the diplomatic lens.61 Such circumstances might include the
support for HIV/AIDS treatment programmes—and associated international
organisations such as the Global Fund—during times of fiscal austerity, in a
manner that ensures that the long-term transfer of responsibility for such
initiatives to in-country actors is achieved in a gradual, humane and sustainable
manner.
The question for smaller donors, such as Irish Aid, is to consider if and how
its pro bono aid programmes can, either explicitly or implicitly, contribute to
broader, high-level and overarching goals such as ‘world peace’ without
compromising their primary goals, or whether such high-level goals should
such be left to larger donors such as the United States and the United Kingdom
to pursue? Given Ireland’s long track-record in support of United Nations
peace-keeping efforts, for example, such high-level goals can hardly be
considered ‘foreign territory’, and working towards them would, in fact,
represent a strengthening of connectedness between goals that are already
pursued by DFAT through currently disparate and disconnected strategies.
Moreover, Ireland’s history of leadership to and empathy for developing
countries in the post-colonial era is well recognised among priority partners in
Africa. Only through the integration of such broader considerations into
debates on Irish Aid’s role and purview can these combined diplomatic and
development goals be addressed meaningfully, and synergies identified.
Mitigating ethical dilemmas related to ‘diplomatic development’
If recipient gains and traditional development targets are not the sole (or even
the primary) goal of assistance programmes, it has been suggested that such
59Sebastian Kevany et al., ‘Health diplomacy and the adaptation of global health interventions
to local needs in sub-Saharan Africa and Thailand’, BioMed Central Public Health 12 (2012),
459; available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471–2458/12/459/abstract (30 September 2015).
Jeff Sheehy, ‘Progress against HIV thwarted by patients’ unmet needs: UCSF study shows
poverty undercuts otherwise major gains in HIV treatment’, news release, 26 April 2012, available
at: http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2012/04/11949/progress-against-hiv-thwarted-patients-unmet-needs
(30 September 2015).
60Gertrude Khumalo-Sakutukwa et al., ‘Project Accept (HPTN 043): a community-based
intervention to reduce HIV incidence in populations at risk for HIV in sub-Saharan Africa and
Thailand’, Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 49 (4) (2008), 422–31.
61Royal Institute for International Affairs, ‘Global health diplomacy: a way forward in
international affairs’, Chatham House meeting summary document (28–9 June 2011); available
at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Global%20Health/280611
summary.pdf (7 October 2015).
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programmes will be corrupted through the loss of ‘pure altruism’.62 However, a
number of examples suggest that both recipients and donors benefit equally
from the diplomatic and foreign policy ‘sensitisation’ of global health
programmes.63 In other words, from the adaptation and refinement of such
programmes to support parallel development and international relations
objectives. First, as noted above, if Irish Aid’s resource allocation decisions
are made on purely utilitarian grounds, there would be no place for the support
of more complex and nuanced ‘multi-level’ or ‘combination’ interventions.64
The prioritisation of such utilitarianism in the policy realm in the past has been
critiqued for overlooking the broader humanitarian benefits, to both donor and
recipient countries, of, for example, the treatment of HIV/AIDS patients. Such
benefits lie outside conventional, and narrow, performance metrics such as
quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs).65 Second, and equally importantly, the
‘diplomatisation’ of international development programmes can have positive
effects and be ethically defensible: in Ireland, as elsewhere, evidence of achieving
collateral domestic goals through international assistance programmes can help
attract support from a broader range of stakeholders across the political, public
and economic fields.66 Doing so, as noted above, helps to widen support beyond
those who see altruism and equity as the primary rationale for aid programmes,
thereby enlisting essential domestic support from those who are not sympa-
thetic to equity or altruistic rationales but who remain open to arguments
around synergies, mutualities and ‘enlightened self-interest’ as justification for
maintenance of development budgets.
Case study: diplomacy and development in Kenya
Kenya is an appropriate setting for the integration of development and
diplomacy under the aegis of Irish Aid, in that Ireland, despite comparatively
low-level trade links by European Union standards, has long-standing links with
the country and has recently strengthened its diplomatic presence through the
appointment of an ambassador.67 In a country where political stability is
increasingly under threat, and in which the national government faces both
internal and regional security pressures, an enhanced role for donor diplomacy in
the development context is of immediate importance.68 In this regard, there is a
62James Andreoni, ‘Impure altruism and donations to public goods’, Economic Journal 100
(461): 466–77; available at: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/jandreoni/Publications/ej90.pdf (7 October
2015).
63Ronald Labonte and Michell Gagnon, ‘Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global
health diplomacy’, Globalization and Health 6 (August 2010), 65–76; available at: http://www.
globalizationandhealth.com/content/6/1/14 (7 October 2015).
64Elliott Marseille and James Kahn, ‘HIV prevention before HAART in sub-Saharan Africa’,
The Lancet 359 (9320) (2002), 1851–6; available at: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12044394 (1
October 2015); Thomas Coates, ‘Effect of community-based voluntary counselling and testing on
HIV incidence and social and behavioural outcomes (NIMH Project Accept; HPTN 043): a
cluster-randomised trial’, The Lancet Global Health 2 (5) (May 2014), e267–e277.
65Peter Piot, ‘HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment’, The Lancet 360 (9326) (6 July 2002),
86 (correspondence); available at: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12114063 (7 October 2015).
66American Foundation for AIDS Research, ‘U.S. global health investments: the evidence on
health, diplomatic and economic impact’, Issue Brief (2011).
67Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Diplomatic and consular information for Kenya’,
available at: https://www.dfa.ie/embassies/irish-embassies-abroad/sub-saharan-africa/kenya/ (2 May
2015).
68Francis Mwega, A case study of aid effectiveness in Kenya: volatility and fragmentation of
foreign aid, with a focus on health, Wolfensohn Center for Development, Working paper 8
(Brookings Institution, 2009); available at: http://www.brookings.edu//media/research/files/
papers/2009/1/kenya%20aid%20mwega/01_kenya_aid_mwega.pdf (7 October 2009).
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need to ensure that Irish Aid programmes in Kenya are culturally, religiously and
socially inclusive, given the country’s contentious ethnic, social and religious
rifts. Further, there is a two-fold need to consider the political and security
implications of Ireland’s aid programmes inKenya, given the need to both ensure
the safety and security of field-workers and Irish citizens and to play a ‘higher-
level role’ through working with Kenyan government and other partners to
advance internal and regional stability.69 The integration of development and
diplomatic goals, strategies and activities is essential in such environments, and
may be facilitated by the current Irish ambassador to Kenya, Dr Vincent O’Neill,
coming from a global health and development background.70 This suggests the
possibility of an increasingly integrated, interdisciplinary and collaborative
future in Kenya for both Irish Aid and DFAT, in collaboration with United
Nations organisations (for which the country is increasingly regarded as a
regional ‘hub’)—and, of course, with the government of Kenya itself. Such a
‘brave new world’ would be one in which global health and development
programmes are employed, in parallel, as tools for international relations,
diplomacy and humanitarianism. This would represent a benign alternative to
manyof themyriad other manifestations of foreign policy, or the equally perilous
consequences of inaction, and could be a precursor to a century in which the
boundary between foreign assistance and diplomacy is increasingly blurred.71
NEXT STEPS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND APPLICATION
Optimising diplomatic and foreign policy benefits: who, what and where?
Those aspects of Irish Aid’s global health and development programmes that
are compatible with, and may help to advance, Ireland’s diplomatic ‘enlightened
self-interest’ on the world stage are, at present, in a nascent form; the explicit
consideration, measurement and assessment of associated diplomatic threats
and benefits is needed.72 While it is possible that Ireland’s current ad-hoc and
implicit system of combining diplomacy and development may be maximising
gains in both spheres, the application of a formal and transparent structure by
which such programmes may be designed, delivered and reviewed from the
diplomatic and foreign policy perspectives will help to ensure that both Irish
and aid-recipient-country interests are optimised. For example, the current
distribution of resources across Irish Aid programmes by geographical region
(the where), recipient population (the who), and intervention type (the what)
may be reviewed, using specialist tools,73 to inform resource allocation decisions
and generate recommendations related to the optimisation of diplomatic and
foreign policy goals. This may also result in greater clarity in regard to which
regions, countries and population groups in Irish Aid’s main partner countries
69Fallon and Gayle, A healthier, safer and more prosperous world, Final report of the CSIS
Commission.
70Public Affairs Ireland, ‘New ambassadors and consul-generals announced’, news release, 7 May
2014, available at: http://www.publicaffairsireland.com/news/1601-new-ambassadors-and-
consul-generals-announced (1 October 2015).
71Rebecca Katz et al., ‘Defining health diplomacy: changing demands in the era of globalization’,
Milbank Quarterly 89 (3) (September 2011), 503–23; available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1468–0009.2011.00637.x/abstract (1 October 2015).
72Eugene V. Bonventre, ‘Monitoring and evaluation of Department of Defence humanitarian
assistance programs’, Military Review 88 (1) (January–February 2008), 66–72.
73Sebastian Kevany, ‘Diplomatic advantages and threats in global health program selection,
design, delivery and implementation: the development and application of the “Kevany Riposte”’,
Globalization and Health, forthcoming, 2015.
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require enhanced diplomatic activity and responsiveness from Ireland in order
to advance strategic, economic, political or international relations objectives.
Other considerations: the ‘how’ and the ‘when’
The explicit consideration, and even quantification, of diplomatic and
development challenges and opportunities would represent an important initial
step towards both optimising Ireland’s latent diplomatic and foreign policy
impact, and guaranteeing returns on investment to the Irish taxpayer—be it in
pursuit of development goals or mutual economic and political benefits for
the donor and recipient country—in a more explicit, effective and structured
manner. Ensuring that Irish Aid’s programmes are not only cost-effective, but
also culturally, religiously and socially adaptable and acceptable, and revising
resource allocations according to these criteria, could advance both the
diplomatic and global social, economic and health equity or altruistic outcomes
of Irish Aid’s work (the how). Other considerations include, for example, the
international health security implications of outbreaks of epidemics such as
Ebola, and other ‘health emergencies’, whereby health threats in impoverished
countries are, as a result of revolutions in global mobility, transport and
communications, increasingly regarded as threats to the health of developed
nations also.74 Such unexpected global ‘events’ demand timely and rapid
responses from countries such as Ireland (the when).
Finally, such a review would include considerations of international prestige;
programme effectiveness; Irish Aid’s unmeasured contributions to the resolu-
tion of civil and international conflict; improved international relations; and the
promulgation of international trade partnerships as a result of better global
health, food security and poverty alleviation. Contemporary models for such
joint political and development initiatives as the ‘First 1,000 days’ campaign—
under the joint stewardship of former United States secretary of state Hillary
Clinton and the WHO, which has been championed by Irish Aid on the world
stage—encompass both sectoral and broader development goals.75
Interdisciplinary training models: educational exchanges
Joint diplomatic and development initiatives require that diplomats and
development professionals are equipped with interchangeable skills that befit
their increasingly overlapping responsibilities.76 This is an area where formal
training may be required for the advancement of a new form of interdisciplinary
metier. In the United States, for example, such capacity building is focused
on the provision of short courses—covering two to three days on an annual
or twice-annual basis—to both diplomats and global health professionals,
designed to bring together personnel from diplomatic and development
backgrounds before deployment. These courses encompass the development
of skills covering not only epidemiology, outcome and impact evaluation,
but also strategic analyses related to the goals of their missions, based on the
synthesis of information from organisations such as the WHO, the Global
Fund and the World Bank. In turn, these efforts provide an overview of the
74Harley Feldbaum, Kelley Lee and Joshua Michaud, ‘Global health and foreign policy’,
Epidemiological Reviews 32 (1) (2010), 82–92.
75Lawrence Haddad, ‘The first 1000 days: Hillary Clinton on undernutrition’, speech to
Development Horizons, 11 May 2010; available at: http://www.developmenthorizons.com/2010/
05/first-1000-days-hilary-clinton-on.html (1 October 2015).
76Katz et al., ‘Defining health diplomacy’.
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health situation in-country; of what the United States government is doing
there (and, thereby, what the ambassador is now responsible for); and of
opportunities for the ambassador to engage with key actors (such as finance
and health ministries) at the beginning of his or her tenure. Representatives
from organisations such as Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) attend the briefings, as, occasionally, do representatives
from the Department of Defence and the Peace Corps, depending on the
country to which the diplomats and development professionals are being
dispatched.77
European models for such capacity building include those of the Graduate
Institute in Geneva and nascent efforts at the Trinity College Dublin Centre for
Global Health.78 Such induction and training processes also help to develop
skills for understanding and engaging in high-level political negotiations on
critical international political and strategic issues (at, for example, the
ambassadorial level), which can then be conducted in the context of an
awareness of a recipient country’s and its regions’ historical, political and
cultural contexts and development needs.79 This inculcation of an enhanced
understanding of Ireland’s (and the broader global community’s) international
political, trade and economic interests within the general experience of
international development professionals would closely mirror ‘education and
training exchange’ systems already underway elsewhere. Through the dual
strengthening of its development aid and diplomatic corps programmes on this
basis, Ireland has an opportunity to take a well-earned place at the vanguard of
the ‘global health diplomacy’ movement.
The role of academic institutions and expertise
Building Irish Aid’s, and the broader DFAT’s, capacity for bridging develop-
ment and diplomacy skills will require the development of appropriate domestic
training and advisory expertise—encompassing not just issues of global health,
but also health policy and international relations. For example, in the United
States, global health diplomacy specialists provide training and advisory
services at third- and fourth-level educational institutions. Such specialists are
also utilised by federal and government agencies to provide strategic guidance
and advice (1) to diplomatic and development personnel, as described above;
(2) on the development of political application of systems to optimise dual
impact; and (3) to ensure that diplomatic representatives (including US
ambassadors overseas) are closely informed about health and other develop-
ment (and development aid) issues.80 Acquiring such capacities, in turn can help
77United States Office of Global Health Diplomacy, Training and educational programs of the
United States Office of Global Health Diplomacy, Personal communication, 2014.
78See Ilona Kickbusch, ‘Executive course in global health diplomacy’, Graduate Institute of
Geneva course prospectus (2014); available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/
shared/executive_education/global-health-diplomacy/Course%20flyer_GHD.pdf (1 October 2015);
and Trinity College Dublin, Centre for Global Health, ‘About the centre for global health’,
documentation available at: https://global-health.tcd.ie/ (1 October 2015).
79Sebastian Kevany et al., ‘Health diplomacy and the adaptation of global health interventions
to local needs’.
80Ilona Kickbusch, ‘Global health diplomacy: the need for new perspectives, strategic
approaches and skills in global health’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 85 (3) (March
2007), 230–2; available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2636243/ (7 October
2015).
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to inform broader international negotiations on development and trade issues.
Such efforts would be closely aligned with Irish Aid’s commitments to
furthering both domestic development education and broader public awareness
of development issues and achievements.81 Such expertise also has significant
potential to be employed in the operational context, beyond an academic or
theoretical role; global health diplomacy initiatives, in the future, are anticipated
to require the application of such skills at the field level. Core competencies might
include skill sets such as the ‘diplomatic’ monitoring and evaluation of global
health programmes; designing adaptable global health interventions; enhancing
recipient country global health diplomacy capacity through the ‘country own-
ership’ paradigm; capacity building in ‘barefoot diplomacy’ for non-diplomats
and for more formal diplomatic capacity within Irish Aid; recognising strategic
opportunities for global health to advance international cooperation and trade;
and an enhanced understanding of the trade-offs between ethics and economics
in global health resource allocation decisions.
Such innovative roles for ‘development diplomacy specialists’ will also
embrace a capacity to contribute, at the highest political levels, to discussions
on ways in which Irish Aid programmes may respond to both short- and long-
term diplomatic, strategic, political and economic imperatives. This is reflected,
in the United States, by the presence of ‘global health diplomacy’ representa-
tives on the National Security Council.82 A stated long-term goal of Ireland’s
One world, one future strategy is to create an exit strategy from aid dependence;
this closely mirrors the Office of Global Health Diplomacy’s ‘country owner-
ship’ initiatives, under which responsibility and funding for global health
programmes is transferred, according to diplomatic principles, to in-country
stakeholders.83 In the context of the European Union, the harmonisation of
Irish Aid’s approaches with ‘smart power’ strategies explicitly employed as part
of the CFSP represents another way in which more ‘applied’ and political
interdisciplinary roles may be required, should Ireland contribute in this regard
at the supra-national level through initiatives such as the European Union’s
Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU-INTCEN).84 Finally, the need to ensure that
Irish Aid may be in a position to learn from, contribute to and collaborate with
the combined development and diplomacy initiatives of countries such as the
United States and the United Kingdom represents yet another way in which
such political, development and academic roles will inevitably overlap.
CONCLUSIONS
Lessons to others, lessons from abroad
Under the theme of ‘coherence’, One world, one future notes that ‘development
policies can best be achieved when government policies and actions complement
each other’.85 Countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom
81Government of Ireland, One world, one future.
82Harley Feldbaum, U.S. global health and national security policy, Center for Strategic and
International Studies Report (Washington, DC, 2009); the text of the report is available online, at:
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090420_feldbaum_usglobalhealth.pdf (7 October 2015).
83Kerry, ‘Remarks at a global health event with partner countries’.
84Rehn, ‘Europe’s smart power in its region and the world’; Europa, ‘Factsheet on EU
Intelligence Analyses Center (INTCEN)’, February 2015, available at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/
articles/en/article_16050_en.htm (1 October 2015).
85Government of Ireland, One world, one future, 28.
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may learn from Irish Aid’s ‘low-risk’, culturally, socially and politically sensitive
development programmes, which have traditionally been highly responsive both
to recipient country needs and preferences and to international best practices.
In the same way, Irish Aid can learn from how larger donors make resource
allocation decisions—taking into account not only altruistic perspectives, such
as the advancement of health and the development equity, but also the
diplomatic, economic and other consequences for the donor country. The
ability to analyse aid decisions according to these criteria does not require that
the interests of recipient countries become subsumed to those of the donor
country; nor does it result in the introduction of ‘tied aid’, which Irish Aid has,
for so long, successfully avoided. It does, however, result in a better analysis of
the development partner and of the diplomacy environments in those countries
in which Irish Aid works.
Making optimal use of the opportunities and synergies that stem from
coherent diplomacy and development approaches requires that both Irish Aid
and the broader Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade monitor how they
perform against a broader set of judgement criteria. Such an approach has the
potential to produce significant collateral diplomatic, economic and political
benefits for Ireland. It may also enhance the case for continuing to provide
global health and development funding by presenting the broadest possible
range of direct, indirect, downstream, collateral and hidden investment
outcomes. In this way, Ireland will be in a position to take the lead—along
with other forward-thinking countries—in pioneering the ‘diplomatic develop-
ment’ programmes of the twenty-first century.86 In the manner of the World
Health Organization’s landmark ‘Health as a bridge for peace’ initiative, the
pursuit of combined diplomatic and development goals is one which, as
American president John F. Kennedy noted 50 years ago, no nation can afford
to ignore, and from which all stand to benefit.87
86Thomas Novotny and Sebastian Kevany, ‘The way forward in global health diplomacy:
definitions, research, and training’, in T. Novotny, I. Kickbusch and M. Told (eds), Twenty-first
century health diplomacy, 203–25 (Geneva, 2013).
87John FitzGerald Kennedy, ‘Address to the United Nations Security Council’, 1963; available
at: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations.aspx
(10 May 2015).
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Provision and scale-up of high quality, evidence-based services is essential for successful
international HIV prevention interventions in order to generate and maintain intervention
uptake, study integrity and participant trust, from both health service delivery and diplomatic
perspectives.
Methods
We developed quality assurance (QAC) procedures to evaluate staff fidelity to a cluster-ran-
domized trial of the NIMH Project Accept (HPTN 043) assessing the effectiveness of a commu-
nity-based voluntary counseling and testing strategy. The intervention was comprised of three
components—Mobile Voluntary Counseling and Testing (MVCT), Community Mobilization
(CM) and Post-Test Support Services (PTSS). QAC procedures were based on standardized
criteria, and were designed to assess both provider skills and adherence to the intervention pro-
tocol. Supervisors observed a random sample of 5% to 10%of sessions eachmonth and evalu-
ated staff against multiple criteria on scales of 1–5. A score of 5 indicated 100% adherence, 4
indicated 95% adherence, and 3 indicated 90% adherence. Scores below 3 were considered
unsatisfactory, and protocol deviations were discussed with the respective staff.
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Results
During the first year of the intervention, the mean scores of MVCT and CM staff across the 5
study sites were 4 (95% adherence) or greater and continued to improve over time. Mean
QAC scores for the PTSS component were lower and displayed greater fluctuations. Chal-
lenges to PTSS staff were identified as coping with the wide range of activities in the PTSS
component and the novelty of the PTSS process. QAC fluctuations for PTSS were also
associated with new staff hires or changes in staff responsibilities. Through constant staff
monitoring and support, by Year 2, QAC scores for PTSS activities had reached those of
MVCT and CM.
Conclusions
The implementation of a large-sale, evidence based HIV intervention requires extensive
QAC to ensure implementation effectiveness. Ongoing appraisal of study staff across sites
ensures consistent and high quality delivery of all intervention components, in keeping with
the goals of the study protocol, while also providing a forum for corrective feedback, addi-
tional supervision and retraining of staff. QAC ensures staff fidelity to study procedures and
is critical to the successful delivery of multi-site HIV prevention interventions, as well as the
delivery of services scaled up in programmatic situations.
Background
The heightened profile of global health efforts in the international relations and political
spheres in turn requires enhanced efforts to ensure that programs are delivered in the most
adaptable, appropriate and diplomatic manner manner. In this context, there remains no more
severe global health crisis in the world today than the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa.
There are approximately 25 million people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, with 1.6 mil-
lion new infections occurring in 2012 alone.[1] In addition to the global death and disease bur-
den, the epidemic has had an enormous impact on economies and life expectancies, and left a
legacy of millions of orphans. Structural factors, such as economic, social, legal and cultural
conditions also contribute to increased risk for HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa.[1]
In response, with associated reference to concentrated HIV epidemics in countries such as
Thailand, the global health community has mobilized unprecedented levels of resources in a
concerted attempt to turn the tide of the epidemic.[1] This has elevated the role of global health
to the realm of ‘high politics, in which both diplomatic and health outcomes of interventions
must be considered,[2] leading to the development of diplomatic perspectives on global health
interventions, such as the ability of staff and programs to pursue international relations goals.
In this context, the provision of Voluntary HIV Counseling and Testing (VCT) services, as
part of the comprehensive approach to HIV prevention, has been established as a key response
to the epidemic.[3] Such HIV testing is linked with clinical and community interventions,
improved referrals to care, treatment, prevention, and post-test support services.
Project Accept
Project Accept (HPTN 043) a cluster-randomized trial of community mobilization, mobile
testing, same-day results, and post-test support for HIV was conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Thailand. The intervention, described in detail elsewhere[4] focused on the ‘scaling-up’ of
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evidence based HIV treatment and prevention strategies on an unprecedentedly large scale,
covering four countries with severe generalized or concentrated HIV epidemics. Briefly, 34
communities in Africa (in South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe) and 14 communities in
Thailand were randomized to receive either a community-based voluntary HIV counseling
and testing (CBVCT) intervention in addition to standard clinic-based VCT (SVCT) services,
or SVCT services alone.
The CBVCT intervention had three major strategies: (1) To make VCT more available in
community settings via mobile voluntary counseling and testing (VCT); (2) to engage the com-
munity through outreach via community mobilization (CM); and (3) to provide post-test sup-
port services (PTSS), irrespective of the participants’ HIV status. For mobile VCT, mobile units
providing HIV testing were available at a range of venues throughout intervention communi-
ties for the duration of the three-year intervention period. For CM and PTSS, specific aims
were to (1) create awareness about and open dialogue around HIV/AIDS in communities, (2)
enhance the communities’ understanding of, participation in, and enthusiasm for MVCT, (3)
foster understanding and acceptance of HIV positive members of the community (stigma
reduction), and (4) promote HIV risk reduction among all community members. The interven-
tion is designed to be evidence-based, cost-effective, and feasible for rapid scale up in resource-
poor settings.[4, 5]
These strategies were designed to change community norms and reduce risk for HIV infec-
tion among all community members, irrespective of whether they participated directly in the
intervention. In addition, given the broad range of cultural geographical, religious and social
context in which these interventions were designed and delivered, these strategies were
designed with close attention to diplomatic considerations, including the maintenance of
appropriate standards of behavior and service delivery standards by project staff. The interven-
tion lasted for three years in each site.
AMultilevel Prevention Intervention
Project Accept is characterized as a multicomponent, multilevel prevention intervention. The
multilevel prevention framework has roots in the “ecological model,” understanding the indi-
vidual as embedded in societal, community, familial, and peer contexts and posits that behavior
is shaped by economic, political, and social structures; sociocultural contexts; and social rela-
tionships in which people negotiate behaviors. As a result, multilevel interventions aim to
address the multiple structural or sociocultural factors that influence an individual; these
include interpersonal processes, community factors, and institutional factors. In addition,
given the broad range of cultural geographical, religious and social context in which these inter-
ventions were designed and delivered, these strategies were designed with close attention to
diplomatic considerations, which included maintenance of partnerships with stakeholders at
all levels within the community, administrative, and political structures, thereby facilitating
scale-up across diverse settings and broader geographical areas. The intervention also ensured
appropriate standards of behavior and high quality of service delivery by project staff. All par-
ticipants in the PTSS and MVCT arms of the study provided written consent. Due to the com-
munity-based nature of the CM component, community-based acceptance was attained in
advance of related activities by relevant social and political leaders.
Quality Assurance for HIV Prevention Interventions
Provision of high quality, diplomatically-sensitive services is essential for successful HIV pre-
vention interventions. The development of efficient and effective procedures designed to moni-
tor the quality of service delivery is therefore central to study planning and implementation.
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The treatment integrity of psychotherapy interventions, which describes the degree to which
an intervention is delivered as intended, was found to be adequately addressed in only 3.5% of
evaluated interventions, though no related work has been undertaken for HIV/AIDS interven-
tions specifically.[6] A number of recommendations have been provided in the literature on
the implementation of treatment integrity procedures.[7–11]
Quality Assurance (QAC) is defined as the steps taken in advance to increase the quality
and consistency with which an intervention is conducted.[12] Quality Control (QC) consists of
activities conducted when the intervention is in the field in order to quickly identify and correct
deviations from protocol as well as identify, according to standard operating procedures, sub
-optimal performance (e.g. errors in staff judgment; non-adherence to study process; partici-
pant problems) Both QAC and QC procedures (hereafter referred to as ‘QAC’) are designed to
maintain the integrity of the components by assessing adherence and assisting staff in meeting
these goals, and are essential components in ensuring maintenance of quality control for
“scaled-up” evidence-based interventions. Perhaps most importantly, the most essential over-
arching goal of the QAC process, besides maintaining study integrity, is to generate and main-
tain intervention uptake, and participant trust.[13] In this paper, we describe the methodology,
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port services (PTSS) and mobile voluntary counseling and testing (MVCT) arms of the study
provided written consent. Due to the community-based nature of the community mobilization
(CM) component, community-based acceptance was attained in advance of related activities
by relevant social and political leaders.
The QAC reporting system and responsibilities are outlined in Fig 1 (Quality Assurance &
Control Reporting System and Responsibilities). In order to ensure that QAC criteria were
applied consistently across sites, a comprehensive, centralized 8- day Training of Trainers
(TOT) meeting was conducted for project managers and component coordinators at the outset
of the intervention. The TOT included discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the inter-
vention, a detailed review of QAC procedures, review of the rating criteria and operational defi-
nitions, and practice QAC sessions and discussion. In addition, all relevant study staff were
provided with extensive training on the importance of adapting the Project Accept intervention
to local conditions, with appropriate awareness of local cultural, religious and social norms. All
study staff (counselors, research nurses, outreach workers and team leaders) were subsequently
trained by study coordinators at their respective study sites. All study staff were also trained in
“Good Clinical Practice” (GCP), provided by the HIV Prevention Trials Network (HPTN).
Study coordinators were required to hold at least a master’s degree in social sciences as well
as supervision experience. All other study staff (counselors, research nurses and outreach
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workers) were required to have a minimum of a diploma in their professional area of expertise.
In addition, they received Project Accept training in HIV counseling (study counselors); HIV
counseling and testing and Rapid testing (research nurses); HIV counseling and group facilita-
tion (PTSS staff); and community outreach and education techniques (CM outreach workers).
Team leaders appointed for each of the study components received additional training in basic
management, supervision and support skills. For each study component, training was stan-
dardized across sites using training manuals developed by Project Accept [http://hivinsite.org/
accept].[14] Efforts were made to ensure the trainings provided matched expected in-country
and international standards and guidelines. From a diplomatic perspective, individuals who
proved their ability to establish rapport, demonstrate good listening skills, and be supportive,
respectful, and nonjudgmental, as well as demonstrating proficiency in basic counseling skills
(active listening, reflection, and information gathering), and the basic facts of HIV transmis-
sion, were chosen as counselors. New staff were selected and trained by the site project director
or a designated senior staff trainer. These procedures helped to ensure that identical procedures
and content were delivered across study sites.
Fig 1. Quality Assurance & Control Reporting System and Responsibilities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149335.g001
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QAC roles and responsibilities at the site level are presented in Fig 1. Consistent with rec-
ommendations for QAC review of behavioral and psychological interventions (Waltz et al,
1993), ratings were made for both (1) adherence to protocol and (2) competence at conducting
the intervention. Standard operating procedures (SOP) manuals detailed QAC procedures for
each intervention component and outlined step-by-step implementation procedures including
goals, materials required, and timelines. Team leaders and coordinators monitored staff perfor-
mance in the VCT, PTSS, and CM intervention components via (1) weekly supervision of field
staff by team leaders and (2) independent review and rating of VCT, CM and PTSS sessions.
Team leaders observed sessions conducted with participants in the field, and rated their fidelity
to the protocol on multiple essential components using QAC evaluation forms scored with a
5-point scale. Supervisors observed a random sample of 5% to 10% of sessions each month and
evaluated staff against multiple criteria on scales of 1–5. A score of 5 indicated 100% adherence,
4 indicated 95% adherence, and 3 indicated 90% adherence. Scores below 3 were considered
unsatisfactory, and protocol deviations were discussed with the respective staff. Component
coordinators were asked to evaluate at least 25% of sessions at their discretion to ensure both
(1) inter-rater reliability and (2) that QAC activities were both timely and accurate.
Reliability & Validity of QACMeasures
For project-specific QACmeasures to be effectively interpreted and generalized, it is essential
that reliability and validity of related scales be considered. In the case of Project Accept, measure-
ment of key constructs (e.g. PTSS protocol adherence) was validated during QAC tool develop-
ment, based on a collaborative process with both service delivery staff and the input and approval
of clients [4]. For example, the use of specific scales (e.g. QAC scores of 1 to 5) was based on
approvals and inputs from both QAC supervisors and project staff on the basis of comparability
and user-friendliness. Of equal importance in this regard are the links between QAC scales and
scores and primary intervention outcomes (e.g. number of HIV/AIDS infections averted). In
order for QAC scores to be both valid and reliable in this regard, links between positive health
outcomes and high QAC scores (allowing for relevant confounders) is critical. In this regard,
though beyond the scope of this paper, comparison with the final outcomes and impact of the
Project Accept intervention will allow for the establishment (if any) of such links.
Sampling Strategy
Throughout the intervention, a random sample of VCT, CM and PTSS sessions were selected
for QAC evaluation by team leaders. For VCT, during the first 6 months of the intervention
10% of counseling sessions were evaluated, with a minimum of 2 evaluations per counselor per
month. Thereafter, 5% of sessions delivered per month were evaluated with a minimum of 1
evaluation per counselor per month. For CM, during the first six months 15% of outreach ses-
sions were evaluated, with a minimum of 2 evaluations per CM staff member per month.
Thereafter, 5% of outreach sessions were evaluated, with a minimum of 1 evaluation per CM
staff member per month. For PTSS, during the first 6 months of the intervention all CET and
stigma reduction sessions, 2 information sharing sessions, 20% of support sessions and 15% of
crisis counseling sessions were evaluated. Thereafter, 1 CET session, 1 stigma reduction session,
4 information sharing sessions, 5% of support sessions and 5% of crisis counseling sessions
were evaluated.
Evaluating Intervention Components
For the VCT component, VCT team leaders assessed counselors’ adherence and skill levels in
10 essential component areas, including (1) general counselor skills in keeping with the client-
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centered, personalized risk reduction model recommended by the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO)[15] and (2) adher-
ence to counseling strategy. Each of these component areas were then assessed via approxi-
mately 10 required activity or skill criteria. General counselor skills included empathy, being
non-judgmental, maintaining appropriate boundaries, and relaying the objectives of the VCT
session. As with CM and PTSS, counseling staff were required to review component or session
protocols, session checklists, and any other relevant information in advance of each session.
From a diplomatic perspective, QAC procedures (1) helped to ensure that project staff com-
pleted the VCT process in a non-threatening and sensitive fashion and (2) in accordance with
the expected international standards for the delivery of HIV counseling and testing.
For the CM component, CM team leaders assessed outreach workers’ adherence and skill
levels for 10 essential areas of community interaction and 6 areas of community referral and
follow-up. These included (1) basic interaction skills, (2) provision of accurate information,
and (3) referrals to further care. Interaction skills included empathy, being non-judgmental,
maintaining appropriate boundaries, and maintaining session cohesion. In addition to adher-
ence to manualized guidelines, CM activities were also rated, using the same scales, on the skill
with which the staff member delivered the session. In particular, community mobilization staff
were assessed on their success in adapting related activities to observe local social, cultural and
religious norms,[16] thereby ensuring that the Project Accept intervention was delivered to
recipient communities and individuals with appropriate attention to diplomatic
considerations.
For PTSS, team leaders assessed facilitators’ adherence and skill levels in individual crisis
counseling, group information sessions, coping effectiveness training, and stigma reduction
training (each with approximately 12 activity or skills criteria). Staff were evaluated on (1)
basic support service delivery skills, (2) skills in guiding goal-setting, and (3) adherence to the
PTSS curriculum. PTSS activities were evaluated and scored separately. As with CM and VCT
assessment procedures, PTSS staff and service delivery was assessed with reference to accept-
able standards of service delivery from the diplomatic perspective, including the provision of
long-term, sustainable and effective coping strategies for patients diagnosed with HIV.
QAC Scoring System
For each session, project staff were informed in advance of QAC assessment in advance. While
this generated a risk that QAC scores would be higher when staff were aware that the specific
sessions were being assessed, given staffing and spatial constraints, alternative blinded or covert
assessment systems were considered unfeasible by the Intervention Core. Team leaders then
recorded the relevant QAC score for each evaluation criterion on the appropriate QAC form.
Evaluation criteria were thematically grouped by essential component area, and the average
score for each group was recorded at the end of each section. Individual item scores within an
area were averaged to create a summary score and those summary scores were again averaged
for an overall QAC score. At the end of the form, a single overall score for the entire session
was calculated based on an average of these scores. For each intervention component, these
scores were then aggregated and averaged to generate a single QAC score for VCT, CM, and
PTSS each month. At the end of each month, all QAC records for each intervention compo-
nent across sites were transmitted to the intervention coordinating center via scanned, secu-
rity-protected e-mail documents. These reports were accompanied by a narrative report from
the site project director describing QAC activity over the reporting period. Receipt of QAC
data was acknowledged, entered into a password-protected Microsoft Access database, and
cross-checked through Microsoft Excel.
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Feedback and Corrective Measures
QAC performance charts across intervention components were produced for each study site
by the intervention coordinating center and returned to site project directors with commentary
and questions on performance on a monthly basis. Feedback reports also described emerging
QAC issues across study sites in order to maintain communication and interactive learning
between sites. Study sites were encouraged to use these reports as a training tool to focus atten-
tion on specific QAC issues, provide early feedback, and foster preventive measures. QAC data
was also presented and examined on a monthly basis with US and site-based principal investi-
gators via conference calls with the study steering committee.
Also at the site level, feedback mechanisms included (1) weekly field staff meetings and (2)
periodical written feedback to field staff by team leaders, component coordinators and project
directors. QAC issues were also discussed at component-specific staff meetings, study-wide
staff meetings, and in one-on-one meetings with project staff. The frequency and structure of
these meetings was left to the discretion of the site team leaders and coordinators, who were
judged to have the best assessment of staff needs. Team leaders and component coordinators
used the QAC scores to (1) identify strengths and weaknesses of individual staff and overall
areas and components of the intervention and (2) create action plans for improvement, retrain-
ing, or more frequent supervision and support. Staff failing to meet minimum QAC require-
ments were retrained and only allowed to resume their role after conducting 2 observed and
evaluated sessions rated at 90% adherence or higher.
In addition, all study sites received support and monitoring visits from the intervention
coordinating center at UCSF and designated National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH)
staff. In this context, monitors accessed and inspected study facilities and documentation, as
well as observing the performance of study procedures. In addition, the intervention coordina-
tion director visited each study site bi-annually to evaluate the quality and consistency of the
implementation of the intervention. These visits allowed firsthand observation of the interven-
tion components and maintained open relations with field staff. Study site visits generally took
one week to conduct and included: (1) Observing sessions and rating performance using the
QC evaluation form; (2) reviewing files and forms for completeness and accuracy; (3) observ-
ing daily operations; (4) ensuring that the intervention was being implemented as prescribed in
the Protocol and SOP guidelines; and (5) individual and group meetings with the site teams
(site PI, project director, coordinators and staff) to provide direct supervision, feedback and
answer questions. Study site visits were supported by monthly conference calls with each site.
Results
VCT
QAC scores across all components are presented in Fig 2 (Quality Assurance & Control Scores
for All Sites) and VCT QAC scores are presented in Fig 3 (VCT Quality Assurance & Control
Scores by Site). Periodic breaks in intervention delivery for holidays and rest periods are dis-
played as gaps in the chart data. All sites began the intervention with VCT QAC scores between
3.9 and 4.5. In Soweto, VCT QAC scores rose consistently throughout the first 6 months and
remained at high levels throughout Year 1 and Year 2. In Year 3, scores declined sharply to 3.5,
but recovered in succeeding months. In Tanzania, VCT QAC scores rose steadily during Year
1 of the intervention, and remained at a high level throughout Year 2. VCT QAC scores fell to
4.7 in Year 3. In Thailand, VCT QAC scores were consistently high during Year 1 and Year 2,
although the cyclical nature of intervention service delivery there meant that VCT QAC data
was not collected in all months. In Vulindlela, VCT QAC scores fell sharply during Year 1 (3.5)
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and Year 2 (3.7). In Zimbabwe, VCT QAC scores remained between 4.0 and 4.7 throughout
Year 1 and Year 2. In Year 3, after a prolonged absence from field work due to national elec-
tions, VCT QAC performance was above 4.5 and remained high throughout the remainder of
the intervention. Overall, during Year 1 of the intervention the mean VCT QAC scores across
the 5 study sites were 4 (95% adherence) or greater and remained consistently high during
Year 2, with some fluctuations. During Year 3, VCT QAC scores fell to 4 and then recovered to
levels above 4.5 throughout the final six months of the intervention.
CM
CMQAC scores are presented in Fig 4 (Community Mobilization Quality Assurance & Con-
trol Scores by Site). CM QAC scores began at between 3.4 (Soweto) and 4.7 (Tanzania). In
Soweto, CM QAC scores rose quickly during the initial months of the intervention from 3.5 to
4.8, and only declined to 4.4 in Year 3. In Tanzania, CM QAC scores remained consistently
high throughout Year 1 and Year 2 before declining to 4.4 in Year 3. CM QAC scores improved
throughout the remainder of Year 3, and the site finished the intervention with average scores
above 4.8. In Thailand, CM QAC scores rose from 4.0 to 4.8 throughout Year 1, and remained
at high levels throughout Year 2 before declining to 4.5 in Year 3. In Vulindlela, CM QAC
scores fell periodically during Year 1 (to 4.3) and Year 2 (to 4.1). The site’s CM QAC scores sta-
bilized in Year 3. In Zimbabwe, CM QAC scores were lower than at other sites throughout
Fig 2. Quality Assurance & Control Scores for All Sites.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149335.g002
Fig 3. VCT Quality Assurance & Control Scores by Site.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149335.g003
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Year 1 and Year 2, with a range of 3.7 to 4.1, but remained at acceptable levels and, as with
VCT QAC, improved during Year 3 (to 4.8) after an enforced absence from fieldwork. Overall,
during Year 1 months of the intervention, the mean scores of CM staff across the 5 study sites
were 4 (95% adherence) or greater and continued to improve over time. CM scores remained
consistently high throughout Year 2 of the intervention and rose again during the first half of
Year 3 to 4.8 before declining to 4.2 in the final months of the intervention.
PTSS
PTSS QAC scores are presented in Fig 5 (Post-Test Support Services Quality Assurance & Con-
trol Scores by Site). In keeping with the intervention protocol, PTSS activities were not initiated
in sites until between the second and fifth month of the intervention. As compared to VCT
and CM, there was a wider range of initial QAC scores across sites, varying from 3.0 in Soweto
to 4.5 in Tanzania. In Soweto, PTSS QAC scores rose rapidly during the first half of Year 1,
from 3.0 to 4.4, before declining to 3.3. PTSS QAC scores then rose consistently throughout
Year 2. In Year 3, PTSS QAC scores fell to 3.0 before recovering. In Tanzania, PTSS scores rose
throughout Year 1, from 4.5 to 5.0, before declining briefly to 4.8 during Year 2. In Year 3,
PTSS QAC scores fell again to 4.2, but recovered to levels above 4.8 by the end of the interven-
tion. In Thailand, PTSS QAC scores improved rapidly during the first months of Year 1, from
3.8 to 4.6, before declining to 3.9. PTSS QAC scores remained at high levels throughout Year 2
before declining to 3.6 in Year 3. The site finished the intervention with a mean score of 4.0. In
Fig 4. Community Mobilization Quality Assurance & Control Scores by Site.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149335.g004
Fig 5. Post-Test Support Services Quality Assurance & Control Scores by Site.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149335.g005
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Vulindlela, PTSS QAC scores fluctuated throughout Year 1 and Year 2, from a high of 5.0 to a
low of 3.2. In Zimbabwe, after an initial decline from 4.0 to 3.4, PTSS QAC scores rose through-
out Year 1 and remained consistently high during Year 2. PTSS QAC scores were only sporadi-
cally available during Year 3 owing to the reasons outlined above, but remained at acceptable
levels (4.2 or above). Overall, combined QAC scores for the PTSS component were lower than
VCT and CM during Year 1 of the intervention, and displayed greater fluctuations (Fig 2: Quality
Assurance Scores for All Sites). Scores fell in the early months of the intervention to 3.4, and
again towards the end of Year 1 to 3.4. Combined PTSS QAC scores were consistently high
throughout Year 2. In Year 3, combined PTSS QAC scores fell to 3.7, but recovered to 4.7 by the
end of the intervention. Across all sites, VCT and CM scores were higher than PTSS scores
throughout Year 1. In Year 2, PTSS QAC scores had reached those of MVCT and CM, before
falling below the other components again in the first half of Year 3. By the end of the interven-
tion, PTSS QAC scores were again comparable to VCT and CMQAC scores.
Discussion
Project Directors identified challenges experienced by study staff as (1) coping with the wide
range of field activities and (2) the novelty of the CBVCT intervention. QAC score fluctuations
were also associated with new staff hires or changes in staff responsibilities. The major effort
put into developing and implementing the in-depth quality-assurance methodology has
resulted in essential information on the successes and challenges of implementing this complex
intervention. The overall 95% adherence to essential intervention delivery components indi-
cates that the wide range of activities contained within the intervention can be successfully and
faithfully implemented in resource limited settings. The QAC process has also been able to
highlight challenges to implementation, especially around PTSS activities, and provided solu-
tions to those challenges, primarily in the early identification of enhanced training needs. QAC
data also serves an important purpose by monitoring consistency of component implementa-
tion. Of note, the application of feedback systems (e.g. site visits by the international interven-
tion core team) were considered to be highly effective in remedying QAVC issues, though
these could not be scientifically linked to changes in QAC results at the site level.
While the goal of QAC is to identify and correct non-adherence to the study protocol, it is
also important to acknowledge elements that were performed particularly well and include
these in the summaries as a way of motivating study staff. It is important that staff be given
positive reinforcement in the areas where they are doing well and to be acknowledged for their
valuable contribution to the project and to the team. These QAC procedures allow for the iden-
tification of skills training needs for VCT, PTSS, and CM staff, and relevant in-service skills
trainings are discussed with the individual staff. In particular, VCT has been scaled up
through-out African countries although very few report any attempts at QAC. Our experience
in this large prevention trial is that such QAC is both (1) feasible and acceptable to both staff
and participants and (2) associated with higher quality programmatic implementation.
The “diplomatic” QACmodel presented under the Project Accept aegis is not without limi-
tations. Given different social contexts, it may entirely appropriate to have greater flexibility
across sites, as the present study did with permitting site team leaders and coordinators to set
the frequency and structure of meetings to address QAC issues. However, this also introduces
variability in how QAC issues are addressed, which could have some bearing on actual QAC
across sites (as well as, for example, staff retention if some sites are better at this than others).
Addressing some of these complexities and the need for additional research on how to assure
QAC before implementing multi-site, multi-level interventions and assuring QAC once in the
field remain key tasks for future related interventions. A further limitation to these results
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relates to the presentation of mean fidelity scores across the sites without associated data on
competencies and specific adherence challenges or that seemed to explain fluctuations over
time and differences across contexts. Such information, given the range of components and
geographical areas covered by the current manuscript, was considered to be beyond the scope
of this paper. Finally, there are numerous factors in addition to QAC that influence fidelity and
the ultimate success of interventions and implementation strategies: although QAC is likely a
useful tool for supporting and promoting high fidelity when HIV prevention interventions are
implemented, one cannot make definitive causal statements in this regard.
Conclusions
The implementation of a large-sale, evidence based HIV intervention requires extensive QAC
to ensure implementation effectiveness, building on a ‘feedback loop’ whereby improvements
in service delivery become both an iterative and an intuitive process. During Project Accept,
ongoing appraisal of study staff by intervention component across sites helped to ensure con-
sistent and high quality delivery of all intervention components, in keeping with the goals of
the study protocol. In addition, for the first time in any kind of global health intervention,
attempts were made to assess standards of service delivery from a diplomatic perspective. The
development of the field of global health diplomacy has helped to drive recognition of the
importance of culturally appropriate and culturally sensitive global health interventions, which
both international and domestic Project Accept QAC staff monitored on a routine basis
throughout the intervention. The primary findings of Project Accept also suggest that a com-
munity-wide multicomponent intervention of mobilization, HIV testing and support services
can be both safe and feasible[17] and can significantly increase testing, particularly in men.
The study also shows that the routine monitoring and assessment of services through QAC is
an essential component of public health practice. In this context, QAC ensures staff fidelity to
study procedures and is critical to the delivery of multi-site HIV prevention interventions.
Both the findings and the associated methods of QAC for the Project Accept intervention
could, therefore, usefully inform other interventions being “moved to scale”.
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The escalating expenditure on patients with HIV/AIDS within an inadequately
funded public health system is tending towards crowding out care for patients
with non-HIV illnesses. Priority-setting decisions are thus required and should
increasingly be based on an explicit, transparent and accountable process to
facilitate sustainability. South Africa’s public health system is eroding, even
though the government has received extensive donor financing for specific
conditions, such as HIV/AIDS. The South African government’s 2007 HIV plan
anticipated costs exceeding 20% of the annual health budget with a strong focus
on treatment interventions, while the recently announced 20122016 National
Strategic HIV plan could cost up to US$16 billion. Conversely, the total non-HIV
health budget has remained static in recent years, effectively reducing the supply
of health care for other diseases. While the South African government cannot
meet all demands for health care simultaneously, health funders should attempt to
allocate health resources in a fair, efficient, transparent and accountable manner,
in order to ensure that publicly funded health care is delivered in a reasonable and
non-discriminatory fashion. We recommend a process for resource allocation that
includes ethical, economic, legal and policy considerations. This process, adapted
for use by South Africa’s policy-makers, could bring health, political, economic
and ethical gains, whilst allaying a social crisis as mounting treatment commit-
ments generated by HIV have the potential to overwhelm the health system.
Keywords: HIV/AIDS; resource allocation; South Africa; policy; cost-effectiveness
Introduction
The HIV pandemic is one of the greatest tragedies to afflict humankind. Sub-Saharan
Africa, a highly impoverished region, has been the most severely affected, with
devastating effects on the lives of individuals, families, whole population groups and
society in general (UNAIDS, 2010). Starting from a very low incidence in the 1980s,
the pandemic has spread rapidly across South Africa (a middle-income country) and
infected over 6 million people, the largest population of HIV patients in any country.
Although South Africa has the most highly developed infrastructure and health-care
system in sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth has been slower than anticipated
since the political transition in 1994, and social and economic inequality remain high
and are getting worse (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
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2011). For these reasons, the pandemic’s impact on the health system and the related
use of scarce health resources deserve special attention.
In this paper, we examine South Africa’s response to the pandemic, which may
have generated both positive and negative impacts on the public health system,
provided by South Africa’s Department of Health (DOH) and associated provincial
governments. After an abysmally slow start, in 2003 the government introduced an
ambitious programme to provide all HIV patients with antiretroviral drugs (ARVs).
Spending on HIV significantly increased and rose at a higher rate than any other area
of health expenditure (vide infra). Increased expenditure on HIV is both commend-
able and necessary. However, recent evidence indicates that as the government
expands funding allocations for the urgent treatment demands of the HIV popula-
tion on an unpredictable and ad hoc basis, the national public health sector’s
capacity to deal effectively with non-HIV diseases and traumatic injuries (which are
also at virtually epidemic levels) may be undermined, in the context of what has been
described as a rapidly deteriorating national public health system (Karim, 2009).
This is not a problem unique to South Africa (Gordon, 2008). Commentators
elsewhere have raised the issue of dramatic increases in HIV treatment funding
(as opposed to more cost-effective HIV prevention initiatives) ‘squeezing out’ other
health-care services (Amico, Aran, & Avila, 2010; England, 2008). Unless tackled
soon and effectively, the government’s failure to allocate scarce health resources
transparently and rationally will become an increasingly critical problem for South
Africa’s public health sector. We provide here a historical perspective on the HIV
epidemic; review the government’s pattern of spending on HIV and non-HIV health
care; examine the present and possible future impact of these funding decisions on
South Africa’s public health sector; and recommend a process to allocate medical
resources in an ethically and legally acceptable way as mounting health-care needs
threaten to overwhelm the nation’s public health services (Househam, 2010).
HIV and the changing burden of disease
The scale of the HIV epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa is unprecedented in modern
medical history (UNAIDS, 2010), and has systematically undermined all health
gains made in the post-apartheid era (Ijumba & Padarath, 2006). In 1996, the
epidemic accounted for only 1.5% of male deaths and 2.5% of female deaths
(Bradshaw et al., 2003). By 2000, HIV had been identified as the leading cause of
death in South Africa, accounting for almost 30% of all deaths. By 2006, this had
risen to 47% (Dorrington, Johnson, Bradshaw, & Daniel, 2006). This percentage may
have been an underestimate as many HIV deaths continued to be attributed to other
causes such as tuberculosis or pneumonia (Anderson & Phillips, 2006). In 2009, an
estimated 390,000 new infections were reported in South Africa. Women were, and
continue to be, most severely affected by the epidemic, with an estimated national
prevalence of 30% amongst the 25- to 29-year-old age group (Karim, 2009). Of
4.6 million South Africans who were tested for HIV between April and November
2010, an astonishing 17% were HIV positive (Bodibe, 2011).
Although South Africa has only 0.7% of the world’s population, it accounts for
17% of the global burden of HIV infection. The average time from HIV infection to
death in South Africa is 8 to 10 years without ARVs (Anderson & Phillips, 2006),
and the average life expectancy at birth in South Africa has fallen from 57 years in

























1980 to 51 years in 2008 (World Bank Disease Control Priorities Project, 2008). It is
not yet clear whether, or how soon, treatment with ARVs will mitigate this
phenomenon. While the incidence of new HIV cases peaked in 1998, the annual
number of deaths caused by HIV is not expected to plateau until 2015 (Dorrington
et al., 2006).
The impact of the pandemic has been felt at all levels of the health system. In a
study of a regional hospital in the Western Cape Province, 32.3% of patients were
HIV positive, and a further 11% were clinically suspected to be positive (Burch &
Benatar, 2006). This burden of infectious disease is markedly greater than it was in
the past: a survey of patients in a major teaching hospital in the Western Cape
showed that infectious diseases accounted for less than 10% of admissions from
1971 to 1982 (Benatar & Saven, 1995). Recent data are therefore representative of a
changing burden of disease pattern that has dramatically altered demands made by
patients on health-care services.
Simultaneously with the catastrophic impact of HIV on the burden of disease,
non-HIV conditions, including stroke, ischaemic heart disease, violence and injuries,
diabetes and chronic lung diseases continue to account for significant proportions of
the total disease burden (Househam, 2010). Homicide, violence and accidents
accounted for 15% of deaths in 2007, while one in five adult males admitted to being
alcohol dependent (Barron, 2008). Death rates from cancer, stroke and diabetes rose
by 12% between 1997 and 2004, while death rates from related conditions have risen
by 35% for males and 18% for females in recent years (Anderson & Phillips, 2006).
Tuberculosis continues to spread rapidly, placing an ever-increasing burden on health
services (National Department of Health, 2004). Patients with multidrug-resistant
(MDR) and extensively drug-resistant (XDR) tuberculosis are much more expensive
to treat, and they present as yet unquantified health-care challenges (Singh, Upshur, &
Padayatchi, 2007). Overall, health as reflected in a range of health indicators is in
decline (Beresford, 2008a; Barron, 2008). Thus, while the public health sector must
continue to find new internal and donor resources to treat a growing number of HIV
patients, it must also continue to meet rising demands from patients with other chronic
and acute diseases and traumatic injuries.
The South African government’s evolving response to the HIV epidemic
Despite the massive scale of the HIV pandemic, already clearly evident in the 1990s,
the government’s initial response was characterised by obfuscatory attitudes and
denialism (Karim, 2009). Health service planners’ lack of foresight and vision and
inadequate resources hampered the public sector’s ability to treat HIV patients. Until
2003, the government was unwilling to fund ARVs for hundreds of thousands of
patients who needed them, having ignored the highly compelling evidence indicating
the cost-effectiveness of ARV treatment available at that time (Baleta, 2003).
Although the pandemic ab initio affected potentially productive members of society,
the early government reaction of denial resulted in the failure to make long-term
plans to cope with the looming public health crisis posed by the disease.
In the face of government apathy, local and international organisations played a
key role in initiating treatment and care for AIDS patients (Baleta, 1999; Benatar,
2004; International Association of Physicians in AIDS Care, 2002; Rodriguez & La
Salvia, 2004). In collaboration with the Provincial Administration of the Western

























Cape and Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), South
Africa’s largest and most effective HIV activist group, mobilised powerful segments
of civil society to challenge the government’s refusal to provide affordable and cost-
effective treatment for HIV patients (Baleta, 2003). Only in 2003 did the government
succumb to intense societal pressure to address the epidemic. The change in
orientation, funding and policy was both dramatic and reactive, lurching from
negligible to unprecedentedly high levels of funding for a specific disease. The
Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and
Treatment for South Africa (‘2003 plan’) (National Department of Health, 2003),
represented an ambitious policy response to be implemented over the 5 ensuing
years. The government proposed to provide treatment to HIV patients pursuant to
the ‘highest international standards’ through a countrywide continuum of care
including home care, adherence support and nutritional support.
In March 2007, the DOH announced its National Strategic Plan (NSP) on HIV
and AIDS, 20072011 (‘2007 Plan’) (National Department of Health, 2007). This
plan was even more ambitious than its predecessor. The DOH aimed to achieve the
following by 2011: (1) to halve the rate of new HIV infections through prevention
strategies and (2) to treat with ARVs 80% of those already living with HIV and their
families. By 2009, over 730,000 HIV patients had been provided ARVs, with a target
of 1.4 million on ARVs by 2012 (Mooney & Gilson, 2009).
In December 2011, the government launched the NSP for HIV and AIDS,
Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and Tuberculosis 20122016 (2011 plan)
(National Department of Health, 2011). The 2011 plan builds on both the 2003 and
2007 Plans, but focuses more attention on (1) the immediate provision of lifelong
antiretroviral treatment to all HIV-positive mothers and TB patients, as well as (2) a
significantly increased focus on prevention. The plan also stipulates that the
government and its implementation partners should prepare to roll out new
biomedical prevention strategies as soon as they have passed regulatory approval.
The goals of the 2011 plan remain broadly similar to the 2003 and 2007 versions, and
they promise ‘universal access’ to HIV prevention interventions (Cullinan, 2011). By
the end of 2016, this new plan aims to: (1) enrol 3 million people for ARV treatment,
(2) circumcise 4.3 million men and (3) reduce mother-to-child HIV transmission to
2% (currently at 4%) (Cullinan 2011). While these steps are overdue and welcome, the
cost of these newly implemented programmes needs to be evaluated and reviewed in
the context of limited resources.
Health expenditure in South Africa
Although the South African government devotes a substantial portion of its national
budget to health care, government health expenditure has remained at a steady level
of between 8.4% and 8.9% of the budget in recent years (Health Systems Trust,
2010). Annual per capita government health expenditure has also remained virtually
constant in recent years, rising from US$135 during 19981999 to US$139 during
20052006 (inflation-adjusted). These small increases have not kept pace with the
changing burden of disease, and the projected annual increases of 7% in national
health expenditure between 2004 and 2011 were expected to barely keep pace with
inflation (Barron, 2008), and they have indeed not done so. It must be remembered
that the national public health sector, staffed by about 30% of the country’s doctors,

























remains the sole provider of health care for 36 to 40 million people who are
uninsured and who constitute approximately 80% of the nation’s population
(Benatar, 2004; Blecher & Thomas, 2005). Less than 20% of South Africans have
private health insurance that provides access to health care from almost 70% of the
country’s doctors, with an annual per capita health expenditure of about $1400
(South African National Treasury, 2010).
Mounting HIV spending poses a challenge to the government
Until the late 1990s, spending on HIV programmes was negligible, and it was only
with the adoption of the 2003 plan that funding was substantially increased.
Expenditure then grew at an extraordinarily high average annual rate of 48.2%
between 1999 and 2005 (Blecher & Thomas, 2005). This was a significantly and
consistently higher rate of growth than in any other area of national health
expenditure. This level of growth has continued at an annual rate of approximately
24.8%, and dedicated HIV funding was recently estimated at US$400 million per
annum (Karim, 2009), of which approximately 40% comes from international donors
(Ndlovu, 2010).
The 2007 plan was estimated to cost anywhere from US$669.3 million in 2007 to
US$1.6 billion in 2011, with one estimate putting the overall cost over 5 years at
US$6.4 billion (National Department of Health, 2007). The 2011 Plan is projected to
cost an extraordinary US$16 billion over the ensuing 5-year period (National
Department of Health, 2011). Overall HIV expenditure may eventually exceed 20%
of the entire national health budget (National Department of Health, 2007), and
treatment costs for HIV are anticipated to rise to 33% of total health expenditure by
2012 (Chopra et al., 2009), to be funded from a combination of donor and national
sources.
These rapidly escalating expenditures on HIV combined with a range of
competing public health commitments pose a potential crisis for a national public
health-care system committed to serving the needs of all South Africans. Assuming
both donor and national HIV expenditure will continue to amount to an ever-
increasing proportion of the expenditure on health, this will, in all probability,
increase tension between competing sectors within South Africa’s public health-care
system. In 2009, HIV accounted for R3359 million (US$486.9 million) or 21.7% of
the total R15.4 billion (US$2.2 billion) national health budget (South African
National Treasury, 2010). In the 2010 budget, an additional R8400 million
(US$1.2 billion) was allocated to HIV expenditure over the coming 3 years (South
African National Treasury, 2010). This falls far short of the estimated $16 billion that
will be needed to implement the 2011 plan over the ensuing 5 years (National
Department of Health, 2011). It should be noted that official estimates of
prospective HIV expenditure have varied widely over recent years, and are frequently
revised. As estimated amounts are not always budgeted and appropriated, it is often
difficult to determine exactly what the South African government intends to spend
on HIV in the medium- or long-term.
Although the current pattern of government health expenditure reflects a needed
increase in HIV funding over earlier periods of neglect, these increases raise
troubling questions from a resource-allocation perspective. Even before the latest
increases, the government had spent over twice as much to care for each HIV patient

























than it did to provide medical services for each patient with non-HIV conditions
(Blecher & Thomas, 2005). In addition to providing health care to all HIV and
non-HIV patients; the health-care infrastructure in the public sector needs to be
improved; academic centres need to be sustained so that new generations of health-
care professionals can be trained to address anticipated health-care needs in South
Africa (Benatar, 2004); many more health-care workers need to be trained, employed
and retained; and working conditions need to be augmented in order to diminish the
‘push’ factors that contribute to the health-care provider ‘brain drain’ (Benatar,
2007).
Although prevention has been widely accepted as a significantly more cost-
effective strategy to curtail the epidemic (Marseille, Hofmann, & Kahn, 2002), a
mere 11% (US$694.6 million) of the planned expenditure on HIV from 2011 to 2016
is allocated to prevention, as opposed to significantly more expensive treatment
initiatives in the 2007 and 2011 plans (National Department of Health, 2007, 2011).
In view of this evidence, it is likely that the government will have to further increase
spending on HIV prevention, thus compounding the long-term, national HIV-related
cost burdens relative to other health conditions. These projected costs, though
already astronomically high, have not taken into account the significant downstream
costs of treating patients with ARV complications at the secondary level (Kevany,
Meintjes, Rebe, Maartens, & Cleary, 2009).
Has spending on HIV ‘crowded out’ funding for non-HIV care?
South Africa faces dramatic resource shortages across its publicly funded health
system. As the overall national health budget grows at less than the inflation rate,
expenditures for HIV continue to grow at a disproportionate rate to general health
expenditure. In this context, and in the absence of any explicit systems to govern or
restrain health-resource-allocation patterns, there is an increasing risk that the ability
to treat other diseases will diminish, as has occurred elsewhere (Houston, 2002).
When Kenya introduced widespread HIV treatment, health services for non-HIV
patients were curtailed against a backdrop of rising mortality rates (Guinness et al.,
2002). Similarly, HIV programmes in the West Indies have been criticised for drawing
providers towards well-funded HIV programmes via preferential funding, with
consequent deleterious effects on the broader health system (Amico et al., 2010;
England, 2008). Increased HIV expenditure has also been shown to be associated
with reduced expenditure on immunisations and reproductive health interventions
(Gre´pin, 2009). In view of this evidence, it is important to ask whether the same risk
exists in South Africa as elsewhere (i.e., whether spiralling expenditures on HIV will
‘crowd out’ treatment of non-HIV conditions) (Beresford, 2008b), causing distor-
tions across the rest of the health system (Chopra et al., 2009). For example, it is of
concern in this regard that maternal mortality in South Africa increased from
150 per 100,000 pregnancies in 1998 to 650 per 100,000 in 2007 (Human Rights
Watch, 2011).
There is some evidence that South Africa’s health system has been significantly
impacted by the HIV epidemic in terms of health-care professional workloads
(Dohrn, Nzama, & Murrman, 2009). For example, in 2003, 94% of primary-level
public health clinics provided sexually transmitted infection (STI) services in
South Africa, including HIV services. By 2004, only two-thirds (67%) of all primary

























health-care facilities provided immunisation services, and only 55% of such facilities
provided antenatal care  two basic and critical elements of primary health care
(Day, 2004). The prevention and treatment of non-communicable diseases has also
been marginalised in South Africa, in part as a result of the overwhelming presence
of communicable diseases that must be treated (Mayosi, 2009). Following substantial
downsizing of hospital beds and medical and support staff across the country
(Blecher, 2002; Benatar, 2004), in 2007, the government again reduced the budgets for
the two major tertiary hospitals in the Western Cape (Cairncross, 2007). In addition
to reducing tertiary services to the vast population served by these two major
academic teaching hospitals, current trends are threatening postgraduate training,
maintenance of surgical skills and research in established medical schools that must
be sustained in order to serve broad national health goals (Benatar, 2004).
The government has suggested that increased spending on HIV treatment will
improve services both to HIV patients and to non-HIV patients by strengthening the
overall treatment and care capacity of the national public health infrastructure
(National Department of Health, 2004). For example, the DOH estimated that 36%
of all HIV plan expenditure would be used to benefit not only HIV patients, but also
many others suffering from other conditions (National Department of Health, 2003).
Some commentators have suggested that there is evidence that HIV spending has a
positive impact on (1) both the broader health system generally (Biesma, Brugha, &
Harmer, 2009) and (2) the treatment of other diseases that contribute to HIV co-
infections, such as tuberculosis (Conseil, Mounier-Jack, & Coker, 2010). In addition,
HIV expenditure may have leveraged a far higher level of expenditure on health than
would otherwise have been the case (El-Sadr, 2009). However, such synergies between
HIV scale-up and health system strengthening remain largely unproven (Rabkin,
2009). Furthermore, a study examining the impact of international aid for HIV/
AIDS on other health issues argues that, conversely, substantial increases in donor
funding for HIV/AIDS may have actually limited the funding available for other
health needs in developing countries (Shiffman, 2009).
While some of the current expenditure on HIV treatment care may provide
benefits for other users of the national public health system in the long-term, these
dramatic increases in spending on HIV also threaten to diminish the resources
available to provide services for patients with non-HIV conditions and for health care
in general. Although the ‘crowding out’ of other health services by HIV expenditures
remains unproven, we have asserted elsewhere that it would be morally, politically
and probably legally unacceptable for expanded treatment of the HIV population to
come at an unacceptable cost to patients who bear the burden of other chronic
diseases and health conditions. We recommended, therefore, that the South African
government urgently find the means to rationally and efficiently allocate its limited
health resources among the many patient populations who need and can benefit from
treatment (Fleischer, Kevany, & Benatar, 2010).
Charting a course for change: transparent, rational and ethical resource-allocation
decisions for health and HIV funding
Given the public health crisis caused by HIV and the dramatic effectiveness of
treatment, the epidemic surely deserves special attention and increased funding.
However, if such prioritisation systematically undermines adequate services for other

























diseases, the national public health sector will have failed in its goal of providing equity
in access to health care for citizens, an outcome which has already been observed in
other settings (England, 2008). To cope with the dual challenges of the HIV pandemic,
as well as maintaining a basic standard of care for all non-HIV patients, the
government must rationally plan for the short-, medium- and long-term future of the
health system, based on explicit and transparent processes (Chopra et al., 2009).
Any solution to the problem of making an arbitrary resource-allocation process
more rational and evidence-based must begin with recognition of harsh realities. The
government already commits 3.6% of GDP (almost 9% of the total national
government budget) to funding health care (Hofman & Tollman, 2010), and there are
limits to how much more the government could contribute to enhancing health care.
There is no scenario under which all demands for health care could be met. Yet,
policy-makers and politicians rarely admit that health resources are being rationed in
a way that will, inexorably, deny some patients essential, life-saving treatment and
sometimes excludes patients altogether. It might be argued that the government
should divert additional resources from those allocated to other public services to fix
a dysfunctional public health sector. Reducing excessive expenditure on defence is
always a popular suggestion, but, without a compelling case for the substitution of
health for military expenditure according to internationally recognised criteria
(such as those proposed by Novotny & Kevany, 2013), it is unlikely to be heeded by
most governments. Further, South Africa faces multiple crises that demand increased
resources for underfunded public services: for example, education, policing,
municipal services, land restitution and even basic services such as sanitation and
clean water. While it is important to continue to advocate for health services to
receive more resources, it would be politically unfeasible for the government to divert
funds from other vital public services in order to expand national health services to
an ideal level.
Despite bureaucratic resistance to admitting that the country must ration its
limited resources, the need for making resource-allocation decisions is a relentless
fact of life in South Africa, as it is in countries with much greater access to public
resources. South Africa cannot avoid rationing its inadequate health resources, and
indeed health administrators routinely engage in implicit rationing decisions, albeit
on an ad hoc basis, and pursuant to no formal, explicit and transparent process that
would ensure a rational outcome. The goal must be to design a process that would
ensure rational, accountable and transparent allocation of resources that would take
into account the views of diverse interest groups, and that the public, clinicians and
administration could accept as fair.
Improved public and stakeholder participation
Traditionally, health budget priorities are set covertly by ‘insiders’ (usually govern-
ment administrators), without involving ‘outsiders’ (such as clinicians, patients,
ethicists and advocacy groups) in the decision-making (Coulter & Ham, 2000). South
Africa’s policy-making processes are no different. For example, none of the HIV
plans that require extraordinary expenditures for HIV made provision for a
transparent process by which health budgets would be allocated, either at national
or provincial levels. Nor do any of the plans require that budgets ensure fair, rational
allocation of scarce resources, much less that this be done with public participation.

























Despite the pressure on the government to meet multiple demands for diverse disease
populations, and the controversy that erupts when the government hands down
budget allocations made in secret, there is not yet an established institutional culture
of making resource-allocation decisions in a rational, accountable and transparent
manner.
While little is known about how national health resource-allocation decisions are
made in most countries, some countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand
and the United Kingdom, as well as the state of Oregon in the United States) have
moved towards explicit rationing processes (Donaldson, 2008). Although we do not
recommend that South Africa simply take over a method of allocation used
elsewhere, we believe that there are many advantages to using an explicit process
for allocating health resources, and we will describe such a process. What we can
learn from other countries is that an essential element of an explicit process is
transparency and public participation.
Policy-makers could respond to this suggestion by claiming that any requirement
of open participation would only invite endless, fruitless debates and delays, none of
which would improve the quality of the budget finally adopted. We argue that public
participation in government decision-making is an important, even essential element
of democracy. Public involvement encourages health administrators to think more
carefully about the practical impact of their proposals on a range of stakeholders and
prepares them to be held accountable for their decisions (Doyal, 1997). If the
decision-making process were enacted in public, involving all critical stakeholders,
the public might be willing to accept reasonable limitations on access to the most
expensive medical treatments and technology in order to ensure equitably accessible
basic care for the entire population (Benatar, 2008).
The goal of such a publicly accessible, participatory process would be to provide
rational, predictable budgets which each health institution could use to make plans
to provide services that would not be interrupted catastrophically by the sudden
withdrawal of funding as one or another crisis intervenes. Where budgets must be
redirected from one sector to another, this would be done with planning over the
long-term in order to ensure some measure of stability and predictability in
standards of service delivery, rather than through sudden pronouncements that
make unreasonable immediate demands on patients and health workers. This
would require the adoption of a transparent, participatory process at all levels of
decision-making.
While this approach to engage in transparent, participatory budgeting might
seem to be a straightforward prescription to achieve a better allocation of scarce
resources, it is not as simple as it may appear to implement this in practice.
The ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ process
Any proposal to engage in rational priority setting faces a threshold problem.
Though society accepts that allocation of scarce resources should be ‘fair and just’ in
theory, it cannot easily, if at all, agree on what specific set of priorities would be ‘fair
and just’ in practice (Benatar, 2008). Advocates for every possible patient population
and treatment will surface when budget reallocations, cuts or increases are proposed,
and each will argue that his or her view is the most ‘rational’ and ethical. While
policy-makers and other participants may agree that resources must be fairly and

























efficiently allocated, and that health priorities must be made ‘rationally’ rather than
arbitrarily, any chance of achieving consensus evaporates when we seek to apply
these agreed-upon principles in a practical situation.
As an alternative to ambitious consensus-seeking on such policies, commentators
have proposed that a fair, deliberative political process for the allocation of HIV and
other health resources should be developed, through which competing proposals can
be openly debated and a definitive distributive policy chosen (Arras & Fenton, 2009;
Daniels & Sabin, 1997). Recognising this need in the context of potential inability to
set priorities based on any agreed definition of ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’, and the adverse
impact this failure has on decision-making in the health sector, Daniels and Sabin
(1997) have proposed a process called ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ (‘A4R’).
Initially formulated for use in the private sector in the United States of America, the
A4R process has already been used to inform priority setting in the Canadian public
health system and in several other countries (Benatar & Martin, 2008). In this
context, Daniels and Sabin (1997) argue that although a diverse, pluralistic society
cannot always agree on definitions of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ to guide substantively
just decisions, it is nonetheless possible to agree on a fair process for making such
decisions. While this process cannot resolve all the dilemmas that arise when
priorities need to be set, four constitutive conditions take us a step towards a more
rational approach.
First, policy-makers must provide relevant reasons for their resource-allocation
decisions, and have these reasons supported by both medical and scientific evidence
and ethical principles and values. Relevant reasons include those that stakeholders
agree are central to meeting the diverse needs of society under resource constraints,
even though some may disagree with how resources are allocated. Second, these
decisions and their rationale must be made publicly accessible. Third, there should be
opportunities for dispute resolution, which may involve appeals to revisit and revise
decisions in the light of new evidence or arguments, or in response to changing
conditions. Finally, those charged with responsibility for making decisions must
provide the leadership to ensure that all of these conditions are met.
Advantages of using A4R
The major advantages of A4R are the following: (1) it provides a framework for
engagement and accountability across and between those stakeholders most
concerned with how limited health resources are distributed, (2) these decisions are
based on relevant evidence and ethical considerations and (3) such decisions are both
effective and ethically and legally justifiable. When the public knows and under-
stands why a decision was made, and how priorities were set, it will generally be more
willing to accept the decision. This is especially true when non-governmental
representatives from the general public have been meaningfully involved in the
decision-making process.
An additional, and critically important, advantage of the A4R process is that if
policy-makers meet its essential conditions, they are more likely to satisfy the
requirements of South Africa’s Constitution that the government’s health-resource
allocation policies must be ‘reasonable’. For example, South Africa’s Constitutional
Court approved a resource-allocation policy adopted by a hospital to limit costly,
long-term dialysis to patients who meet medical criteria for a kidney transplant,

























and who therefore would have a chance to be cured. The court explained that it
would be ‘slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith [by hospital
administrators]’ (Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu Natal, 1998)
[emphasis added].
In a subsequent case, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), an activist
organisation representing people with HIV, sued the government, demanding that it
provide nevirapine to pregnant HIV-positive women to reduce the chance of their
transmitting the infection to their babies. It provided evidence that many poor, rural
women who urgently needed the drug had no access to the limited number of
‘experimental’ centres, the only clinics in the country, where the government was
willing to administer the drug (Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign,
2002).
The Court rejected the government’s claims that more research was needed to
prove the safety and effectiveness of nevirapine and that the state could not afford to
provide this drug to all HIV-positive pregnant women. Accepting the evidence
submitted by TAC that showed that the drug was safe and effective and that the
government had the capacity to expand its programme to reach many more women,
the court concluded that the government’s policy was ‘unreasonable’. The court
added that for a policy to be reasonable, ‘those whose needs are the most urgent and
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is [sic] most in peril, must not be ignored by
the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the [Constitutional] right [to access
treatment]’ ’’ (ibid.).
The court ordered the government to provide the drug immediately through
public health facilities that already had the capacity to do so, and to develop a plan
to roll out treatment to all HIV-positive women throughout the country. The court
made several pointed comments that could be taken as practical advice for policy-
makers. It called for ‘proper communication, especially by the government’ and insisted
that for a programme to ‘meet the constitutional requirement of reasonableness’, its
contents must effectively be made known to ‘all concerned, down to the district nurse
and patients.’ [Emphasis added.] (ibid.). The A4R process thus echoes the court’s
judgement that an allocation policy must be based on ‘relevant, rational reasons’,
including evidence that shows that the policy will lead to effective outcomes, taking
into account the interests of all stakeholders.
Economic considerations in A4R: the use of cost-effectiveness data
Resource-allocation decisions for public health programmes are increasingly based on
the availability, analysis and application of up-to-date cost-effectiveness information
on the expense, outputs, outcomes and impact of alternative intervention types. This
methodology, aimed at achieving the socially optimal level of health-resource
allocation, can be applied both within and across disease groups to facilitate technical
efficiency (the distribution of resources across similar interventions aimed at the same
disease or condition) and allocative efficiency (the distribution of resources across
different disease groups and interventions). This approach is in keeping with recent
calls for the South African government to divide health resources and set priorities on
the basis of available epidemiological and cost information (Hofman & Tollman,
2010).

























In the case of the HIV epidemic, an increasing body of evidence from economic,
social and ethical perspectives points to the promotion of a change in the current
balance of expenditure between HIV prevention and treatment strategies from an
economically, socially and ethically optimal viewpoint. Such considerations do not
appear to have informed the South African government’s policy on treatment versus
prevention resources, which remain heavily skewed towards treatment expenditure in
spite of its lesser cost-effectiveness (Lyman & Wittels, 2010). However, recent
analyses do indicate important HIV prevention gains from treatment programmes
(Granich et al., 2010). There is also no evidence that the South African government
has considered the cost-effectiveness of a more inclusive range of non-HIV health
interventions, such as those identified by the Disease Control Priorities Project
(Laxminarayan et al., 2006) when allocating an increasing level of resources to the
HIV epidemic in the context of static health expenditure elsewhere.
While the application of academic, economic and scientific evidence for HIV
resource allocation is attractive, a number of practical limitations to this approach
should be recognised. The achievement of the ‘social-ethical optimum’ at the expense
of the individual optimum goes against a number of medical ethical principles,
including the ‘rule of rescue’ (Cookson, McCabe, & Tsuchiya, 2008). In addition,
cost-effectiveness evidence is by no means comprehensive, and evidence of the impact
of alternative investments such as health-systems strengthening are still unknown
(Biesma et al., 2009). Finally, the application of such evidence needs to be tempered
by consideration of the political, ethical and social acceptability of economically
driven resource-allocation decisions. However, failing a consensus on substantive
issues, at the very least, the A4R process would facilitate rational decision-making
that would seek to weigh and balance both economic and non-economic considera-
tions (Benatar, 2006).
Policy considerations in A4R: global health diplomacy
In addition to consideration of economic and ethical criteria, it must be recognised
that any national government must make resource-allocation decisions in the context
of broader policy decisions and ‘realpolitik’. To this end, the emerging field of ‘global
health diplomacy’ is focused on the broader, strategic evaluation of public health
interventions in the public and foreign policy context. While the first duty of health-
care resource-allocation decisions is, of course, to maximise positive health outcomes
in an ethically acceptable manner, consideration must also be given to the collateral
‘diplomatic’ effects of alternative health interventions (Fidler, 2007; Lyman &
Wittels, 2010); resource-allocation decisions must also be politically and socially
acceptable, culturally sensitive, and, wherever possible, take into account their
interactions with a range of broader policy considerations and goals for optimal
overall social, development and economic effects (Labonte´ & Gagnon, 2010).
Undertaking resource-allocation decisions without consideration of these issues
creates a ‘tense and dangerous duality’ and may lead to missed opportunities to
achieve multiple health and other social, political or developmental goals simulta-
neously (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010). To this end, policy-
makers should, wherever possible, adopt a holistic monitoring and evaluation system
(Jan, 1998) that takes into account not merely the more traditional, but notoriously
narrow, outcomes of health interventions such as disability-adjusted life years

























(‘DALYs’) and quality-adjusted life years (‘QALYs’), but also, in the interest of more
transcendent goals, a range of practical considerations such as programme
acceptability, geographical coverage, cultural appropriateness, equity, health-systems
strengthening, strategic, political, international relations and diplomatic considera-
tions (Conseil et al., 2010; Fidler, 2007). With the inclusion of such foreign and
public policy considerations, a more socially acceptable allocation of resources both
within HIV and across public health programmes in general may be achieved. As
noted in the previous section, all of these factors, to the extent relevant to the
allocation policies under consideration, could be considered under the A4R process.
One province adopts A4R to allocate health resources
Until recently, there have been only isolated examples of explicit, transparent rational
resource allocation in South Africa (Benatar, Fleischer, Peter, Pope, & Taylor, 2000).
Since 2008, the DOH of the Western Cape has engaged in a project based on the A4R
process, adapted to local circumstances that would, through transparency and public
participation, create explicit resource-allocation policies. Although the project is in
its early stages, it has excited considerable interest and produced some promising
results. Most recently, a policy for allocation of limited renal replacement therapy
was proposed and adopted (Rayner & Swanepol, 2011). It is expected that other
scarce medical resources (e.g., admission to ICUs and access to very expensive
treatments) will be subject to a similar process over the coming years.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that any of the other eight South African
provinces, much less the national DOH, have begun to engage in any similar process
that would engage with a wide variety of stakeholders such as clinicians, academics
and health administrators actually responsible for delivering health care (Benatar,
2008). Without broader use of such a tool, it is not likely that resources will be
allocated any differently in the future than in the past, just as it is not likely that the
current ad hoc and somewhat arbitrary allocation of resources that has produced
unfair, inequitable treatment of patients will change.
Given the arbitrary nature of past policy, and the resulting dysfunctions that
threaten to undermine our public health system, we believe it is critical for South
Africa’s national health policy-makers to take the lead in developing a transparent
rationing process by which they themselves are accountable for their decisions. In our
view, the key to accomplishing this in a politically, ethically and legally justifiable way
is to adopt a decision-making process that is publicly accessible and accountable, and
in which all major stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in a meaningful
manner. While adherence to the A4R process will not solve all resource-allocation
problems, this process would go a long way towards achieving more politically,
ethically and legally justifiable decisions.
Future challenges
Other possibilities for increasing equitable access to health care, such as widespread
adoption of the primary health-care approach or the government’s proposal to
develop a form of national health insurance, cannot be addressed here. However, if
implemented, both programmes would have potentially important implications for
the sustainability of the current HIV treatment funding arrangements. We also

























recognise that South Africa’s DOH actually has limited control over the allocation of
resources to vertical HIV programmes, as opposed to other forms of health
expenditure, given the high proportion of HIV-specific donor funding and the
associated agendas that are involved. Nonetheless, as donor contributions to HIV
continue to decline (Lyman & Wittels, 2010), it becomes even more important that
the DOH adopt a process by which its limited funds will be allocated amongst many
competing users in a transparent, diplomatic, cost-effective and rational way.
Conclusion
South Africa, along with many other developing countries, faces seemingly
insurmountable difficulties in improving standards of, and access to, health care.
Many more health professionals will be needed, as well as considerable infrastruc-
tural improvement within public sector health institutions, to meet idealistic
demands of equity. How to train and retain more professionals and how to achieve
an improved health-care infrastructure are additional major challenges and will take
several decades to achieve. These challenges, along with others discussed above,
provide some insight into the serious limits of what could be achieved in the quest for
an entirely equitable health-care system in our economic context. They also highlight
the need for modesty regarding what could be achieved in the short-term in a middle-
income country bearing a massive burden of disease with the largest HIV-positive
population in the world. While aspiring to achieve equity in health care, it should
also be remembered that neglect of the social determinants of disease will seriously
impede achievement of equity and improved population health. In such a challenging
environment, the only option for governments such as that of South Africa is to
work as fairly, and intelligently, as possible with the limited resources available to
them.
To deal with this serious challenge to the sustainability of the South African
national public health system, we recommend that national and provincial health
administrators adopt the A4R process, tailored to suit South Africa’s unique
circumstances. We believe that through collaborative, participatory endeavours, such
as those gradually being undertaken by the Western Cape’s Department of Health,
policy-makers could achieve greater consensus among all interested parties who
participate in priority setting. Finally, budgetary decisions allocating health
resources pursuant to a fair, transparent process would be more likely to be accepted
as reasonable, non-discriminatory, fair and appropriate under conditions of severe
resource constraint.
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Abstract
Background: Study-based global health interventions, especially those that are conducted on an international or
multi-site basis, frequently require site-specific adaptations in order to (1) respond to socio-cultural differences in
risk determinants, (2) to make interventions more relevant to target population needs, and (3) in recognition of
‘global health diplomacy’ issues. We report on the adaptations development, approval and implementation process
from the Project Accept voluntary counseling and testing, community mobilization and post-test support services
intervention.
Methods: We reviewed all relevant documentation collected during the study intervention period (e.g. monthly
progress reports; bi-annual steering committee presentations) and conducted a series of semi-structured interviews
with project directors and between 12 and 23 field staff at each study site in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Thailand and
Tanzania during 2009. Respondents were asked to describe (1) the adaptations development and approval process
and (2) the most successful site-specific adaptations from the perspective of facilitating intervention
implementation.
Results: Across sites, proposed adaptations were identified by field staff and submitted to project directors for
review on a formally planned basis. The cross-site intervention sub-committee then ensured fidelity to the study
protocol before approval. Successfully-implemented adaptations included: intervention delivery adaptations (e.g.
development of tailored counseling messages for immigrant labour groups in South Africa) political, environmental
and infrastructural adaptations (e.g. use of local community centers as VCT venues in Zimbabwe); religious
adaptations (e.g. dividing clients by gender in Muslim areas of Tanzania); economic adaptations (e.g. co-provision of
income generating skills classes in Zimbabwe); epidemiological adaptations (e.g. provision of ‘youth-friendly’ services in
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Tanzania), and social adaptations (e.g. modification of terminology to local dialects in
Thailand: and adjustment of service delivery schedules to suit seasonal and daily work schedules across sites).
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and Thailand: evaluating findings fromProject
interventions to local needs in sub-Saharan
Africa
health
Health diplomacy and  ``the adaptation of global
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Conclusions: Adaptation selection, development and approval during multi-site global health research studies
should be a planned process that maintains fidelity to the study protocol. The successful implementation of
appropriate site-specific adaptations may have important implications for intervention implementation, from both a
service uptake and a global health diplomacy perspective.
Keywords: Adaptations, Voluntary counseling and testing, Global health diplomacy, HIV, Sub-Saharan Africa
Background
The HIV epidemic
From a public health perspective, there is no more com-
pelling crisis in the world today than the HIV epidemic in
sub-Saharan Africa. Since the epidemic began, more than
60 million people have been infected with HIV [1], and in
2009, AIDS killed 1.4 million people in Africa alone. In
addition to the death and disease burden, the epidemic
has had an enormous impact on economies, life expectan-
cies, and society. Globally, about one-third of those cur-
rently living with HIV are aged 15–24, and young adults
account for 40% of all new infections [1]. From the per-
spective of national AIDS control planners and policy-
makers in these countries, evidence-based strategies that
have maximum epidemic impact on target regions and
populations are critically important. For this to occur,
both planners and implementers need interventions
that are both sustainable, and adaptable, to the local
epidemiological, cultural, economic and infrastructural
context [2,3]. Randomized controlled trials that test such
interventions should be correspondingly flexible and sen-
sitive to local needs throughout their development and
implementation.
Adapting global health interventions
Adaptations to health programs are defined as the degree
to which they are changed or modified by a user in the
process of their adoption and implementation [4]. HIV-
related interventions that have been proven for efficacy
frequently need to be adapted to different environments
and settings when implemented as public health programs
[5,6]. Similarly, HIV-related trials, especially those that are
conducted in multiple countries or at multiple sites within
a country, frequently require site-specific adaptations to
the intervention in order (1) to respond to socio-cultural
differences [7] (2), to make interventions more relevant
and sensitive to target populations (including different risk
determinants and risk behaviors) [2,3,8], (3) to improve
intervention utilization and effectiveness [9], and (4) to
ensure that interventions meet minimum diplomatic [10]
and foreign policy [11] standards. For the latter, an inabil-
ity to align broader policy goals with global health initia-
tives, has the potential to create ‘a tense and confusing
duality’ [12]. In all cases, adaptation development and
implementation should be a planned process that main-
tains fidelity to core elements of the study protocol [13].
Project Accept
The Project Accept intervention has been described else-
where [9]. Briefly, 34 communities in sub-Saharan Africa
(at study sites in Soweto and Vulindlela in South Africa,
Kisarawe in Tanzania, and Mutoko in Zimbabwe) and 14
communities in Thailand were randomized to receive
either a community-based voluntary counseling and test-
ing (CBVCT) intervention in addition to standard clinic-
based VCT (SVCT) services, or SVCT services alone. The
CBVCT intervention had three major components
designed to change community norms and reduce risk of
HIV infection among all community members, irrespect-
ive of whether or not they participated directly in the
intervention. These were (1) to make counseling and test-
ing more available in community settings through mobile
voluntary counseling and testing (MVCT), (2) to engage
the community through community mobilization (CM),
and (3) to provide post-test support services (PTSS), in-
cluding psychosocial support groups, coping effectiveness
and stigma reduction training. The intervention was of
42 months duration, with start and end-dates varying by
site.
Although the intervention in each of the countries and
study sites was derived from the same theoretical model
[14,15], contained the same core strategies, and con-
formed to common standard operating procedures, the
implementation of intervention components was
designed to be responsive and adaptable to each local
context. To this end, all stages of intervention imple-
mentation were determined through intensive collabor-
ation between host-country investigators and
institutions, study communities, field staff, and their
international partner institutions (listed at end of paper).
In particular, the multisite study steering committee
worked with representatives of national AIDS programs
in host countries throughout the development of the
intervention, on both a deliberative and an ad-hoc basis,
both (1) to keep national planners informed on project
activities and (2) to ensure that project activities were
implemented in a manner that would be both appropri-
ate and sustainable in resource-limited settings.
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An intervention subcommittee was tasked with over-
seeing all aspects of the intervention and included mem-
bers from each of the five project sites. The duties of the
subcommittee were (1) to monitor intervention imple-
mentation to ensure that all sites worked to common
standards, (2) develop and conduct regular quality assu-
rance activities, and (3) propose, discuss and determine
acceptability of site-specific adaptations to the study
protocol. In addition, the intervention subcommittee
established an intervention working group at each site
including site principal investigators and project direc-
tors. These groups worked via conference calls and site
visits throughout the intervention. This participatory
process facilitated the resolution of both site-specific and
cross-site issues– and helped in developing, determining
and applying protocol adaptations.
The CBVCT intervention was remarkably successful
in terms of service utilization. After 42 months of the
intervention, utilization of the CBVCT model was more
than 10 times higher than utilization of SVCT in control
communities , acriss sites [9]. This divergence was pri-
marily attributable to the mobile nature of the interven-
tion, combined with extensive CM efforts to promote
utilization in intervention communities. In addition to
these explanations, the ongoing adaptability of the
CBVCT intervention to local conditions may have
helped to generate and maintain these utilization levels.
Adaptations to the Project Accept intervention
Each intervention component was designed with varying
allowances for adaptations to local conditions through-
out the intervention. For MVCT, sites were free to deter-
mine the most appropriate system of service delivery(e.g.
tents, caravans, community buildings, or project vehicles)
as well as field hours operating schedules. For CM, study
staff were asked: ‘Is our innovation sensitive to, and com-
patible with, the community's existing values and beliefs,
local culture, indigenous customs, past experiences, and
the needs of potential adopters?’ In this way, CM staff
were responsible for discovering how the intervention
could be made more compatible with communities' exist-
ing values through (1) suggesting and developing new
systems for working with local social networks and (2)
the ongoing refinement of information, education and
communication (IEC) messages. For PTSS, coordinators
components were encouraged to work with community
representatives to identify local post-test service needs as
well as collaborating with related existing services (if
any). For certain components of PTSS which had hereto-
fore only been proved for effectiveness in industrialized
countries, staff were encouraged to monitor their accept-
ability to local populations. In this paper, we report on
the adaptations development and approval process at
each site and the major adaptations developed and
implemented at each site, presented according to (1)
intervention component and (2) broader adaptations
themes and types. For all components, while scope for
possible adaptations was provided in advance of inter-
vention implementation, the adaptation process itself
was more precisely developed and ‘fine-tuned’, in re-
sponse to specific (and often unforeseeable) issues, sub-
sequent to intervention implementation.
Ethical review
The study procedures were approved by the following
ethical review committees: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Committee on Human Research (Thailand); Chiang
Mai University Research Institute for Health Sciences
(Thailand); the Ministry of Public Health (Thailand);
The Medical University of South Carolina Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for Human Research (Tanzania);
Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences IRB
(Tanzania); The National Institute of Medical Research
IRB (Tanzania); The University of California, San Fran-
cisco Committee on Human Research (Zimbabwe); and
The Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe (Zim-
babwe); and the University of the Witwatersrand Health
Sciences Research Ethics Committee (South Africa). Pro-
ject Accept also had an independent Data Safety and
Monitoring Board which biannually reviewed project
benchmarks, outcomes, and adverse events. These eth-
ical review committees remained active throughout the
intervention, reviewing and advising the study steering
committee on specific proposed intervention adaptations
as part of the approval process. In turn, the project-
specific ethics committee was composed of investigators
from each site, and advised on when an adaptation
would require a protocol modification to be approved by
these review boards.
Methods
Community consultations and adaptation implementation
Monitoring community members’ attitudes toward study
activities and promoting community involvement were key
elements of intervention development and helped study
staff to troubleshoot implementation problems and imple-
ment adaptations with the support of intervention com-
munities. Throughout the duration of the study, structured
community involvement helped (1) to ensure ongoing
two-way communication between study teams and study
communities and (2) to respond to the ethical and prac-
tical issues raised by trial participants or their representa-
tives. Communication with relevant district, regional and
national leadership, including local government represen-
tatives, was also maintained throughout the intervention
as required. A number of ways of maintaining community
involvement in the adaptations process were developed, as
described below.
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Community working groups
Community Working Groups (CWGs) represented com-
munity members’ interests in each intervention commu-
nity. CWGs consisted of approximately 30 representatives
from a cross-section of local ethnic, tribal and community
groups who were also leading members of local social net-
works, including faith-based organizations (FBOs), sporting
clubs, community health services, and local government.
CWG members were encouraged to keep in close contact
with their communities, and frequently met in the absence
of the research team to solicit feedback on project activities
that the community might be reluctant to articulate in a
larger forum. CWGs also helped to develop and tailor in-
formation, education and communication (IEC) materials
relevant to the various social networks within the commu-
nity and were supported through continuing training and
education throughout the intervention. CWG members
were not project staff, but were paid a sitting allowance at
some sites for attendance in meetings. Representatives
from each CWG also served on a Study Advisory Commit-
tee (SAC), designed (1) to allow primary stakeholders to
exercise leadership at a higher level of study coordination
and (2) to ensure community involvement both within and
across communities.
Community-based outreach volunteers
As part of the CM team, community-based outreach
volunteers (CBOVs) were responsible for liaising with
local organizations such as peer groups, FBOs and social
clubs on behalf of Project Accept. CBOVs were commu-
nity members who became early adopters of VCT or
PTSS and, where possible, held strategic positions within
local social networks. As community members, CBOVs
were uniquely placed to monitor and report on the on-
going acceptability of the intervention to participating
communities.
Community engagement
Study staff were consistently encouraged to develop new
and creative ways to keep participating communities
informed about, and engaged in, intervention develop-
ment, acceptability and adaptation. These included regular,
interactive community meetings; the creation and use of
informal communication channels (e.g. impromptu group
or individual discussions with community members);
developing relationships with key informants outside
CWG structures (e.g. local business owners); and facilitat-
ing linkages between CWGs other community
organizations.
The adaptations process
While provision for adaptations was made in the original
study protocol, as described above, the adaptations process
was primarily developed during the intervention itself, on a
site-by-site, ‘learning by doing’ basis, as appropriate to the
wide range of issues and often unforeseen obstacles that
had to be addressed throughout the intervention period.
The adaptations process therefore evolved organically,
throughout the intervention, on an expost rather than on
an ex-ante basis. In this way, the use of community involve-
ment and feedback mechanisms were essential to the adap-
tations process across sites. Key features of adaptations
development and implementation were consistent across
sites, and included (1) identification and discussion of site-
specific utilization and uptake issues on bi-weekly confer-
ence calls with the intervention sub-committee throughout
the intervention period in order to ensure prompt feedback
on utilization challenges; (2) submission of a written pro-
posal for adaptation to the intervention sub-committee (3);
review of proposals, recommendations, and forwarding to
the steering committee for further review; and (4) the steer-
ing committee making a final decision on whether to ap-
prove or reject the proposed adaptations. As described
above, the CBVCT intervention also maintained an ethics
sub-committee throughout the intervention period, respon-
sible for the review and approval of any proposed adapta-
tions to service delivery from a human subjects perspective,
in order to determine if protocol modifications would need
to be approved by the various review boards. Adaptations
approved by the ethics and intervention sub-committees,
and later by the study steering committee, were then intro-
duced to project staff via periodical cross-site retrainings
and intervention sub-committee site visits. Project coordi-
nators were then responsible for pilot-testing the adaptation
and, equally importantly monitoring performance of field
staff as the adaptation was implemented.
Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, adaptations were initially proposed by field
staff during weekly debriefings following consultations
with and feedback from CWGs, MVCT, CM and PTSS
participants, as well as other stakeholders in the study
communities, including ward councilors, village heads,
local chiefs, and religious and political leaders. Proposed
adaptations were then discussed at internal project man-
agement meetings with the principal investigator, and
approved adaptations were discussed with intervention
monitors and the steering committee before implementa-
tion. Approved adaptations were then communicated to
the local chief community, who then instructed junior
chiefs, village heads, and so on down the local hierarchy
to assist project staff with their implementation.
Thailand
In Thailand, field staff across components and CWGs
were responsible for observing intervention acceptability
and performance on a day-to-day basis throughout the
intervention. Additional community-level consultations
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with teenagers, village health personnel, religious groups,
households, and other local volunteer or charity groups
were also conducted throughout the intervention. Pro-
ject staff reported findings and suggestions for adapta-
tions to the project director at weekly project meetings,
which were in turn considered at monthly meetings of
senior staff, including local principal investigators, the
project director, and intervention component coordina-
tors. Implementation of adaptations was rolled-out to
the broader community after consultation with CWGs
and other local stake holders, including community
representatives from government, health care and com-
merce. CWG meetings were frequently divided into
smaller working groups to discuss the implementation
of proposed adaptations and, were attended by both se-
nior and field staff.
Tanzania
In Tanzania adaptation conceptualization and develop-
ment took place at the field staff and CBOV level. Based
on their day-to-day experience of field activities, meetings
between field staff and CBOVs were held on a regular
basis to exchange ideas on intervention implementation.
Proposed adaptations were then referred to component
coordinators, the local project director, the SAC, and the
local principal investigator. After preliminary approval for
adaptations from the study steering committee, further
approval was sought from local religious leaders and com-
munity groups. Before implementation, all adaptations
were publicized and explained in community meetings.
Vulindlela
Project staff initiated changes to the intervention in Vulin-
dlela. The site used an ongoing data management and
fieldwork ‘feedback loop’ to monitor intervention imple-
mentation and adaptations, and weekly review and plan-
ning meetings between field staff and senior management
were central to ensuring efficiency and effectiveness of
adaptation delivery. Using monitoring and evaluation data,
including utilization and quality assurance measures to
track operational innovation effectiveness was also critical
to the adaptations process. CBOVs also played an import-
ant role at the Vulindlela site, providing (1) a useful source
of ideas for what innovations would or would not work in
this cultural context, and (2) ensuring that adaptations
obtained the necessary support from traditional, political
and community structures.
Soweto
In Soweto, adaptations to the intervention originated pri-
marily with field staff. Cross-component events planning
committees made up of MVCT, CM and PTSS represen-
tatives were established in each intervention community
to develop adaptations before presentation to the project
director. Adaptations project leaders were then identified
by the project director and component coordinators and
were responsible for providing organizational leadership
in the implementation of adaptations. CBOVs were essen-
tial to the implementation of adaptations in Soweto by
generating support from the primary stakeholders, includ-




Adaptations to the structure and schedules of field teams
were required across sites. In Zimbabwe and Vulindlela,
the initial division and rotation of field teams across inter-
vention communities by intervention component (MVCT,
CM and PTSS) was found to be both inefficient in terms
of staff transportation and confusing to participants. In
Zimbabwe, separate CM, MVCT and PTSS teams were
restructured into two combined teams, each of which
included representatives from MVCT, CM and PTSS.
Each team was allocated two intervention communities,
and operated in each community for a two-week period
each month. In Vulindlela, four combined teams were cre-
ated and assigned to individual communities for the re-
mainder of the intervention. Intervention delivery
schedules were also adapted to local conditions. In Zim-
babwe, project staff negotiated with mining employers to
deliver the intervention at workplaces for clients that
would not otherwise have had access to project services
during working hours, and, similarly, with farming
employers during harvest times. In Thailand, it was
observed within the first 6 months of the intervention that
utilization by the 18 to 32 year-old target population was
higher on evenings and weekends, and intervention deliv-
ery was rescheduled for these times. In Vulindlela, a late
afternoon and early evening intervention delivery schedule
was introduced in response to participant feedback and
based on a successful pilot. Weekend service delivery was
also piloted, but abandoned after participants reported a
preference for attending family activities in Vulindlela and
as a result of low demand in Tanzania.
A number of other cross-component adaptations were
also introduced throughout the intervention. In Vulin-
dlela, a performance incentive system, including bonuses
for staff meeting intervention delivery targets was intro-
duced in response to high levels of staff turnover in the
early stages of the intervention. The risk of coercion was
mitigated by the exclusion of field supervisors from this
incentive scheme. Also in Vulindlela, a reluctance by par-
ticipants to evaluate project activities using written forms
meant that these were replaced by feedback discussions
with CBOVs. In Thailand and Zimbabwe, the frequent at-
tendance of intoxicated villagers at intervention activities
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meant that the sites had to develop a system to assess eli-
gibility for participation based on the amount of alcohol
consumed. In Tanzania, owing to the long distances
involved, project equipment was stored in secure village
storage areas, including the houses of village leaders.
Religious adaptations
The support of FBOs can be critical to the acceptance of
HIV interventions in resource-limited settings [16,17].
Sites were encouraged to respond to objections, sugges-
tions or concerns from FBOs about project activities as
they arose, and to adapt the intervention accordingly.
Across sites, interaction with FBOs included project staff
facilitating HIV/AIDS discussions during religious ser-
vices, provision of MVCT on religious center grounds,
and the establishment of FBO-based support groups. In
Zimbabwe, project staff proactively engaged with religious
groups with known histories of discouraging members
from seeking medical services. In those cases where reli-
gious leaders declined all involvement with the interven-
tion, their decision was respected by study staff. In
Thailand, support from local monks was essential to com-
munity acceptance of the intervention in Buddhist com-
munities, and staff were trained in the correct etiquette
and protocol for working with senior religious figures. In
addition, monks in intervention communities were invited
to participate in training sessions on project goals and the
impact of HIV on their communities. As a result of these
efforts, Buddhist temples were made available for project
activities, and a number of monks worked closely with
CBOVs. In Zimbabwe and Thailand, the discussion of reli-
giously-sensitive issues was discouraged during project ac-
tivities held in, or in close proximity to, Catholic churches
(e.g. on church grounds). In Soweto, special sessions for
local Christian church leaders (abafundisi) were intro-
duced to promote awareness of project activities: as a re-
sult, religious leaders both accessed MVCT and disclosed
their HIV status during bafundisi forums. In Tanzania,
intervention activities were divided by gender in Muslim
areas, project activities were not provided in mosques, and
CM messages were adapted to ensure sensitivity to local
Muslim communities, including a suspension of services
during Ramadan when requested.
Epidemiological adaptations
Sites were encouraged to adapt intervention delivery to re-
spond to the local HIV epidemic, and in particular to tar-
get those high-risk populations with low service
utilization. In Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Soweto, high levels
of HIV prevalence amongst younger age groups [18] led to
the introduction of ‘youth-friendly’ activities and curricula,
including intervention presence at soccer tournaments,
where information sessions were provided before and dur-
ing matches; presentations on project activities in school
guidance and counseling classes; inter-school quiz competi-
tions on HIV and project activities; and the development of
support groups for out-of-school youths. In Zimbabwe, the
intervention targeted truck drivers and roadside vendors
(via intervention delivery at halting sites); military
personnel (via information sessions at local barracks); and
couples (via promotions encouraging joint MVCT and
PTSS attendance). In Thailand, where the HIV epidemic is
concentrated in young, high-risk populations [1,19],
CBOVs held workshops with teenage groups to assess
which aspects of the intervention were most attractive to
them. In Soweto, specific population groups were targeted
for mobilization, including traditional healers, Zulu males
living in hostels, and women’s groups.
Social, political & cultural adaptations
Although efforts had been made to include site-specific
social and cultural adaptations during protocol develop-
ment, a range of further and related adaptations were
introduced throughout the intervention through the
identification of popular local practices by field staff.
Across all sites, popular social gathering places
(e.g. pubs and community centers) and their times of
peak operation were identified over time and included
as intervention venues. In Zimbabwe, Tanzania and So-
weto, adaptations were made to health and project ter-
minology based on feedback from participants and in
keeping with local dialects. In Thailand, these included
tribal rituals (e.g. sword dances and costume displays)
performed during project events; field staff hired based
on their knowledge of local languages and customs; the
provision of karaoke facilities to participants during
evening sessions; and special liaison staff hired and
trained to work with refugee groups residing in inter-
vention communities located on the Thailand-Burma
border. In Tanzania, cultural norms meant that women
were discouraged from utilizing project services. As a
result, targeted campaigns at female gathering places
(e.g. water boreholes) to encourage women to access
project services were introduced. Also in Tanzania, the
intervention was re-named as “Project Afiki” (the local
Kiswahili term for “Accept”). In both Thailand and Tan-
zania, small gifts are frequently exchanged in social set-
tings as a form of etiquette. Although the protocol
prohibited the provision of material incentives to attend
project activities, it was agreed that the provision of
small, valueless presents (e.g. key rings) to participants
would be permitted as a cultural concession. In Soweto,
field staff observed that many participants were reluc-
tant to access MVCT services alone and preferred to
participate in groups. As a result, a ‘Bring a Friend’
strategy was introduced.
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Mobile voluntary counseling and testing
Intervention delivery adaptations
Ongoing adaptations to MVCT delivery were required
across sites, and counseling messages were updated to re-
flect both new scientific evidence and local needs through-
out the intervention. Across sites, (1) culturally-tailored
health services messages were introduced into counseling
curricula, including information on local availability and
referrals (except practices); (2) treatment referral messages
were regularly updated to reflect the ongoing expansion of
antiretroviral therapy, and (3) special counseling curricula
for high-risk population groups were delivered in response
to emerging evidence on their role as drivers of the epi-
demic. In Zimbabwe, clients requested, and recieved the
addition of a bereavement-counseling message to assist in
coping with HIV-related deaths.
MVCT adaptations according to ongoing changes in
national health policies were also required across sites.
In Tanzania, project staff coordinated MVCT delivery
with the president’s national testing campaign [20],
which was rolled out for a three-month period midway
through the intervention. In Soweto and Vulindlela, the
minimum age of participation in MVCT was lowered
from 18 to 16 years old, in keeping with the South Afri-
can national HIV testing policy [21].
Environmental and infrastructural adaptations
Across sites, MVCT venues and equipment were adapted
to local environment and infrastructure. In Zimbabwe,
remote villages were frequently inaccessible due to road
and weather conditions, and participants reported walk-
ing distances of up to 7 kilometers to access designated
venues. In response, intervention teams introduced
MVCT to a series of remote ‘satellite venues’ identified
in collaboration with CBOVs. In Thailand, the commu-
nal philosophy of ‘house, temple, school’ was adopted for
MVCT delivery. With the permission of local commu-
nity leaders, Buddhist temples, Christian churches, other
religious centers, private houses, and local health centers
were used as MVCT venues, and river-boats and motor-
bikes were used to transport MVCT staff to more remote
venues. Tables and chairs were provided by the commu-
nal temple (wat), and community members were active
in helping to set up equipment. As a result of this com-
munity assistance, the site did not need to invest in cara-
vans or tents throughout the intervention. In Tanzania,
roadside service provision was introduced along major
transportation routes to increase MVCT utilization. In
Vulindlela, Soweto and Zimbabwe, and with the encour-
agement of teachers, MVCT was provided in local
schools. CM staff later reported increased knowledge
and awareness of project activities from students’ par-
ents. In Vulindlela, the original MVCT caravans were
replaced with larger models in order to meet utilization
demands at peak times, while in Zimbabwe and Tanza-




Community perceptions of PTSS were ambivalent at the
introduction of the intervention and PTSS participation
was often mistakenly associated with HIV infection by
community members. In these cases, community mem-
bers assumed that only HIV-positive individuals would
require PTSS. The resulting initial low uptake of PTSS
drove a range of adaptations to eligibility and participa-
tion criteria to improve both recruitment and commu-
nity perceptions of PTSS. Across sites, initial uptake of
PTSS services was mainly by people who had not yet
been tested for HIV by Project Accept. These individuals
were designated as “guests” within the PTSS system and
were granted limited access to services. This restriction
was abandoned after ‘guest’ participants requested
greater access to PTSS in order to prepare for VCT. As
a result, the role of PTSS evolved into supporting and
advising both VCT participants and those considering
VCT. In Zimbabwe, where PTSS groups were initially
separated between HIV positive and negative individuals,
combined-status groups were introduced, and partici-
pants were invited both to contribute to curriculum de-
velopment and form their own administrative structures.
The structure, content and scheduling of PTSS sessions
were also adapted in response to participant demands.
Across sites, individual psycho-social counseling sessions
were initially only available by advance appointment. As the
intervention progressed, and in response to client demand,
this service was were provided before and after other PTSS
activities, on an ad-hoc basis. In Thailand, (1) CET sessions
were divided by age group to accommodate a wide age
range of participants, each of which had different discussion
preferences, and (2) support group provision was delivered
in collaboration with local government health centers after
staff discovered that these centers were delivering an identi-
cal service. Also in Thailand, due to the low incidence of
HIV in intervention communities, CET sessions were
adapted to provide information to HIV-negative persons on
coping with the potential risk of HIV and helping others to
cope with HIV. In Thailand and Tanzania, the planned 8-
hour sessions for coping effectiveness (CET) and stigma re-
duction activities were found to be too long for participants,
and were reduced to three 3 hour sessions over successive
days. In Tanzania, more flexible scheduling of PTSS was
introduced to respond to community demands.
Various other adaptations were made to PTSS service
delivery throughout the course of the intervention. Across
sites, PTSS information booths were set up adjacent to
MVCT to facilitate recruitment of participants to PTSS.
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In Tanzania, sporting activities, card games and board
games were introduced into PTSS sessions in order to
provide a social forum for HIV discussions. In Zimbabwe,
a trainer-of-trainers course was introduced for PTSS parti-
cipants. In Soweto, PTSS advocates were trained in safe
disclosure procedures, and special PTSS sessions designed
for the education and training of traditional healers on
HIV/AIDS and related issues were introduced. As a result,
a number of traditional healers referred their patients to
MVCT and PTSS. In Vulindlela, PTSS staff provided tele-
phone reminders of session times to new participants.
Environmental and infrastructural adaptations
Across sites, PTSS venues were adapted to the local envir-
onment and infrastructure. In Zimbabwe, Vulindlela and
Soweto, PTSS was redesigned as a mobile service in order
to improve access. Venues included schools, community
halls, and local business centers. In Vulindlela, partici-
pants indicated a preference for accessing PTSS in com-
munities other than those in which they lived, in order to
reduce possible stigma associated with PTSS participation.
As a result, Project Accept offices, which were located
outside intervention communities, were adopted as PTSS
venues. Transport was provided to participants by project
staff, and participants subsequently reported a more enab-
ling and open learning environment. In Zimbabwe, parti-
cipants reported difficulty accessing PTSS referral services
due to transport costs. In response, project staff trans-
ported service providers, including nutritionists, lawyers,
and nurses, to the intervention communities.
Economic adaptations
PTSS adaptations also responded to local economic condi-
tions. In Zimbabwe and Tanzania, poverty, hunger and mal-
nutrition were common issues in intervention communities
and were frequently cited as reasons for non-attendance of
longer sessions. The following adaptations were developed
in response: (1) provision of tea, lunch and nutritious drinks
(mahewu) to participants, (2) income generation and skills
development classes provided before and after PTSS activ-
ities, (3) development of partnerships with local organiza-
tions and government officials to provide farming inputs,
food aid, and legal services to participants, (4) support
groups were provided with horticultural equipment and
training in partnership with local groups, and (5) lay coun-
selors were trained through the Zimbabwe Institute of Sys-
temic Therapy (ZIST-CONNECT). In Thailand and
Tanzania, income-generating equipment, including chicken
coops and crop seeds, were provided to both unemployed
and HIV-positive participants. These adaptations helped
both to mitigate the economic effects of HIV-related stigma




Across all sites, ongoing adaptations to CM messages
were required to mitigate both participant fears of blood
draws and intervention ‘staff stigma’, in which project
staff were suspected of being infected with HIV. In
Vulindlela, the use of pamphlets as an outreach strategy
was found to be ineffectual due to poor literacy and was
replaced by public mobilization talks held in central and
public community areas. In Soweto, CM ‘road shows’,
which involved vehicles and field staff touring through
intervention communities, were developed and included
a combination of door-to-door activities and participa-
tion by prominent local community members; CM
‘street dialogues’, which involved approaching and en-
gaging community members in conversation about the
intervention, combined with the distribution of promo-
tional materials; and skills development workshops, in-
cluding career counseling, were provided to community
members as part of CM activities. In both South African
sites, megaphones and loud hailers were used to deliver
CM messages and announce MVCT and PTSS venues
and activities after staff observed community members
using PA systems to announce community events. In
addition, youth-specific CM activities were introduced in
schools, and project drivers were trained to become
part-time CM staff.
Environmental, political and infrastructural adaptations
CM activities were continually responsive to the local en-
vironment. Across all sites, and in response to commu-
nity feedback, CM activities were gradually relocated
closer to MVCT and PTSS venues, throughout the inter-
vention. In Zimbabwe, (1) CM activities were suspended
during election periods to avoid being mistaken for polit-
ical activism and ensure the safety of staff, participants
and project equipment, and (2) CM staff provided trans-
port and nursing staff wherever possible during disease
outbreaks (e.g. cholera), which was beyond the initial
scope of the protocol. In Soweto, CM campaigns specif-
ically focused their efforts on Zulu hostels, which were
initially opposed to male involvement in HIV testing ac-
tivities, and, in both South African sites, CM staff pro-
moted the intervention as a part of the ‘‘life skills’‘
curriculum in local schools. In Tanzania, CM activities in
remote communities were concentrated in the dry sea-
son, and CM team size was adjusted across communities
in inverse proportion to intervention demand.
Community-based outreach volunteers
Across sites, the role of community-based outreach volun-
teers (CBOVs) evolved in response to intervention needs.
In Vulindlela, unanticipated demands of CM work on field
staff resulted in the increased recruitment and utilization
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of CBOVs. CBOVs were given individual and group tar-
gets for PTSS and MVCT recruitment, and stipends,
transport allowances, and other incentives were provided.
As a result, CBOVs were renamed Community-Based
Outreach Mobilizers in keeping with their enhanced CM
role. Also in Vulindlela, a strong family culture led to the
deliberate recruitment of CBOVs from large families, who
then encouraged their social networks to attend MVCT
and PTSS. In Zimbabwe, initial low levels of involvement
by women prompted the training of increased numbers of
female CBOVs. In Tanzania, CBOVs helped to advise on
the choice of intervention venues, giving them an un-
anticipated role in the intervention delivery process.
Discussion & conclusions
Consistency & flexibility in adaptation development
Both the adaptations process and implementation of the
adaptations themselves were critical to the acceptance,
utilization and sustainability of the Project Accept inter-
vention across study sites. The adaptations process,
which had to balance sensitivity to the local context in
order to improve utilization against consistency in the
core elements of intervention delivery in accordance
with the multi-site study protocol, also needed to ensure
a minimum level of comparability across sites. In this
way, site-specific adaptations processes, while procedur-
ally variable, maintained a common set of features. These
included (1) involvement of field staff in the generation
of adaptations, (2) community acceptance measures, and
(3) the role of the study steering committee, ethical re-
view boards, and intervention sub-committees in their
approval and implementation.
The adaptations developed across sites, while diverse,
also maintained a common set of themes and
approaches. In many cases, the same cross-component,
or component-specific, adaptations would be developed
independently across sites. In other cases, successful
adaptations in one site would quickly be adopted by
other sites. In these ways, a number of common themes
in adaptation types, such as those identified above, were
readily identifiable across sites.
Measuring adaptation impact & estimating effects on
uptake
While our experiences, and associated anecdotal evidence,
provide compelling support for the hypothesis that these
adaptations influenced the impact of the CBVCT interven-
tion through increased MVCT and PTSS utilization, it is,
of course, not possible to establish a purely causal link be-
tween adaptation implementation and such outcomes. A
range of potential confounding factors exist, including, but
by no means limited to, the stage of intervention imple-
mentation, increased community acceptance over time,
and broader environmental changes in knowledge of, and
attitudes towards, testing for HIV in intervention commu-
nities. Nonetheless, is it notable that intervention uptake
in intervention communities was over 10 times higher
than in control communities, in which no adaptations
were permitted, by the end of the intervention [9]. In
addition, service utilization monitoring and evaluation
data, when reviewed on a site-by-site basis, may be
chronologically associated with the implementation of sig-
nificant adaptations, when allowing for appropriate time
lags. For example, at the Vulindlela site, service uptake for
MVCT rose by over 100 per cent (mean uptake for the
first two quarters of 2007 was 142 participants, as com-
pared to 289 participants in the second two quarters, and
increasing further to 369 participants in the first two quar-
ters of 2008), directly after the service provision plan was
adapted from rotating specialized MVCT, PTSS and CM
teams to community-based, integrated, and multi-skilled
teams. Given the temporal proximity of such improve-
ments in utilization with adaptation implementation, it
may be postulated that such adaptations may have had,
across sites, a significant impact on service utilization.
Determining when to challenge societal norms
One of the most challenging aspects of the CBVCT
intervention was determining when to challenge societal
norms in intervention delivery and adaptation. For ex-
ample, as described above, gender issues were circum-
vented through the adapted delivery of female-specific
interventions. On the other hand, religious issues were,
in general, accommodated, rather than challenged, by
adapting the intervention. Decisions around when soci-
etal norms should be challenged, through intervention
adaptations are inherently subjective and environment-
specific [15]. However, as a general principle, adapting
to, rather than challenging, societal norms was found to
be most appropriate in the CBVCT context.
Diplomacy, global health, and foreign policy
The capacity to adapt global health interventions to local
conditions also has considerable significance from the for-
eign policy perspective, in the context of the discipline
now known and recognized as global health diplomacy
[10]. Under this aegis, the inclusion of scope for adaptabil-
ity in intervention design and delivery has the potential to
make significant differences to local perceptions of inter-
national development activities, including the approval
and acceptance of programs and interventions by recipient
countries, communities, and individuals, and, by exten-
sion, the profile and prestige of donor organizations and
countries [22,23]. Over time, such interventions may need
to become more sensitized to these broader roles and re-
sponsibilities, as currently reflected at the policy level by
increased integration between departments of foreign pol-
icy and foreign assistance in donor countries - helping to
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maintain, or even increase, levels of development funding
on a ‘smart power’ basis. Systems of more formallly consid-
ering the value and worth of global health interventions
from a ‘foreign policy’ perspective may be developed, in-
cluding such considerations as community acceptance and
involvement, so that such they can be monitored and evalu-
ated on this basis [24]. The associated capacity of interven-
tions to adapt to local economic, cultural, religious, and
other environmental conditions in recipient countries may
have the potential to make a substantial difference to these
broader ‘collateral’ diplomatic, and foreign policy outcomes
of foreign assistance programs [25].
Recommendations
A number of adaptation-related recommendations for
related future interventions may be gleaned from the Pro-
ject Accept experience. Collaboration with local actors,
not just in service delivery, but at the highest levels of
intervention design and planning, is, of course, a sine qua
non of any enlightened intervention in the 21st century.
Perhaps most importantly, however, the necessity of build-
ing in provisions and scope for adaptations to the study in
advance of intervention implementation, on an ex ante
basis, should be borne in mind both by planners and scien-
tists. This may be achieved, most directly, through the use
of appropriate terminology in both the study protocol and
standard operating procedures documents: in avoiding the
use of excessively dogmatic or didactic language, interven-
tions may be implicitly permitted appropriate levels of
flexibility in intervention delivery, whilst maintaining fidel-
ity to the original study protocol. Similarly, related and fu-
ture studies should, wherever possible, make allowance for
the monitoring and evaluation of changes in service
utilization consequent to adaptation implementation-
though, as described above, this may be difficult to achieve
in the presence of multiple competing factors effecting ser-
vice uptake. Nonetheless, wherever possible, the effect of
adaptation implementation on key study outcomes should
be carefully reviewed, on a site-by-site basis, and with
reference to appropriate lead times, in order to determine
their effectiveness. Finally, as described above, the broader
‘collateral’ gains of such adaptations, such as improvements
in international relations and community acceptance,
should be carefully considered, wherever possible, through
the development and application of appropriate metrics.
Conclusions
Adaptations are particularly important in the design of
HIV-related interventions. Given the oft-contentious na-
ture of such interventions from a social, cultural and reli-
gious perspective [26], it is essential to ensure that,
wherever possible, and from both the service delivery and
the global health diplomacy perspectives, these interven-
tions are designed with the expectations and needs of
recipient communities in mind. In the more specific case
of VCT, for which utilization by most-at-risk populations
is frequently a key issue [27], adaptability to local condi-
tions may help to break down a both behavioral and envir-
onmental barriers to the testing process.
Ultimately, the need for intervention adaptation is
based on challenges that could not have been foreseen
during the design and launch of the intervention. Pre-
parations will never be perfect, so time, money, capacity
and flexibility to produce interventions has to be ‘built-
in’ to the design of both trials, and interventions them-
selves, at all stages of the planning process. Without this
inherent adaptability, program designers and implemen-
ters risk achieving sub-optimal utilization levels. As long
as integrity to the key elements of the intervention
protocol can be maintained, such adaptations can only
enhance the value of the intervention in the eyes of pol-
icymakers, communities and individuals - in both donor
and recipient countries.
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COMMENT ON 
THE GEOPOLITICS OF EBOLA AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY: WHY ANTHROPOLOGY MATTERS 





The combination of an exceptionalised disease, 
fragile health systems and a failure of global 
health leadership and governance constituted a 
perfect storm for the spread of Ebola in West 
Africa. In this heightened sense of emergency, a 
shift in global health securitizationi has occurred, 
which should not go unnoticed or unchallenged. 
Globally mediated epidemics are highly political 
and anthropologists are uniquely placed to 
interrogate the geopolitics of Ebola and global 
health security.  
 
The outbreak of Ebola in three West African 
countries has raised the worldwide profile of this 
zoonotic infectious disease to an unparalleled 
level. No previous Ebola outbreak spread so 
widely; the previous 24 epidemics remained 
within national borders and were never reported 
to have killed more than 300 people (Lancet Ebola 
Resource Centre, 2014). International responses 
to the West African Ebola outbreak have elicited a 
wide range of responses – not all positive, some 
openly critical – and much hyperbole.  
 
Only 3% of World Health Organisation (WHO) non-
support staff have the non-medical skills (e.g. law, 
diplomacy, trade, economics and anthropology) 
required for epidemic preparedness (Gostin & 
Friedman, 2015). Clearly anthropology can 
contribute to understanding outbreaks in terms of 
customs and practices and local responses to 
disease (Hewlett & Amola, 2003; Hewlett & 
Hewlett, 2007). Following a One-Health approach, 
anthropologists have also explored the extent to 
which human-animal-environment interactions 
(Brown & Kelly 2015) and hunting practices (Wolfe 
et al, 2000; Saez et al, 2014) are central to the 
emergence of zoonotic diseases. Indeed because 
of this, anthropology also has a significant role to 
play in reviewing and critiquing the repercussions 
of Ebola on international politics and international 
relations.  
 
The Perfect Storm 
Exceptionalisation of Ebola 
The framing of a disease as exceptional or unique 
from other diseases (and therefore warranting 
exceptional response) has vast, often problematic, 
consequences. As evidenced by AIDS 
exceptionalism, 30 years of targeted interventions 
has been criticised for shifting resources 
disproportionally away from endemic diseases and 
health system strengthening (Smith & Whiteside, 
2010), and for contributing to the problem of 
stigma and self-stigma (Cameron 2006, Kelly 2006) 
in low income contexts. Infectious diseases (widely 
referred to as ‘emerging infectious diseases’), and 
include the inappropriately named haemorrhagic 
viruses, such as Ebola. The haemorrhagic term 
stems from a westernized, media-hyped image 
surrounding the gastro-intestinal heamorrhagic 
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clinical symptoms, sometimes seen towards the 
late stages of the disease. However the more apt 
and recently applied title, Ebola Virus Disease 
(EVD) has not normalized the exceptional image of 
Ebola. Portrayed as an uncontrollable threat, 
particularly to the westernized nations, EVD is 
viewed as one of the greatest threats to global 
security warranting co-ordinated global action 
(Kalra et al, 2014). In 2015 that global action took 
the form of military deployment by donor 
countries in West Africa. 
 
Bass (1998), Bennett & Edelman (1985) Sontag 
(1989) and Wald (2008) have all documented the 
consequences of consistent and stereotypically 
negative narratives of a disease. By fashioning an 
account around a priori assumptions,  
‘history seems clear and undeniable because the 
analytical perspective has made it so […] leaving the 
psychological impression that one is experiencing 
reality-driven objectivity’ (Bennett & Edelman, 
1985:162).  
 
Sontag (1989:141) observed that ‘from class 
fiction to the latest journalism, the standard 
plague story is of inexorability, inescapability’. 
Bass (1998:446) argues that this ‘hegemonic 
residue of imperial 'contamination' remains 
embedded in our culture’. 
 
Thus, along with a ‘disease-knows-no-borders’ 
rhetoric, this move toward securitised response 
strategies has emerged from a concept of 
‘universal consensus’. Granted, the concept of 
universality in terms of collaboration and sharing 
resources to resolve major global challenges is 
hard to challenge. However targeting responses to 
Ebola from the perspective of containment in 
terms of securitization, and placing such response 
strategies at the top of the global health agenda, 
may support  a ‘universal consensus’ that in 
Connell’s (2007) words represents ‘the views of 
the most privileged 600 million assuming the same 
views are experienced by the whole 6000 million 
who are actually in the world’. 
 
Fragile Health Systems: 
The high mortality from Ebola in this instance is in 
part due to inadequate health systems and lack of 
resources (Boozary, Farmer & Jha, 2014)- 
problems that will continue to challenge these 
three West African governments when the 
outbreak is contained. Edelstein, Anglides & 
Heymann, (2015) detail some of the challenges 
that are already being observed - decreased 
vaccination coverage for infectious diseases 
(including measles); a disruption to HIV, TB and 
Malaria programmes, and the loss of more than 
800 health workers from an already depleted 
health workforce. The focus on Ebola at the 
expense of other health programmes has resulted 
in an increase in the rates of other treatable 
diseases including respiratory viruses, diarrhoea, 
Lassa fever, malaria (Lancet Ebola Resource 
Centre, 2014). And this does not begin to explore 
the economic, social, and psychological impact of 
the outbreak which will also have repercussions 
for many years to come.  
 
Failure of Global Health Leadership and 
Governance 
It is clear that global health leadership failed West 
Africa in this instance (Farrar & Piot 2014, Gostin 
& Friedman 2014, 2015, Horton, 2015, Rosling 
2015, Boozary et al 2014). The early response was 
left to national governments of the three most 
affected countries – Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Liberia – which are amongst the world’s lowest 
ranking countries in terms of the Human 
Development Indexii; none had the capacity or 
infrastructure to respond to the worsening crisis.  
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The WHO over the past decade has reduced its 
core budget, and the bulk of its remaining budget 
is project/programme driven, with relatively little 
core budget to respond quickly to situations such 
as Ebola (Rosling 2015).  Despite the 
establishment by the WHO in 2005, of a legally 
binding governing legal framework – the 
International Health Regulations – there is no 
coordinated, funded commitment to countries 
with reduced capacity to comply with the 
regulations (Wilson, Brownstein & Fidler, 2010). 
Global health governance is shown to be an ‘ad 
hoc series of institutions, laws and strategies that 
do not function as a coherent whole’ (Gostin & 
Friedman 2015:1903). In the vacuum created by 
the lack of clear leadership we saw a shift in 
power from the WHO to the UN in the form of a 
UN Mission (UN Mission for Ebola Emergency 
Response – UNMEER) which, as Boozary et al 
(2014) point out, gained more support than any 
resolution since the founding of the United 
Nations in 1946.  
 
Global Health Security 
The West African Ebola outbreak, constituted a 
serious crisis for the people of West Africa, not for 
the world. It was without doubt a humanitarian 
emergency that merited international support and 
assistance. However the securitization and 
militarization that followed should not go 
unnoticed or unchallenged. 
 
While the idea of Global Health ‘security’ has been 
in existence for some time, in recent years this has 
increasingly been shaped by the war on terror 
(Collier et al, 2004). Ingram (2005) explores the 
origin of the structure and dynamics of the 
security discourse, and its shift from the 
paradigmatic case of war. Extending the security 
discourse to other realms he argues, ‘risks mis-
stating the nature of the problem, rendering 
'security' analytically fuzzy, or calling forth 
inappropriate state involvement’ (2005: 524). 
Global health security thus becomes 
extraordinary, or outside the frame of ‘normal 
politics’. The decision to introduce forces (in a civil 
defence capacity) might seem attractive, even 
understandable, advantages include the 
productive and humanitarian employment of 
personnel and equipment otherwise designed for 
destructive purposes and the increased 
integration between international development 
and broader international affairs and relations 
under the ‘smart global health’ (CSIS, n.d.) 
paradigm.  However, the ‘norm of preparedness’ 
(Lakoff, 2008) which shapes, and structures, the 
Emergency Response discourse and strategies has 
ongoing consequences for global health and 
involves ‘the migration of techniques initially 
developed in the military and civil defense to 
other areas of governmental intervention’ 
(2008:422). The concern here is while the key to 
preparedness would undoubtedly be a robust 
health system in each country, that goal is being 
usurped by preparedness for an ‘emergency 
response’. The best possible form of preparedness 
would be a combination of long-term, well 
resourced health systems in-country and strong 
global health governance structure.iii 
 
Of particular concern is the manner in which 
donor countries, such as the United States and 
European Union member states (including the 
Republic of Ireland), dispatched military forces on 
the basis of an ‘emergency response’ – on the 
basis that armed forces are considered to have the 
most well-developed capacity to respond to 
epidemic outbreaks that threaten health security 
in a way that the more lumbering, bureaucratic 
structures of the United Nations and other 
supranational and multilateral organizations could 
never hope to do.   
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This interface between societal, political and 
medical forces is where anthropology should 
situate itself. How have recipient and other 
severely-affected societies been affected by the 
international response? To what extent have 
issues of national sovereignty and independence 
been jeopardized by the occupation of 
international armed forces in West Africa?  How 
are legislative, diplomatic and organizational 
structures developed and maintained – often at 
very short notice – to govern such measures?  
How are local communities affected?  And, 
perhaps most importantly, what precedent does 
this set on an international level?  Could the 
incumbent Russian government, for example, 
employ similar measures – on the basis of national 
security – in response to perceived or actual 
disease outbreaks in the Ukraine? 
 
In the 21st Century, security concerns – including 
specific elements such as global health security – 
tend to trump all other considerations, including 
the diplomatic, the societal, the medical, the 
political and (given the costs of securitization) the 
economic.   Similarly, at the individual, community 
and national population levels, these concerns 
may have eroded other priorities.   The gains are 
manifold; including diversification of military roles, 
greater resource allocation to global health, and 
tangible increases in human security. But what are 
the costs, most particularly at the societal and 
cultural levels?  The imposition of global health 
security measures, including surveillance, the 
employment of health service provision from 
outside the national health system without an 
official mandate, and the associated 
disempowerment of the individual in related 
policy decisions all stand to erode social and 
political empowerment in developing countries.  
In order for future interventions comparable to 
the Ebola response to be successful, the 
employment of anthropological perspectives and 
preparations are therefore essential.   
 
Conclusion 
The combination of disease exceptionalism, fragile 
health systems and a failure of global health 
governance has contributed to a shift in power in 
global health emergency responses, and the 
setting of unfortunate precedents. The overlap 
between military forces and global health 
initiatives is not limited, as one might imagine, to 
global ‘superpowers’.  In conjunction with the 
global response, the Irish Department of Defence 
deployed 4 personnel to the United Kingdom’s 
Ebola treatment centre in Sierra Leone in 2015.  
Although the recent involvement of the Irish Navy 
in the European migrant crisis does not transgress 
international sovereign borders, these efforts 
provide a further compelling example of the 
armed forces’ enhanced role in health and 
humanitarian endeavors – with a specific focus on 
emergency responses – in the 21st Century.   
 
For better or for worse, the precedent has been 
set for the militarization of such interventions.  
The question that both the global health and 
anthropological communities will face is whether 
to embrace or steadfastly oppose these changing 
remits and purviews.  If the former, the 
articulation of a set of standards or guidelines, 
jointly developed by civil society, the military, and 
the global health community, governing the 
boundaries of military involvement in global 
health efforts according to ‘diplomatic’ standards, 
should be articulated. It is not enough for Western 
powers to mobilize responses to resource poor 
settings and withdraw once the crisis is overcome. 
Failure to build up strong health systems will 
inevitably lead to additional crises in the future, 
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i The process of (in this case) supranational and 
international actors transforming subjects into matters of 
‘security’, thus enabling extraordinary means to be used in 
the name of security. 
ii United Nations Human Development Index ranks Sierra 







respectively on a scale of 187 (UNDP, 2013) 
iii One of the few good reviews the US military received in 
this regard was the construction of long-term health clinics 

























 August 2015 WHO reports 27,929 total cases (Suspected, Probable, and 
Confirmed) of this strain of Ebola subtype ZEBV (CDC 2014, Baize et al 2014, Kalra et 
al 2014), with total deaths recorded as 11,283. Guinea and Sierra Leone continue to 
have new cases though the trend is downward. Liberia, has been declared Ebola-free. 
The WHO situation report of 10
th
 June 2015 states 'case incidence has been below 10 
confirmed cases per week for three consecutive weeks, but there remains a significant 
risk of further transmission and an increase in case incidence in the near and medium 
term'. 
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Box 4. The Role of Diverse Actors in Global Health Diplomacy 
• Who is responsible for undertaking or engaging in GHD? 
• How do specific actors (and types of actors) participate in GHD? 
How do they influence GHD individually and collectively? 
• What are the relative roles of state and non-state actors in GHD? 
• What are the relative roles of health and non-health actors in 
GHD? 
• Why do certain actors participate in GHD? What are their interests 
and what goals/interests do they seek to pursue? 
• What determines the power and influence of specific actors 
in GHD? 
• Who holds authority in GHD and from where does this authority i 
derive? How does this change by issue area and over time? ^ 
• Does authority/legitimacy in GHD coincide with responsibility? 
• Which actors are underrepresented in GHD and why? What can 
be done to improve the representativeness, of GHD? 
• How can we assess the quality of GHD in terms of accountability, 
transpai-ency, representativeness, and effectiveness? 
communities that come together in times of crisis but with different 
contexts — for one group, health is the issue, while for the other, 
health is just one of many issues that need to be pursued, and not 
always the central one. 
To better equip those engaged in GHD, in coherence with 
the Network's training objectives; research processes that include 
the participation of GHD actors might yield more relevant informa-
tion, forming a closer loop between research findings and 
practice. 
To learn lessons from diplomacy not related to health. 
To gain a better understanding of the role of the WHO in GHD, relative 
to other processes, both bilateral and multilateral. 
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Box 5. Venues and Forms of Global Health Diplomacy 
How can we assess the quality of GHD in terms of accountability, 
transparency, representativeness, and effectiveness? 
How much GHD takes place? How would it be measured? 
How does GHD actually work or not work? How would this be'' 
assessed? 
Which institutions formally conduct GHD and how effectively do 
they function? |||| 
Are certain venues more effective at conducting GHD than 
others? 
At what different institutional levels does GHD take place? How 
do they function together? 
Can we distinguish between formal and informal GHD? |M 
What are the principles of decision making in GHD? 
What channels and processes of "new diplomacy" could be used^ 
for GHD? 41 
To what extent is GHD facilitated or hindered by netpohtik? How 
might this be changing the nature of GHD? 
What institutional mechanisms are needed to support GHD? 
Is there such a thing as new public diplomacy in global health? 
What is the relationship between new public diplomacy and 
global health? 
i 
Evaluating Global Health Programs from the Diplomatic 
and Foreign Policy Perspectives 
In the increasingly constrained global health funding environment, the 
measurement of implicit and explicit outputs, outcomes, and impacts of 
global health financing has assumed great importance. In keeping with the 
principles of performance-based funding demanded by organizations such 
as the World Bank, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), the US Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), and the Bill and 
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diplomacy, alongside defense — has had strong bipartisan support" in the 
US Congress.'5 
In the United States, closer ahgnment between the activities of the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
Department of State (DOS) has become a central feature of foreign assis-
tance reform under both the current (Obama) and the prior (Bush II) admin-
istration; this was further articulated by President Obama in 2009 as the US 
Global Health Initiative (GHI). The joint DOS and USAID Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) set institutional priorities 
and provided strategic guidance as a framework for efficient allocation of 
foreign assistance resources under the GHI, and this reahgnment was 
intended to be a post-partisan political effort. However, recent pohtical 
obstructionism has precluded full funding of the GHI, and the initiative has 
now been moved to a new Office for Health Diplomacy embedded within 
the DOS."* At this writing, the outcome of the GHI's restructuring is not yet 
clear, though the broader trend of interdepartmental integration remains 
evident in the initiative. As a part of the DOS, it can be expected that health 
will be serving as an important component of US foreign pohcy and smart 
power in the "whole of government" approach going forward. 
In the United Kingdom, the Department for International Development 
(DFID) has been recognized as a key element of modern British foreign 
policy." In fact, it is a cabinet-level entity rather than a department within 
a ministry; while, in the European Union, the Common Foreign and 
Security Pohcy makes exphcit reference to the role of development programs 
such as global health under a smart power framework."^ These structures 
represent a determined effort to link global health programming and 
foreign policy priorities, helping to provide meaningful and effective 
alternatives to hard power interventions, and have been described earlier 
in this volume by Silberschmidt and Zeltner (Chapter 11) with a focus on 
Switzerland. 
Fidler notes that "the imphcations of successful global health programs 
without foreign pohcy considerations are just as dangerous to human dig-
nity as the reverse."''' In all countries, the demands for key personnel with 
appropriate qualifications and experience in both the global health and 
foreign policy spheres are evident. Special, transdisciplinary skills ai-e 
necessary in order align the mutual objectives of the foreign policy and 
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foreign assistance communities in GHD.^ In addition, new infrastructures 
in which to practice these sidlls may be necessary. For example, "poliucal 
analysis liaison units" within multilateral health-related donor organiza-
tions such as the GFATM would complement the development of health 
expertise among foreign policy professionals. Equally important, systems 
of evaluation that "speak a language that people with power really under-
stand,"''* as well as systems of evaluating the success of such integradon 
efforts within donor governments, will be necessary for cohesive foreign 
policy and global health assistance programs. 
Diplomatic evaluation concepts 
How then can the benefits of GHD be more explicidy measured in the 
foreign policy enterprise?'^ A good starting point may be to examine the 
distinction between "diplomatically sensitized" global health program-
matic outcomes and "global-health-sensitized" foreign policy outcomes. 
On one hand, diplomatically sensitized global health programs may incor-
porate foreign policy considerations such as partnership development, 
recipient perceptions and priorities, strategic geographic issues, social 
jusdce and equity, and, of course, effectiveness and efficacy. On the other 
hand, global-health-sensitized foreign policy may influence the realpolitik 
of global affairs, including tradidonal foreign policy issues such as 
balance of power, peacekeeping, geostability, international prestige, eco-
nomic stability, and other strategic objectives (Ref 20 and Chapter 8 of 
this volume). Diplomacy is a tool of foreign policy, and GHD is a special-
ized version of diplomacy now recognized by many established as well as 
emerging economies as cridcally important to their national priorities. 
In the more nuanced realm of humanitarian assistance in conflict and 
post-conflict settings (see Chapter 9), GHD considerations may be even 
more important (if not mission-critical), even if no formal method of quan-
tifying their effectiveness is currently available. Internadonally supported 
humanitarian or military intervendons in settings such as South Sudan, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan may, intendonally or unintentionally, support (or 
undermine) peacekeeping, geopolidcal, and "nation-building" goals-'-- to 
an extent far beyond their stated purview. Perhaps most important in the 
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I 
(d) Rise of the BRICS in Health Diplomacy. Participants will under-
stand the power shifts that have led to the increased dip!:—;::: 
strength of emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and S: u::. 
Africa. South-to-south health diplomacy (including Cuba; ^d 
extractive diplomacy (China) are cases to consider. i 
(e) Policy Consistency in Global Health. Participants will evaluate the 
impact of the Oslo Declaration, the Paris Declaration on Development 
Assistance, Worid Bank pohcies, and other government policies that 
attempt to place health in the forefront of foreign policy. 
(f) Participant-Provided Health Diplomacy Cases. Participants will 
prepare a case study based on their home agency programs and 
agendas. These are then discussed by small learning groups in 
order to establish a pattern of collaboration and group learning. 
Conclusion 
We have provided an overview of the efforts to define the field and tax-
onomy of GHD, a review of some of the key research challenges in this 
growing field, and suggestions as to how training in GHD might be 
approached. Certainly, the evaluafion of GHD outcomes is the most cri::-
cal need on the research agenda; it is important for leaders in both foreigr-
policy and health disciplines, as well as in the agencies responsible for 
these sectors, to have a sense of what works in GHD, who should conduct 
the GHD, and what skills are needed to prepare for GHD practice. Global 
health programs are now part of many, many schools of public health, 
medicine, and political science. However, the integration of training in 
foreign affairs and public health and the coverage of the transdisciplinan. 
skills necessary for negotiating within the dynamic arena of GHD ha\
not yet been included in most curricula of these programs. We ha\ pro-
posed some training scenarios geared more toward executive, profes-
sional, or on-the-job training programs, but the content of these programs 
may well be translated to the formal academic enviromiient or to the 
preparatory training of diplomats as well as global health providers. \Miat 
is clear is that GHD has grown from a notion to a critical need in research 
and training. The success and sustainability of the complex, heavily 
funded, and extremeh important global health assistance programs thai 
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have emerged over the last 20 years depends on the skills and evidence 
that must be incorporated into 21st century health diplomacy. 
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Global Health Diplomacy, “San Francisco Values,”
and HIV/AIDS: From the Local to the Global
Sebastian Kevany, MA, MPH
San Francisco, CA
Abstract
B A C K G R O U N D San Francisco has a distinguished history as a cosmopolitan, progressive, and
international city, including extensive associations with global health. These circumstances have con-
tributed to new, interdisciplinary scholarship in the field of global health diplomacy (GHD). In the present
review, we describe the evolution and history of GHD at the practical and theoretical levels within the
San Francisco medical community, trace related associations between the local and the global, and
propose a range of potential opportunities for further development of this dynamic field.
M E T H O D S We provide a historical overview of the development of the “San Francisco Model” of
collaborative, community-owned HIV/AIDS treatment and care programs as pioneered under the “Ward
86” paradigm of the 1980s. We traced the expansion and evolution of this model to the national level
under the Ryan White Care Act, and internationally via the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. In
parallel, we describe the evolution of global health diplomacy practices, from the local to the global,
including the integration of GHD principles into intervention design to ensure social, political, and
cultural acceptability and sensitivity.
R E S U L T S Global health programs, as informed by lessons learned from the San Francisco Model, are
increasingly aligned with diplomatic principles and practices. This awareness has aided implementation,
allowed policymakers to pursue related and progressive social and humanitarian issues in conjunction
with medical responses, and elevated global health to the realm of “high politics.”
C O N C L U S I O N S In the 21st century, the integration between diplomatic, medical, and global health
practices will continue under “smart global health” and GHD paradigms. These approaches will enhance
intervention cost-effectiveness by addressing and optimizing, in tandem with each other, a wide range
of (health and non-health) foreign policy, diplomatic, security, and economic priorities in a synergistic
mannerdwithout sacrificing health outcomes.
K E Y W O R D S diplomacy, global health, HIV/AIDS, international relations, San Francisco
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. This is an
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S AN F RANC I S CO AND GLOBA L H EA L TH
D I P LOMACY , R E V I S I T E D
San Francisco has a distinguished history as a
cosmopolitan, progressive, and international city,
including associations with the founding of the
United Nations after World War II, the emergence
of several academic and nongovernmental health
and development organizations, and the growth
of international philanthropies based in Silicon
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Valley.1 Over time, this reputation was enhanced
by the peace movement of the 1960s, the
technological innovation of the 1990s, and by the
city’s ongoing social and cultural willingness to
challenge the status quo to advance humanitarian
causes, including human dignity and sexual, social
and racial equality.2 These circumstances have con-
tributed to a new, interdisciplinary scholarship in
the field of global health diplomacy. This nascent
discipline is based on the combination of previously
distinct skills in both global health development
and foreign policy, and was originally described in
San Francisco Medicine by University of California,
San Francisco (UCSF), Professors Thomas
Novotny and Vincanne Adams.3 This review pro-
vides an update on that commentary, describes sub-
sequent achievements in global health diplomacy
(GHD) at both the practical and theoretical levels
within San Francisco and other medical commun-
ities, traces related associations between the local
and the global, and proposes a range of potential
opportunities for further development of this
dynamic field.
San Francisco’s Global Health Environment. San
Francisco’s distinction in both local and global
health research and practice has gained interna-
tional recognition.4 In a city characterized by
diversity, tolerance, and medical excellence, health
researchers and practitioners continuously respond
to a broad range of social, cultural, and political
challenges, at both the individual patient and
broader community levels.5e8 Local public health
programs by necessity target the needs of very
diverse populations; for example, the tailoring of
HIV/AIDS interventions is needed to address a
wide variety of highly vulnerable communities.9
More broadly, this environment has engendered a
palpable and thoughtful approach to international
health program development that is based on
humanist rather than utilitarian considerations10;
San Francisco’s unique milieu requires innovative
and interdisciplinary approaches to both health care
disparities and epidemic diseases such as HIV/
AIDS from all elements of the academic, policy,
and medical spectrum. The Bay Area is con-
sequently often considered “ground zero” for what
is workingdand what is notdin developing sol-
utions for the world’s emerging and ongoing
complex health and social problems.11 With
international initiatives now placing increasingly
high value on the integration of locally inspired
“success stories” at all stages of service delivery,
health professionals have been able to develop
culturally, diplomatically, and politically informed
public health programs that have the capacity to
function at both the local and global levels.
H I S TOR I C A L FOUNDAT I ON S O F
TO L E RANC E , HUMAN I T Y , AND
D I P LOMACY
The historical foundations of San Francisco’s asso-
ciations with both diplomacy and progressive health
and social practices can be dated to the 1849 gold
rush when an influx of multiple ethnicities and
cultures, each with their own health challenges,
converged on the city.12 Such an infusion of
humanity, by necessity, bred a culture of tolerance
and diversity that was further enhanced in the after-
math of World War II. San Francisco, as 1 of only
3 national demobilization centers, was again faced
with an infusion of immigrantsdthis time in the
context of the emerging civil rights movement
and a newly desegregated military.13 During the
1960s, these events demanded the further develop-
ment of a culture of social progress and tolerance
that not only brought about the rise of the “Beat
Generation,” but also, less sensationally, the pursuit
of equity in and access to health care through the
“Free Clinic” movement.14 More recent health
and social advances have focused on epidemic
illnesses and conditions that effect not just
mainstream but also marginalized populations.
Ground-breaking legislation such as the Ryan
White Care Act (RWCA),15,16 pioneered via bipar-
tisan leadership from Senators Ted Kennedy (D-
Mass) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and driven by
a succession of San Francisco mayors including
Dianne Feinstein, Art Agnos, and George Mos-
cone, established political support for HIV/AIDS
prevention and care associated with broader inter-
national relations practices.17 Among other effects,
this meant that no damaging (and politically polar-
izing) debates about the social issues involved
in HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention were
necessary.
TH E “ S AN F RANC I S CO MODE L ”
As a result of such enlightened “post-partisanship,” as
early as 1982, theUSCongress allocated $5million to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for
HIV/AIDS surveillance and $10 million to the
National Institutes of Health for associated
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research.18 In parallel, the County Board of Supervi-
sors established the “San Francisco Model” of
community-based planning and involvement, which
addressed both the health needs of disadvantaged or
disenfranchised populations aswell as their associated
social, cultural, political, and economic challenges.19
Through development of the city’s “Centers of Excel-
lence” in HIV/AIDS, San Francisco’s medical com-
munity was among the first to address many highly
controversial issues related to the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic, including needle exchange programs, metha-
done clinics, social equality for sexual minorities, and
sexually transmitted infection control.20 These prac-
tices thereby informed broader national policies such
as the Americans with Disabilities Act21; broader
structural, social, behavioral, economic, and clinical
issues required the inclusion of and sensitivity toward
specific marginalized populations residing in Bay
Area counties.11 Through innovative systems of
accountability and planning processes, an “unruly
melange”22 of politicians, medical professionals,
racial and sexual minorities, substance users,
migrants, homeless persons, and the incarcerated
joined forces to take “ownership” of the HIV/AIDS
response. Through the power of negotiation and
diplomacy at the local level, these efforts advanced
not just public health, but also social justice.
T RAN S LA T I NG TH E LOCA L TO TH E
G LOBA L
Success in GHD, including the enhancement of
recipient country and community leadership, simi-
larly depends on attentiveness to political exigencies
and cultural contexts in which global health pro-
grams operate. For example, in settings such as
Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Sudan,23e25 appropri-
ately designed and delivered health and develop-
ment assistance advance not only health outcomes,
but also ulterior (and often unanticipated) consider-
ations such as peace-keeping, nation-building,
international relations, and diplomacy in mutually
supportive manner. In this context, institutions
such as UCSF have made unique contributions to
the design and delivery of global health programs
in resource-constrained, conflict, and postconflict
settings through their associations with groups
such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tubercu-
losis and Malaria (GFATM), the President’s Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS), the World Health Organization
(WHO), and other United Nations (UN) agen-
cies.26,27 Such initiatives are built upon San Francis-
co’s unique cultural, social, and human rights
environment, as well as the city’s pluralist health
politics. This work has, in turn, suggested the
need for training of health professionals in the inte-
gration of diplomatic skills as part of the global
health enterprise.28
DEV E LOP I NG G LOBA L H EA L TH
D I P LOMACY P RAC T I C E S
Global health has not had a perfect record of success
in accomplishing diplomatic goalsdand sometimes
even threatens them.29,30 Additionally, there is an
ongoing unmet need for further intellectual dis-
course, research, and evaluation science for health
diplomacy practice.31 Currently, ad hoc GHD that
seeks to leverage foreign policy goals that may be
at odds with the perceived or actual altruistic ideal-
ism associated with public health32 is a “risky part-
nership.”33 For example, recent violence against
polio eradication workers in Pakistan was likely a
result of the purported association of an immuniza-
tion campaign with security activities against mili-
tant political and religious radicals.34 Such
perceived subterfuge within health programs com-
plicates the relationship between global health and
foreign policy.35 However, if ethically conducted,
negotiations involving global health and foreign
policy goals may, in fact, mitigate political and mili-
tary conflict, support the pursuit of transcendent
ideals such as “world peace,” and simultaneously
achieve critical international health objectives.36
Research at UCSF and elsewhere seeks to evaluate
the diplomatic and foreign policy threats, advan-
tages, and broader effects of global health interven-
tions to ensure accountability, local involvement,
cultural and political sensitivity, and cost-
effectiveness through strategic global health pro-
gram design and delivery.37,38
P R I N C I P L E S I N TO P RAC T I C E : P E P F A R ,
OGAC , AND TH E OGHD
The integration of public health principles into real-
politik practice is demonstrated by the recent estab-
lishment of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy
(OGHD) within the US Department of State in
conjunction with the Office of the Global AIDS
Coordinator (OGAC) and PEPFAR.39 Led by
health professionals and diplomats with the rank
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of ambassador, this office seeks to establish global
health partnerships built on principles of collabora-
tion, sustainability, recipient engagement, and
“country ownership,”40 via both an enhanced polit-
ical awareness of global health resources and their
associated diplomatic implications. For example,
the OGHD trains US international political ambas-
sadors, diplomats, and envoys to recognize the
extent and potential influence of global health
resources provided to partner countries, as well as
how such contributions might be leveraged to sup-
port foreign policy goals.41 It is increasingly clear
that these explicit links between global health, polit-
ical stability, and international security are implicitly
intended to help with conflict resolution, trade dis-
putes, and economic development efforts.42 GHD
may support the idea of “smart global health” initia-
tives that involve diverse sectors and political per-
spectives.43 Just as the San Francisco medical
community once used health issues to advance social
and political causes, so too the United States and
other nations may, using appropriate systems of
program design, delivery, and evaluation, leverage
global health programs to pursue myriad ulterior
strategic foreign policy goals.44 Similarly, in much
the same way as San Francisco embraced all ele-
ments of the political spectrum in the battle against
HIV/AIDS, so too was PEPFAR constructed as a
bipartisan initiative under an expanded US global
health agenda.45,46 Both the San Francisco Model
and the OGHD are, therefore, compelling examples
of enlightened self-interest in foreign policy devel-
opment and practice, involving both the “winning
of hearts and minds” and pragmatic policy applica-
tions flavored by altruism.47
TH E “ COUNTRY OWNE R SH I P ”
PARAD I GM
As PEPFAR’s initial “emergency response” model
became unsustainable in the wake of the global
financial crisis,48 combined with concerns that the
vertical structure of the plan threatened to under-
mine and “crowd out” local public health system
functioning,49 innovative strategies to ensure the
continuation of this largest-ever public health pro-
gram were required to transition service delivery
responsibility to the country level. This transition
included a more accountable investment strategy;
the development of health systems and personnel
to ensure recipient absorptive capacity of resources;
and a shift away from vertical interventionism
toward integrated, sustainable, and community-led
responses and strategies. This process required sig-
nificant integration of diplomatic and global health
approaches and paradigms. As was the case in San
Francisco and other severely affected cities after
the initial HIV/AIDS response, PEPFAR contin-
ues to respond to an urgent “unmet need” to bring
all global health stakeholders into the “ownership”
process for intervention design and delivery. In
much the same way as individuals and communities
were empowered and encouraged to advance their
health interests during the 1980s, the post-2009
PEPFAR period must simultaneously reduce
dependence on external implementing partners
and deliver HIV/AIDS treatment and care systems
that can achieve a greater range, scope, and scale of
health outcomes with fewer resources.49 In both
cases, the empowerment of local actors to make
prioritization, funding, and resource allocation
decisions through diplomatic discourse50 is
designed to create a system of local responsiveness
and responsibility that advances both recipient
country health systems and related international
engagements.
B E YOND H I V / A I D S : O TH E R
CONT EMPORARY CONS I D E RA T I ON S
FOR D I P LOMACY I N G LOBA L H EA L TH
Medical, economic, and political concerns are inex-
tricably linked in global health programs.51 An
unprecedented range of actors are currently involved
in attempts to contain and roll back other public
health crises such as the Ebola epidemic and
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB). These
groups include military personnel from the United
States and Europe, the health and development
agencies of both donors and recipient countries,
multinational development banks (eg, the World
Bank and the African Development Bank), and
intergovernmental health organizations (eg, the
WHO and the UN Development Program). Such
complexity of effort presents significant challen-
gesdnot only for health interventions and related
logistical activities, but also for the diplomatic envi-
ronment in which they operate.52,53 Unfortunately,
multilevel global health diplomacy has not, to
date, been given sufficient consideration or attention
before or during national and international
responses, making coordination of global and local
efforts extraordinarily difficult. Issues of sovereignty,
health systems capacity, health manpower shortages,
logistics, and security all require not only an under-
standing of the global health architecture, but also
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of the negotiations and governance processes
involved in order for such responses to succeed.
In these situations, diplomats require a thorough
understanding of related health issues, whereas,
conversely, health professionals need a detailed
appreciation of the complex diplomatic considera-
tions involving both donor and recipient countries.
A post hoc analysis of how diplomacy was (or was
not) employed in the global HIV/AIDS, Ebola,
and MDR-TB crises may help to ensure that, in
future scenarios, the global community will be pre-
pared to enhance its capacity in this regard.54
A DOUB L E - E DG ED SWORD
The complex intertwining of global health with for-
eign policydincluding in the defense, international
security, “hard power,” and broader military policy
contextsddoes, however, also require careful con-
sideration of the moral quandary that such entangle-
ments can lead to. Although such considerations
extend far beyond the scope of the San Francisco
Model, country ownership approaches, and the evo-
lution of PEPFAR, connections with these para-
digms remain relevant. For example, the
aforementioned opposition to militaryeindustrial
efforts that “San Francisco Values” tend to be asso-
ciated with may conceivably have helped to influ-
ence innovative approaches to foreign policy
whereby health and development programs are
framed as feasible (and, more importantly, proven
effective) alternatives to the use of military force.24
Nonetheless, examples such as the principled oppo-
sition of medical practitioners such as Howard Levy
to “hearts and minds” strategies during the Vietnam
era illustrate the discomfort with which many still
view these nascent strategic and altruistic
collaborations.55
Despite these reservations, the ascendancy of
“smart power” (and even smart global health)
approaches suggests that this collision of universes
is not only inevitable, but already well advanced.43
If GHD results in enhanced military contributions
toward public health programs, it becomes morally
more defensible. Yet, conversely, when global
health programs support the military agenda in a
developing country, this rationale may become
less defensible. The advantages of GHD argu-
ments in creating a rationale for transfer of funds
from militaryeindustrial to development initiatives
therefore have to be tempered and reviewed in the
context of supporting those military agendas that
may not necessarily advance the global good. The
recent debate over the use of international armed
forces in response to the West Africa Ebola epi-
demic56 adds yet another layer of complexity of
these issues. Should such efforts be welcomed as
providing a new, humanitarian, and nondestructive
role for the military? Or should reservations around
the possibilities that this strategy opens up for
other international actors to deploy international
armed forces on ostensible health grounds (eg,
Russian military presence in the Ukraine and Syria)
be considered more carefully? The advantages and
disadvantages of GHD efforts in supporting non-
health agendas in recipient countries can only be
controlled and optimized for the good of the global
community by the careful application of existing
“diplomatic” and “foreign policy” criteria by groups
such as the OGHD working in collaboration with
the State Department.57 The evolution of GHD
practice are not limited to the United States, with
corresponding efforts taking place in countries
such as Ireland,58 the United Kingdom,59 and Aus-
tralia,60 although to date, such efforts remain both
nascentdand, occasionally, controversial.
TH E FU TUR E O F G LOBA L H EA L TH
D I P LOMACY : S AN F RANC I S CO AND
B E YOND
Public health, diplomatic, and political professionals
in San Francisco have significantly contributed to
international health and development programs
that extend far beyond their local purview. In so
doing, they have come to better understand the
forces impacting the goals and objectives of global
health programs supported by PEPFAR, the Global
Health Initiative (GHI), OGAC, and the
GFATM, as well as their programs’ associated col-
lateral, indirect, or “non-health” political and diplo-
matic outcomes. HIV/AIDS research in the San
Francisco Bay Area has, thereby, contributed signif-
icantly to public health practice globally.61 These
efforts in turn informed US international efforts
on HIV/AIDS prevention and care in southeast
Asia, China, and eastern Europe.62
The generation of related systems of local
accountability, planning processes, and opportuni-
ties to empower local actors to proactively address
mortality and morbidity resonates of the early expe-
riences and principles of the San Francisco Model.
The innovative scholarship and pedagogy necessary
for the development of such skills is reflected in the
recent formation of the UCSF Institute for Global
Health Delivery and Diplomacy under Ambassador
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Eric Goosby, a former head of the OGHD. UCSF
plans to contribute to this nascent field through
research, political consultation, and educational
activities designed to better prepare health and dip-
lomatic professionals to advance the overall global
health mission, foster sutainability through a shared
global responsibility, enhance and streamline inter-
national discourse and negotiation procedures, and
pursue essential global diplomatic goals.
Promulgation of the “country ownership” para-
digm may also gain added impetus through align-
ment with broader universal health coverage goals.63
Through such initiatives, and in concert
with the work of local policymakers, health care
providers, and advocates in recipient countries,
the Bay Area’s global health community will con-
tribute not only their formidable health and medi-
cal resources to the “global public good,” but also
their values of tolerance, political commitment,
and cultural sensitivity to the practice of global
health diplomacy.
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someone who is often functioning, Second Thoughts style, 
in parallel with the locals themselves, what may remain 
relevant is our reconsideration of the “slash and burn” 
consumerism of high-end yacht charters; of private beaches, 
islands, reefs, and waves designed exclusively for the 
pleasure of affluent patrons.
No longer, then, need surfing be considered a selfish, 
occasionally guilt-ridden, and often exploitative pursuit. 
Similarly, no longer are surfers stripped of responsibilities 
for their human, ethical, and physical environments. No 
longer is surf etiquette confined to a somewhat absurd 
bubble in which rules of engagement, recognition, and 
karma apply only to “equals” floating in the lineup. 
I, for one, could have used such guidance, style, and 
principles long ago. The pragmatic surfing boets from 
Cape Town ironically knew the game far better than the 
idealistic outsider, intuitively understanding what was 
appropriate and what kind of “good will gestures” would 
be misinterpreted as conspicuous largesse or mocked as 
high idealism. In such circumstances, a set of principles— 
a guide, or “soft law”—adapted from global health 
diplomacy principles might help. 
If nothing else, at the most basic level, it is a case 
of bearing in mind one more standard of behavior—of 
respect, and of style—as one travels, explores, and surfs. 
A conscientiousness of the tricky consequences of our 
extreme good fortune. In turn, such recognition stands to 
build support for both global health and surf diplomacy, 
making them an important part of the modern and 
enlightened surfer’s quiver.   ◊ 
Sebastian Kevany has conducted over 100 missions to Africa, 
the Middle East, and South-East Asia, with a focus on conflict 
and post-conflict settings. He is an assistant adjunct professor 
at Trinity College Dublin and an affiliate of the Institute for 
Global Health Delivery and Diplomacy at the University of 
California, San Francisco.
diplomacy” takes a successful and well-developed paradigm 
—wave riding—and attempts to optimize its effects. Is there 
any reason why all surfers should not also play a constructive 
part on the world stage in this regard—a polarization, and 
indeed reversal, of the “Charlie don’t surf” cliché? 
At the individual level, such efforts manifest 
themselves by surfers acting as informal conduits of 
progressive values. Efforts by SurfAid for malaria treatment 
activities in Indonesia, and surfers such as Easkey Britton 
working for human rights in the Middle East, provide 
tangible examples. They also beg the question of how surf, 
international relations, and development can be innovatively 
combined, in much the same way that international soccer, 
for example, may support similar agendas. 
Back in Elands, the only conflicts were of the social, 
cultural, and economic kinds, and the residents had already 
tapped into appropriate responses. I cannot say that I ever 
made the slightest difference to this situation. Yet Elands 
inspired these ideas, and is an appropriate setting for future 
efforts. A local schoolteacher, Mr. Loyiso Mashawa, painted 
a picture for me over a Windhoek one evening in the bar of 
the Hotel Eland: of drug use, HIV/AIDS, and neglect in the 
local township, juxtaposed with the (occasionally extreme) 
wealth of visiting surfers. 
The same evening, the local Draaihoek proprietress 
described surfing efforts for vulnerable children at the 
point, while the nearby Vensterklip Hotel hosted a youth 
dance troupe as we swam and ate in the hotel’s otherwise 
private compound. The traveling surfer, myself included, 
has a lot to learn from such engagement. Both surfing 
and surfers then become part of the positive milieu of 
their destinations, rather than a curiosity or tolerated 
alien presence. 
In the 21st century, a combination of surf and global 
health diplomacy can aspire to address broader issues, 
such as human rights and conflict resolution. And while 
identifying with such ideals is often far from easy for 
modern range and variety of surf travel—ever more opulent 
and expensive options for luxury surf destinations, available 
to the lucky few. But even in the roughest accommodations 
of Elands, it required Herculean efforts for me to block out 
the “Affluenza” of privilege in the water compared with 
the minimalist, survivalism on the land. 
The local surfers I knocked around with, and who 
attempted to address this, included Cape Town stylists 
Matthew Beatty and James Lennard, architect and industrial 
designer respectively. Their reductionist aesthetic sought to 
eradicate the bling, ostentation, and showmanship that is so 
much the marque of the nouveaux riches, and a red flag 
of discontent and animosity. Related lifestyle approaches 
by characters such as Pierre de Villiers and wooden 
surfboard maker Patrick Burnett also deeply impressed me.
Still, it took some time for me to realize quite how 
much I didn’t know. There was no “Eureka Moment,” but 
I eventually reckoned that international surfing, diplomacy, 
and global health initiatives, seemingly separate universes, 
had a surprisingly broad range of commonalities. All are 
pursuits often focused on the poorest countries in the world, 
in which natural resources are abundant, but ill-health, 
conflict, and inequity also pervasive. Surfing takes its 
acolytes to remote parts of the globe. In the same way, global 
health and diplomatic efforts often take place in obscure 
latitudes of the world’s trickiest regions. Might there be 
some way to rationalize these pursuits, I wondered? To 
leverage our good fortune—however feral its style—in 
service of local populations and barefoot diplomacy? 
It is impetuous, naïve, and even dangerous to address 
the complexities of health or diplomacy in a knee-jerk 
fashion. Surfing itself can also be a rickety platform for 
change—no one wants to sit in a hard-earned lineup, 
waiting for a moment that may have been years in the 
making, only to be assailed by such considerations. And 
even then, it is not enough to simply go along for the ride. 
In much the same way one approaches a set wave at Elands 
—an experience that requires acute attention to align 
with the moods and vagaries of the point—awareness and 
balance are demanded to keep pursuits such as diplomacy, 
surf travel, and development in trim.
I have spent much of the past decade in some 
tricky places—from Iraq to Sudan, from South Sudan to 
Afghanistan, from Zimbabwe to Egypt—trying to make sure 
global health efforts are not counterbalanced by unforeseen 
consequences. Any endeavor that does not consider its 
collateral or domino effects can quite easily do more harm 
than good. “Global health diplomacy” joins medical 
altruism with broader concerns of the global community 
such as health, peace keeping, nation building, and 
conflict resolution. This “dual role,” if pursued according 
to the right principles, produces much more than better 
health outcomes. 
In many ways, the same perspectives can be applied 
to global surfing. What has been described as “surf 
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or me the drive from Cape Town to Elands Bay was 
a passage from one world to another. As with any 
crossing, actual or ephemeral, I found that changes 
in the environment required adaptability. It took 
time for me, an Irish surfer and global health student at 
the University of Cape Town—in many ways a fish out of 
water—to process what I was experiencing.
My friends and I made pre-dawn departures under 
the shadow of Table Mountain. By the time we reached 
Yzerfontein, the sun had come up, and the whine of the 
Peugeot 504’s ancient engine would no longer register. 
Subtle indicators of what kind of day it would be revealed 
themselves. The real point of no return into what felt like 
terra incognita came with the turn onto the unpaved, 
heat-shimmering, railway roads, populated only with 
Armageddon machines straight out of a post-apocalyptic 
landscape. Geen Ingang—“No Entry” in Afrikaans—read 
the oft-disregarded sign as we peeled into the desert. 
Escapades from my professional life in global health 
and diplomacy, combined with a natural concern for my 
own skin, caused new ideas to generate first gradually, but 
then with increasing momentum, in this environment. 
Most of my thoughts turned toward development—of 
breaking even with the immense good fortune and stoke of 
the classic Elandsbaai surf mission. But such considerations 
sit uneasily, or at odds with, the culture of surfing.
Many surfers—myself included—get into the water 
to escape from the perils and challenges of the world’s 
inequalities, poverty, conflict, and ill-health, rather than 
to be reminded of them. For me, Elands also represented 
a chance to escape from the hectic, urban flux of Africa 
and engage with a kind of reductionist desert stability.    
A deepening exposure to, and awareness of, the health 
conditions of its local population—in the vulnerable, 
vacuous, dry moments between long and shiny point 
waves—was an uneasy side effect of this escapism. 
Driving down those unmarked roads, surfing desert 
waves, week after week, brought with it unavoidable 
exposure to the way most people in the world live: long 
distances walked on foot, penetrating stares, rough 
shacks, intense heat and dust, subsistence economics. In 
dispassionate World Bank jargon, it was a “resource-poor” 
environment. By radical contrast, I was also faced with the 
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